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*Stages in Language Development and Reading Exposure**

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This study of language acquisition in children between the ages of six and ten investigates their linguistic competence with respect to complex aspects of English syntax. Thirty-six children were tested for knowledge of nine complex syntactic structures. Five of the structures proved to be acquired in sequence, revealing five developmental stages in acquisition of syntax. The nature of specific disparities between adult grammar and child grammar are discussed, and the gradual reduction of these disparities as the children's knowledge of their native language increases is traced. Of particular interest is the regular order of acquisition of structures, accompanied by wide variation in rate of acquisition in different children.

The author then examines the relationship between the children's exposure to the written language and the rate of linguistic development. The relations between linguistic development, a variety of reading measures, IQ, and socioeconomic status are discussed. The results show a strong correlation between a number of the reading exposure measures and language development.

* The work reported on here was performed under Office of Education Grant No. OEG-1-9-090055-0114 (010), Project No. 9-A-055, while the investigator was a Scholar at the Radcliffe Institute. This article was prepared from the final report to the Office of Education. The full report, "Linguistic Development in Children from 6 to 10," is available through the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) Document Reproduction Service (EDRS), as described in a forthcoming issue of *Research in Education*.

This article summarizes a study of linguistic development in elementary school children. We investigated children's knowledge of specific aspects of the syntax of English by testing their comprehension of a number of complex structures. Thirty-six children between the ages of six and ten were in the experiment.

Because the study deals with only a few structures, it does not attempt a general description of children's grammar within the age group. Rather it traces the acquisition of specific structures, revealing interesting aspects of the children's construction of implicit grammatical rules. In addition, the results demonstrate a common order of acquisition of syntactic structures among the different children though there is considerable variation in age of acquisition. This shared order of acquisition of structures defines a developmental sequence of linguistic stages through which all of the children apparently pass. The ages at which different children reach the stages vary, but the sequence of stages appears to be the same for all.

A second aspect of the study investigated the children's exposure to the written language through independent reading and through listening to books read aloud. We examined the relation between rate of linguistic development and exposure to written materials as a source of complex language inputs. Our results show a strong correlation between a number of the reading exposure measures and language development. A description of the reading study is presented in the second half of this paper, along with a discussion of the relations between language development, the reading measures, IQ, and socioeconomic status (SES).

This article is a brief and fairly condensed description of a detailed study of several years duration, and it attempts to present only the highlights of the methods employed and the experimental results.

Framework for the Linguistic Study

The approach and methods of the linguistic study, described in detail in an earlier work,¹ demonstrate the feasibility of dealing with the learning of complex syntactic structures in children beyond age five through psycholinguistic experimentation. This is the period of life when a major portion of the task of language acquisition has already been accomplished. The child of six exhibits

¹C. Chomsky, *The Acquisition of Syntax in Children from 5 to 10* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969).

competence with his* native language that appears to approach adult competence. Discrepancies between his grammar and adult grammar are rarely revealed in spontaneous speech.

Our purpose is to explore areas in which the six-year-old's knowledge of his language falls short of adult knowledge, and to gain information about the course of the acquisition of this knowledge as the child matures. In order to deal with these questions, we must first characterize what we mean by knowing one's language. In effect, we must answer the question, "What is the nature of the information that is acquired by the child?"

Clearly, speakers of a language do not draw from a memorized list of all possible sentences in their language each time they wish to say something. Rather, they can understand and produce sentences they have never before heard. Indeed, a major portion of language usage consists of sentences that have never been spoken or written before, for example, this sentence or the closing sentence of any article in today's *New York Times*.

Given any sequence of words we care to devise, speakers can recognize whether or not the sequence constitutes a sentence in their language. This creative aspect of language use rests on the fact that we have learned the system of rules for making sentences. This system is called the grammar of the language.

Our knowledge of these rules is implicit. We are not taught them, and we would be hard put to state even the smallest fraction of them. Yet they govern our speech.

Because these rules are implicit, they cannot be observed directly. While the linguist is interested in the speaker's *competence* (the underlying system of rules), he has access only to a speaker's *performance* (the way he uses the rules). Thus, various aspects of performance are used to reveal the nature of underlying competence.

What the child learns, then, as he acquires his language is a complex system of rules that enables him to understand and produce the sentences of his language. He internalizes these rules from what he hears by a process of active construction as yet little understood. His earliest utterances, even at the stage when he begins to put two words together to make sentences, are innovative and rule-governed. The evidence shows he is not just repeating fragments of sentences he has heard, but is creating his own sentences according to grammatical rules

* The masculine form of pronoun is used here for convenience; children of both sexes were included in the study. [Ed.]

that he continually constructs and revises. The acquisition of syntax, then, means developing the rule system, restructuring it with increasing maturity as new evidence is added, and eventually producing an internalized grammar which accords with the facts of the language.

How do we employ this framework in studying knowledge of syntax in children between six and ten? The problem is that by age six, a child's grammar, as revealed in his spontaneous speech, does not appreciably differ from adult grammar. In order to identify areas in which child and adult grammar are different, we must actively probe the child's linguistic performance. We can do this by selecting complex grammatical structures—structures that we consider difficult and, therefore, likely to be acquired relatively late. Children's comprehension and interpretation of these complex structures yield evidence of the syntactic rules employed and the way in which these rules diverge from adult grammar. As we gain information about these child/adult discrepancies, we may contribute to existing notions about language complexity.

On the basis of current linguistic work we are able to select a variety of complex structures that appear to be likely candidates for late acquisition. Potential structures would include those "which deviate from a widely established pattern in the language, or whose surface structure is relatively inexplicit with respect to grammatical relationships, or even simply those which the linguist finds particularly difficult to incorporate into a thorough description." . . .² Some candidate structures turn out to be difficult for the children; some do not.

In order to be useful in this study, a structure must also lend itself to testing with young children. We must be able to devise an operational test of comprehension that even six-year-olds can handle. This requirement sharply limits the selection. The structures and tests finally decided upon are the result of much planning and revision, a good bit of pilot testing, and many discards.

Altogether, we tested nine structures with the children. Of these, only the five that turned out to be relevant to an overall developmental sequence will be discussed here. The other four were either too easy (all the children knew them), too hard (known by only one or two of the children), or they elicited scattered responses not relevant to the sequence. Almost twice as many structures were tested as turned out to be relevant to the developmental sequence. Thus, we proceeded by collecting a range of structures, testing them all, and leaving it up to the experimental results to reveal a sequence, if any.

² Chomsky, p. 4.

We did have some theoretical and practical guidelines to aid in selecting structures. For example, the relation between two structures, *promise* and *ask*, is such that a given order of acquisition is implied on theoretical grounds. *Promise* is simpler than *ask* along a particular scale of complexity, and ought therefore to be acquired first. And, in fact, evidence of this predicted order was found in an earlier experiment with *promise* and *ask*.³ These two structures, then, were useful to include because of their strong potential for yielding developmental data. Another construction, *easy to see*, is recognized as a good indicator of grammatical development from the work of several different researchers⁴ although no experimental work has yet suggested a relationship to other constructions in terms of order of acquisition. This construction was included because of its stability as a measure. Use of the measure led to identical conclusions in three separate experiments. Beyond considerations of this sort, there was little to go on. In fact all of the constructions tested with children for the first time here resulted from a fortuitous intersection of complex structures and experimental techniques that could measure them.

Our experimental procedure elicited information from the children by direct interview. By age six, the children are willing to be questioned, play games, carry out tasks, manipulate toys, identify pictures, and engage in conversation. The interview was carried out informally and, for the children, was interesting play.

Our test group ranged in age from five years old, when many of the children gave evidence of not yet knowing the constructions, up to ten years old, when a number of the children exhibited an adult command of the structures. For some structures there was considerable variation in age of acquisition in different children. Of particular interest is that this variation in *age* of acquisition does not seem to affect *order* of acquisition of different structures. For the structures reported here, the evidence is that linguistic development, whether it occurs earlier or later, nevertheless proceeds along similar paths. This has been a basic and repeated finding of longitudinal studies with younger children at earlier stages of language development. It is encouraging that the same principle is demonstrable on the basis of cross-sectional studies with older children at much later stages of linguistic development.

³ Chomsky.

⁴ R. F. Cromer, " 'Children are nice to understand': Surface Structure Clues for the Recovery of a Deep Structure," *British Journal of Psychology*, 61, 1970, pp. 397-408; F. S. Kessel, "The Role of Syntax in Children's Comprehension from Ages Six to Twelve," *Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development*, Ser. no. 139, 35, (September, 1970); C. Chomsky, 1969.

We drew children from an elementary school in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which is predominantly middle-class, but has nevertheless some range in the socioeconomic background of the children. Thirty-six children from kindergarten through fourth grade were selected to ensure a representative sample in terms of age and reading level. The children were interviewed individually at school by the author and an assistant over a period of several months in the fall of 1969, with each interview lasting about a half hour.

The Test Constructions

1. The construction *Easy to See* in the sentence "*The doll is easy to see*"

In this interview we tested the child's ability to determine the grammatical relations which hold among the words in sentences of the form *The doll is easy to see*.

The complexity of this construction derives from the fact that the grammatical relations among its words are not expressed directly in its surface structure. Of the two constructions

- (a) The doll is eager to see.
- (b) The doll is easy to see.

which look alike on the surface, only (a) retains in its surface structure the relations of subject and verb which are implicit in the meaning of the sentence: i.e., not only is *doll* the subject of sentence (a), but it is also the implicit subject of the complement verb *see*. The surface structure of (a) expresses this by normal word order of subject precedes verb. In (b), however, the word order is misleading. *Doll* is actually the implicit *object* of the complement verb *see*, for in (b) it is easy for someone else to see the doll. The implicit subject of *see* is omitted in (b)'s surface structure, and the listener must fill it in for himself as "someone else." The child who has not yet learned to recognize the underlying difference in structure of these two superficially similar sentences will interpret them both according to surface structure, and report that in (b), as well as (a), it is the doll who is doing the seeing. Such a child would interpret (b) incorrectly to mean "It is easy for the doll to see," instead of "It is easy for someone else to see the doll."

The interview was opened by placing a doll, with eyes that close, lying down with eyes closed on a table in front of the child. The child was then asked to say whether the doll was easy to see or hard to see. After responding, he was

asked the question "why?" Then he was asked to make the doll either easy to see or hard to see, depending on his response to the first question.

The child who interprets the sentence correctly will answer that the doll is easy to see and support this interpretation when asked by answering that the doll is right there in front of him. When asked to make the doll hard to see he will hide the doll under the table or cover his own eyes or make a similar meaningful response.

The child who misinterprets the sentence and answers that the doll is hard to see will support this interpretation by indicating that her eyes are closed so she can't see and when asked to make her easy to see will open the doll's eyes.

This construction was fairly easy for the children. Everyone over age 7.1⁵ succeeded with it, and below this age there was mixed success and failure. Five of the children below 7.1 failed, approximately half of this age group. Our sample did not include children young enough for us to observe onset of acquisition. Below we will see that lack of competence in this construction constitutes Stage 1 in our developmental sequence.

2. The construction *Promise* as in

"Bozo promises Donald to stand on the book."

Here we examined the child's knowledge of a particular syntactic structure associated with the world *promise*. His ability to identify the missing subject of a complement verb following *promise* was tested, a task which is relatively complex for the following reasons. Consider the sentences

(a) Bozo promised Donald to stand on the book.

(b) Bozo told Donald to stand on the book.

In these sentences the subject of the verb *stand* is not expressed, but must be filled in by the listener. Although the two sentences are superficially alike, differing only in their main verbs *promise* and *tell*, in (a) it is Bozo who is to stand on the book, and in (b) it is Donald who is to stand on the book. Since this information is not given anywhere in the surface structure of these sentences, the listener must, in order to interpret them differently, draw on his underlying knowledge of the verbs *promise* and *tell* and the structures associated with them.

Sentence (b) is a very common structure in English. The missing subject of a

⁵ 7.1 is used to indicate 7 years, 1 month.

complement verb is almost always the first noun phrase preceding it. If Bozo tells Donald to stand on the book, it is Donald who is to do the standing. This is true for almost all verbs in English that can substitute for *tell* in this sentence, for example, *persuades, urges, expects, wants, orders, hires, likes, etc.* We learn this rule early and we learn it well. *Promise*, however, is an exception. With *promise* the missing subject is not the closest noun phrase, but a noun phrase farther away. This is a rare construction in English found with only a very few verbs. In order to interpret sentence (a) correctly, we must have learned in dealing with *promise* to discard the general rule and to substitute the special rule for *promise*.

Our expectation was that children who have not yet learned this exceptional feature of the verb *promise* will use their well-learned general principle and interpret sentence (a) according to the structure of (b). They will report that in (a) it is Donald who is to stand on the book; Bozo promises Donald that he, Donald, can stand on the book. In a previous experiment carried out by this writer, *this was found* to be the case; some children still misinterpreted the construction up to the age of eight and one-half, and uniform success was achieved only above this age.⁶

To test knowledge of this construction we had the child manipulate two toy figures to illustrate the action of a series of test sentences. The figures used were Bozo the Clown and Donald Duck, and a book was provided for them to stand on.

First it was determined that the child knew the meaning of the word *promise* by asking questions such as: Can you tell me what you would say to your friend if you promise him that you'll call him up this afternoon? What do you mean when you make somebody a promise? What's special about a promise?

Then the child was asked to name the two figures. Practice sentences were given to familiarize the child with the actions and with the "intentional" nature of the test sentences. The child has to illustrate how the stated intention of the sentence is carried out because in "Bozo promises Donald to stand on the book," the child shows who stands on the book. The practice sentences introduce this notion: Bozo wants to do a somersault—Make him do it. Bozo wants Donald to do a somersault—Have him do it. Donald decides to stand on the book—Make him do it.

This was followed by five test sentences of the form "Donald promises Bozo to hop up and down—Make him hop."

⁶ Chomsky.

In general the children easily understood what they were to do, and appeared to enjoy the task. The sentences were repeated freely for those children who required repetitions or who seemed to hesitate.

The children who interpreted the sentences correctly selected the more distant noun phrase as subject of *stand*. For "Bozo promised Donald to stand on the book—Make him do it," they picked up Bozo and placed him on the book. The children who misinterpreted the construction selected the closest noun phrase as subject of *stand*. In response to this same sentence, they picked up Donald and placed him on the book.

We found the children to be highly consistent in their responses. The most common response was to assign the missing subject the same way in all five sentences, whether correct or incorrect, and to do so rapidly and with assurance. Only a very few children varied their responses, and generally these were the ones who hesitated and appeared confused.

Our results indicate that this construction was relatively easy for the children. Criterion for success was four correct out of five. Two thirds of the thirty-six children succeeded with the construction. The failers, with one exception, were all under eight years old, with failure being the rule for the five-year-olds, as likely as success for the six-year-olds, and the exception for the seven-year-olds. Lack of competence in this construction with the verb *promise* distinguishes children in Stage 2 in our developmental sequence from those in Stage 3.

3. The construction *Ask* as in

"The girl asked the boy what to paint."

This interview examined the child's knowledge of a particular syntactic structure associated with the verb *ask*. This construction, or the child's handling of the verb *ask* in general, proves to be a particularly good indicator of syntactic development. The child must identify the missing subject of a verb following *ask* in a complement clause, introduced by a question word such as *when* or *what*, for example, the subject of *paint* in

The girl asked the boy what to paint.

The verb *ask* breaks a general structural rule of English as does *promise*. The nature of the complexity of this construction has been treated at length elsewhere,⁷ and will be reviewed only briefly here.

⁷ Chomsky.

Consider the sentences

(a) The girl asked the boy what to paint.

(b) The girl told the boy what to paint.

The missing subject of *paint* in (a) is *the girl*. The correct paraphrase of (a) is *The girl asked the boy what she should paint*. In (b), as in most other sentences of this form in English, the missing subject is *the boy*, that is *the girl told the boy what he should paint*. Since the weight of evidence in the language as a whole favors the (b) interpretation, children who have not yet learned this exceptional feature of the verb *ask* will interpret sentence (a) according to the structure of (b). They will report that in (a) the girl is asking the boy what he is going to paint. This interpretation persists in some children until age ten or later.

The actual interview consisted of a conversational portion and a picture identification test. In the conversational portion, two children who knew each other well carried out a number of tasks according to instructions. Only one child was being tested, the second child serving as a conversational partner. The two children were seated at a table on which were placed toy food, and figures of Donald Duck, Pluto Pup, and Bozo. We explained to the child that he was going to play some games with the things on the table; he would feed the dog, for example, and so on.

The instructions themselves were then given. *Ask* instructions were interspersed with *tell* instructions, but the opening instruction was always *ask*. The interview proceeded as follows:

Interviewer: Ask Bruce what to feed the dog.

Child: THE HAMBURGER.

Interviewer: Tell Bruce what food to put back in the box.

Child: THE HOT DOG.

etc.

The interview was carried out in an informal conversational manner, with repetitions, extra instructions at the child's point of difficulty, discussion of confusions and inconsistencies, and with special attempts to draw the child's attention to his "errors." Maximum help was given the child to express what he knew.

Errors were of two kinds. Some children told their partner what to do in response to an *ask* instruction, rather than asking him. *The hamburger* above would be a correct response if the instruction had been "Tell Bruce what to feed the dog." Children who respond in this manner have failed to interpret *ask* as requiring

a question response, and respond as if instructed to tell. This response error indicated the least competence with the verb *ask*.

When making the other error, children asked their partner a question, but assigned the wrong missing subject to the key verb, responding to "Ask Bruce what to feed the dog" with "What are you going to feed the dog?" The child who answers in this manner understands that he is to ask a question, but has not yet learned that *ask* signals an exception to his well-learned general rule of English for picking missing subjects. He picks his missing subject incorrectly, according to the general rule, which says to choose your partner rather than yourself. He may ask a variety of questions, all with the subject *you* following *ask*; for example,

What do you want to feed the dog? or

What are you going to feed the dog?

This response indicates greater competence with *ask* than the preceding response, but still reveals lack of knowledge of *ask* as signalling an exceptional structure.⁸

Only one third of the children were able to give the correct response, asking a question and assigning the correct subject to the key verb, responding to "Ask Bruce what to feed the dog," with the question "What should I feed the dog?" This response indicates mastery of the construction, and was the only one accepted as correct for our purposes. Criterion for success was correct response to at least four-fifths of the instructions given.⁹


After the conversational portion of the interview was concluded, the partner left, and the subject was shown two pairs of pictures (Figs. 1 and 2). For Pair 1 he was asked: "Which picture shows the girl asking the boy what to paint?" and "What is she saying to him?"; for Pair 2 he was asked: "Which picture shows the boy asking the girl what shoes to wear?" and "What is he saying to her?" The child was instructed to look at both pictures of a pair before deciding on an answer. In each case, the correct choice is Picture a. For Picture 1a, the girl should be quoted as saying, "What should I paint?" and for Picture 2a, the boy should be quoted as saying, "What shoes should I wear?"

Here again, we find the same two kinds of error as with the conversational


⁸ The children's performance with *ask* in general reveals a number of levels of competence, which the present discussion only touches on. Since the various degrees of competence short of total mastery do not contribute to our developmental sequence, they are referred to only peripherally here.

⁹ The actual number of instructions given varied from child to child because of the informal nature of the interview.

1a. Correct interpretation



1b. Incorrect interpretation



Test Pictures 1a. and 1b.


Test sentence: The girl asks the boy what to paint.

Subject is shown both pictures simultaneously and asked


1. Which picture shows the girl asking the boy what to paint?
2. What is she saying to him?

FIGURE 1

2a. Correct interpretation



2b. Incorrect interpretation



Test Pictures 2a. and 2b.

Test sentence: The boy asks the girl which shoes to wear.

Subject is shown both pictures simultaneously and asked

1. Which picture shows the boy asking the girl which shoes to wear?
2. What is he saying to her?

FIGURE 2

test of *ask*. Some children choose the wrong picture (b), giving a quote in which one child *tells* the other what to do, e.g., "Wear those shoes." This would be a correct response if the cue had been "Which picture shows the girl telling the boy what shoes to wear?" As before, children who respond in this manner have failed to interpret *ask* as requiring a question response. They respond as if instructed to tell. This response indicates the least competence with the verb *ask*.

The second error is to choose the wrong picture, quote the picture child as asking a question, but the wrong question: "What are you going to paint?"; "What shoes are you going to wear?" Again, the child who answers in this manner understands that he is to ask a question, but has not yet learned the exceptional nature of *ask*. He picks his missing subject incorrectly and proceeds to choose a picture and question consistent with his hypothesis. As before, this response indicates greater competence with *ask* than the preceding response, but falls short of total mastery.

In each of the above errors the picture choice and quoted command or question are consistent with each other. Given the way the child interprets the cue sentence, his response is logical and "correct." He is not confused nor is he guessing. This was true also for the conversational test, where the child's actions supported his words in almost all cases. He is operating successfully according to rule; it is just that his rule differs from the standard. This is a common observation in this type of linguistic testing, where children are often confident when operating with well-entrenched, though inappropriate, rules. Indeed, confusion or hesitation, or recognition that a construction is problematic, may signal progress on the child's part, usually indicating that he has begun the process of restructuring his rule system.

An interesting feature of the results is that the picture test for *ask* was easier for some children than the conversational test. Five children succeeded with the pictures and failed the conversational test, and only one child reversed this pattern. Criterion for success with the *ask* construction as a whole was success with both the pictures and the conversation test.¹⁰

An analysis of our results showed that this construction was considerably more difficult for the children than our preceding ones, and exhibited strong vari-

¹⁰ This scoring procedure simplifies the stages of our developmental sequence, and was adopted for this reason. Separating the children who passed only the picture test would add one stage to the sequence, which might be useful for some purposes but seemed superfluous here.

ability in age of acquisition. Only one third of the children, ranging in age from 7.2 years to 10.0, succeeded at both the conversational interview and the picture test. The ages of those who failed ranged from 5.9 to 9.9. No child under 7.2 succeeded. From 7.2 up, we find the children fairly evenly divided among passers and failers. The mean age of the failers was six months under that of the passers, 8.2 as compared to 8.8.

The striking feature of these results is the high variability in age of acquisition of the structure, and the persistence of lack of knowledge right up to the top age in our sample. Clearly after age seven, individual rate of development is a stronger factor than is age in acquisition of the *ask* construction. Below we will see that knowledge of this construction distinguishes Stage 3 from Stage 4 in our developmental sequence.

It is interesting that the ability to assign a missing subject correctly following *ask* appears later in the child than the ability to carry out what appears to be the same task with the verb *promise*. Both verbs require that a general rule of subject assignment be broken and replaced with a rule specific to these two words. If the specific rule is the same for both *ask* and *promise*, why then does the child consistently learn to apply it first with *promise*?

The answer appears to lie in the greater simplicity of the verb *promise* as compared to *ask*. *Promise* is a consistent verb, whereas *ask* evidences inconsistency when used in two different senses as follows. Consider (a) Seymour asked Gloria to leave, (b) Seymour asked Gloria when to leave. In (a) Gloria is to leave; *ask* behaves as the majority of verbs in English. In (b) Seymour is to leave; *ask* behaves according to the special rule. The child must learn conflicting rules for these two structures with *ask*, whereas no such problem exists with *promise*. *Promise* always requires the special rule—there is no structure such as (a) to complicate matters.

4. Constructions following *And* and *Although*

Here we tested the children's ability to identify a missing verb differently in two sentences which differ only in the use of *and* and *although* as clause introducers. Consider the sentences:

(a) Mother scolded Gloria for answering the phone, and I would have done the same.

(b) Mother scolded Gloria for answering the phone, although I would have done the same.

These sentences do not say what I would have done; the listener must fill it in

for himself. There are two candidate verbs preceding *done the same* which might serve as referent: *scolded* and *answered*. Following *and*, the referent is *scolded*; following *although*, the referent is *answered*; in (a) I would have scolded Gloria, and in (b) I would have answered the phone.¹¹

No careful experimental technique was devised for testing these constructions. We simply read the sentences to the children and asked for each one: "What does this sentence say I would have done?" There was some question in our minds about the effectiveness of this direct approach, but it appears to have been adequate in this case. The results show interesting developmental patterns, and they fit in very well with the rest of our data.

The examples mentioned above were used as well as the sentences: "The cowboy scolded the horse for running away, and I would have done the same—What would I have done?" "The cowboy scolded the horse for running away, although I would have done the same—

What would I have done?"

These sentences were usually read several times to the children, particularly the younger children, before they were able to formulate an answer. Those who could read were given the sentences typed on cards to follow as we read aloud.

We determined in an earlier portion of the interview that all of the children could correctly interpret the shorter sentence, "The cowboy scolded the horse for running away—Who ran away?" None of the children had any trouble assigning *horse* as subject of *running away*.

We also determined earlier in the interview session which children were competent in the use of *although* in simpler sentences where no deletions were involved. All but eight of the children performed successfully on an oral sentence-completion task with sentences such as "Although my favorite TV program was on, I..." and "I wore a heavy jacket although..." Those who failed were under seven years of age, and not among the passers of our *and* and *although* test.

This experiment turned out to be more interesting than anticipated. During the planning stage we considered the *although* sentences to be the difficult ones, and had included *and* sentences only for contrast. As it turned out, not only was the *although* construction very difficult for the children (only four children succeeded with it), but the *and* sentence, surprisingly enough, proved to be inter-

¹¹ This interesting and rather unusual aspect of the word *although* was brought to the author's attention by Adrian Akmajian.

esting in its own right. Unexpectedly, twenty-three children failed the *and* sentence. Whereas we had set out to test *although*, *and* itself proved to be a useful test construction as discussed below.

Scoring was as follows. In the *although* sentences the child had to choose the referent of *done the same* from two candidate verbs preceding it in the sentence: *scolded*, the far candidate, and *answering*, the near candidate. The correct choice is the near candidate, *answering*. Scoring, however, requires caution, for some children will choose the near candidate from lack of knowledge. As we have seen in the constructions of *promise* and *ask*, the child tends to always choose the *near* candidate to fill in a deletion when he works from general principles of English. In our test sentence the near candidate (*answering*) is the correct one, the one the child would choose also from specific knowledge of the *although* construction. Since both general principles and specific knowledge of *although* yield the same answer, how can we determine on what basis the child is choosing? Fortunately, our *and* sentence provides the means for distinguishing. It presents what appears to be the same construction differing only in the replacement of *although* by *and*, and requires the *far* candidate, *scolded*, as referent of *done the same*.

By correctly choosing the far candidate (*scolded*) for *and* the child shows that he has learned to discard general principles in dealing with this surface structure. When this child then chooses the near candidate for *although* we can assume that he does so not from general principles but because he recognizes the different function of *although* in the sentence.

And indeed we find a pattern of development which supports this hypothesis. The younger children selected the near candidate for both *and* and *although*; apparently they worked from general principles for both words. As age increases children began to select the far candidate for both words; they have learned the exceptional nature of the surface structure, but not the specific *although* rule. In the most advanced stage, children have also learned the specific *although* rule and distinguish the two cases.

The criterion for success with *although*, then, was choosing the near candidate verb as referent of *done the same*, while at the same time choosing the far candidate verb for *and*. Children were scored correct only if all four test sentences were judged correctly. Only four children, ages 7.6, 8.3, 8.11, and 9.9, achieved this success. Clearly age is a poor predictor of success with this construction, and knowledge of it is strongly dependent on individual rate of development.

The relation between our simple use of *although* in the sentence completion task and its more complex use with verb deleted shows the expected course of development. There are children who know neither construction, children who know both, and many intermediate children who know the simple construction but not the complex one. No children reverse this order, and know the complex construction without knowing the simple one.

In summary, all children seven and older succeeded with *although* in its simple construction. The more complex *although* construction was very difficult for the children and only four succeeded at it. Knowledge of the simple construction precedes knowledge of the complex one.

This *although* construction was the most difficult of the constructions reported here, and we will see below that success at it constitutes the highest stage in our developmental sequence.

Considered separately, the *and* construction yielded interesting results. Above we pointed out that the youngest children dealt with *and* according to general principles of English and selected the near candidate to fill in the missing verb.

The parallel of these *and* results with our results for *ask* is remarkably close. Their main feature is the high variability in age of acquisition of the structure, and the fact that we find children up to the oldest failing. After age seven, age is less of a factor in acquisition of the construction than individual rate of development. We will see below that, with only minor exceptions, the same children succeeded with both *ask* and *and*. Accordingly, joint knowledge of *ask* and *and* serves to distinguish Stage 3 from 4 in our developmental sequence.

Overall Developmental Sequence

By measuring children's competence in dealing with individual grammatical constructions, we gain information about patterns of acquisition characteristic of the different constructions. If we are fortunate this information may shed some light on the nature of the constructions themselves. It is far more interesting, however, to deal with a number of related structures. With a variety of structures, we hope to observe developmental sequences in the acquisition of the different constructions.

Thus, for a set of related constructions, with the verb *ask*, for example, we find that an individual child's successes and failures on test questions always assume the same pattern. Consider for the moment two separate *ask* constructions, the one

TABLE 1
Stages in Acquisition of Ask Constructions

	Task 1	Task 2	Task 3
Stage A			
Stage B	—	—	—
Stage C	+	—	—
Stage D	+	+	—
	+	+	+
+ Success			
— Failure			

discussed earlier and another, simpler one: (a) Ask Harry what time it is; (b) Ask Harry what to feed the dog.

Sentence *a* is simpler than *b* in that there is no missing subject in the clause—all information is given and nothing has to be filled in by the listener. To interpret (a) or (b) correctly, the child must recognize that *ask* signals a question. To interpret (b) correctly, the child must, in addition, select the missing subject correctly. In effect, the child must carry out the following three tasks:

1. Recognize that *ask* signals a question before the simple construction (a);
2. Recognize that *ask* signals a question before the complex construction (b);
3. Assign a correct missing subject in the complex construction (b).

Now when we test children on these two structures, we find the pattern of successes and failures shown in Figure 3.

Task (3) implies (2), which in turn implies (1).¹²

Given this pattern, we conclude that the children attain competence on these tasks in the order listed. The grammatical development is observed to take place in an orderly fashion, from simple to complex, according to an invariant sequence.

¹² Children who can do Task 3 can always do 2 and 1, and children who can do 2 can always do 1. There are no children who break this pattern, who can do 3, for example, and not 2 and 1; or who can do 2 without being able to do 1; or 1 and 3 without 2. On the other hand we do find children who can do 1 but not 2 or 3; and children who can do 1 and 2, but not 3. When our data are of this sort, when the operations can be arranged into a Guttman scale such that 3 presupposes 2 which in turn presupposes 1, then we have information about order of acquisition. Although we have not observed children over time as they progress from 1 to 2 to 3, we can nevertheless conclude that this is the order of acquisition and that we have an invariant developmental sequence.

That we can find such sequences when testing closely related structures is not very surprising. Sometimes, however, we find a stage we did not expect (such as the first two lines of Table 1 above). This is more interesting because we have learned something about how individual syntactic rules are adjusted in children's grammatical systems as their linguistic competence increases and they approach the adult linguistic system. This is the heart of the matter in linguistic work of this sort, for in this way we find out what the rules look like, how they change, what steps the child has to go through, what progress actually looks like step by step, what is hard and what is easy.

It is most interesting of all, of course, when structures that are related to each other only loosely reveal this same orderly developmental sequence. The five structures discussed exhibit this sequential relationship, in the order presented: *easy to see*, *promise*, *ask*, *and*, and *although*.

These structures appear to be quite divergent, and one would not ordinarily group them together as candidates for a developmental sequence, nor predict a specific order of acquisition. Yet our results show that they are acquired in the order listed. The children's performance on these constructions divides them into five stages as shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2
Developmental Stages in Children's Acquisition of Five Test Structures

	<i>easy to see</i>	<i>promise</i>	<i>ask</i>	<i>and</i>	<i>although</i>
STAGE 1: age 5.9-7.1 n=4	—	—	—	—	—
STAGE 2: age 5.9-9.5 n=9	+	—	—	—	—
STAGE 3: age 6.1-9.9 n=12	+	+	—	—	—
STAGE 4: age 7.2-10. n=7	+	+	+	+	—
STAGE 5: age 7.6-9.9 n=4	+	+	+	+	+

+ Success
— Failure

Children who fail all five constructions are at Stage 1; Stage 2 children pass *easy to see* and fail the others; Stage 3 children pass *easy to see* and *promise* and fail the others; Stage 4 children pass all but *although*; Stage 5 children pass all five constructions.

What is interesting in the data is the uniformity of the results. The amount of divergence from this sequence of acquisition is extremely small, the children's individual responses deviating from the observed pattern at the rate of 4 responses per 100.¹³

How do we account for this striking orderliness in the children's acquisition of these seemingly diverse structures? A closer look at the structures themselves reveals that they do have one feature in common. They all require the listener to fill in a missing item in order to understand the sentence. The surface form of these sentences lacks either a noun phrase or a verb phrase which is crucial to its understanding, and the listener must know how to fill it in if he is to understand the sentence correctly. In each case it has to be filled in in a manner at variance with the general tendency of the language, which accounts for the difficulty. More technically, the listener, given only the surface structure of the sentence, must recreate its underlying form. To do this he has to know, among other things, the rules governing deletions from underlying to surface structure. If a child has not yet mastered the rules for these constructions, he will make mistakes in filling in the missing items, and end up with wrong interpretations.

The general rule in English for filling in deletions such as in the above constructions is to choose the nearest preceding candidate item in the sentence. The child has learned this as a general principle of the language very early on. These five constructions, though very different from each other, all require that this principle be abandoned. They require instead the rather unusual principle: don't choose the nearest preceding candidate item in the sentence, keep looking. In a sense the child has to be freed from a deeply entrenched constraint in order to interpret each one of these constructions. He has specifically to learn in each of the above cases that his general principle does not apply. Evidently the relative complexities of these five structures are such that children tend to master them in the order listed, with surprisingly little variation.

Table 3 summarizes our test constructions. It illustrates the five structures, with the correct and incorrect interpretations given. Children who do not know a construction respond with the incorrect interpretation (near candi-

¹³ When the stages are considered as a Guttman scale, the coefficient of reproducibility is .96.



TABLE 3
Correct and Incorrect Interpretations of 5 Test Structures

	<i>to be filled in</i>	<i>near candidate incorrect</i>	<i>other candidate correct</i>
EASY TO SEE	subject of <i>see</i>	doll	somebody else
PROMISE	subject of <i>lie down</i>	Donald	Bozo
ASK	subject of <i>paint</i>	boy	girl
AND	referent of <i>done the same</i>	answered the phone	scolded
ALTHOUGH	referent of <i>done the same</i>	scolded*	answered the phone

* likely candidate by analogy with AND sentence, once learned

STRUCTURES: EASY TO SEE: The doll is easy to see.
PROMISE : Bozo promises Donald to lie down.
ASK : The girl asks the boy what to paint
AND : Mother scolded Gloria for answering the phone, and I would have done the same.
ALTHOUGH : Mother scolded Gloria for answering the phone, although I would have done the same.

date); those who know the construction respond with the "other" candidate.


Several interesting observations may be noted in connection with the sequence of acquisition outlined here.

First, *easy to see*, which was tested along with *promise* and *ask* by the author in an earlier experiment¹⁴ did not precede *promise* in that experiment as it does in this one. The reason for this may be faulty experimental technique in the first experiment, which introduced extraneous cues and made the construction too difficult for the children. The current experiment, with improved technique, may reflect the children's competence more accurately.

Second, *promise* precedes *ask* in this experiment as in the 1969 experiment, confirming the earlier results. Only the final stage in the acquisition of *ask* (Table 1, Stage D) is relevant to this overall developmental sequence.

And finally, *and* and *ask* appear to "come in" together if *ask* is scored from

¹⁴ Chomsky.



both the conversational portion of the interview and the picture test. Apparently the child learns the *and* construction at about the time he masters *ask*; if this result is borne out by future experimentation, it would suggest that the two constructions are of approximately the same degree of complexity.

In summary, the five constructions tested in this study can be ordered in a Guttman scale, indicating a developmental sequence in children's acquisition of these structures. The five structures, though quite diverse, all require that the child apply a specific principle of sentence analysis that is uncommon in English. Apparently, the child's ability to apply this principle progresses in a regular fashion from simple structures to more complex ones.

Reading

A second portion of this study surveyed the children's reading background and current reading activity. We wished to consider the relation of the amount and complexity of what children read to rate of linguistic development, along with other factors such as IQ and SES. To do this we used the five linguistic stages outlined above as the measure of rate of linguistic development and a variety of information on reading and listening.

Reading information was gathered through questionnaires to both children and parents, and through daily records kept at home of all reading (and listening to books read aloud) engaged in by the child over a one-week period. We calculated amount and complexity of independent reading (and listening), background in children's literature, and recall and recognition of books read and heard. In order to judge the extent of the children's reading at different complexity levels, we applied our own formula for measuring syntactic complexity to the books and magazines reported by the children in their week's record of day-to-day reading.

Our records thus contain a variety of measures of each child's reading exposure which together yielded a general picture of some interest. We have information on books read over a week's time, books that the child named in the course of a half-hour interview, parent reports of reading aloud, and so on. By assessing how much and what is read to him, and how much and what he reads on his own, we attempted to characterize each child's independent reading and get a picture of how reading functions in his background and current life. As mentioned above, both the amount read and the complexity of the material were taken into consideration.

Our concern is not so much with the child's level of reading ability as it is with the reading that he actually engages in. That is, the mechanical skill that he has acquired is of interest for our purposes primarily in the way he puts it to use. The written language is potentially of a more complex nature than speech, both in vocabulary and syntax. The child who reads (or listens to) a variety of rich and complex materials benefits from a range of linguistic inputs that is unavailable to the non-literary child. It is this exposure that we wish to examine for its relation to rate of linguistic development.¹⁵

In the following section we present some of our reading results and discuss their relation to linguistic development.

Relations of Reading Measures to Linguistic Stages

One excellent measure used in our reading survey was Huck's *Taking Inventory of Children's Literary Background*.¹⁶ This multiple-choice quiz tests a child's knowledge of the content of sixty widely-read books, poems, and stories from children's literature. Scores on the Huck inventory are positively related to linguistic stage. In other words, the higher the Huck score is, the higher, in general is the child's linguistic stage in our data.

This can be seen from Table 4, line 1. Each of the Huck scores is the *average* for all children in the stage listed at the head of the column in Table 4.¹⁷

Other reading measures, developed by the author, also show a positive relation with linguistic stage. Like the Huck score, they appear as within-stage averages in Table 4. The data from which these measures were derived came from three sources:

1. *Master Book List*. This list contained the titles of some 400 children's books and was left in the home for the child and parent to complete jointly by checking off the titles of books with which the child was familiar. The number of books checked off that were at the top level of syntactic complexity was one positive measure and is presented in Table 4, line 6. The *total* number of books

¹⁵ From the point of view of exposure to the written language, it may matter little whether the child has the book read to him, as would be the case with the younger children in our study, or reads it himself, as do the older children. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that in both situations the contents, style, and language usage of the book are made available to the child with little difference in effectiveness.

¹⁶ Charlotte S. Huck, *Taking Inventory of Children's Literary Background* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman, 1966).

¹⁷ For example, 23 is the average Huck score for all children in Stage 1. The notation "n = 4" at the foot of the first column, tells you that four children are at Stage 1.

TABLE 4

Average Scores at Each Linguistic Stage on a Variety of Reading and Other Measures

	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	Stage 5
<i>Measures good at all stages</i>					
1. Huck Inventory of Literary Background	23	31	38	39	43
2. Numerical scores from Child Interview	37	50	55	56	59
3. Numerical scores from Parent Interview	45	55	58	61	64
4. Weighted total books named—Parent Interview	21	30	42	47	49
5. Average level books named—Parent Interview	1.4	2.1	2.4	2.9	3.0
6. Master Book List—top level count	2.3	3.9	4.9	5.0	6.3
7. IQ (WPPSI, WISC) full scale	105	118	123	129	138
8. IQ—verbal	105	119	122	129	141
9. IQ—performance	104	114	120	123	129
	n = 4	n = 9	n = 13	n = 6	n = 4

checked off on the Master Book List was also a good measure, though not quite as good as the top level count.

2. *Parent Interview.* One of the child's parents—in all but one case, the mother—was interviewed at home. Questions in the interview centered around the child's reading habits, library trips, reading aloud to the child, favorite books, time spent in independent reading, etc. Special attention was given to eliciting from the parent as many titles as possible of books and magazines that the child had encountered over the years.

Three measures from this interview were found to relate positively to linguistic stage as shown in Table 4: a) average complexity level of books named by the parent (line 5); b) the total number of books named, weighted by complexity levels of the individual books (the raw total was not a distinguishing measure) (line 4); and c) the total numerical score from the interview, calculated from questions with numerical answers such as time spent reading to the child during the early years, the amount of time the child spends reading now, frequency of public library visits, average number of books borrowed from the library each visit, and so on (line 3).

3. *Child Interview.* An interview was held with each child at school. Roughly the same information was sought as in the parent interview. The measure which correlated positively with linguistic stage from this interview was, as in

the parent interview, numerical score. This score reflected the child's answers to questions concerning library trips (What books do you have out this week? How many of the books that you take out do you generally read?), favorite books and authors, books reread many times, time spent reading daily or weekly, TV watching (credit given inversely to amount of time spent watching TV), number of people at home who read to you, now or formerly, and so on. This numerical score measure for the child interview appears in Table 4 (line 2).

In addition to demonstrating a positive relation with linguistic stages displayed in Table 4, the five reading measures all relate positively to the Huck score. Four of the correlations were significant beyond the .001 level: Master Book List top level book count, average complexity level and weighted total of books from the parent interview, and the numerical score from the child interview. The Pearson product-moment correlations were .564, .577, .392, and .631 respectively. The numerical score from the parent interview was also positively correlated with the Huck score ($r = .462$, $p = .003$). With a sample of only thirty-six, these correlations indicate a high degree of association.

Given the positive relation of these five measures with linguistic stages in Table 4 (evidenced also by positive Kendall rank order correlations significant at least at the .013 level)¹⁸ and the positive and significant Pearson correlations of these five measures with the Huck score, we conclude that the relation between reading exposure and linguistic stage is not due to a peculiarity of one of the reading measures. To assume otherwise, since the measures are largely non-overlapping, would lead us to claim that each measure has some unique peculiarity that causes it to produce a positive relation with linguistic stage that in fact has little or nothing to do with the child's reading exposure. Experience tells us that concentrating on six such unique measures is unlikely. Therefore, we conclude that a valid relation between reading exposure and linguistic stages exists.

It is worth noting that the Huck Inventory, a direct and easily obtainable measure, apparently functions as an excellent single measure of reading exposure to which linguistic stages are related. We may speculate that the Inventory

¹⁸ Kendall rank-order correlations for these measures are:

Master Book List—top level count	.328	(.002)
Average Level books named—parent	.409	(.001)
Weighted total books named—parent	.274	(.009)
Numerical score—parent	.258	(.013)
Numerical score—child	.327	(.002)

refines the notion of exposure to written materials by incorporating not just the amount read but internalization and retention of the material as well.

Relationship of Other Measures to Linguistic Stages

One other measure, IQ, is positively related to linguistic development across all stages.

The Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence (WPPSI) test was given to the six children in the study who were under 6.2 years of age at testing time. The remaining thirty children (ages 6.5 and over) were given the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) test. IQ's ranged from 98 to 142 and the average scores within each linguistic stage are presented in Table 4, lines 7-9. Not only do the full scale IQ scores increase with linguistic stage but so do the verbal and performance subtests of the test.

The Kendall rank order correlations of linguistic stage with IQ, with each of the IQ subtests, with age, and with grade were all significant at the .001 level while the Pearson correlation of linguistic stage with the Census Bureau measure of SES, whose range is 01-99, was significant at the .02 level.

It is not surprising that SES was highly correlated with IQ but not with age or grade. However, the correlations of SES with reading vocabulary and with reading comprehension grade level scores from standardized tests were also non-significant while the correlation of SES with IQ was significant at the .001 level. Moreover, the Pearson correlations of SES with all measures of books from the parent interview, child interview and Master Book List were significant at the .001 level.

What inferences can be drawn from this correlational information? First, if our five stages reflect an underlying developmental sequence, we would expect variables like age, grade, reading grade level scores, and IQ to be positively and significantly correlated with linguistic stage. They are.

Second, it is reasonable to speculate that the various IQ and reading exposure measures are not mere substitutes for the age measure; the exposure measures play an independent role in influencing linguistic stage. This follows because the IQ score and its components are age corrected¹⁰ and are therefore uncorrelated with age. Also, the sample was stratified by age (young, medium, old)

$$^{10} \text{ IQ} = \frac{\text{Mental Age}}{\text{Chronological Age}} \times 100$$

and by reading grade level score (low, medium, high). This stratification would lead at most to a negligible correlation between age and reading grade level score.

Third, given the pattern of significant and nonsignificant correlation of SES with various measures, *if* SES acts upon linguistic stage placement through any of the measures included in this study it is through general ability or the reading environment of the child. Statistical techniques for studying this question exist, but a new and larger sample should be drawn.

Relationship of Listening Measures to Linguistic Stages

A calculation was made of the amount of time spent reading aloud to the children and the complexity of the books read to them at home during a one-week period. As might be expected, listening to books read aloud decreases sharply after first grade as the children's own reading begins to replace their listening. Even in the first grade independent reading is beginning to predominate for the more able readers.

Among the pre-readers, listening to books read aloud is positively related to linguistic stage. As the next section will show, those pre-readers in higher linguistic stages are read to by more people and hear more books per week, at higher complexity levels than children at lower linguistic stages.

In summary, the measures which discriminate the whole linguistic range of stages include IQ, memory of content of books read (Huck), book counts weighted by complexity level, and questionnaire replies. In addition, certain measures work well at lower linguistic stages, and others at higher linguistic stages. Several of the book counts (number of books recalled and recognized) appear to discriminate best at the lower linguistic stages, and word counts (number of words read during the recorded week) discriminate best at the higher stages. Reading complex materials quite strikingly characterizes the top linguistic stage.

Mini-Comparisons: Uniform Age and IQ, Different Linguistic Stages

A natural question, given the type of data collected here is: What factors differentiate children in different linguistic stages, who are of roughly the same age and IQ? If we control for age and IQ, do any of the various measures that we used serve to distinguish children in lower linguistic stages from those in higher stages?

The small number of children tested precludes a statistical answer to this question. At most we can compare individual children who meet the requirement of same age and IQ and different linguistic stage. The results are not uninteresting, however. We were able to select three such sets of children, one from among the youngest in the sample, one from the mid-age group, and one from the oldest. In each group there were three children of comparable age and IQ, who were nevertheless at different linguistic stages.

Such a procedure of "mini-comparisons" clearly has its limitations, but we are able in each age group to note a number of factors that vary as does linguistic stage. The overall picture shows that at each age, reading or hearing books read is a strong factor, with many different individual measures of reading exposure contributing to this trend. Interestingly enough, SES appears as a factor most strongly in the youngest group (5.9-6.1), where many of the reading measures vary directly with SES. It is hardly news that higher SES parents read to their young children more; what is interesting is that SES is less of a differentiating factor among the older children. In the middle and oldest group, the children share a relatively high SES. For these children (particularly the oldest group where SES varies least), it is their own activity, not SES differences, that varies with linguistic stage. This suggests the following speculation, which might be interesting to test further: given a high SES, once a child can read, he's on his own. His linguistic progress at this age may well turn out to reflect what he does with his time.

The tables which follow (Mini-comparisons 1, 2, 3) present the individual differentiating measures in each mini-comparison. Only the significant measures are included at each age, although all questions were asked of all children.

Notice that three items appear in all three age groups: the number of books named by the child in the course of his interview (child and parent in the youngest group), the average number of books taken out on regular visits to the public library, and, interestingly, the number of books that the mother cited from her own childhood that she has enjoyed reading to the child. This third item, though somewhat of a surprise at first, makes sense once its implications are considered. The mother who recalls certain books with pleasure from her own childhood may well transmit this enjoyment to her child very early on when she reads to him. We may speculate that this child learns to assign a special role to reading, for what his mother enjoys doing with him, he quite naturally comes to enjoy and recognize as a valued activity.

TABLE 5
Mini-comparison 1 Measures that Vary as Linguistic Stage in Three Young Children of Uniform Age and IQ

	Ling. stage 1	Ling. stage 2	Ling. stage 3
age of child	5.9	5.9	6.1
grade in school	K	K	K
IQ (WISC)	118	120	118
SES (Census Bureau scale 01-99)	63	89	93
fathers' occupation score (Census Bureau scale 01-99)	80	80	99
father's years of education	12	16	20
WISC comprehension subtest	13	14	18
books named on parent and child questionnaires, weighted total	14	40	111
books named on parent and child questionnaires, average level	1	1	3
reading to child in experimental week, total number words read	0	6,700	17,500
reading to child in experimental week, number words read multiplied by complexity factor	0	17,700	62,500
Reported on parent questionnaire:	12	40	62
books named by parent, weighted total	27	37	60
numerical score on parent's questionnaire	1	2	2
number of people at home who read to child	1/2	1/2	>2
amount of time child is read to per week at home	hr.	hr.	hrs.
average level of books cited by parent	1	1	2
as reread to child many times	no	no	yes
does child visit public library?	—	—	3
average number public library books taken out each visit	0	0	1
subscriptions to children's magazines	0	0	1
years nursery school attendance	0	2	1
number books from mother's own childhood cited as read to child	0	2	1

Conclusions

What status can we ascribe to the five linguistic stages observable in our data on the basis of the constructions tested? Given the small sample size and the fact that most of these relationships were observed for the first time here, they clearly should be considered as only suggestive. Further testing with larger

TABLE 6

Mini-comparison 2 Measures that Vary as Linguistic Stage in Three Mid-age Children of Uniform Age and IQ

	Ling. stage 2	Ling. stage 4	Ling. stage 5
age of child	7.10	8.6	8.3
grade in school	2	3	2
Reading grade score (school record)	voc: 5.2 compr: 5.1	voc: 7.1 compr: 7.0	voc: 4.8 compr: 5.1
IQ (WISC)	138	136	136
SES (Census Bureau scale 01-99)	81	93	91
father's occupation score (Census Bureau Scale 01-99)	68	94	92
child's reading in experimental week, total number words read	22,100	114,400	322,000
child's reading in experimental week, number words read multiplied by complexity factor	46,700	626,600	2,826,300
Reported on child's questionnaire:			
books named by child, weighted total	23	25	40
average number public library books taken out each visit	1	2	3
recent books read, number named	1	1	5
average level of books cited as recently read	2	2	5
average time TV watched per day	> 1 hr.	1 hr.	< 1/2 hr.
Reported on parent questionnaire			
reads long books to child (now or formerly), continued from day to day	no	yes	yes
average level of long books named	—	3	4
rereads favorite books many times to child (now or formerly)	no	yes	yes
average level favorite books reread	—	3	4
frequency of child's visits to public library	irreg.	biweekly	> weekly
average number public library books taken out each visit	1	2	4
years nursery school attendance	1	2	2
number books from mother's own childhood cited as read to child	0	2	7

TABLE 7

Mini-comparison 3 Measures that Vary as Linguistic Stage in Three Older Children of Uniform Age and IQ

	Ling. stage 3	Ling. stage 4	Ling. stage 5
age of child			
grade in school	9.4	10.0	9.9
reading grade score (school record)	4	4	4
	voc: 6.8	voc: 6.7	voc: 5.6
	compr: 6.6	compr: 6.5	compr: 6.3
IQ (WISC)	135	129	136
SES (Census Bureau scale 01-99)	93	96	96
father's occupation score (Census Bureau scale 01-99)	88	96	96
father's years education	16	16	20
Reported on child's questionnaire:			
books named by child, total number	6	10	14
books named by child, weighted total	14	32	39
numerical score on child's questionnaire	50	56	69
average number public library books taken out each visit	—	—	6
number library books out now	0	0	4
number favorite books named	1	2	3
are you in the middle of a book now?	no	yes	yes
child named last book read	no	yes	yes
level of last book read	—	2	3
do you ever read when you get home from school?	no	no	yes
average time spent reading	twice/ wk.	daily	daily
average number books read per week	—	< 1/2 hr.	> 1/2 hr.
Reported on parent questionnaire:		2	3
average time child was read to when small			
average time child spends reading now	1 hr./ wk.	daily	daily
number books named by parent as read recently by child	1 hr./ wk.	> 15 min.	> 15 min.
average level of books recently read by child	1	15 min./ day	> 15 min./ day
number books from mother's own childhood cited as read to child	2	1	7
	2	2	3
	2	2	3

groups of children, or at least replication with small groups, would be necessary if one wished to substantiate the order of emergence of the structures. My guess is that the distinction between Stages 3 and 4 would hold up under additional testing, since it has a good theoretical base and was observed here for the second time. The other stages may or may not be borne out by future experimentation. This has been only a first trial, in no sense definitive. It is important to stress that the interest of results such as these lies not so much in the particular structures dealt with as in the confirmation of the continuing and orderly course of language acquisition among older children. The structures are more interesting as means to this end than in themselves.

In this vein I would like to caution against considering these constructions relevant for practical purposes such as diagnostic procedures or for teaching to children. In interpreting results such as these it is important to recognize that the choice of structures is highly arbitrary as far as children are concerned. The selection reflects more the state of knowledge in the field of linguistics than the field of language acquisition, for knowledge of child grammar is as yet far too rudimentary to guide such a choice. Further, our particular experimental requirements impose certain constraints. Thus our findings with regard to complexity of structure should not be interpreted to mean that because a child of eight does not know a particular construction, therefore we should attempt to teach it to him. All in all, our constructions may have little to do with what is important in children's knowledge and may tell virtually nothing about gaps that might be worth trying to fill in terms of enhancing development. Very likely they do reflect the extent of children's knowledge, but attempting to introduce these arbitrary structures artificially cannot be expected to have much effect on the total range of that knowledge.

What then are the practical implications of work of this sort, and what potential educational significance does it have? It seems to me that its relevance may lie in the continuing language acquisition that it reveals in school age children, and in the connections noted between this language development and reading. These results may have implications with regard to language programs in the elementary schools, and the philosophy underlying curriculum design and selection of materials.

We know very little about the actual processes by which children learn language, but there has been an increasing awareness over the past few years of just how much the child brings to the task by way of his own internal organization and innate human characteristics. He certainly is not "taught" language

in any formal sense, but acquires it naturally, so to speak, in the course of maturing and developing in an environment where he is adequately exposed to it. Interestingly enough, we now see that this natural process of acquisition continues actively into the early school years, and perhaps beyond. The variety of linguistic material that the child is still learning on his own during the elementary school years must certainly be extensive, if our few, rather arbitrarily chosen examples (arbitrary from the point of view of language acquisition) uncovered this continuing acquisition so readily.

What results of this sort indicate is that the child enters the classroom equipped to learn language and able to do so by methods of his own. This suggests that perhaps the best thing that we might do for him in terms of encouraging this learning would be to make more of it possible, by exposing him to a rich variety of language inputs in interesting, stimulating situations. The question is how.

Our reading results indicate that exposure to the more complex language available from reading does seem to go hand in hand with increased knowledge of the language. This would imply that perhaps wider reading should find a place in the curriculum. The child could be read to, stimulated to read on his own, not restricted to material deemed "at his level" but permitted access to books well "above his level" to get out of them whatever he may. Perhaps he should be encouraged to skim when he reads, to skip uninteresting portions and get to the "good parts" instead of concentrating at length on controlled texts. In general it may be that the effort should be towards providing more and richer language exposure, rather than limiting the child with restrictive and carefully programmed materials. In this way the child would be permitted to derive what is accessible to him from a wide range of inputs, and put it to use in his own way. This approach would seem to be more closely in accord with the nature of language acquisition as we are coming to understand it.

These remarks are, of course, speculative. Their purpose is to emphasize that the potential relevance of work of this sort to language curricula will lie in its suggestiveness for effective use of classroom time, rather than in its relation to the specifics of grammar teaching.

*Organizing the 'Meritocracy': A History of the College Entrance Examination Board**

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As higher education has opened to more and more students, the standardized tests of the College Entrance Examination Board, which regulate access to it, have attracted considerable attention. And for good reason: in the past two decades, job opportunities in the white collar and professional worlds have expanded much more rapidly than the number of blue collar positions.¹ Because higher education is taken as prerequisite to the white collar and professional ranks, more young people have focused their ambitions on college entrance. College entrance exams arouse deeply felt anxieties, for it is important not only to go to college but to the "college of your choice." Higher education has differentiated as it has expanded, and colleges are distinguished from one another not only in curricular offerings but, perhaps more important, in status. Status is closely connected to how high a college's standards for admissions are, how "selective" a college is. The more selective private colleges, along with a few

* For their helpful criticism of earlier versions of this article I would like to thank Daniel Bell, Marvin Lazerson, Robert Manoff, and David Riesman.

¹ Between 1950 and 1970 the number of white-collar workers increased from 22.4 million to 38.0 million while the number of blue-collar workers grew from 23.3 million to 26.5 million. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. *The American Almanac* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1972), Table No. 347, p. 222.

prestigious state universities, have the most active pipelines to graduate and professional schools, business, and government. For some students, a high score on the "College Boards" may open opportunities they had only dreamed of; for others, a low score may close doors they had counted on walking through.

It is no wonder, then, that of the various agencies that shape educational policy, none is more familiar, frightening, and imposing to many high school students, their teachers, counselors, and parents, than the College Entrance Examination Board. Yet the College Board has neither the legal power of government agencies, the self-regulating authority of accreditation associations, nor the financial influence of foundations. Its widespread impact stems from its ability to respond to or anticipate the wishes of the colleges it serves. These wishes have had more to do with the desires of established Eastern colleges to standardize education than to improve it, more to do with their interest in attracting to their own campuses the most able students than in providing equal opportunity generally, more to do, in the shorthand that titles this essay, with organizing a "meritocracy" than with anything else.

This essay traces the history of the College Board, seeking explanations for what it has become and, as well, clues to what it and American education generally might have been. History often seems, to its participants, an open fabric, and this is a view which, even once removed, I share. Identifying general developments or trends in history is not a matter of denying the participants in history real and important choices, but of trying to understand what range of conceivable and practicable choices was available to them—and why.

When the College Board was organized in 1900, economic expansion and the development of better transportation, communication, and organization had begun to weld relatively isolated communities into a single society.² This process did not easily nor entirely overcome local and regional loyalties and structures. Leaders seeking national markets and national audiences concerned themselves with the standardization of technology, social organization, and culture in order to establish the minimal bases for communities to reach one another. For instance, railroads that had developed locally or regionally reset tracks according to a standard gauge in the 1880's to become part of a national rail system. Similarly, schools and colleges, even in the same region, had developed their own programs with little regard for the policies of related institutions; in line with the general

² For a general discussion of this transformation see Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877-1920* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967).

development of nationalization, educators tried to standardize secondary school curricula and college entrance requirements.

The College Board was founded to bring order to the chaos of college entrance requirements in the Eastern states. Its creators hoped it would replace the idiosyncratic examinations of its original clientele—established Eastern colleges—with a single set of examinations of its own. Standardization was its aim and early in its history the Carnegie Foundation praised it as “the most effective agency working toward uniformity in administration of entrance requirements.”³ Yet what was praiseworthy to some was execrable to others: secondary school teachers and principals complained that college entrance examinations forced their curricula into a single, conventional mold. If the College Board served the better articulation of schools and colleges, it also strained against an educational system built on local autonomy. If standardization helped open access to college to students from more schools, it also made the preparation for college more uniform.

Implicit in the phenomenon of standardization was not only the concept of uniformity but also that of a single scale of quality in education. Educators were interested in *standards* as well as in standardization. Could the schools and colleges, to rephrase a question of more recent vintage, be standard—and excellent too? Just as standardization conflicted with diversity, so standards ran up against the educators’ own ideals of democratic values in education. Any standard for differentiating one individual from another (other than those seen to be self-generated like hard work or chastity) tended to be suspect in America. The relative absence of an aristocracy in America kept the country from falling back on a traditional European pattern of legitimated class distinctions.

Differentiation, as it is used here, is the separation of persons into different groups according to some criterion. The criterion may be meaningful—differentiation by sex or by age, for example—without implying that one sex is better than another or one age group more deserving than another. The non-evaluativeness of differentiation is still more clear when the criterion used is arbitrary. For instance, when students enter a school building to take the College Board exams, they may be told that “students with last names A through L” should go to one room and “students with last names M through Z” should go to another. No ranking of the students is implied.

³ Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, *Third Annual Report* (New York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1908), p. 103.

Stratification, on the other hand, is the differential allocation of economic, social, and political rewards to different groups of persons. Thus males may be more highly paid, even for the same work, than females; older people may have more political rights than younger people. When students come out of the rooms in which they have taken their College Boards and later receive their scores, they are more finely differentiated than they were before. When they walked in, they had been arbitrarily divided into two groups. When they receive their scores, they are differentiated by the criterion of "scholastic aptitude" with scores ranging from 200 to 800. This is a specific measure and has no necessary relationship to more general valuations of a person's worth. But, in fact, these scores provide students differential access to higher education and, hence, to economic, social, and political rewards. This is stratification. The scores, and education generally, act as a social sorting device. The criterion of stratification here is achievement or merit as measured primarily by educational attainment. A society where stratification is thus arranged "according to competence, interest, and achievement rather than according to origin"⁴ can be called a "meritocracy."⁵ Insofar as the College Board tests are important in determining if a student goes to college and which college he or she goes to, the College Board has helped to organize an American meritocracy.

Meritocracy, like standardization, is a word with conflicting connotations. On the one hand, meritocracy is taken to be the characteristic social organization of an advanced industrial society where ascriptive and particularistic criteria have given way to "achieved" and universalistic criteria; it represents the rationalization of social life. This is conventionally regarded as *progress*, and was so regarded by reformers of the late nineteenth century who sought to rationalize politics and social life. Civil service reform, in which the "merit system" of standardized examinations supplanted the "spoils system" of political patronage was taken to be a move toward a just society of equal opportunity. Reformers of municipal government who removed power from the city wards and corrupt "machines" and placed it in the hands of "men of intelligence and civic responsibility" portrayed their work as democratic, popular, and progressive. But the idea of rationalizing of social life can also be viewed simply as the metaphysic of an industrial social order, and of the dominant social groups in that

⁴ Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, *The Academic Revolution* (New York: Doubleday, 1968), p. 12.

⁵ The term is from Michael Young's satire, *The Rise of the Meritocracy* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1958).

order. Civil service reform was intended in part to limit, not to promote democracy, to protect government from the people by insulating within it an educated elite.⁶ Municipal reform was a movement of upper class, professional, and business groups to control politics for their own ends.⁷ "Achievement" in the school system is defined, controlled, and measured in terms of ability to survive within a culture which reflects the behavior and values of the upper, upper middle, and professional classes. Thorstein Veblen made the point at the turn of the century when he argued that the "usages, actions, and views of the well-to-do leisure class acquire the character of a prescriptive canon of conduct for the rest of society."⁸

American society is by no means fully meritocratic. The best qualified people do not always get the jobs they apply for nor do students always receive educational resources commensurate with their abilities; often students with little tested ability advance while students with better scores do not. There is great concern for making society more meritocratic and people feel that justice has not been done whenever a social institution falls short of meritocratic practices. While political and intellectual controversy still swirls about this matter, a more fundamental question has been raised: not to ask how the United States can be made a meritocracy but to wonder if a meritocracy is desirable.

Two issues are involved here. First, there is the question whether to regard differentiation of people according to educational attainment or test scores as a dimension of true ability or, alternatively, to regard our particular standards of merit as one among many possible definitions. Increasing sensitivity to the class and culture bias of testing and other measures of educational achievement has led in recent years to a more widespread adoption of the latter position.

Second, even if differentiation of people along the dimension of tested mental abilities should appear legitimate, it must still be asked whether social stratification along the same dimension is morally justified. This, too, has been increasingly challenged in recent years. The meritocratic aspects of the educational system have been identified with the needs of a capitalist social system to produce workers to fit its occupational hierarchy.⁹ Reform movements have been regarded as "per-

⁶ Rush Welter, *Popular Education and Democratic Thought in America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 204-206.

⁷ Samuel P. Hays, "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, vol. 55 (October, 1964) pp. 157-169.

⁸ Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York: New American Library, 1953), p. 138.

⁹ David K. Cohen and Marvin Lazerson, "Education and the Corporate Order," *Socialist Revolution*, vol. 2 (March-April, 1972), pp. 47-72. See also Samuel Bowles, "Unequal Education and

verse" in seeking to afford individuals mobility through better and better meritocratic mechanisms without confronting the more fundamental issue of social stratification—the extent to which stratification serves special class interests, and the extent to which it is necessary at all.¹⁰

Origins of the College Board

When Harvard College was founded in 1636 as the first institution of higher learning in America, a command of Latin and Greek was the only requirement for admission—and remained the only requirement well into the eighteenth century.¹¹ In 1745 Yale College added elementary arithmetic to its requirements. By 1800 the other colleges dotting the Northern colonies all required Latin, Greek, and elementary mathematics. The uniformity of admissions standards faithfully mirrored the uniformity of the course of study in schools and colleges.

In the nineteenth century new subjects were added. Harvard introduced geography as a requirement in 1807 (Princeton, Columbia, and Yale followed in 1819, 1821, and 1822 respectively). English grammar and algebra were included by these colleges before mid-century. By 1870, history, geography, and English grammar and composition were also required fields, in different combinations and different amounts, with Harvard and the University of Michigan demanding some preparation in all of them.

At that time colleges did not have close relations with most secondary schools. Admission was by examination at the college and preparation by private tutoring was as acceptable as formal schooling.¹² But this began to change with the creation of a national arena for business and the professions and the growth of a national consciousness and national social structure connecting the higher levels of society. The established Eastern colleges became interested in gathering students from beyond a narrow locale. It was, however, increasingly difficult to count on secondary schools to provide the normal college preparatory curricula. Secondary schooling was in demographic ferment. In 1870 there were just 80,000 secondary school students, most of them attending private

the Reproduction of the Social Division of Labor." *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 3 (Fall/Winter, 1971), pp. 1-30.

¹⁰ Cohen and Lazerson, p. 72.

¹¹ The discussion of college entrance requirements before 1900 relies primarily on Edwin C. Broome, "A Historical and Critical Discussion of College Admission Requirements," in *Columbia University Contributions to Philosophy, Psychology, and Education*, vol. 11, nos. 3-4, 1903.

¹² Edward A. Krug, *The Shaping of the American High School: 1880-1920* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), p. 7.

academies. During the 1880's enrollment in the increasing number of public high schools passed that in the private schools.¹³ The number of "people's colleges," as the high schools were sometimes called, grew from 500 in 1870 to 10,000 by 1910, enrolling over 900,000 students, about ninety per cent of the total secondary school population. Most of these schools were preparing students "for life" rather than "for college" and did not organize their programs to fit the entrance requirements of a particular college or of colleges generally.¹⁴

At the same time, the colleges were extending their requirements. The established Eastern colleges introduced modern languages (French and German), English literature, and the natural sciences as part of required preparation for college by 1900. The traditional concept of college education as fostering "mental discipline" by study of Greek and Latin began to give ground to a more utilitarian mold. This was expressed in the "university" model of higher education, taken up by many leading educators but most fully embodied and most effectively promoted by Charles W. Eliot of Harvard. Eliot stressed an "elective system" in which the students were free to choose their own course of study and to specialize in it rather than to submit all their time and energy to the discipline of the classics.¹⁵

Colleges at the turn of the century were not "selective" in the sense that so many are now—there were not more applicants than places. Few colleges conceived of any upper limit of students they could accept and register (Vassar was a rare exception). Although college admissions was not the public issue it has since become, it was still a thorn in the side of professional educators. The difficulty was that every college had its own idiosyncratic requirements. A college would demand, for example, not general reading and translating skill in Latin but preparation in specific works of Latin authors—and the works prescribed differed from Harvard to Yale to Princeton. One secondary school principal complained that college admission standards "range from the merest rudiments

¹³ Krug, p. 5.

¹⁴ "The plain fact is that not one-tenth of the schools called high in Massachusetts habitually maintain a course of study which enables the pupil to prepare himself for admission to Harvard College, or to any other college in the State which enforces its requirements for admission stated in its catalogue." Charles W. Eliot, "The Gap Between the Elementary Schools and the Colleges," in National Education Association, *Journal of Proceedings and Addresses* (Topeka: Topeka, Kansas, Publishing House, 1890).

¹⁵ For histories of the American college and university at this time see especially Laurence R. Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965). Also R. Freeman Butts, *The College Charts its Course* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), and Frederick Rudolph, *The American College and University* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962).

of arithmetic, reading, and writing, up to the highest mathematics or, moral philosophy, and the history of art. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the histories of all states and all times are included, from Babylonian and Assyrian history, specially designated in the requirements of one college, and of Persian history, in those of another, down to the history of Texas and North Carolina, the former required by three, the latter by two colleges."¹⁶

For the secondary school principal trying to organize a curriculum to prepare students for different colleges (and other students for no college at all), this was a great burden. As educators came to see the schools and colleges as part of a single system of education, it became a burning issue. During the 1890's the task of articulating college and secondary school curricula and standards was viewed by many as the key problem in American education. A study of college entrance requirements published in 1903 concluded, "... the salvation of both the colleges and the schools depends on a close articulation between the two systems."¹⁷

The College Board was a response to this perceived problem, but not the only response and not the first. In the two decades before 1900 an increasing number of associations had been established to coordinate the schools. Between 1885 and 1898, the New England, Middle States, North Central, and Southern school associations of colleges and secondary schools were formed, on the initiative of secondary school leaders in the New England and North Central regions, at the prompting of college leaders elsewhere. These and other associations took a special interest in the problem of college admissions. By 1878 the New York Board of Regents had established an examination for secondary school graduation and for admission to some colleges in the state.¹⁸

In 1879 a conference of New England colleges agreed to a standard English requirement (Harvard's).¹⁹ In 1886 the New England Association of Colleges and Preparatory Schools established a commission on entrance examinations which adopted a uniform English requirement in 1888. The Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools of the Middle States and Maryland joined the New England group in 1894 in revising and adopting the uniform English requirement.

¹⁶ Quoted in David B. Tyack, *Turning Points in American Educational History* (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing, 1967), p. 355.

¹⁷ Broome, p. 73.

¹⁸ William K. Selden, *Accreditation* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), pp. 30-34.

¹⁹ This discussion relies in large part on Claude Fuess, *The College Board: Its First Fifty Years* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950). Fuess, long associated with the Board as its director of financial affairs, wrote the volume for the Board's fiftieth anniversary.

The requirement was recognized by eighty-seven colleges by 1897, but it was only one, and not the most important or most controversial, of the entrance requirements of the Eastern colleges.

By 1900, a national consciousness was emerging that extended to the country's geographic limits. It was made possible by the railroads, fostered by cooperation between business and government; the growth of newspapers, telegraph, and telephone; and not least of all, the expansion of schools which increasingly introduced students and their families to national values and standards. Although the National Education Association had been organized in 1857, not until the 1880's did these other developments enable it to have a genuinely national membership and national influence. One of the first and most lasting contributions of the N.E.A. was its promotion of a standard, national high school curriculum. During the 1880's its National Council on Education prepared six separate reports on the relationship of the schools to the colleges and its bearing on curriculum. The schools saw the problem as especially severe because many students in the burgeoning public high schools had no intention of going on to college but were still submitted to a curriculum adjusted to college entrance requirements.²⁰

The colleges were dissatisfied with existing arrangements for admissions on other grounds. Both the examination and accreditation methods of entrance occupied too much faculty time and college resources. The examination system, used in the Eastern colleges, was a series of written essay examinations prepared and graded by faculty members from the administering college. As we have already noted, every college had examinations peculiar to the biases of its own faculty. The other pattern of admission, accreditation, was introduced by the University of Michigan in 1871 and was practiced by nearly 200 colleges by 1896, predominantly Middle Western and Western institutions. In this system, faculty members of a given college would inspect a secondary school to determine the quality of its program of instruction. If judged adequate, the school would be accredited by the college and all students with diplomas from the school would gain automatic acceptance.

The concern during the 1890's for better articulation between school and college was most laboriously but most importantly expressed in the work of the National Education Association's "Committee of Ten" appointed in 1892 with Charles Eliot as its chairman and a roster of the most important and pres-

²⁰ See TheodoreSizer, *Secondary Schools at the Turn of the Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 58-61.

tigious educators of the day. The committee was charged with formulating a better curricular mesh between school and college. The committee's report, issued in 1894, came at a time when direction in curricular matters was sorely needed and widely sought. Because the report had the authority of the country's most respected educators behind it and because it seemed to fit the mood of the times, it was widely read and debated and greatly influenced secondary school administrators.²¹ The report was the first important attempt to define a unit of instruction-time for the schools so that one student's preparation in a subject could be compared in quantitative terms to the preparation of another student in the same—or in any other—school.

The machinery of the Committee of Ten followed the blueprint President Eliot had laid out in an address to the N.E.A. in 1892. He argued that without federal control of education and without significant state control,

the best hope of exerting an influence throughout the nation over school and college programmes is through the voluntary action of a few experts in each subject of instruction who can command the cooperation of institutions which have obtained an acknowledged preeminence, and can act under the sanction of an association having a national organization.²²

This roughly describes the Committee of Ten and, but for one important particular—the sanction of a national organization—describes the College Board soon to be established.

The Committee of Ten helped move American primary and secondary education toward a more standard, national curriculum, but it had not dealt at all with the college side of college-school relations: entrance requirements. But these, too, were receiving critical attention. As early as 1885 Eliot has recommended a common examination board to standardize college entrance examinations. The chief publicist of the report of the Committee of Ten, Nicholas Murray Butler, then a professor at Columbia and founder and editor of *Educational Review*, took up the idea of a common examination board. In 1893 he proposed it to the Columbia faculty, which tabled the suggestion. But when he revived the idea three years later, it passed unanimously.

In the meantime, the N.E.A. had appointed still another committee: the Committee on College Entrance Requirements which submitted a report

²¹ Sizer. Sizer's book is, as he calls it, a biography of the Committee of Ten.

²² Charles W. Eliot, "Undesirable and Desirable Uniformity in the Schools" in National Education Association, *Journal of Proceedings and Addresses*, 1893, p. 44.

in 1899 advocating not uniform requirements in all colleges, but the expression by all colleges of their requirements in terms of standard, national units of instruction-time.²³

When the Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools of the Middle States and Maryland met in December, 1899, the issue of college entrance had been well aired and proposals for change widely considered. At that meeting, Nicholas Murray Butler proposed that the association establish a common examination board. There was opposition to the resolution. The president of Lafayette College feared that an independent Board would usurp Lafayette's authority to admit whatever students it wanted to admit. Charles Eliot, sitting in on the meetings to support Butler, replied:

The President of Lafayette College has misunderstood Mr. Butler's proposal. The College Entrance Examination Board, if constituted, is not to admit students to any college, but so to define the subjects of admission that they will be uniform, to conduct examinations in these subjects at uniform times throughout the world, and to issue to those who take the examinations certificates of performance,—good, bad, or indifferent. And, President Warfield, it will be perfectly practicable under this plan for Lafayette College to say, if it chooses, that it will admit only such students as cannot pass these examinations. No one proposes to deprive Lafayette College of that privilege.²⁴

The final vote was unanimous in favor of the Board.

We should observe that, just as the Committee of Ten had assumed without question that there would be a national audience for its report, so did the proponents of the College Board hope and expect that their plan would gain nationwide acceptance. However, the Committee of Ten was the child of a national association and included among its members not only Eastern educators but the United States Commissioner of Education and the presidents of the Universities of Michigan, Missouri, and Colorado. The College Entrance Examination Board, in contrast, was urged by Eliot of Harvard and Butler of Columbia and grew out of the Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools of the Middle States and Maryland. And as long as accreditation was the more popular admissions procedure in the Middle West, the possible influence of the College Board, oriented to the examination system, was limited. The continuing distinc-

²³ Later, with their advocacy by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, to be called "Carnegie-units."

²⁴ Fuess, p. 26.

tion between admissions in the East and in the Middle West was reinforced by the considerable distrust Western educators felt for Eliot and the Eastern colleges.²⁵

Under Nicholas Murray Butler's leadership, a plan of organization for the College Board was prepared and on November 17, 1900, formally approved by twelve institutions: Barnard College, Bryn Mawr College, Columbia University, Cornell University, Johns Hopkins University, New York University, Rutgers College, Swarthmore College, Union College, University of Pennsylvania, Vassar College, and the Woman's College of Baltimore (later Goucher). The primary task of the Board in its first year was to determine the examination subjects and to choose examiners eminent enough to insure wide respect for the Board exams. The subjects selected were chemistry, English, French, German, Greek, history, Latin, mathematics, and physics. The Board followed the 1899 report of the N.E.A.'s Committee of Twelve, adopting its specifications of what should constitute standard preparation in the different subjects. In the case of Latin, French, and history, the Board followed recommendations of the appropriate professional associations.

Nine hundred seventy-three students took the first College Board examinations in 1901. The examination papers were read by thirty-nine readers, as carefully selected for prominence in their fields as the examiners had been. Nevertheless, the academic world did not prove eager to replace time-honored entrance procedures with the Board practices. Only Columbia, Barnard, and New York University abandoned their own entrance exams. Thirty-five colleges agreed to honor Board examinations as substitutes for their own, but Harvard and Bowdoin refused even this.²⁶ Despite President Eliot's championing of the Board, Harvard did not join the Board until 1904. Even then, Harvard and other college members of the Board retained their own examinations. In 1911 the total number of students separately examined by Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Penn, Bryn Mawr, Stevens, and M.I.T. was still greater than the number of students taking the Board exams. So a decade along, the Board's hopes of rationalizing college admissions were far from met. The Board had grown—from 973 ex-

²⁵ Laurence Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 110.

²⁶ Nicholas Murray Butler referred to this group of colleges as "substantially every college and scientific school in the United States" in the College Board's *Annual Report*. This is a curious parochialism in light of the fact that there were nearly 1000 institutions of higher education in the country in 1900, a good many of them offering "classical" courses.

aminees to 3731, from twelve members to twenty-nine—but the Board was still, at most, a service agency to a few Eastern colleges and saw its main public relations task as securing cooperation from these institutions. The impulse to attract students to college from a wider geographic area and from a more diverse group of secondary schools, clearly, was not deeply felt by all the Eastern colleges nor by all decision-makers even at the colleges that most ardently supported the nationalizing and rationalizing trends.

It would be well at this point to order our survey of the Board's development in terms of changes in American education as a whole. In a study of American secondary education, sociologist Martin Trow developed a periodization which proves helpful in a study of the College Board, as well.²⁷ Trow defines the period from 1870 to 1910 as the first phase of growth in secondary education, during which period high schools were still designed along "common school" lines with the classics as the core of the curriculum. The high school in *Middletown*, for example, offered only the "Latin" and "English" courses of study in 1890.²⁸

Between 1910 and the end of World War II, while colleges remained the province of a minority, the secondary schools were transformed into a system of mass education. Between 1910 and 1940 the secondary school enrollment rose from 1.1 million to 7.1 million students, from fifteen per cent to more than seventy per cent of the high school age population. The high schools differentiated their curricula at the same time, introducing vocational education for the working class students attending high school for the first time.²⁹ *Middletown's* high school by the mid-twenties offered twelve separate courses of study—not only the general and college preparatory courses, but music, art, shorthand, bookkeeping, home economics, and five other vocational programs.

Since World War II, American education has entered a third period: college, as well as secondary education, is taken to be the prerogative of the masses of American young people. Secondary education has continued to expand, to 11.6 million students in 1965, better than ninety-two per cent of the high school age population. College enrollments have multiplied from 1.5 million students in 1940 to 2.7 million in 1950 and nearly 7 million today, close to half of the population aged eighteen to twenty-one. And the major growth took place in the public universities.

²⁷ Martin Trow, "The Second Transformation of American Secondary Education" in *Class, Status, and Power*, ed. Reinhard Bendix and S. M. Lipset (New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 437-449.

²⁸ Robert and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1929), p. 192.

²⁹ See Sol Cohen, "The Industrial Education Movement, 1906-1917," *American Quarterly*, 20 (Spring, 1968), pp. 95-110.

The history of the College Board since 1910 fits neatly into Trow's periodization, as we shall see. What was significant in the Board's growth from 1910 to 1945 was not the slight change in size and national character but the change in the nature of the testing technology the Board used. This change gave the Board the legitimacy and the technical facility which enabled it to expand after World War II.

The Refinement of Testing: 1910 to 1945

The creation of the College Board meant that, for the first time in American education, an agency was devoted solely to testing and owed its existence to the success it had in promoting its examinations to the reluctant Eastern colleges. Thus it was forced to respond to the growing emphasis in American education on standards of efficiency and scientific procedure. American colleges had originally been religious institutions, but by the turn of the century, science was becoming the most important source of authoritative knowledge and the colleges its most important citadels. The scientist replaced the cleric as the guardian of truth just as natural science and command of the vernacular replaced Latin and Greek as preparation for college studies. This overstates the case: science certainly did not supplant all of religion's functions nor, where it did slip into religion's suit, was it able to do so without alterations. But the historical puzzle remains: how did the change take place? How could science command assent in a society as pluralistic as the American? For the purposes of this essay, we must simply note that the change did occur. Standards, henceforth, would gain stature from "scientific" foundations; criteria of merit would be most acceptable if standardized, "objective," and quantified.

The examinations the Board gave in 1910, as in 1901, were essay examinations in different subjects based on fairly rigid expectations of exactly what the student should have prepared. The exams tested command of content more than they tapped anything that might be called independent ability for critical thinking.

But the nature of the Board's exams began to change. In 1915, the year in which Harvard, Yale, and Princeton finally abolished their own separate examinations, the Board resolved to develop a set of "comprehensive examinations"—in response to a request from Harvard. Harvard had initiated a "New Plan" of admissions in 1911 which required, first, a report of the student's high school record—subjects studied, amount of time devoted to them, and quality of work; then, if this proved satisfactory, the student was asked to take, not the

whole panoply of examinations that had been required, but only four—in *English, Latin (or French or German), mathematics or physics or chemistry*, and a fourth from a long list of possibilities. The Association of New England Colleges approved this New Plan in 1910 and the Middle States group appointed a committee to study the plan a year later. By providing an alternative, flexible admissions scheme, the New Plan attempted to improve the articulation of school and college. It was regarded as a significant step in this direction. However, students whose schools were not geared to the colleges' expectations still had trouble with the New Plan exams that the College Board endorsed and began to administer in 1916 in addition to its regular exams. The New Plan did not gain widespread acceptance. As late as 1922 even Harvard admitted more than half of its students by the old design.

An innovation which would prove in the long run more important was the development of intelligence tests, or psychological tests or mental tests as they were called. Amidst a general enthusiasm for testing and measurement,³⁰ American psychologists drew upon Alfred Binet's intelligence test developed out of work in the French school system. The Stanford (University) Revision of the Binet test was published in 1916, but psychological testing did not turn up in the schools until after World War I. In World War I, the army sought a method to select out recruits of low intelligence and called on the American Psychological Association for help. Through the Committee on Classification of Personnel in the Army, set up under the direction of A.P.A. president Robert Yerkes, the "Army Alpha" test was developed—especially by Stanford psychologist Arthur Otis—and administered to over 1,700,000 men.

The army dropped psychology and psychologists as soon as the war ended and did not regain interest until World War II. But industry and education responded quite differently, as Yerkes could testify in 1919:

Before the war mental engineering was a dream; today it exists, and its development is amply assured. From leaders in our school systems, from administrative officers and leaders in colleges and professional schools, and from specialists in educational psychology come requests for permission to use the army mental tests.³¹

³⁰ The testing movement is discussed in Douglas E. Scates, "Fifty Years of Objective Measurement and Research in Education," *Journal of Educational Research*, 41 (December, 1947), pp. 241-264; Lawrence Cremin, *The Transformation of the School* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 185-192; and Raymond E. Callahan, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 99-125.

³¹ Quoted in Kathryn W. and James D. Linden, *Modern Mental Measurement: A Historical Perspective* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), p. 50.

The years from 1917 to 1926 saw a tremendous increase in the use of standardized educational measurement. In 1919 the first tests of commercial test publishers were issued. By 1928 1300 different tests existed, and some thirty to forty million copies were in use annually.³²

Almost immediately after the war, some colleges introduced mental tests as part of their admissions program, generally employing the Army Alpha itself. Columbia is credited by the Bureau of Education as the first college to institute psychological testing (the Thorndike Tests for Mental Alertness) as part of its admissions program. Under this plan—which was alternative to the regular College Board examination procedure—the student applying had only to submit his high school record and, if this was in order, to take the mental test “as a test of his capacity to do college work.”³³ By 1920 some 200 colleges had used mental tests—though not in all cases for admissions purposes. Correlations between results on these tests and college achievement proved higher than that between other entrance exams or even secondary school record and college achievement.³⁴

The College Board promptly took note. In 1919 the Board recognized the rise of psychological tests and in 1920 appointed a committee to study them. After appointing a series of related committees, the Board approved in 1925 and first administered in 1926 a psychological test of its own, the Scholastic Aptitude Test—which has remained to this day the core of the College Board testing program. The S.A.T., like the New Plan before it, was supported by the most prestigious Eastern colleges seeking a more national student population. Of the 8000 students who took the S.A.T. in 1926, more than three fourths were applying to Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Pennsylvania, Smith, Wellesley, and Vassar.

Why were these colleges, which for so long had appealed only to a regional clientele, so intent on extending the reach of the net through which their students were chosen? Developments that encouraged this more national focus, stimulating the changes in College Board exams, included the growth of national transportation and communication systems, the rise of nationally-based business, the rise of national professions—with touchstones in the graduate

³² Scates, p. 249.

³³ Quoted from the annual report of Columbia University for 1919 in Harry McKown, *The Trend of College Entrance Requirements, 1913-1922*. U.S. Department of Interior Bureau of Education Bulletin No. 35 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1925), p. 24.

³⁴ McKown, p. 31.

schools, the loosening of the colleges' ties with local constituencies, and the growing importance of the faculty over the college trustees in influencing the direction of college policy.³⁵ Still, the college members of the College Board did not actively recruit students from distant areas, and we should examine just how successful they were in attracting a more national student body. If the data reported by the College Board is a fair representation, they were not very successful at all. (See Table A.) There was a trend to greater representation of public school examinees. However, it was by no means commensurate with the enormous expansion of public secondary education. Already, when the College Board began, only seventeen per cent of all secondary school students were enrolled in private schools; by 1930 it was only seven per cent (see Table B for absolute numbers enrolled)—in the same year more than forty per cent of the secondary schools with one or more students taking the College Board exams were private schools, a time when less than twelve per cent of all secondary schools were private.

As for regional representation, Table A shows only a slight trend away from the predominance of New England and Middle Atlantic state students. The nationalization of the undergraduate private Eastern colleges, then, seems to have been effected more in principle than in practice during the 1920's.

The S.A.T.'s continued to be used during the 1930's as an alternative to the Board essay examinations. The tests had been designed by a committee headed by Carl Brigham, professor of psychology at Princeton. By 1930 Brigham's constant attention to the improvement and evaluation of the S.A.T. won him a place on the payroll of the College Board. By that time, too, the S.A.T. had been altered under his guidance to include separate mathematical and verbal aptitude sections—as it still does today.

Brigham's leadership in developing the S.A.T.'s and in cautiously encouraging their use was a happy contrast to more uncritical acceptance of mental testing by others during the 1920's. Thorndike, one of the leading exponents of the testing movement, went far beyond his data in praising the tests, suggesting that what they measured was hereditary, not environmental, and suggesting that intelligence correlated positively with morality (even providing the correlation coefficient—.3). "If any virtue is worth seeking," he wrote, "we shall seek it more eagerly the more we know and measure it."³⁶

³⁵ See Jencks and Riesman, pp. 12-27.

³⁶ Quoted in Merle Curti, *The Social Ideas of American Educators* (Paterson, N.J.: Pageant Books, 1959).

Walter Lippmann attacked the most flagrant testimonials for mental tests in a celebrated series of articles in *The New Republic* in 1922. He observed that intelligence tests were very useful for classification and grouping of individuals—as the Army had proved in World War I. But, he argued, their use was *likely* to be abused because so many of the creators and marketers of the tests claimed not only to measure intelligence (whatever that might mean) but asserted as well that what they measured was hereditary. “Intelligence testing in the hands of men who hold this dogma,” Lippmann wrote, “could not but lead to an intellectual caste system in which the task of education had given way to the doctrine of predestination and infant damnation.”³⁷

The issue still raged at the end of the decade when John Dewey criticized the use of intelligence testing in the schools. But he, too, saw that testing was an efficient mechanism of classification. Classification was important not only for matters of administration and efficiency internal to the school but, more fundamentally, for making the schools useful to the social system as a whole. Where stratification was taken for granted and where no ready-made system of differentiating a large and diverse population (like a caste system) was available, a legitimate basis for social sorting was sought. The school system, increasingly inclusive in its reach, standard in its format, and justified by scientific testing in the distinctions it made among students, was well suited as a selective mechanism. Even George Counts, an outspoken progressive critic of the way in which secondary education favored upper social classes and so helped reproduce social class inequalities, believed that if “objective” methods were employed to select students for high school, the democratic ideal in education would be preserved.³⁸

Higher education after World War I, troubled by increasing numbers of applicants, began to be more self-conscious about “selection.” Secondary school enrollment had risen sharply and was to double before the end of the decade; college costs had not kept pace with other rising prices; returning veter-

³⁷ Walter Lippmann, “The Abuse of the Tests,” *The New Republic*, November 15, 1922, pp. 297-298.

³⁸ See John Dewey, “Progressive Education and the Science of Education” (originally published in *Progressive Education*, 1928) in Reginald D. Archambault, ed., *John Dewey on Education: Selected Writings* (New York: Random House Modern Library, 1964) and George S. Counts, *The Selective Character of American Secondary Education* (New York: Arno Press and The New York Times, 1969), originally published in 1922. Counts wrote that a Democratic educational system could be arranged in secondary education either by opening the high schools to all students or by adapting objective methods of selecting a small group which would be taught, among other things, “the meaning of social obligation.” See also the discussion in Cremin, pp. 188-192.

ans swelled the rolls, and business was showing more interest in college graduates than before.³⁹ In times past the number of students in a college was taken to be an index of the institution's worth. Just before America's entry into the war the president of the American Association of University Professors made it a point to criticize this "ingenuous worship of mere numbers."⁴⁰ Worshipfulness soon became worrisomeness, however. The A.A.U.P.'s Committee G, devoted to "Methods of Increasing the Intellectual Interest and Raising the Intellectual Standards of Undergraduates" expressed alarm that college enrollment was growing much faster than the general rate of population growth. In their 1926 report on "The Selection, Retention, and Promotion of Undergraduates," the committee noted that enrollment increase had begun to slow but that, by the middle twenties, institutions that had been forced by the deluge of applicants to consider limiting enrollment found reason to maintain their limitations. Some felt that "mass production results in standardized products" and that, in education, this would be tragic. The Committee noted with approval that Bowdoin, Lafayette, Princeton, Smith, Harvard, and Yale (all members of the College Board) had decided to limit enrollment. They cited arguments pro and con regarding enrollment limitations, but finally sided with the limiters. The Committee was more fearful of mediocrity in higher education, which they associated with large numbers, than of accusations of elitism or privilege. If the opposite view should prevail, they feared, "the intellectual life of the country is doomed; everybody except the sheer idiot is to go to college and pursue chiefly sociology, nature study, child study, and community service—and we shall have a society unique only in its mediocrity, ignorance, and vulgarity."⁴¹

What was to be done? The A.A.U.P. Committee extensively reviewed the various plans of college admission, and discussed the arguments for and against each. They noted as arguments against the examination system of college entrance the likelihood of standardization—the forcing of secondary schools to specialize in what the colleges required and the direction of teachers' efforts toward instructing students in the ability to answer limited sorts of ques-

³⁹ Frank Nicolson, "Report of the Commission on Faculty and Student Scholarship," *Association of American Colleges Bulletin*, 7 (April, 1921), p. 51. Nicolson remarks that in the past businessmen had "looked askance" at college graduates. See comments to the same effect in Veysey, pp. 13-14.

⁴⁰ John Wigmore, "President's Report," *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*, 2 (November, 1916), p. 31.

⁴¹ "The Selection, Retention, and Promotion of Undergraduates," *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*, 12 (October, 1926), p. 459.

tions. They noted, as well, that the standards the exams set up might not be proper—that they tested memory rather than reasoning, knowledge rather than appreciation, and gave unfair advantage to “the verbally expert.” Nonetheless, Committee G decided that the examination system—and in particular the New Plan of the College Board—should provide the basis for college admissions policy, supplemented by certification, school records, mental tests, and recommendations. The Committee advised colleges to announce maximum enrollment figures after determining the largest number of students they could efficiently teach, and to declare frankly that admissions would be a process “of selecting the most promising material available.” Colleges were advised to consider the College Board examinations “because home-made examinations are often a means of disguising low standards.”⁴²

Despite the A.A.U.P.’s fear of increasing numbers in the colleges, we should keep in mind that the New Plan they approved had not been designed to keep students *out* of college (or out of *some* colleges). Nor was this the rationale for the S.A.T., though the first report on the S.A.T. made note of the new policy of some colleges to limit enrollment. These innovations were, instead, responses to the fact that college entrance examinations had long tested for a category of skills and abilities much more narrowly defined than the abilities necessary for good college work—and more confined to the preparatory curricula of the secondary schools traditionally associated with the Eastern colleges. The new tests tried to provide an index on which students from an increasingly heterogeneous and national range of secondary schools could be fairly compared—and so attract students *to* the established Eastern colleges.

This national emphasis is well illustrated by the use of the S.A.T.’s during the Depression. In 1934 James Conant established the National Scholarships at Harvard. These were novel in that the amount of the award was to be scaled to student need; the object of the scholarships was to attract students of outstanding academic ability. The scholarships were at first offered only to students from Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. This was an answer both to Conant’s own interest in making Harvard a “national” university and to “the restlessness of the Western Harvard alumni.”⁴³ Conant appointed assistant deans Wilbur Bender and Henry Chauncey (later to become the first director of Educational Testing Service) to devise the best method of

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 467.

⁴³ James B. Conant, *My Several Lives* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 129.

selecting scholarship recipients. They reported that the S.A.T.'s of the College Board, backed by the traditional subject-matter exams, interviews, and recommendations would provide the best basis for selection. The scholarship committees of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton coordinated their efforts and in 1937 asked the College Board to initiate a series of one-day examinations at 118 centers across the country for scholarship competition. The Board took on the task. By this date a series of one-hour standardized achievement tests had been instituted as well. These, together with the S.A.T.'s, were administered in April, before the school year ended. The older essay tests had generally been given in June because it was taken for granted that the student would have to finish his course of study to be prepared for these more content-oriented examinations.

The S.A.T.'s gained ground, thanks to their high predictive value, the efficiency with which they could be administered and scored, and the sponsorship of the Ivy League colleges. "The record seems to show," Conant writes in his memoirs, "that Harvard's interest in the use of objective tests for selecting national scholars was an important factor in promoting the use of these tests for general admissions purposes."⁴⁴ The popularity of the S.A.T.'s was general—"No single test or examination in the Board's program has been as popular as the Scholastic Aptitude Test," executive secretary George Mullins reported in the annual report for 1941. But the S.A.T.'s had a special effect, as well. Students from public schools represented more than sixty per cent of all students taking the S.A.T.'s between 1937 and 1940, just over a third of those taking the June subject-matter exams. The overall percentage of public school candidates rose from thirty-five per cent in 1931 to forty per cent in 1936, forty-two per cent in 1937, forty-six per cent in 1940.⁴⁵ However, since ninety-three per cent of all secondary school students attended public schools in this decade, it is clear that private school students continued to be statistically much over-represented among College Board examinees.

When the United States entered World War II, colleges looked to these tests to expedite admissions. Just ten days after Pearl Harbor, Harvard, Princeton, and Yale announced their adoption of the April tests as the only examination requirement for admission. So of the 10,000 students who had planned to write the June essay examinations in 1942, over 6500 were able to transfer to the April tests as other colleges followed the lead of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Conant, p. 134.

⁴⁵ College Entrance Examination Board, *Annual Report* (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1940).

⁴⁶ Fuess, p. 156.

The Board decided to abandon the essay examinations altogether in 1942—and forever after, as it turned out. By that time, according to Conant, the S.A.T. had gained much support and the subject-matter examinations were declining sharply in importance. Still, the gathering of secondary school and college teachers to read and mark the exams had been a cherished part of the Board's work since 1901. It symbolized and substantiated a close relationship of schools to colleges and could not be given up without regret. Besides, the move ran counter to deeply held beliefs among many college and secondary school educators who favored "essay" exams. This point of view reasserted itself in criticism of the Board in the 1950's and won a small victory in the Board's continuing use of the "writing sample." We may wonder, then, if the S.A.T.'s could have superseded the subject-matter exams as quickly as they did had it not been for the pressure of war. We can trace the general acceptance of the S.A.T.'s to the exigencies of World War II just as we can find their origin in the Army's development of intelligence testing in World War I. Parenthetically, if this is at all representative of the effect of war on social institutions, then there may be other things we take to be necessary consequences of industrial society which, in fact, are organically connected only to the massive mobilization of modern war. With our awe-ful capacity to organize destruction before us, we prepare to organize for living, patterning our models of the best of times after devices adapted to the worst.

By 1942, then, the Board examinations had reached something much like their present form. (Indeed, the students taking the S.A.T. in 1941 served as the base group for the establishment of the mean score of 500 and standard deviation of 100 still employed.) The Board, however, remained responsive and responsible to a very small segment of the American educational system. By 1915 the Board had established its own community of thirty to forty Eastern seaboard colleges and several hundred secondary schools oriented to them. The size of this group did not change very much during the interwar years. The number of college members of the Board grew from thirty-three in 1920 to forty-four in 1940, a period during which the number of institutions of higher education in the country had grown from 1041 to 1708. (See Table C for College Board membership changes.) Whatever pretensions the Board had at its inception to national significance were earned only in that the colleges the Board served were the oldest and most prestigious private institutions in the nation.

Originally, the Board had opened itself to any college wanting to join. In 1904 Western Reserve became a member under this policy—the only Middle West institution to join until the University of Chicago became a member in

1940. In 1906, more stringent requirements were introduced: any college member of the Board was required to maintain high academic standards and to have an endowment yielding \$20,000 or more annually. Since colleges were not pounding on the door of the Board for membership, the function of these rules could not have been to keep colleges out of membership but, more likely, was designed to attract (by prestige value) colleges that did meet the standards. The endowment figure for membership was raised to \$50,000 in 1916 and a greater expectation that new members would use the Board examinations developed. In 1922 two institutions were rejected for membership for not using Board exams. In 1942 membership was opened up again—to any college approved by the Association of American Universities. In 1946, approval by a regional accreditation association provided the standard criterion of acceptance for Board membership, and in 1954 the understanding that a college member would require the Board tests for admission was made explicit.⁴⁷ Thus the Board sought to shed its reputation as an exclusive club⁴⁸ and at the same time to extend its hegemony over college entrance. Board policy may have consolidated this hegemony but was not responsible for having established it—the growth of the Board's influence after World War II has been a result of the general rise in importance of higher education in the social system.

National Influence of the College Board: 1945 to 1970

The social criteria by which one measures his own adequacy change historically and cross-culturally. Intelligence like other characteristics waxes and wanes in significance as does one's physical size, predestination, or honesty.⁴⁹

Intelligence—as measured by standardized tests of both aptitude and achievement and by performance in the school system—has become a predominant social criterion of self-regard generally in the United States, and especially so in the upper middle class and upwardly mobile individuals from various social

⁴⁷ Edward S. Noyes, "A History of College Board Membership Policies," *The College Board Record*, vol. 63 and 64 (Spring and Summer, 1967).

⁴⁸ Commission on Tests, *Report of the Commission on Tests: Righting the Balance* (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1970), p. 21. Frank Bowles in *The Refounding of the College Board, 1948-1963* (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1967), pp. 3, 8, comments on hostility toward the Board in the thirties and forties.

⁴⁹ Orville Brim, Jr., David C. Glass, John Neulinger, Ira J. Firestone, and Sally C. Lerner, *American Beliefs and Attitudes About Intelligence* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969), p. 3.

TABLE A:

Number of Public and Private Secondary Schools Sending Examinees to Take College Board Exams. College Board Examinees from the Middle Atlantic States and New England, by Percentage.

	Public schools	Private schools	Percentage of examinees from Eastern States	
1906	277	329	79.6	
1909	384	390	80.9	
1916	568	519	81.2	
1920	810	624	76.9	
1925	855	836	76.2	
1930	1,155	844	73.1	
1934	1,069	736	78.5	
1940	N.A. ^a	N.A.	77.0	80.0 ^b
1950	N.A.	N.A.	72.8	
1955	N.A.	N.A.	66.7	

^a After the 1930's the College Board Annual Report no longer printed information on the secondary school background of examinees.

^b The first figure for 1940 is for the S.A.T. tests administered in April; the second is for the older subject-matter exams administered in June. Data from College Entrance Examination Board, *Annual Reports*.

TABLE B:

Number of Students Enrolled in Public and Non-Public (Private or Parochial) Secondary Schools, in Thousands

	Public	Non-public
1900	519	111
1910	915	117
1920	2,200	214
1930	4,399	341
1940	6,601	458
1950	5,725	672
1960	8,485	1,035
1965	11,597	1,329

From *Standard Education Almanac*, Alvin Renetzky, ed. (Los Angeles: Academic Media, 1970) table one.

TABLE C:

- 1) *Number of College Members of College Board*
 2) *Number of High School Seniors Examined by the College Board for College Entrance*

	Member Colleges	High School Seniors Examined by College Board ^a	
1901	15	973	
1905	27	2,077	
1910	29	3,731	
1915	31	4,941	
1920	33	15,266	
1925	35	19,775	
1930	40	11,470	
1935	39	9,083	
1940	44	17,377	
1945	50	25,680	
1950		—by College Board	—by A.C.T. ^b
1955	114	63,352	—
1960	167	85,790	—
1965	428	400,000	132,963
1970	579	850,000	705,089
	850 ^c	1,000,000	992,724

^a In the early years the great majority of students taking the examinations were graduating seniors intending to enroll in college the following fall. Later, "preliminary" as well as "final" candidates began taking the exams. For 1930, 1935, 1940, 1945, 1950, and 1955 the figures represent *final* candidates only. For 1960, 1965, and 1970 the figures are estimates of final candidates (seniors) taking the S.A.T. Data comes from College Entrance Examination Board, *Annual Reports*. Estimates for 1960 and 1965 come from W. B. Schrader and E. Elizabeth Stewart, "Descriptive Statistics on College Board Candidates and Other Reference Groups" in William Angoff, ed., *The College Board Admission Testing Program* (New York, College Entrance Examination Board, 1971), p. 90. Estimate for 1970 from Commission on Tests, *Righting The Balance*, p. xiii.

^b The American College Testing Program began its tests, much like the College Board's, in 1959-60.

^c Estimated. See Commission on Tests, *Righting the Balance*, p. 27. That the College Board does not detail the number of member colleges and number of students examined in recent annual reports may be a result of the declining need to show growth in these figures in order to legitimate the Board.

strata.⁵⁰ The universities have grown as centers of power and authority, and higher education has become an increasingly salient, controversial, and emotionally-laden focus of aspiration and expectation. The "rise of the meritocracy"⁵¹ has become a phenomenon of some generality and is tied increasingly to the certification procedures of higher education.

More young people attend institutions of higher education now than ever before (see Table D) and this fact has been used to argue that a young person's class origin is less important in determining his access to higher education than it once was.⁵² This may be true but is certainly misleading if it is meant to suggest a growing equalization of opportunity in American society.

First, access to higher education has become much more important than it once was. "Those who receive the most education are going to move into virtually all the key jobs. Thus the question 'Who should go to college?' translates itself into the more compelling question, 'Who is going to manage the society?'"⁵³ Not until the 1950's did higher education translate so readily and perceptibly into social mobility—and higher education alone. To be kept out of college today is a much more severe limit to a person's life chances than it once was.

Second, students from families of high socio-economic status still do have a much greater chance of going to college than those from families of lower socio-economic status. This is true even when studies control for academic ability.⁵⁴

Third, as soon as higher education came to serve a large or mass public, it grew more stratified within itself:

Educational inequalities linked to social class differences are not wiped out by the growth of mass higher education, but find their expression in the internal differentiation of the system.⁵⁵

Some colleges and types of colleges, in other words, enroll predominantly students from the upper and upper middle classes; others, less "selective" and less

⁵⁰ See Jencks and Riesman, especially Chapter 3.

⁵¹ The phrase is from Young.

⁵² By, among others, Talcott Parsons and Gerald Platt, "Considerations on the American Academic System," *Minerva*, 6 (Summer, 1968), pp. 501-502.

⁵³ John Gardner, *Excellence* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 71.

⁵⁴ See Jencks and Riesman, Chapter 3, for a clear and comprehensive review of social stratification and higher education. See also William H. Sewell, "Inequality of Opportunity for Higher Education," *American Sociological Review*, 36 (October, 1971), pp. 798-809.

⁵⁵ Martin Trow, "The Democratization of Higher Education in America," *European Journal of Sociology*, 3, 1962, p. 239.

TABLE D:

Number of Undergraduate Students Enrolled in Institutions of Higher Education, in Thousands, and as percentage of Population aged 18 to 21.

	<i>Number of Students (1000's)</i>	<i>Percentage of Population 18 to 21</i>
1870	52	1.7
1880	116	2.7
1890	154	3.0
1900	232	3.9
1910	346	5.0
1920	582	7.9
1930	1,053	11.9
1940	1,388	14.5
1950	2,422	26.9
1960	3,227	33.8
1970	6,840	47.6

From Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, *New Students and New Places* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1971), Appendix B, Table 1.

prestigious, enroll students from the middle classes; still others take most of their students from the working class. A study in California in the late 1950's found that at Stanford University, a select private institution, only six per cent of the students came from working class families. At the University of California at Berkeley, a prestigious public institution, seventeen per cent of the students were from the working class. At San Jose State College the figure was forty-five per cent, and at San Jose Junior College, sixty-two per cent. And all four institutions are located in the greater San Francisco Bay region.⁵⁶

Withdrawal from college is much more common among students from lower than from upper income families, even when academic ability is the same.⁵⁷ Only the more selective colleges and universities, catering largely to students from privileged backgrounds, can expect most of their students to graduate within four years: more than eighty per cent do in the most selective private universities, less than a quarter do in state colleges and public junior colleges.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Burton R. Clark, *The Open Door College* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960) p. 54.

⁵⁷ James W. Trent, *The Decision to Go to College: An Accumulative, Multivariate Process* (Los Angeles: U.C.L.A. Graduate School of Education, Center for the Study of Evaluation, 1970), p. 6.

⁵⁸ Frank Newman et al., *Report on Higher Education* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 2.

The colleges at the head of the academic procession⁵⁹ are populated primarily, though not exclusively, by students from upper and upper middle-class families. This group includes all of the institutions which were early members of the College Board. A recent survey of 2320 American institutions of higher education⁶⁰ placed only sixty-eight in the highest of seven categories of selectivity. Nine of the original twelve members of the Board were included in this group, thirty-five of the fifty colleges that comprised the Board membership in 1945.

The College Board, as the testing agency which serves these high status institutions, has been the most visible device for sorting students into the different strata of higher education. It is difficult, however, to judge the independent influence of the College Board on the educational system or its stratification. The "visibility" of the Board makes it especially likely to be anecdotally blamed or praised for its influence, and we should be wary of this. On the other hand, its very visibility is itself an influence—a psychological and cultural influence which may be translated back indirectly into the educational system by the anxieties and aspirations of students and their parents. The College Board grew, in part, because people *believed* the College Board to be important. Colleges began to apply for membership on the Board for its prestige value; being a member of the College Board and recommending or requiring its examinations became a recruitment mechanism. Good students during the 1950's would write to colleges to which they were applying to ask why the Board examinations were *not* required.⁶¹

The Board reorganized in 1947; on the recommendation of the Carnegie Commission, Educational Testing Service was carved out of the Board and other testing agencies as an independent, non-profit test research and development corporation. It took with it all the research functions of the Board, leaving only responsibility for the college admissions testing program: prescribing the tests, setting exam dates and fees, appointing examination committees in each subject, and setting policy on the tests. The Board found this responsibility weighty enough. Colleges after the war were faced with an overwhelming number of applicants. This was at first accounted for by the number of veterans returning to college in addition to the normal age cohort. But beyond this, college became by the middle 1950's an expected stage in the growing up

⁵⁹ David Riesman, "The Academic Procession" in *Constraint and Variety in American Education* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1956).

⁶⁰ Alexander W. Astin, *Predicting Academic Performance in College* (New York: Free Press, 1971).

⁶¹ Ethel DuBois, "Admissions Prospects—A School View," *College Board Record*, Vol. 35 (Spring, 1958) and S. A. Kendrick, College Board research director, personal communication.

of middle class adolescents, necessary for passage to white collar and professional positions.

Colleges were thus faced with a deluge of applications. Colleges most in demand sought better means of admissions to reduce attrition or drop-out rates in the early years of college. The College Board exams—available, convenient to use, and widely respected—served this purpose well. The use of the Board rose meteorically, serving over 850 member colleges (and many non-member institutions) by 1970—compared with 114 in 1950; testing more than a million high school seniors in 1970—compared with 63,000 in 1950. (See Table C.)

The range of Board services expanded, too. The first "College Handbook" of the Board was published in 1941 with information on admissions requirements of member colleges; later, full descriptions of the colleges were included. The guidance function of the Board developed and the Board designed new materials to aid high school guidance counselors. In 1958 the Board authorized high schools—for the first time—to tell students their scores on the Board exams and to interpret the scores for the students. Nothing could be more indicative of the extent to which the Board had been the servant of the colleges—the educational system, if you will. Board executives sought to shift this long-standing preoccupation with the colleges' needs to give some attention to the applicants' interests. The decision to release the scores was regarded by Frank Bowles, president of the Board from 1948 to 1963, as the most important act of the Board in those years. The act was a symbol of the increasing importance of choosing a college and being chosen by one and was in part an unintended cause of the growing anxiety over test scores among the college-bound and their families. Bowles' remarks in 1960 about test score release manifest a much less critical attitude toward its effects than would be likely today:

There was great fear that students would have their values warped by learning their own scores, but I learned from hearing my own children's conversation that SAT scores have now become one of the peer group measuring devices. One unfortunate may be dismissed with the phrase, "That jerk—he only made 420!" The bright, steady student is appreciated with his high 600, and the unsuspected genius with his 700 is held in awe. This is not exactly the use of College Board scores we had in mind when we decided to authorize their distribution, but it's possible to think of many worse, so perhaps we had better not complain.⁶²

⁶² Frank Bowles, "Observations on Guidance" (speech of January 11, 1960) in Frank Bowles, *The Refounding of the College Board, 1948-1963* (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1967) pp. 238-252.

The impression grew during the fifties that the College Board had great influence on shaping American education—an influence which restricted the freedom of secondary education. In a speech delivered in 1960, Frank Bowles, saw the universities as dominating educational thought and practice more and more and so depriving the high schools of what he termed “mobility”—the freedom to set their own educational goals.⁶³ The College Board did little to counter this tendency and much to serve it. And, again, its influence was greatest in the middle and upper middle classes. A study of nationalizing influences in secondary education published in 1963 found that agencies like the National Science Foundation, the National Defense Education Act, and the College Board do help standardize secondary education and do tend to shift curricular decision-making from the local to the national level. The study looked at seven secondary schools in Illinois in depth and surveyed 240 high schools in the state, concluding that there were some nationalizing influences at work in all the schools, but that the strongest influence was on schools serving middle and upper middle class neighborhoods.⁶⁴ While the College Board inaugurated the College Scholarship Service during the fifties (a program of general utility to families of college-bound students), another major innovation—the Advanced Placement Program—served primarily private and very good public secondary schools which instituted new courses or reoriented old ones toward the Advanced Placement exams. These tests—taken in a recent year by some 55,000 students—are more content-related than the S.A.T.’s, place less reliance on multiple-choice response items, and are scored by committees of professors and teachers, not by machine. This whole pattern—from the make-up of the tests to their use by a small number of students from a small group of high schools applying to highly selective colleges—reproduces in *placement* the pattern the College Board followed for most of its history in *admissions*.

While the Board, then, through some of its programs continues to serve some colleges most, it is also important that it now serves most colleges. The Board examinations have come to be an important criterion of self-reference and self-esteem on a nationwide basis. As college attendance mushroomed in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the College Board provided a means of differentiating and stratifying students (by S. A. T. scores) and colleges (by *selectivity*: mean Board scores

⁶³ Frank Bowles, “Patterns of Dominance and Choice,” *College Board Record*, Vol. 38 (Spring, 1959).

⁶⁴ Roald F. Campbell and Robert A. Bunnell, ed., *Nationalizing Influences on Secondary Education* (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, 1963).

of students enrolled) in a single national prestige ranking. This nationalization of the Board has been a rapid and profound change, but it has been incomplete on two accounts.

First, the College Board is still less important in the Middle West than elsewhere. In fact, an agency competitive to the College Board was organized in Iowa in 1959. This group, the American College Testing Program, taps the same kind of skills the S.A.T.'s examine. The development of the new agency can be credited not to distinct goals but to the vast need for testing and to the traditional Middle Western distrust of the College Board as representative of the Eastern educational establishment. The A.C.T.'s are annually taken by a number of students equal to the number the Board tests, but they are almost all concentrated in the Middle West and parts of the South and West—and especially among students applying to state college systems. Of the 833 college members of the College Board listed in *Lovejoy's College Guide* for 1970, all require applicants to take the College Board exams except for twelve requiring the A.C.T. and forty-seven accepting either examination. The geographic distribution of these fifty-nine exceptions is striking: fifty-three are located in the Middle West, West, or South.

Second, as we have already observed, the College Board's national influence is centered on the upper social strata. The "selectivity" scale of colleges is of importance only to families and students who are so oriented at home and guided in school as to consider the whole range of college possibilities. For most college-bound students, college choice is not so problematic—there is the state university, its branches, or perhaps several local colleges from which to choose. For the middle and upper middle classes, however, choosing a college is a critical and traumatic event, and College Board scores, like tea leaves, are believed to contain one's whole future.

The S.A.T.'s have been called "our national matriculation exam"⁶⁵ and, qualifying this by the very important limits to the Board's national reach mentioned above, this seems a fair characterization. As the S.A.T.'s have become less a professional and somewhat occult instrument of the Eastern colleges and more a component of the personal profile of the middle and upper middle class adolescent, they have attracted more and more criticism.

Without singling out the Board, Pitirim Sorokin spoke out against the spread of "testolatry" and the influence of the "testocrats" in the middle fifties.⁶⁶ Senti-

⁶⁵ Campbell and Bunnell, p. 125.

⁶⁶ Pitirim Sorokin, *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1956).

ment in higher education for essay or subject-matter tests was far from dead. The president of Barnard advocated an essay supplement to the College Boards, pleading at the same time for a return to the study of classics, though she feared that this would be like "the baker trying to get the vitamins back in the bread."⁶⁷

In 1960 the Board itself sponsored a colloquium to consider problems of college admissions in which criticism of American education focussed on studies which indicated that many students admitted to college were of low academic ability and others without college ambitions had high aptitude. One participant called the situation "a sad indictment of American democracy" and the *New York Times* saw fit to editorialize in support of his position.⁶⁸ The same point of view, however, could be turned against the Board if the capacity of Board examinations to identify the best minds was doubted—and it was.

Prominent among the popular critics was Banesh Hoffmann whose articles appeared in journals with an upper middle-class audience: "Best Answers or Better Minds" in *American Scholar* in 1959 and "The Tyranny of Multiple-Choice Tests" in *Harper's* in 1961. These attacked the College Board exams and other standardized tests for rewarding the methodical over the insightful. Hoffmann was outraged by what he saw as the bias in standardized testing against creativity, depth, and subtlety. In the introduction to Hoffmann's 1962 *The Tyranny of Testing*, Jacques Barzun rhetorically agreed:

But if the tendency of such tests is to denature or misrepresent knowledge, to discourage the right habits of the true students, and to discriminate against the original in favor of the routine mind, of what use are such tests to a nation that has from its beginnings set a high value on instruction and the search for truth?⁶⁹

The use of the tests, as we have seen, has relatively little to do with instruction or the search for truth, a great deal to do with the perceived need to "identify, select, and appraise the best qualified individual competitors for membership and preferment within a meritocratic hierarchy."⁷⁰ Hoffmann's criticism, nevertheless, is of considerable significance. Without rejecting intellectual skill as the criterion for college admissions (and, *ipso facto*, as the criterion for social advancement and economic reward), he argues that the tests do not adequately

⁶⁷ Millicent McIntosh, quoted in *New York Times*, March 2, 1957, p. 16.

⁶⁸ Colloquium reported in *New York Times*, June 26, 1960, p. 1. The quotation is Samuel Stouffer's which the *Times* editorial page picked up the next day, June 27, 1960, p. 24.

⁶⁹ In Banesh Hoffmann, *The Tyranny of Testing* (New York: Crowell-Collier, 1962).

⁷⁰ Edgar Z. Friedenberg, "Can Testing Contribute to the Quest for Community Among Students?" in Commission on Tests, *Report of the Commission on Tests: II. Briefs* (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1970), p. 33.

measure that skill. This is anything but a rejection of tests and standards, yet it shows a willingness among educated middle-class laymen to challenge the tests and testers. While the authority of science might be unquestioned, the realization of scientific authority in practice is doubted.

The College Board leadership itself has been frank and sophisticated in its understanding of the examinations. The sorting function of the Board tests was acknowledged by the Board president, Frank Bowles, who told newsmen in 1958 that the object of testing is "to control the numerical flow of students into their institutions."⁷¹ At the same conference where this statement was made (a conference called in response to the growing salience of testing in the public mind and the desire of the testing agencies to allay fears and misunderstandings) more probing questions produced a less sophisticated homiletics. Wesley Walton, a spokesman for Educational Testing Service, defended the national scholarship testing programs (like the National Merit program) in these terms:

... these national testing activities emphasize in almost every high school in the country the idea that going to college is a desirable thing. These activities also highlight academic proficiency as something desirable

When asked, "Have you found out what happens to the tremendous number of students who take these scholarship examinations and do not win?" Walton replied:

There is no systematic evaluation of this. But I believe one beneficial result is that students are introduced to our American competitive system while they are in school instead of confronting it after they leave school and enter the labor force.⁷²

It would take no special talent to pillory these remarks. What is interesting is that so bald a statement as Walton's might be used not to defend but to attack the testing system today. In 1967 the College Board appointed a commission to critically evaluate its program and to plan testing activities to support open access to higher education. In the report of that Commission on Tests, released at the end of 1970, "our American competitive system" is challenged. The critical central section of *Righting the Balance* reviews major critiques of the Board—Hoffmann's being the first. The report dismisses Hoffmann's argument that the "wrong students" are selected by Board tests as empirically unfounded—there is no evidence, at any rate, that creative students are

⁷¹ Educational Testing Service, *Editors and Writers Conference on Testing* (Princeton, N.J.: Educational Testing Service, 1959), p. 34.

⁷² Educational Testing Service, p. 69.

any *more* penalized by the standardized tests than by normal classroom practice. What is most important about this refutation is how casually the Commission rebuffs Hoffmann while treating with greater care criticisms which, to this date, have been less well argued and no more supported by evidence.

Hoffmann's criticism is no longer politically salient and his assumptions about the aims of education, coming from the era in which he wrote, are closer to Walton's and the upper middle-class college-going public of 1958-1962 than to those of the Commission on Tests and the advocates of minority group student enrollment or open college admissions in 1970. Educational policy-making as well as criticism of education in the late fifties and early sixties centered on locating and developing intellectual talent, a perfectly understandable concern in a system designed to organize the meritocracy and stimulated by the scientific advances of Russia. The focus on equality of educational opportunity since then, product of a changed and charged political climate has led to the beginnings of a reevaluation of "talent" itself. The discussion was once about some presumably in-born, plastic reservoir of skills and ideas in individuals regardless of race or class and how to tap it through testing and schooling. It is now concerned with how to provide admittedly culture-bound training necessary to "make it" in the "national upper-middle class style" while keeping schools from destroying human will and potential, especially among working class and Black students.

Thus the Commission writes sympathetically of allegations that the Board examinations have helped corrupt the process of education. This, presumably, has been done by encouraging students in all of their school work to expect a "right answer," by channeling secondary school curricula toward test-preparatory courses, and by selecting for college only students who will normally do well in the college system as it is now set up—thus affording the colleges an automatic legitimation. This provides the colleges what the Commission terms a "rationale for nondevelopment" and helps freeze the national upper middle-class style.

The Commission accepts these criticisms of the College Board as valid. Further, it recognizes that the College Board has helped to perpetuate what has been viewed in this paper as a class-based, meritocratically legitimated system of stratification. But precise language is important here and it would be worth quoting the Commission itself at length:

How much good the Board's or anyone else's support of educative functions can do as long as so much of education is conducted in a competitive context is debatable. The benefits of competition are rarely extolled today, perhaps because the harmful effects of too much of it are clear, or perhaps because by emphasizing it we have not encouraged

and rewarded a wide enough range of talents, at least not until after a protracted apprenticeship in academic institutions. Certainly it is particularly unfortunate that *the characteristics that make for success in school work as it is commonly conducted are, if not specific to some segments of society, at least disproportionately distributed among its social classes and its racial and ethnic groups.*⁷³ [Emphasis added]

The report of the Commission on Tests, applauded by College Board officials, is an impressive document, a thoughtful consideration of the College Board and its functions in our society. If the Commission faltered, it did not do so on the side of naiveté. It does not hold, as others in the testing business have, that "testing, measurement, and evaluation have been with us for a long, long time. The original evaluation was when God . . . looked at everything he made and saw that it was *very good*."⁷⁴ Instead, it pays attention to the historically and culturally specific kind of evaluation we now have. It is not prey to the view that testing is designed in the interest of individuals being tested although others have argued that "the educational system in America has been developed primarily to serve individuals."⁷⁵ Instead, it recognizes that the interests of the colleges were those primarily taken into account.

The Commission reflects very well current criticism of the Board. It restates, in fact, the argument Bowdoin College used when in the beginning of 1970 it decided to drop the College Board tests as a requirement for admission. Bowdoin's admissions director, Richard Moll, told the press that the tests could not escape cultural bias and so "tend to work in favor of the more advantaged elements of our society, while handicapping others." This appeared to Fred Hechinger, *New York Times* education editor, to be an "inevitable" move away from machine-processed admissions, a revolt against the "computerization of man's condition."

"Inevitable" is a word to use with some caution. Colleges have not jumped to Bowdoin's bandwagon, and it is now more than two years since Bowdoin's decision was announced. Hechinger's comments obscure the difficult issues involved—and these have little to do with machine-processing or computerization. The difficulty with which Bowdoin and the Commission on Tests and oth-

⁷³ Commission on Tests, *Righting the Balance* (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1970), p. 50. *Righting the Balance* was reviewed by this author, *Harvard Educational Review*, 41 (November, 1971).

⁷⁴ William A. Mehrens and Irvin J. Lehman, *Standardized Tests in Education* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969), p. 3.

⁷⁵ John Folger and Charles Nam, "Trends in Education in Relation to the Occupational Structure," *Sociology of Education*, vol. 38 (Fall, 1964), p. 20.

ers are wrestling begins with our doubts that achievement as we have defined it is a measure of true merit. Definitions of merit appear class-bound in our class stratified society, culture-bound in our multi-culture society. There begins to be the suspicion that the allocation of economic, political, and social resources by educational attainment is "a difference of degree, not of kind"⁷⁶ from systems of inequality we would reject outright. Where Nicholas Murray Butler could speak glowingly of standardization, we worry about the ill effects of uniformity. The ideal of equality of opportunity, important as it has been for legislating the human rights of minorities, in the end seems to leave those very rights denatured. As the anthropologist Dorothy Lee has observed, the ideal of equality is a worthy ideal only when it is based on a belief in the intrinsic dignity of the human being, a dignity "incomparable and ultimate."⁷⁷ Our use of the idea of equality of opportunity woven into a meritocratic social order rests on the premise that human beings are comparable and finite, that their use-value can be measured and that such measurement is a legitimate basis for stratification.

This premise is no longer taken for granted. Where early Board reports could take pride in more and more successfully predictive tests of academic aptitude, the Commission on Tests wonders what besides academic aptitude should be tested. Where testing, we have been told, was supposed to reduce illegitimate discrimination—and has, to some extent, the Supreme Court now tells us that "diplomas and tests are useful servants, but Congress has mandated the common-sense proposition that they are not to become masters of reality."⁷⁸ Where once the Board and the many others who supported its efforts could see moral worth in creating a meritocracy, we now confront the gap between the grasp of testing in any form and the reach of the ideal of a good society.

⁷⁶ Jencks and Riesman, p. 151, remark that "elites based on knowledge are likely to be somewhat larger, somewhat less exclusive, somewhat less powerful, and somewhat more responsible than elites based on property" but that this "seems to be a difference of degree, not of kind."

⁷⁷ Dorothy Lee, *Freedom and Culture* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), pp. 39-52.

⁷⁸ Willie S. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., *U.S. Supreme Court Bulletin* (March 8, 1971).

*Towards a Political Economy of Education: A Radical Critique of Ivan Illich's Deschooling Society**

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The author critiques Ivan Illich's Deschooling Society, arguing that, despite his forthright vision of the liberating potential of educational technology, Illich fails to understand fully how the existing educational system serves the capitalist economy. Gintis evaluates and rejects the book's major thesis that the present character of schooling stems from the economy's need to shape consumer demands and expectations. Instead, he offers a production orientation which maintains that the repressive and unequal aspects of schooling derive from the need to supply a labor force compatible with the social relations of capitalist production. Gintis concludes that meaningful strategies for educational change must explicitly embrace a concomitant transformation of the mechanisms of power and privilege in the economic sphere.

Ivan Illich's *De-Schooling Society*, despite its bare 115 pages, embraces the world. Its ostensible focus on education moves him inexorably and logically through the panoply of human concerns in advanced industrial society—a society plainly in

* Ivan Illich, *Deschooling Society* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).

The ideas in this paper were developed in cooperation with Samuel Bowles, whose help in preparing this manuscript was integral.

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progressive disintegration and decay. With Yeats we may feel that "things fall apart/ The center cannot hold," but Illich's task is no less than to discover and analyze that "center." His endeavor affords the social scientist the unique and rare privilege to put in order the historical movements which characterize our age and define the prospects for a revolutionary future. Such is the subject of this essay.

This little book would have been unthinkable ten years ago. In it, Ivan Illich confronts the full spectrum of the modern crisis in values by rejecting the basic tenets of progressive liberalism. He dismisses what he calls the Myth of Consumption as a cruel and illusory ideology foisted upon the populace by a manipulative bureaucratic system. He treats welfare and service institutions as part of the problem, not as part of the solution. He rejects the belief that education constitutes the "great equalizer" and the path to personal liberation. Schools, say Illich, simply must be eliminated.

Illich does more than merely criticize; he conceptualizes constructive technological alternatives to repressive education. Moreover, he sees the present age as "revolutionary" because the existing social relations of economic and political life, including the dominant institutional structure of schooling, have become impediments to the development of liberating, socially productive technologies. Here Illich is relevant indeed, for the tension between technological possibility and social reality pervades all advanced industrial societies today. Despite our technological power, communities and environment continue to deteriorate, poverty and inequality persist, work remains alienating, and men and women are not liberated for self-fulfilling activity.

Illich's response is a forthright vision of participatory, decentralized, and liberating learning technologies, and a radically altered vision of social relations in education.

Yet, while his *description* of modern society is sufficiently critical, his *analysis* is simplistic and his program, consequently, is a diversion from the immensely complex and demanding political, organizational, intellectual, and personal demands of revolutionary reconstruction in the coming decades. It is crucial that educators and students who have been attracted to him—for his message does correspond to their personal frustration and disillusionment—move beyond him.

The first part of this essay presents Illich's analysis of the economically advanced society—the basis for his analysis of schools. Whereas Illich locates the source of the social problems and value crises of modern societies in their need to reproduce alienated patterns of *consumption*, I argue that these patterns are merely manifestations of the deeper workings of the economic system. The second part of the

essay attempts to show that Illich's over-emphasis on consumption leads him to a very partial understanding of the functions of the educational system and the contradictions presently besetting it, and hence to ineffective educational alternatives and untenable political strategies for the implementation of desirable educational technologies.

Finally, I argue that a radical theory of educational reform becomes viable only by envisioning liberating and equal education as serving and being served by a radically altered nexus of social relations in *production*. Schools may lead or lag in this process of social transformation, but structural changes in the educational process can be socially relevant only when they speak to potentials for liberation and equality in our day-to-day labors. In the final analysis "de-schooling" is irrelevant because we cannot "de-factory," "de-office," or "de-family," save perhaps at the still unenvisioned end of a long process of social reconstruction.

The Social Context of Modern Schooling: Institutionalized Values and Commodity Fetishism

Educational reformers commonly err by treating the system of schools as if it existed in a social vacuum. Illich does not make this mistake. Rather, he views the internal irrationalities of modern education as reflections of the larger society. The key to understanding the problems of advanced industrial economies, he argues, lies in the character of its consumption activities and the ideology which supports them. The schools in turn are exemplary models of bureaucracies geared toward the indoctrination of docile and manipulable consumers.

Guiding modern social life and interpersonal behavior, says Illich, is a destructive system of "institutionalized values" which determine how one perceives one's needs and defines instruments for their satisfaction. The process which creates institutional values insures that all individual needs—physical, psychological, social, intellectual, emotional, and spiritual—are transformed into demands for goods and services. In contrast to the "psychological impotence" which results from institutionalized values, Illich envisages the "psychic health" which emerges from self-realization—both personal and social. Guided by institutionalized values, one's well-being lies not in what one *does* but in what one *has*—the status of one's job and the level of material consumption. For the active person, goods are merely means to or instruments in the performance of activities; for the passive consumer, however, goods are ends in themselves, and activity is merely the means toward sus-

taining or displaying a desired level of consumption. Thus institutionalized values manifest themselves psychologically in a rigorous fetishism—in this case, of commodities and public services. Illich's vision rests in the negation of commodity fetishism¹:

I believe that a desirable future depends on our deliberately . . . engendering a life style which will enable us to be spontaneous, independent, yet related to each other; rather than maintaining a life style which only allows us to make and unmake, produce and consume. (*De-Schooling Society*, hereafter *DS*, p. 52)

Commodity fetishism is institutionalized in two senses. First, the "delivery systems" in modern industrial economies (i.e., the suppliers of goods and services) are huge, bureaucratic institutions which treat individuals as mere receptors for their products. Goods are supplied by hierarchical and impersonal corporate enterprises, while services are provided by welfare bureaucracies which enjoy ". . . a professional, political and financial monopoly over the social imagination, setting standards of what is valuable and what is feasible. . . . A whole society is initiated into the Myth of Unending Consumption of services" (*DS*, p. 44).

Second, commodity fetishism is institutionalized in the sense that the values of passive consumerism are induced and reinforced by the same "delivery systems" whose ministrations are substitutes for self-initiated activities.

. . . manipulative institutions . . . are either socially or psychologically 'addictive.' Social addiction . . . consists in the tendency to prescribe increased treatment if smaller quantities have not yielded the desired results. Psychological addiction . . . results when consumers become hooked on the need for more and more of the process or product. (*DS*, p. 55)

These delivery systems moreover "both invite compulsively repetitive use and frustrate alternative ways of achieving similar results." For example, General Motors and Ford

. . . produce means of transportation, but they also, and more importantly, manipulate public taste in such a way that the need for transportation is expressed as a demand for private cars rather than public buses. They sell the desire to control a machine, to race at high speeds in luxurious comfort, while also offering the fantasy at the end of the road. (*DS*, p. 57)

¹ Illich himself does not use the term "commodity fetishism." I shall do so, however, as it is more felicitous than "institutionalized values" in many contexts.

This analysis of addictive manipulation in private production is, of course, well-developed in the literature.² Illich's contribution is to extend it to the sphere of service and welfare bureaucracies:

Finally, teachers, doctors, and social workers realize that their distinct professional ministrations have one aspect—at least—in common. They create further demands for the institutional treatments they provide, faster than they can provide service institutions. (DS, p. 112)

The well-socialized naturally react to these failures simply by increasing the power and jurisdiction of welfare institutions. Illich's reaction, of course, is precisely the contrary.

The Political Response to Institutionalized Values

As the basis for his educational proposals, Illich's overall framework bears close attention. Since commodity fetishism is basically a psychological stance, it must first be attacked on an individual rather than political level. For Illich, each individual is responsible for his/her own demystification. The institutionalization of values occurs not through external coercion, but through psychic manipulation, so its rejection is an apolitical act of individual will. The movement for social change thus becomes a cultural one of raising consciousness.

But even on this level, political action in the form of *negating* psychic manipulation is crucial. Goods and services as well as welfare bureaucracies must be *prohibited* from disseminating fetishistic values. Indeed, this is the basis for a political program of de-schooling. The educational system, as a coercive source of institutionalized values, must be denied its preferred status. Presumably, this "politics of negation" would extend to advertising and all other types of psychic manipulation.

Since the concrete social manifestation of commodity fetishism is a grossly *inflated level of production* and consumption, the second step in Illich's political program is the substitution of leisure for work. Work is evil for Illich—unrewarding by its very nature—and not to be granted the status of "activity":

... 'making and acting' are different, so different, in fact, that one never includes the

² See for instance: Herbert Gintis, "Commodity Fetishism and Irrational Production," (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Institute for Economic Research, 1970); "Consumer Behavior and the Concept of Sovereignty," *American Economic Review*, forthcoming; "A Radical Analysis of Welfare Economics and Individual Development," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, forthcoming; John K. Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963); Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

other. . . . Modern technology has increased the ability of man to relinquish the 'making' of things to machines, and his potential time for 'acting' has increased. . . . Unemployment is the sad idleness of a man who, contrary to Aristotle, believes that making things, or working, is virtuous and that idleness is bad. (*DS*, p. 62)

Again, Illich's shift in the work-leisure choice is basically apolitical and will follow naturally from the abolition of value indoctrination. People work so hard and long because they are taught to believe the fruits of their activities—consumption—are intrinsically worthy. Elimination of the "hard-sell pitch" of bureaucratic institutions will allow individuals to discover *within themselves* the falsity of the doctrine.

The third stage in Illich's political program envisages the necessity of concrete change in social "delivery systems." Manipulative institutions must be *dismantled*, to be replaced by organizational forms which allow for the free development of individuals. Illich calls such institutions "convivial," and associates them with leftist political orientation.

The regulation of convivial institutions sets limits to their use; as one moves from the convivial to the manipulative end of the spectrum, the rules progressively call for unwilling consumption or participation. . . . Toward, but not at, the left on the institutional spectrum, we can locate enterprises which compete with others in their own field, but have not begun notably to engage in advertising. Here we find hand laundries, small bakeries, hairdressers, and—to speak of professionals—some lawyers and music teachers. . . . They acquire clients through their personal touch and the comparative quality of their services. (*DS*, p. 55-6)

In short, Illich's Good Society is based on small scale entrepreneurial (as opposed to corporate) capitalism, with perfectly competitive markets in goods and services. The role of the state in this society is the prevention of manipulative advertising, the development of left-convivial technologies compatible with self-initiating small-group welfare institutions (education, health and medical services, crime prevention and rehabilitation, community development, etc.) and the provisioning of the social infrastructure (e.g., public transportation). Illich's proposal for "learning webs" in education is only a particular application of this vision of left-convivial technologies.

Assessing Illich's Politics: An Overview

Illich's model of consumption-manipulation is crucial at every stage of his political argument. But it is substantially incorrect. In the following three sections I shall criticize three basic thrusts of his analysis.

First, Illich locates the source of social decay in the autonomous, manipulative behavior of corporate bureaucracies. I shall argue, in contrast, that the source must be sought in the normal operation of the basic *economic* institutions of capitalism (markets in factors of production, private control of resources and technology, etc.),³ which consistently sacrifice the healthy development of community, work, environment, education, and social equality to the accumulation of capital and the growth of marketable goods and services. Moreover, given that individuals must participate in economic activity, these social outcomes are quite insensitive to the preferences or values of individuals, and are certainly in no sense a reflection of the autonomous wills of manipulating bureaucrats or gullible consumers. Hence merely ending "manipulation" while maintaining basic economic institutions will affect the rate of social decay only minimally.

Second, Illich locates the *source* of consumer consciousness in the manipulative socialization of individuals by agencies controlled by corporate and welfare bureaucracies. This "institutionalized consciousness" induces individuals to choose outcomes not in conformity with their "real" needs. I shall argue, in contrast, that a causal analysis can *never* take socialization agencies as basic explanatory variables in assessing the overall behavior of the social system.⁴ In particular, consumer consciousness is generated through *the day-to-day activities and observations* of individuals in capitalist society. The sales pitches of manipulative institutions, rather than *generating* the values of commodity fetishism, merely *capitalize* upon and *reinforce* a set of values derived from and reconfirmed by daily personal experience in the social system. In fact, while consumer behavior may seem irrational and fetishistic, it is a reasonable accommodation to the options for meaningful social outlets *in the context* of capitalist institutions. Hence the abolition of addictive propaganda cannot "liberate" the individual to "free choice" of personal goals. Such choice is still conditioned by the pattern of social processes which have historically rendered him or her amenable to "institutionalized values." In fact, the likely outcome of de-manipulation of values would be no significant alteration of values at all.

³ Throughout this paper, I restrict my analysis to *capitalist* as opposed to other economic systems of advanced industrial societies (e.g., state-socialism of the Soviet Union type). As Illich suggests, the *outcomes* are much the same, but the *mechanisms* are in fact quite different. The private-administrative economic power of a capitalist elite is mirrored by the public-administrative political power of a bureaucratic elite in state-socialist countries, and both are used to produce a similar complex of social relations of production and a structurally equivalent system of class relations. The capitalist variety is emphasized here because of its special relevance in the American context.

⁴ Gintis, "Consumer Behavior and the Concept of Sovereignty."

Moreover, the ideology of commodity fetishism not only *reflects* the day-to-day operations of the economic system, it is also *functionally necessary* to motivate men/women to accept and participate in the system of alienated production, to peddle their (potentially) creative activities to the highest bidder through the market in labor, to accept the destruction of their communities, and to bear allegiance to an economic system whose market institutions and patterns of control of work and community systematically subordinate all social goals to the criteria of profit and marketable product. Thus the weakening of institutionalized values would in itself lead logically either to unproductive and undirected social chaos (witness the present state of counter-culture movements in the United States) or to a rejection of the social relations of capitalist production along with commodity fetishism.

Third, Illich argues that the goal of social change is to transform institutions according to the criterion of "non-addictiveness," or "left-conviviality." However, since manipulation and addictiveness are not the sources of social decay, their elimination offers no cure. Certainly the implementation of left-convivial forms in welfare and service agencies—however desirable in itself—will not counter the effects of capitalist development on social life. More important, Illich's criterion explicitly accepts those basic economic institutions which structure decision-making power, lead to the growth of corporate and welfare bureaucracies, and lie at the root of social decay. Thus Illich's criterion must be replaced by one of democratic, participatory, and rationally decentralized control over social outcomes in factory, office, community, schools, and media. The remainder of this essay will elucidate the alternative analysis and political strategy as focused on the particular case of the educational system.

Economic Institutions and Social Development

In line with Illich's suggestion, we may equate individual welfare with the pattern of day-to-day *activities* the individual enters into, together with the personal *capacities*—physical, cognitive, affective, spiritual, and aesthetic—he or she has developed toward their execution and appreciation. Most individual activity is not purely personal, but is based on social interaction and requires a social setting conducive to developing the relevant capacities for performance. That is, activities take place within socially structured domains, characterized by legitimate and socially acceptable roles available to the individual in social relations. The most

important of these activity contexts are work, community, and natural environment. The character of individual participation in these contexts—the defining roles one accepts as worker and community member and the way one relates to one's environment—is a basic determinant of well-being and individual development.

These activity contexts, as I shall show, are structured in turn by the way people structure their *productive relations*. The study of activity contexts in capitalist society must begin with an understanding of the basic economic institutions which regulate their historical development.

The most important of these institutions are: 1) *private ownership* of factors of production (land, labor, and capital), according to which the owner has full control over their disposition and development; 2) *a market in labor*, according to which a) the worker is divorced, by and large, from ownership of non-human factors of production (land and capital), b) the worker relinquishes control over the disposition of his labor during the stipulated workday by exchanging it for money, and c) the price of a particular type of labor (skilled or unskilled, white-collar or blue-collar, physical, mental, managerial, or technical) is determined essentially by supply and demand; 3) *a market in land*, according to which the price of each parcel of land is determined by supply and demand, and the use of such parcels is individually determined by the highest bidder; 4) income determination on the basis of the *market-dictated returns to owned factors* of production; 5) *markets in essential commodities*—food, shelter, social insurance, medical care; and 6) *control of the productive process by owners of capital* or their managerial representatives.⁵

Because essential goods, services, and activity contexts are marketed, income is a prerequisite to social existence. Because factors of production are privately owned and market-determined factor returns are the legitimate source of income, and because most workers possess little more than their own labor services, they are required to provide these services to the economic system. Thus control over the developing of work roles and of the social technology of production passes into the hands of the representatives of capital.

Thus the activity context of work becomes alienated in the sense that its structure and historical development do not conform to the needs of the individuals it affects.⁶ Bosses determine the technologies and social relations of production within

⁵ The arguments in this section are presented at greater length in Gintis, "Power and Alienation," in *Readings in Political Economy*, ed. James Weaver (Rockleigh, N. J.: Allyn and Bacon, forthcoming, 1972) and "Consumer Behavior and the Concept of Sovereignty."

⁶ This definition conforms to Marxist usage in that "alienation" refers to *social processes*, not psychological states. For some discussion of this term in Marxist literature, see Gintis, "Power and Alienation," and "Consumer Behavior and the Concept of Sovereignty."

the enterprise on the basis of three criteria. First, production must be flexibly organized for decision-making and secure managerial control from the highest levels downward. This means generally that technologies employed must be compatible with hierarchical authority and a fragmented, task-specific division of labor.⁷ The need to maintain effective administrative power leads to bureaucratic order in production, the hallmark of modern corporate organization. Second, among all technologies and work roles compatible with secure and flexible control from the top, bosses choose those which minimize costs and maximize profits. Finally, bosses determine product attributes—and hence the “craft rationality” of production—according to their contribution to gross sales and growth of the enterprise. Hence the decline in pride of workmanship and quality of production associated with the Industrial Revolution.

There is no reason to believe that a great deal of desirable work is not possible. On the contrary, evidence indicates that decentralization, worker control, the re-introduction of craft in production, job rotation, and the elimination of the most constraining aspects of hierarchy are both feasible and potentially efficient. But such work roles develop in an institutional context wherein control, profit, and growth regulate the development of the social relations of production. Unalienated production must be the result of the revolutionary transformation of the basic institutions which Illich implicitly accepts.

The development of communities as activity contexts also must be seen in terms of basic economic institutions. The market in land, by controlling the organic development of communities, not only produces the social, environmental, and aesthetic monstrosities we call “metropolitan areas,” but removes from the community the creative, synthesizing power that lies at the base of true solidarity. Thus communities become agglomerates of isolated individuals with few common activities and impersonal and apathetic interpersonal relations.

A community cannot thrive when it holds no effective power over the autonomous activities of profit-maximizing capitalists. Rather, a true community is *itself* a creative, initiating, and synthesizing agent, with the power to determine the architectural unity of its living and working spaces and their coordination, the power to allocate community property to social uses such as participatory child-care and community recreation centers, and the power to insure the preservation and development of its natural ecological environment. This is not an idle utopian dream. Many living-working communities do exhibit architectural, aesthetic, social, and

⁷ See the essay by Stephen Marglin, “What Do Bosses Do?” unpublished, Dept. of Economics, Harvard University, 1971.

ecological integrity: the New England town, the Dutch village, the moderate-sized cities of Mali in sub-Saharan Africa, and the desert communities of Djerba in Tunisia. True, these communities are fairly static and untouched by modern technology; but even in a technologically advanced country the potential for decent community is great, given the proper pattern of community decision mechanisms.

The normal operation of the basic economic institutions of capitalism thus render major activity contexts inhospitable to human beings. Our analysis of work and community could easily be extended to include ecological environment and economic equality with similar conclusions.⁸

This analysis undermines Illich's treatment of public service bureaucracies. Illich holds that service agencies (including schools) fail because they are manipulative, and expand because they are psychologically addictive. In fact, they do not fail at all. And they expand because they exist as integral links in the larger institutional allocation of unequal power and income. Illich's simplistic treatment of this area is illustrated in his explanation for the expansion of military operations:

The boomerang effect in war is becoming more obvious: the higher the body count of dead Vietnamese, the more enemies the United States acquires around the world; likewise, the more the United States must spend to create another manipulative institution—cynically dubbed 'pacification'—in a futile effort to absorb the side effects of war. (*DS*, p. 54)

Illich's theory of addiction as motivation proposes that, once begun, one thing naturally leads to another. Actually, however, the purpose of the military is the maintenance of aggregate demand and high levels of employment, as well as aiding the expansion of international sources of resource supply and capital investment. Expansion is not the result of addiction but a primary characteristic of the entire system.⁹

Likewise from a systematic point of view, penal, mental illness, and poverty agencies are meant to contain the dislocations arising from the fragmentation of work and community and the institutionally determined inequality in income and power. Yet Illich argues only:

... jail increases both the quality and the quantity of criminals, that, in fact, it often creates them out of mere nonconformists ... mental hospitals, nursing homes, and orphan asylums do much the same thing. These institutions provide their clients with the destructive self-

⁸ See Michael Reich and David Finkelhor, "The Military-Industrial Complex," in *The Capitalist System*, ed. Richard C. Edwards, Michael Reich, and Thomas Weisskopf (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

⁹ See Gintis, "Power and Alienation," for a concise summary.

image of the psychotic, the overaged, or the waif, and provide a rationale for the existence of entire professions, just as jails produce income for wardens. (*DS*, p. 54)

Further, the cause of expansion of service agencies lies *not* in their addictive nature, but in their failure even to attempt to deal with the institutional sources of social problems. The normal operation of basic economic institutions progressively aggravates these problems, hence requiring increased response on the part of welfare agencies.

The Roots of Consumer Behavior

To understand consumption in capitalist society requires a *production* orientation, in contrast to Illich's emphasis on "institutionalized values" as basic explanatory variables. Individuals consume as they do—and hence acquire values and beliefs concerning consumption—because of the place consumption activity holds among the constellation of available alternatives for social expression. These alternatives directly involve the quality of basic activity contexts surrounding social life—contexts which, as I have argued, develop according to the criteria of capital accumulation through the normal operation of economic institutions.

What at first glance seems to be an irrational preoccupation with income and consumption in capitalist society, is seen within an activity context paradigm to be a logical response on the part of the individual to what Marx isolated as the central tendency of capitalist society: the transformation of all complex social relations into impersonal *quid-pro-quo* relations. One implication of this transformation is the progressive decay of social activity contexts described in the previous section, a process which reduces their overall contribution to individual welfare. Work, community, and environment become sources of pain and displeasure rather than inviting contexts for social relations. The reasonable individual response, then, is a) to disregard the development of personal capacities which would be humanly satisfying in activity contexts which are not available and, hence, to fail to demand changed activity contexts and b) to emphasize consumption and to develop those capacities which are most relevant to consumption *per se*.

Second, the transformation of complex social relations to exchange relations implies that the dwindling stock of healthy activity contexts is parceled out among individuals almost strictly according to income. High-paying jobs are by and large the least alienating; the poor live in the most fragmented communities and are subjected to the most inhuman environments; contact with natural environment

is limited to periods of *vacation*, and the length and desirability of this contact is based on the means to pay.

Thus commodity fetishism becomes a *substitute* for meaningful activity contexts, and a *means of access* to those that exist. The "sales pitch" of Madison Avenue is accepted because, in the given context, it is true. It may not be much, but it's all we've got. The indefensibility of its more extreme forms (e.g., susceptibility to deodorant and luxury automobile advertising) should not divert us from comprehending this essential rationality.

In conclusion, it is clear that the motivational basis of consumer behavior derives from the everyday observation and experience of individuals, and consumer values are not "aberrations" induced by manipulative socialization. Certainly there is no reason to believe that individuals would consume or work much less were manipulative socialization removed. Insofar as such socialization is required to *stabilize* commodity fetishist values, its elimination might lead to the overthrow of capitalist *institutions*—but that of course is quite outside Illich's scheme.

The Limitations of Left-Convivial Technologies

Since Illich views the "psychological impotence" of the individual in his/her "addictedness" to the ministrations of corporate and state bureaucracies as the basic problem of contemporary society, he defines the desirable "left-convivial" institutions by the criterion of "non-addictiveness."

Applied to commodities or welfare services, this criterion is perhaps sufficient. But applied to major contexts of social activities, it is inappropriate. It is not possible for individuals to treat their work, their communities, and their environment in a simply instrumental manner. For better or worse, these social spheres, by regulating the individual's social activity, became a major determinant of his/her psychic development, and in an important sense define *who* he/she is. Indeed, the solution to the classical "problem of order" in society¹⁰ is solved only by the individual's becoming "addicted" to his/her social forms by *participating through them*.¹¹ In remaking society, individuals do more than expand their freedom of choice—they change *who they are*, their self-definition, in the process. The criticism of alienated social spheres is not simply that they deprive individuals of necessary

¹⁰ Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York: Free Press, 1939).

¹¹ Karl Marx, *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1959) and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Germany Ideology* (New York: International Publishers, 1947).

instruments of activity, but that in so doing they tend to produce in all of us something less than *we intend to be*.

The irony of Illich's analysis is that by erecting "addictiveness vs. instrumentality" as the central welfare criterion, he himself assumes a commodity fetishist mentality. In essence, he posits the individual *outside* of society and using social forms as instruments in his/her preexisting ends. For instance, Illich does not speak of work as "addictive," because in fact individuals treat work first as a "disutility" and second as an instrument toward other ends (consumption). The alienation of work poses no threat to the "sovereignty" of the worker because he is not addicted to it. By definition, then, capitalist work, communities, and environments are "non-addictive" and left-convivial. Illich's consideration of the capitalist enterprise as "right-manipulative" only with respect to the consumer is a perfect example of this "reification" of the social world. In contrast, I would argue that work is *necessarily addictive* in the larger sense of determining who a man/woman is as a human being.

The addictive vs. instrumental (or, equivalently, manipulative vs. convivial) criterion is relevant only if we posit an essential "human nature" prior to social experience. Manipulation can then be seen as the perversion of the natural essence of the individual, and the de-institutionalization of values allows the individual to return to his/her essential self for direction. But the concept of the individual prior to society is nonsense. All individuals are concrete persons, uniquely developed through their particular articulation with social life.

The poverty of Illich's "addictiveness" criterion is dramatized in his treatment of technology. While he correctly recognizes that technology can be developed for purposes of either repression or liberation, his conception requires that the correct unalienated development of technological and institutional forms will follow from a simple aggregation of individual preferences over "left-convivial" alternatives.

The same analysis which I applied to the atomistic aggregation of preferences in the determination of activity contexts applies here as well: there is no reason to believe that ceding control of technological innovation and diffusion to a few, while rendering them subject to market criteria of success and failure, will produce desirable outcomes. Indeed this is *precisely* the mechanism operative in the private capitalist economy, with demonstrably adverse outcomes. According to the criterion of left-conviviality, the historical development of technology in *both* private and public spheres will conform to criteria of profitability and entrepreneurial control. Citizens are reduced to *passive consumers*, picking and choosing among the technological alternatives a technological elite presents to them.

In contrast, it seems clear to me that individuals must exercise direct control over technology in structuring their various social environments, thereby developing and coming to understand their needs through their exercise of power. The control of technical and institutional forms must be vested directly in the group of individuals involved in a social activity, else the alienation of these individuals from one another becomes a *postulate* of the technical and institutional development of this social activity—be it in factory, office, school, or community.

In summary, the facile criterion of left-conviviality must be replaced by the less immediate—but correct—criterion of *unalienated social outcomes*: the institutionally mediated allocation of power must be so ordered that social outcomes conform to the wills and needs of participating individuals, and the quality of participation must be such as to promote the full development of individual capacities for self-understanding and social effectiveness.

Schooling: The Pre-Alienation of Docile Consumers

Everywhere the hidden curriculum of schooling initiates the citizen to the myth that bureaucracies guided by scientific knowledge are efficient and benevolent. . . . And everywhere it develops the habit of self-defeating consumption of services and alienating production, the tolerance for institutional dependence, and the recognition of institutional rankings. (DS, p. 74)

Illich sets his analysis of the educational system squarely on its strategic position in reproducing the economic relations of the larger society. While avoiding the inanity of reformers, who see "liberated education" as compatible with current capitalist political and economic institutions, he rejects the rigidity of old-style revolutionaries, who would see even more repressive (though different) education as a tool in forging "socialist consciousness" in the Workers' State.

What less perceptive educators have viewed as irrational, mean, and petty in modern schooling, Illich views as merely reflecting the operation of all manipulative institutions. In the first place, he argues, the educational system takes its place alongside other service bureaucracies, selling a manipulative, pre-packaged product, rendering their services addictive, and monopolizing all alternatives to self-initiated education on the part of individuals and small consenting groups.

Yet, argues Illich, schools cannot possibly achieve their goal of promoting learning. For as in every dimension of human experience, learning is the result of personal activity, not professional ministration:

Most learning is not the result of instruction. It is rather the result of unhampered participation in a meaningful setting. Most people learn best by being 'with it,' yet school makes them identify their personal, cognitive growth with elaborate planning and manipulation. (DS, p. 39)

Thus, as with all bureaucratic service institutions, schools fail by their very nature. And true to form, the more they fail, the more reliance is placed on them, and the more they expand:

Everywhere in the world school costs have risen faster than enrollments and faster than the GNP, everywhere expenditures on school fall even further behind the expectations of parents, teachers, and pupils. . . . School gives unlimited opportunity for legitimated waste, so long as its destructiveness goes unrecognized and the cost of palliatives goes up. (DS, p. 10)

From the fact that schools do not promote learning, however, Illich does not conclude that schools are simply irrational or discardable. Rather, he asserts their central role in creating docile and manipulable consumers for the larger society. For just as these men and women are defined by the quality of their *possessions* rather than of their *activities*, so they must learn to "transfer responsibility from self to institutions. . . ."

Once a man or woman has accepted the need for school, he or she is easy prey for other institutions. Once young people have allowed their imaginations to be formed by curricular instruction, they are conditioned to institutional planning of every sort. 'Instruction' smothers the horizon of their imaginations. (DS, p. 39)

Equally they learn that anything worthwhile is standardized, certified, and can be purchased.

Even more lamentable, repressive schooling forces commodity fetishism on individuals by thwarting their development of personal capacities for autonomous and initiating social activity:

People who have been schooled down to size let unmeasured experience slip out of their hands. . . . They do not have to be robbed of their creativity. Under instruction, they have unlearned to 'do' their thing or 'be' themselves, and value only what has been made or could be made. . . . (DS, p. 40)

Recent research justifies Illich's emphasis on the "hidden curriculum" of schooling. Mass public education has not evolved into its present bureaucratic, hierarchical, and authoritarian form because of the organizational prerequisites of imparting cognitive skills. Such skills may in fact be more efficiently developed in demo-

cratic, non-repressive atmospheres.¹² Rather, the social relations of education produce and reinforce those values, attitudes, and affective capacities which allow individuals to move smoothly into an alienated and class-stratified society. That is, schooling reproduces the social relations of the larger society from generation to generation.¹³

Again, however, it does *not* follow that schooling finds its predominant function in reproducing the social relations of *consumption per se*. Rather, it is the social relations of *production* which are relevant to the form and function of modern schooling.

A production orientation to the analysis of schooling—that the “hidden curriculum” in mass education reproduces the social relations of production—is reinforced in several distinct bodies of current educational research. First, economists have shown that education, in its role of providing a properly trained labor force, takes its place alongside capital accumulation and technological change as a major source of economic growth.¹⁴ Level of educational attainment is the major non-ascriptive variable in furthering the economic position of individuals.

Second, research shows that the type of personal development produced through schooling and relevant to the individual's productivity as a worker in a capitalist enterprise is primarily *non-cognitive*. That is, profit-maximizing firms find it remunerative to hire more highly educated workers at higher pay, essentially *irrespective* of differences among individuals in cognitive abilities or attainments.¹⁵ In other words, two individuals (white American males) with identical cognitive

¹² The literature on this subject is immense. Illich himself is quite persuasive, but see also Charles E. Silberman, *Crisis in the Classroom* (New York: Random House, 1970), for a more detailed treatment.

¹³ Gintis, “Contre-Culture et Militantisme Politique,” *Les Temps Modernes* (February, 1971) “New Working Class and Revolutionary Youth,” *Socialist Revolution* (May, 1970); and “Education and the Characteristics of Worker Productivity,” *American Economic Review* (May, 1971); David Cohen and Marvin Lazerson, “Education and the Corporate Order,” *Socialist Revolution*, March 1972; Clarence Karrier, “Testing for Order and Control,” *Education Theory*, forthcoming; Michael B. Katz, *The Irony of Early School Reform* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968) and “From Voluntarism to Bureaucracy in American Education,” *Sociology of Education*, forthcoming, 1972; Joel Spring, “Education and Progressivism,” *History of Education* (Spring, 1970); and Robert Dreeben, *On What Is Learned in Schools* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968).

¹⁴ See Edward F. Denison, *The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States and the Alternatives Before Us* (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1962) and Theodore Schultz, *The Economic Value of Education* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

¹⁵ This surprising result is developed in Gintis, “Education and the Characteristics of Worker Productivity,” and is based on a wide variety of statistical data. It is validated and extended by Christopher Jencks *et al.*, *Education and Inequality* (New York: Basic Books, forthcoming, 1972).

achievements (intelligence or intellectual attainment) but differing educational levels will not command, on the average, the same income or occupational status. Rather, the economic success of each will correspond closely to the average for his educational level. All individuals with the same level of educational attainment tend to have the same expected mean economic success (racial and sexual discrimination aside). This is not to say that cognitive skills are not necessary to job adequacy in a technological society. Rather, these skills either exist in such profusion (through schooling) or are so easily developed on the job that they are not a criterion for hiring. Nor does this mean that there is no correlation between cognitive attainments (e.g., IQ) and occupational status. Such a correlation exists (although it is quite loose),¹⁶ but is almost totally mediated by formal schooling: the educational system discriminates in favor of the more intelligent, although its contribution to worker productivity does not operate primarily *via* cognitive development.¹⁷

Thus the education-related worker attributes that employers willingly pay for must be predominantly *affective* characteristics—personality traits, attitudes, modes of self-presentation and motivation. How affective traits that are rewarded in schools come to correspond to the needs of alienated production is revealed by direct inspection of the social relations of the classroom. First, students are rewarded in terms of grades for exhibiting the personality characteristics of good workers in bureaucratic work roles—proper subordinancy in relation to authority and the primacy of cognitive as opposed to affective and creative modes of social response—above and beyond any actual effect they may have on cognitive achievement.¹⁸ Second, the hierarchical structure of schooling itself mirrors the social relations of industrial production: students cede control over their learning activities to teachers in the classroom. Just as workers are alienated from both the *process* and the *product* of their work activities, and must be motivated by the external reward of pay and hierarchical status, so the student learns to operate efficiently through the external reward of grades and promotion, effectively alienated from the process of education (learning) and its product (knowledge). Just as the work process is stratified, and workers on different levels in the hierarchy of authority and status are required to display substantively distinct patterns of values, aspirations, personality traits, and modes of “social presentation” (dress, manner of speech, per-

¹⁶ See, e.g., Jencks *et al.*

¹⁷ For more extensive treatment, see Jencks *et al.* and Gintis, “Education and the Characteristics of Worker Productivity.”

¹⁸ For an analysis of relevant data and an extensive bibliography, see Gintis, “Education and the Characteristics of Worker Productivity,” and “Alienation and Power,” diss., Harvard University, 1969.

sonal identification, and loyalties to a particular social stratum),¹⁹ so the school system stratifies, tracks, and structures social interaction according to criteria of social class and relative scholastic success.²⁰ The most effectively indoctrinated students are the most valuable to the economic enterprise or state bureaucracy, and also the most successfully integrated into a particular stratum within the hierarchical educational process.²¹

Third, a large body of historical research indicates that the system of mass, formal, and compulsory education arose more or less directly out of changes in productive relations associated with the Industrial Revolution, in its role of supplying a properly socialized and stratified labor force.²²

The critical turning points in the history of American education have coincided with the perceived failure of the school system to fulfill its functional role in reproducing a properly socialized and stratified labor force, in the face of important qualitative or quantitative changes in the social relations of production. In these periods (e.g., the emergence of the common school system) numerous options were open and openly discussed.²³ The conflict of economic interests eventually culminated in the functional reorientation of the educational system to new labor needs of an altered capitalism.

In the mid- to late 19th century, this took the form of the economy's need to generate a labor force compatible with the factory system from a predominantly agricultural populace. Later, the crisis in education corresponded to the economy's need to import peasant European labor whose social relations of production and derivative culture were incompatible with industrial wage-labor. The resolution

¹⁹ This phenomenon is analyzed in Claus Offe, *Leistungsprinzip und Industrielle Arbeit* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlaganstalt, 1970).

²⁰ See Merle Curti, *The Social Ideas of American Educators* (Chicago: C. Scribners Sons, 1935); Gintis, "Contre-Culture et Militantisme Politique"; Gorz, "Capitalist Relations of Production and the Socially Necessary Labor Force," in *All We Are Saying . . .*, ed. Arthur Lothstein (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970) and "Technique, Techniciens, et Lutte de Classes"; Samuel Bowles, "Unequal Education and the Reproduction of the Social Division of Labor," in *The Capitalist System*, ed., Edwards, Reich, and Weisskopf; and "Contradictions de L'enseignement Supérieure" *Les Temps Modernes*, Août-Sept., 1971; and David Bruck, "The Schools of Lowell," honors thesis (unpublished), Harvard University, 1971.

²¹ This statement is supported by the statistical results of Richard C. Edwards, Diss., Department of Economics, Harvard University, in progress.

²² Katz, *The Irony of Early School Reform* and "From Voluntarism to Bureaucracy in American Education"; Lawrence Cremin, *The Transformation of the School* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964); Raymond E. Callahan, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Curti; Bowles, "Unequal Education and the Reproduction of the Social Division of Labor"; Spring; Cohen and Lazerson.

²³ See David B. Tyack, *Turning Points in American Educational History* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1967); and Katz.

of this crisis was a hierarchical, centralized school system corresponding to the ascendancy of corporate production. This resolution was not without its own contradictions. It is at this time that the modern school became the focus of tensions between work and play, between the culture of school and the culture of immigrant children, and between the notion of meritocracy and equality. Thus while Illich can *describe* the characteristics of contemporary education, his consumption orientation prevents him from understanding how the system came to be.

It seems clear that schools instill the values of docility, degrees of subordination corresponding to different levels in the hierarchy of production, and motivation according to external reward. It seems also true that they do not reward, but instead penalize, creative, self-initiated, cognitively flexible behavior. By inhibiting the full development of individual capacities for meaningful individual activity, schools produce Illich's contended outcomes: the individual as passive receptor replaces the individual as active agent. But the articulation with the larger society is *production* rather than *consumption*.

If the sources of social problems lay in consumer manipulation of which schooling is both an exemplary instance and a crucial preparation for future manipulation, then a political movement for de-schooling might be, as Illich says, "at the root of any movement for human liberation." But if schooling is both itself an *activity context* and preparation for the more important activity context of work then personal consciousness arises not from the elimination of outside manipulation, but from the experience of solidarity and struggles in remolding a mode of social existence. Such consciousness represents not a "return" to the self (essential human nature) but a *restructuring* of the self through new modes of social participation; this prepares the individual for itself.

Of course this evaluation need not be unidirectional from work to education. Indeed, one of the fundamental bases for assessing the value of an alternative structure of control in production is its compatibility with intrinsically desirable individual development through education. In so far as Illich's left-convivial concept is desirable in any ultimate sense, a reorganization of production should be sought conformable to it. This might involve the development of a vital craft/artistic/technical/service sector in production organized along master-apprentice or group-control lines open to *all* individuals. The development of unalienated work technologies might then articulate harmoniously with learning-web forms in the sphere of education.

But a reorganization of production has other goals as well. For example, any foreseeable future involves a good deal of socially necessary and on balance per-

sonally unrewarding labor. However this work may be reorganized, its accomplishment must be based on individual values, attitudes, personality traits, and patterns of motivation adequate to its execution. If equality in social participation is a "revolutionary ideal," this dictates that all contribute equally toward the staffing of the socially necessary work roles. This is possible only if the hierarchical (as opposed to social) division of labor is abolished in favor of the solidary cooperation and participation of workers in control of production. Illich's anarchistic notion of learning webs does not seem conducive to the development of personal characteristics for this type of social solidarity.²⁴

The second setting for a politics of education is the *transitional society*—one which bears the technological and cultural heritage of the capitalist class/caste system, but whose social institutions and patterns of social consciousness are geared toward the progressive realization of "ideal forms" (i.e., revolutionary goals). In this setting, the social relations of education will themselves be transitional in nature, mirroring the transformation process of social relations of production.²⁵ For instance, the elimination of boring, unhealthy, fragmented, uncreative, constraining, and otherwise alienated but socially necessary labor requires an extended process of technological change in a transitional phase. As we have observed, the repressive application of technology toward the formation of occupational roles is not due to the intrinsic nature of physical science nor to the requisites of productive efficiency, but to the political imperative of stable control from the top in an enterprise. Nevertheless the shift to automated, decentralized, and worker-controlled technologies requires the continuous supervision and cooperation of workers them-

²⁴ The main elements in Illich's left-convivial "learning web" alternative to manipulative education are all fundamentally dispersive and fragmenting of a learning community:

1. Reference Services to Educational Objects—which facilitate access to things or processes used for formal learning. Some of these things can be reserved for this purpose, stored in libraries, rental agencies, laboratories, and showrooms like museums and theaters; others can be in daily use in factories, airports, or on farms, but made available to students as apprentices or on off-hours.
2. Skill Exchanges—which permit persons to list their skills, the conditions under which they are willing to serve as models for others who want to learn these skills, and the addresses at which they can be reached.
3. Peer-Matching—a communications network which permits persons to describe the learning activity in which they wish to engage, in the hope of finding a partner for the inquiry.
4. Reference Services to Educators-at-Large—who can be listed in a directory giving the addresses and self-descriptions of professionals, paraprofessionals, and free-lancers, along with conditions of access to their services.

²⁵ Bowles, "Cuban Education and the Revolutionary Ideology," *Harvard Educational Review*, 41 (November 1971).

selves. Any form this takes in a transitional society will include a constant struggle among three groups: managers concerned with the development of the enterprise, technicians concerned with the scientific rationality of production, and workers concerned with the impact of innovation and management on job satisfaction.²⁶ The present educational system does not develop in the individual the capacities for cooperation, struggle, autonomy, and judgment appropriate to this task. But neither does Illich's alternative which avoids the affective aspects of work socialization totally, and takes technology out of the heads of learners.

In a transitional setting, liberating technologies cannot arise in education, any more than in production, spontaneously or by imposition from above. The social relations of unalienated education must evolve from conscious cooperation and struggle among educational administrators (managers), teachers (technicians), and students (workers), although admittedly in a context of radically redistributed power among the three. The outcome of such a struggle is not only the positive development of education but the fostering of work-capacities in individuals adequate to the task of social transition in work and community life as well.²⁷

The inadequacy of Illich's conception of education in transitional societies is striking in his treatment of China and Cuba. It is quite evident that these countries are following new and historically unprecedented directions of social development. But Illich argues the necessity of their failure from the simple fact that they have not de-schooled. That they were essentially "de-schooled" *before* the revolution (with no appreciable social benefits) does not faze him. While we may welcome and embrace Illich's emphasis on the social relations of education as a crucial variable in their internal development toward new social forms, his own criterion is without practical application.

The third setting in which the politics of education must be assessed—and the one which would most closely represent the American reality—is that of capitalist

²⁶ Marco Maccio, "Parti, Technicien, et Classe Ouvriere dans la Revolution Chinoise," *Les Temps Modernes*, (August-September, 1970), and Gorz, "Techniques, Techniciens et Lutte de Classes."

²⁷ The theory of political organization which takes *contradictions* among the interests of the various groups participating in the control of a social activity context as central to social development, underlies my argument. This theory is well developed in Chinese Communist thought, as presented in Mao Tse Tung, "On Contradiction" in *Selected Works* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1952), and Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). In terms of this "dialectical theory of political action," the reorganization of power in education in a transitional society must render the contradictions among administrators, teachers, and students *non-antagonistic*, in the sense that the day-to-day outcomes of their struggles are the positive, healthy development of the educational system, beneficial to all parties concerned.

society itself. Here the correspondence principle implies that educational reform requires an *internal failure* in the stable reproduction of the economic relations of production. That is, the idea of liberating education does not arise spontaneously, but is made possible by emerging contradictions in the larger society. Nor does its aim succeed or fail according as its ethical value is greater or less. Rather, success of the aim presupposes a correct understanding of its basis in the contradictions in social life, and the political strategies adopted as the basis of this understanding.

The immediate strategies of a movement for educational reform, then, are political: a) understanding the concrete contradictions in economic life and the way they are reflected in the educational system; b) fighting to insure that consciousness of these contradictions persists by thwarting attempts of ruling elites to attenuate them by co-optation; and c) using the persistence of contradictions in society at large to expand the political base and power of a revolutionary movement, that is, a movement for educational reform must understand the social conditions of its emergence and development in the concrete conditions of social life. Unless we achieve such an understanding and use it as the basis of political *action*, a functional reorientation will occur vis-a-vis the present crisis in education, as it did in earlier critical moments in the history of American education.

In the present period, the relevant contradiction involves: a) Blacks moved from rural independent agriculture and seasonal farm wage-labor to the urban-industrial wage-labor system; b) middle-class youth with values attuned to economic participation as entrepreneurs, elite white-collar and professional and technical labor, faced with the elimination of entrepreneurship, the corporatization of production, and the proletarianization of white-collar work²⁸; and c) women, the major sufferers of ascriptive discrimination in production (including household production) in an era where capitalist relations of production are increasingly legitimized by their sole reliance on achievement (non-ascriptive) norms.²⁹

This inventory is partial, incomplete, and insufficiently analyzed. But only on a basis of its completion can a successful educational strategy be forged. In the realm of contradictions, the correspondence principle must yet provide the method

²⁸ Bowles, "Contradictions de L'enseignement Superieure," and Gintis, "Contre-Culture et Militantisme Politique" and "New Working Class and Revolutionary Youth."

²⁹ For a general discussion of these issues, see Edwards, Reich, and Weisskopf, ed., *The Capitalist System*.

of analysis and action. We must assess political strategies in education on the basis of the single—but distressingly complex—question: will they lead to the transitional society?

I have already argued that de-schooling will inevitably lead to a situation of social chaos, but probably not to a serious mass movement toward constructive social change. In this case the correspondence principle simply fails to hold, producing at best a temporary (in case the ruling elites can find an alternative mode of worker socialization) or ultimately fatal (in case they cannot) breakdown in the social fabric. But only if we posit some essential pre-social human nature on which individuals draw when normal paths of individual development are abolished, might this lead in itself to liberating alternatives.

But the argument over the sufficiency of de-schooling is nearly irrelevant. For schools are so important to the reproduction of capitalist society that they are unlikely to crumble under any but the most massive political onslaughts. "Each of us," says Illich, "is personally responsible for his or her own de-schooling, and only we have the power to do it." This is not true. Schooling is legally *obligatory*, and is the *major means of access* to welfare-relevant activity contexts. The political consciousness behind a frontal attack on institutionalized education would necessarily spill over to attacks on other major institutions. "The risks of a revolt against school," says Illich,

... are unforeseeable, but they are not as horrible as those of a revolution starting in any other major institution. School is not yet organized for self-protection as effectively as a nation-state, or even a large corporation. Liberation from the grip of schools could be bloodless. (*DS*, p. 49)

This is no more than whistling in the dark.

The only presently viable political strategy in education—and the precise *negation* of Illich's recommendations—is what Rudi Deutchke terms "the long march through the institutions," involving localized struggles for what Andre Gorz calls "non-reformist reforms," i.e., reforms which effectively strengthen the power of teachers vis-a-vis administrators, and of students vis-a-vis teachers.

Still, although schools neither can nor should be eliminated, the social relations of education *can* be altered through genuine struggle. Moreover, the experience of both struggle and control prepares the student for a future of political activity in factory and office.

In other words, the correct immediate political goal is the nurturing of individuals both liberated (i.e., demanding control over their lives and outlets for their creative activities and relationships) and politically aware of the true nature of their misalignment with the larger society. There may indeed be a bloodless solution to the problem of revolution, but certainly none more simple than this.

Conclusion

Illich recognizes that the problems of advanced industrial societies are institutional, and that their solutions lie deep in the social core. Therefore, he consciously rejects a partial or affirmative analysis which would accept society's dominant ideological forms and direct its innovative contributions toward marginal changes in assumptions and boundary conditions.

Instead, he employs a methodology of total critique and negation, and his successes, such as they are, stem from that choice. Ultimately, however, his analysis is incomplete.

Dialectical analysis begins with society as is (thesis), entertains its negation (antithesis), and *overcomes* both in a radical reconceptualization (synthesis). Negation is a form of demystification—a drawing away from the immediately given by viewing it as a “negative totality.” But negation is not without presuppositions, is not itself a form of liberation. It cannot “wipe clean the slate” of ideological representation of the world or one's objective position in it. The son/daughter who acts on the negation of parental and societal values is not free—he/she is merely the constrained negative image of that which he/she rejects (e.g., the negation of work, consumption order, and rationality is not liberation but negative un-freedom). The negation of male dominance is not women's liberation but the (negative) affirmation of “female masculinity.” Women's liberation in dialectical terms can be conceived of as the overcoming (synthesis) of male dominance (thesis) and female masculinity (antithesis) in a new totality which rejects/embodyes both. It is this act of overcoming (synthesis, consciousness) which is the critical and liberating aspect of dialectical thought. Action lies not in the act of negation (antithesis, demystification) but in the act of overcoming (synthesis/consciousness).

The strengths of Illich's analysis lie in his consistent and pervasive methodology of negation. The essential elements in the liberal conceptions of the Good Life—consumption and education, the welfare state and corporate manipulation—are demystified and laid bare in the light of critical, negative thought. Illich's failures can be consistently traced to his refusal to pass *beyond* negations—beyond a total

rejection of the appearances of life in advanced industrial societies—to a higher synthesis. While Illich should not be criticized for failing to *achieve* such a synthesis, nevertheless he must be taken seriously to task for mystifying the nature of his own contribution and refusing to step—however tentatively—beyond it. Work is alienating—Illich rejects work; consumption is unfulfilling—Illich rejects consumption; institutions are manipulative—Illich places “nonaddictiveness” at the center of his conception of human institutions; production is bureaucratic—Illich glorifies the entrepreneurial and small-scale enterprise; schools are dehumanizing—Illich rejects schools; political life is oppressive and ideologically totalitarian—Illich rejects politics in favor of individual liberation. Only in one sphere does he go beyond negation, and this defines his major contribution. While technology is in fact dehumanizing (thesis), he does *not* reject technology (antithesis). Rather he goes beyond technology *and* its negation towards a schema of liberating technological forms in education.

The cost of his failure to pass beyond negation in the sphere of social relations in general, curiously enough, is an implicit affirmation of the deepest characteristics of the existing order.³⁰ In rejecting work, Illich affirms that it *necessarily* is alienating—reinforcing a fundamental pessimism on which the acceptance of capitalism is based; in rejecting consumption, he affirms either that it is inherently unfulfilling (the Protestant ethic), or would be fulfilling if unmanipulated; in rejecting manipulative and bureaucratic “delivery systems,” he affirms the *laissez-faire* capitalist model and its core institutions; in rejecting schools, Illich embraces a commodity-fetishist cafeteria-smorgasbord ideal in education; and in rejecting political action, he affirms a utilitarian individualistic conception of humanity. In all cases, Illich’s analysis fails to pass beyond the given (in both its positive and negative totalities), and hence affirms it.

The most serious lapse in Illich’s analysis is his implicit postulation of a human “essence” in all of us, preceding all social experience—potentially blossoming but repressed by manipulative institutions. Indeed, Illich is logically compelled to accept such a conception by the very nature of his methodology of negation. The given is capitalist (or state socialist) socialization—repressive and dehumanizing. The antithesis is no socialization at all—individuals seeking independently and detached from any mode of social integration their personal paths of development. Such a view of personal growth becomes meaningful in human terms only when

³⁰ Indeed to stop one’s analysis at negation normally leads to implicit affirmation. For a discussion of this, see “The Affirmative Character of Culture,” in Herbert Marcuse, *Negations* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

anchored in some absolute human standard within the individual and anterior to the social experience that it generates.

In such a conception of individual "essence," critical judgment enters, I have emphasized, precisely at the level of sensing and interpreting one's pre-social psyche. This ability requires only demystification (negation); hence a methodology of negation is raised to a sufficient condition of a liberating social science. Dialectical analysis, on the other hand, takes negation (demystification) as the major *precondition* of liberation, but not its sufficient condition. Even the most liberating historical periods (e.g., the Reformation, the French and American Revolutions), despite their florid and passionately idealistic rhetoric, in fact responded to historically specific potentials and to limited but crucial facets of human deprivation. Dialectical analysis would view our present situation as analogous and, rejecting "human essence" as a pre-social driving force in social change, would see the central struggles of our era as specific negations *and their overcoming* in localizable areas of human concern—while embracing the ideologies that support these struggles.

The place of critical judgment (reason) in this analysis model lies in a realistic-visionary annihilation of both existing society *and* its negation-in-thought in a new, yet historically limited, synthesis. I have argued that this task requires as its point of departure the core economic institutions regulating social life—first in coming to understand their operation and the way in which they produce the outcomes of alienating work, fragmented community, environmental destruction, commodity fetishism, and other estranged cultural forms (thesis), and then in entertaining how we might negate and overcome them through political action and personal consciousness. Illich, in his next book, might leave the security and comfort of negation, and apply his creative vitality to this most demanding of tasks.

Correspondence

*Models and Muddles Concerning Culture and Inequality: A Reply to Critics**

This essay is prompted by two critiques, directed at certain aspects of my work, which have recently appeared in the *Harvard Educational Review*. I shall take up first the major part of John D. Herzog's essay review (August, 1971) which deals with my book (*Culture and Poverty*, 1968). Next I shall turn to reactions to my article, "Deficit, Difference and Bicultural Models of Afro-American Behavior" (May, 1971), by Herzog in his review, and by Gary Simpkins, Robert L. Williams, and Thomas Gunnings in "What a Culture a Difference Makes" (November, 1971).

The principal criticism in Herzog's review of *Culture and Poverty* is that I misused the concept of culture in that book. It happens that the development of my own thinking during the five years since that book was written has brought me to a similar conclusion. For the most part, however, it seems to me that the reviewer and I have quite different misuses of the culture concept in mind. For example, it has been clear to me for some time now that my initial discussion of situational conditions, collective adaptations, and culture contains some contradictions.¹ Herzog is probably correct in locating the surface indications of the problem in my conceptualization of *situational adaptations* as opposed to *cultures as adaptive systems*. As I now see them, my earlier arguments on these topics were flawed by unwittingly accepting certain misleading assumptions involved in the conception of culture employed by the very scholars I was criticizing. Most important among these is the philosophically idealist assumption that *the continuity and perpetuation of culture is fully accounted for by the mechanism of enculturation*, i.e., the collective program of conscious and unconscious learning by which each older generation induces and stimulates its descendents to internalize and practice established group behavior patterns. A most rele-

*The version which appears here is edited from the author's original response.

¹ *Culture and Poverty*, Ch. 1, 5. Difficulties along these lines were first pointed out to me by my colleagues, James Jaquith and Norman Whitten, and have also been suggested in published reviews (e.g., Rodman, 1969; Valentine *et al.*, 1969).

vant and succinct expression of this assumption is Oscar Lewis' repeated statement that poverty culture is "a way of life handed on from generation to generation" (cf. Lewis, 1966, p. 19).

Accepting this assumption about enculturation as essential to a valid definition of culture, I then argued that many phenomena described as lower-class culture traits are not cultural peculiarities of poor groups, for there is little or no reason to believe that these phenomena are produced and maintained by enculturative processes peculiar to the poor. From this viewpoint, it seemed quite evident that such facts as low income or lack of property are best understood as aspects of the *condition* of being poor, not enculturated in-group patterns of behavior, belief, or feeling. It then seemed equally reasonable to suggest that consensual marriage, female-focused households, and the like might well be *situational adaptations* to the conditions just mentioned, not inculcated patterns supported by socially shared values or rationalized in terms of a poor people's ideology. It seemed most obvious of all that traits like hostility toward dominant classes or pessimism about one's life chances could easily be understood as normal emotional responses or realistic perceptions, requiring no special enculturating agency for their generation or perpetuation.

There seems no reason to deny that situational responses to poverty conditions may evolve into culture patterns. To show that such an evolution has actually occurred, however, would require a demonstration that the behavior in question was determined by enculturation. This is a crucial point which poverty-culture theorists have often asserted but generally failed to demonstrate convincingly. It is this line of argument which Herzog does not seem to understand. However, the more serious difficulty, it is now clear to me, lies in the very assumption that cultural continuity is produced only by intergenerational replication through enculturation. Certain important limitations of this view have been succinctly presented by Marvin Harris (1971a).

There is no evidence to support the view that every replicated pattern is a result of the programming that one generation experiences at the hands of another. Many replicated patterns are the result of the response of successive generations to similar conditions of social life. The programming received may even be different from the actual patterns; in other words people may be enculturated to behave in one way but be obliged by situational or functional factors beyond their control to behave in another way. [p. 140]

Once we recognize that cultural continuities may be due to situational conditions and functional factors—*independent of or even in opposition to enculturation*—then collective behavioral differences between the poor and the non-poor become intelligible. From this viewpoint it becomes reasonable to recognize cultural contrasts between the poor and other social strata. Moreover, this brings us back to a structural perspective, for the most obvious factors other than enculturation which impinge on the poor are the stratified structures of the whole society. As Harris puts it, "many poor people find themselves living in houses, eating food, working, and raising a family according to patterns that replicate

their parents' culture but that result from differential economic and political power rather than from enculturation [p. 140]." In short, inequality is a structural property of the social system as a whole. Moreover, the enculturated patterns which most obviously and effectively operate to preserve this structure are to be found not among the poor but in the behavior of the wealthy and the powerful.

Contrary to Herzog's repeated but unfounded allegations, my book does not suggest that individuals and groups never suffer irreversible change or irremediable victimization from the condition of poverty. Rather, the major thrust in this respect was a challenge to poverty analysts to give up their pervasive biases, which lead them to prejudge the question of whether or to what extent poverty is perpetuated by the culture of the poor as opposed to the structure and processes of the social system as a whole. In hopes of posing this challenge vigorously, I attempted to highlight the weaknesses in ruling ideas that saw disorganization and pathology as the essential qualities of a supposedly self-perpetuating lower class. Throughout the book, allegations of pathology are questioned on grounds that the data offered as supporting evidence are inadequate or open to alternative interpretations, that the research methods in question are inappropriate to the problems at issue, and that the results are biased by theoretical prejudgments. Indeed, the book repeatedly and systematically presents questions of pathology, disorganization, and so forth as empirical problems to be settled by methodologically and theoretically more appropriate research (Valentine, 1968, Ch. 5, 6).

Herzog suggests that my criticism of poverty-culture theory holds good only in an artificial way, because I confined the critique to non-structuralist writings. In this connection Herzog describes my arguments as failing to specify the criteria by which criticized works were chosen, as well as "pretending" that those given most attention represent the whole range of writing in the poverty field. In fact, however, it is clear in the book that Lewis, Moynihan, and the rest were selected because their ideas were (as they still are) dominant in academic, political, and popular discussions of poverty in the United States. Far from making any pretense that no alternative interpretations have been put forward by scholars, the last section of the first chapter, all of chapter 4, and portions of chapter 5, as well as extensive bibliographic notes, are explicitly devoted to such alternatives.

Nevertheless, on a related point I must agree with one of Herzog's strictures. *Culture and Poverty* is indeed weakened by insufficient attention to major writers of the radical left, including not only Fanon and Marx but some of their more contemporary interpreters and others as well. When the book was written I was not qualified to provide more than a brief and simplified consideration of these orientations. Since then it has become clear to me that any study of poverty and related problems is seriously incomplete without systematic attention to materialist, revolutionary, and socialist ideas. In particular, as one of my more astute critics has pointed out (Harris, 1971b) and as I have acknowledged above and elsewhere (Valentine, 1971d), a basic weakness of some major arguments in *Culture and*

Poverty is their bias toward implicit assumptions from philosophical idealism, which are part of the received wisdom of much cultural anthropological theory.

Herzog complains about my contention that poverty-culturists find mainly negative qualities in the alleged lifeways of the poor, that they indulge in derogatory evaluations of those lifeways, and that they express or imply the judgment that poverty is perpetuated by the culture of minorities and of poor people. The reviewer suggests that I have read all this into the works under discussion and thus falsely attributed ideas that are not there. Yet *Culture and Poverty* is fairly stuffed with extended quotations in which the relevant authors speak for themselves and clearly express the views in question. To cite but one abbreviated example: "in the life of the Negro American . . . the present tangle of pathology is capable of perpetuating itself without assistance from the white world."²

My reviewer goes on to suggest that my thinking on relationships between the poor and middle-class values is essentially the same as that of poverty-culturists. Yet the differences between the two lines of thought are both sharp and basic. Lewis, Walter Miller, and others contend that the lower class has no meaningful allegiance to middle-class ideologies. I argue first that this is an empirical question that has not been fully settled. Already there is considerable evidence available that many poor people are partially committed to bourgeois values in spite of the conditions of their lives. Recently my wife and I reported research findings that poverty-stricken Afro-Americans express and behave in terms of complex and ambiguous commitments to mainstream concerns and standards, while they also are committed to ethnic interests and valuations outside the mainstream (Valentine and Valentine, 1970; Valentine, 1971a, 1971d).

Equally mistaken is Herzog's contention that I am in some sense "committed" to middle-class lifeways—that I see no problems or weaknesses in American mainstream life. On the contrary, references to the contradictions, derelictions, and pathologies of privileged Americans pervade the book in order to highlight the absurdity of judging all such problems among the poor against middle-class standards.

Ultimately Herzog's critique falls into one of the very confusions which I identified and attempted to resolve in *Culture and Poverty* (pp. 121-127): the tendency to equate the stratum of the poor with minority groups, a confusion of class status with ethnicity. Thus he attributes to me the statement that "minority people" have few collective distinctions other than "situational or circumstantial adaptations," an absurdity which appears nowhere in my writings. To compound the confusion Herzog attributes to me a suggestion that ethnic differences are less significant than class differences—a statement clearly identified as taken from Herbert Gans and as consistent with the views of Oscar Lewis. Throwing around labels like "crypto-assimilationist" does not successfully obscure the fact that, even though the focus of the book was on poverty rather than ethnicity, I was careful to emphasize that

² Moynihan, 1965, p. 47; *Culture and Poverty*, p. 33. Readers who wish to go beyond Herzog's baseless allegations on this matter can also consult a debate which includes similar charges by some of these writers themselves, together with my detailed replies (Valentine *et al.*, 1969).

"ethnic subcultural variety [is] a dimension no less worthy of attention in poverty research than social stratification . . . suggesting that both stratification and ethnicity be considered . . . equally important for defining the framework of such research" (Valentine, 1968, p. 126).

In the area of social policy, Herzog is unimpressed with my proposal for positive discrimination in favor of the poor in employment, education, and the politics of poverty areas. Though my own reasons are somewhat different, I too am unimpressed with this plan now that some six or seven years have passed (cf. Valentine, 1966, 1967). Originally the idea of positive discrimination in multiple fields was put forth as an alternative to the spurious slogans and programs of "equal opportunity" which effectively legitimated the national structure of inequality (cf. Willhelm, 1971). It grew out of the ambitions and hopes—characteristic of the last stages of the Civil Rights Movement and the beginnings of the Black Power Movement—for a significant redistribution of economic resources and political power within the framework of the existing social system.

Only in the quite specific sense of failing to challenge the basic structure and processes of advanced industrial capitalism does that old plan deserve the "assimilationist" label which Herzog pins on it. The proposal was a sort of last appeal to the establishment to grant peacefully some substantial changes in the interests of the oppressed. It was conceived in the aftermath of Harlem (1964) and Watts (1965) as one remaining alternative to intergroup struggles on a new level. As far as I am concerned, the illusions of that period are gone. Equally irrelevant and even more illusory, however, is Herzog's 1971 alternative of family allowances, guaranteed incomes, and other so-called "reforms" or misnamed "extensions" of the existing welfare system. I will not repeat the arguments against the Moynihan-Johnson-Nixon schemes for family "assistance" and "stabilization" which I presented in *Culture and Poverty* (pp. 37 ff., pp. 151 ff.). Instead two more recent developments are quite sufficient to expose the duplicity of this hoax. First, the principal political justification for the "reform" proposals of the Nixon government is that they will *save* the taxpayers money, which of course can only mean that the presently miserable level of redistribution would be further reduced. Second, the national trend for the last several years has been substantial reductions by state and local governments in both the level of welfare support and the numbers of persons or households eligible for assistance (Valentine, 1971d).

Herzog justifies such income proposals with typical establishment-liberal rationalizations about what is politically "feasible." In this connection, he has the temerity to suggest that "Valentine pretends political innocence." Rather than reply in kind, I will suggest that the reviewer's apparent political ignorance may involve no pretense.

At one point Herzog correctly notes my statement that a socialist revolution in the interests of the oppressed in America did not seem practicable in 1967. He then asks quite reasonably, "So what, if structural discrimination is the root cause?" My answer then was that positive discrimination was the last possible reform of the system. My answer today is that a fundamental and revolutionary restructuring of society is the only solution, that to support anything short of this is effectively to defend a grossly inhumane status quo, and that

there are some grounds for cautious hope that national and world conditions may be moving toward a point at which this necessary solution will come about (cf. Valentine, 1971d; Valentine and Valentine, 1972).

Toward the end of his review, Herzog accuses me of expressing indignation. I am glad he did understand that much of my book, but I am not impressed with the implicit assumption that there is something wrong with outrage against disgracefully inhumane realities. The only slight justification the reviewer grants me for my feelings is his statement that the poverty-culture model has been misunderstood and misapplied in institutions such as schools and government agencies. In reply I can only reiterate a major argument of the book, that what is outrageous about social science contributions to institutional policies and public affairs in the field of poverty is precisely *not* misunderstanding or misapplication of good ideas. Rather, because the ideas themselves are both wrong and bad, their most faithful applications do much human harm. I am confident that careful readers will see for themselves that this does not warrant the reviewer's final supercilious description of my work as mere "extremism," making "caricatures of opponents' positions," and denying "all flaws in the conduct" of poor people. Once again, however, insidious implicit assumptions should be laid bare: there is not necessarily anything wrong with extremism if one happens to be right.

* * * * *

The concept of biculturation, especially as formulated in my *HER* article, leaves some relevant questions open and some related problems unclarified. Nevertheless, the idea of simultaneous enculturation in two different lifestyles comprehends a much wider range of the actual experience of cultural minorities than deficit or difference formulations, *both* of which are associated with assimilationist assumptions and carry pejorative implications. The bicultural model emphasizes the twofold competence, multifaceted strengths, and flexible adaptability of groups shaped by dual socialization. That there are also unresolved contradictions and enduring problems in a bicultural mode of life is due primarily to the systemic inequalities inherent in the political economy of the United States and other European-dominated societies.

Simpkins *et al.* properly call attention to the relationship between biculturation and double consciousness as a conceptual problem which needs clarification.³ W. E. B. DuBois was indeed a pioneer in this effort, and he did stress awareness and consciousness more than enculturation as such. Yet, as the famous quotation that my critics cite clearly shows, DuBois recognized that much more is involved than external perceptions of the self through the eyes of others. Equally important is the internalization of "two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings, two warring ideals in one dark body," as DuBois' poetic language has it (1961, p. 17).

³ I have recently made an effort to contribute to such a clarification, which cannot be repeated in detail here (Valentine, 1971d).

The critics' quotation from Fanon (1967, p. 17) also fails to support their stated position. Fanon's very next sentence, which they do not quote, says, "That this self-division is a direct result of colonialist subjugation is beyond question." Thus it is clear again that here too we are dealing not only with the externals of different behavior in contrasting contexts but also with an internally divided self. While behavioral scientists may perhaps quarrel with the somewhat mentalistic language of these passages, it seems clear that both DuBois and Fanon expressed a deeper understanding of the profound effects flowing from biculturalization under conditions of structural inequality than Simpkins *et al.* would have us believe.

It is equally clear from the strongly pro-Black and anti-imperialist positions espoused by DuBois and Fanon that acceptance of biculturalization as a reality has nothing to do with denying the struggle for group dignity and against alienation from Blackness. On the contrary, both writers consistently emphasized that the cultural and psychological effects of dual socialization must be fully understood in order that these very struggles can be carried on effectively.

Recognizing bicultural processes thus does not imply any denial or minimizing of the resistance to assimilation emphasized by Simpkins *et al.* Indeed it should be clear that Afro-Americans remain bicultural both because of this resistance and because Euro-Americans have withheld mainstream cultural resources. Nor is there any implication that only Blacks or other oppressed minorities have experienced dual enculturation.⁴

In the definition of a difference model by Simpkins *et al.* there is much with which any informed student of ethnicity and culture would be likely to agree. There can hardly be any quarrel with the basic point that cultural differences between ethnic groups are real, important, and valuable. Yet a model which comprehends only inter-ethnic differences—particularly when coupled with the contention that the problems of Afro-Americans are due entirely to "culture conflict," as in the work of Baratz, Stewart, and others—is perniciously incomplete, to say the least. Such a model not only ignores shared cultural patterns, including the mainstream competences of Afro-Americans, but also distracts attention from structural inequality and thus tends to explain away inter-group oppression as "cultural misunderstanding." Cultural pluralism is a fact, and indeed it is a welcome phenomenon to the extent that it actually does "increase the number of options." Nevertheless, it is both unrealistic and dangerous to minority interests not to recognize that the major intergroup process of pluralist societies such as the United States is restriction of minority options through systematic discrimination and oppression.

Since the beginnings of cultural nationalism, the concern for cultural distinctiveness as a source of positive group self-images and collective identities has been generally under-

⁴ I have recently proposed at some length that most if not all ethnic groups in complex societies are bicultural to varying degrees, with differing results depending upon the historical and contemporary position of each group in national and international systems of ethnic stratification (Valentine, 1971d). This discussion also deals further with the difference between biculturalization and assimilation.

stood as a necessary basis for effective struggles on behalf of the oppressed. Yet what is recognized as a necessary beginning must not be misunderstood as constituting the whole battle. Cultural nationalism, in the absence of additional insights into the workings of the social system, can easily be coopted to support the structural status quo. It is an idealist fallacy—not to say fantasy—that assertions or convictions of positive group identity are sufficient to overcome the structural constraints of an ethnically stratified society. Here we come to a major distinction between the cultural nationalist and the revolutionary proponent of minority interests. The latter recognizes that, in addition to psychological resources, the struggle against such systems will require material strength and collective power. The difference model by itself is bankrupt when it comes to the need and the search for these latter sources of strength.

At several points in their critique Simpkins, Williams, and Gunnings interpret my article as suggesting that there is no unified Black culture. It is quite true that I opposed the difference model as a simplified image which neglects internal diversity within Afro-America. It is also true, however, that I suggested pan-Afro-American sociocultural commonalities from three sources: "African cultural roots," "common influences from the intervening ethnohistory under European domination," and the "emergent Afro-American culture influenced by Black nationalism" (Valentine, 1971b, p. 141).

Nevertheless, at the early stage in our research represented by the *HER* article, my wife and I may have over-emphasized heterogeneity, both in response to simplifications by other authors, and because of the impressive human diversity of Blackston for which we were quite unprepared when we began this work. Even so, my article hardly presents the picture of "unconnected subcultural groups" which the critics impute to it (cf. Valentine and Valentine, 1970; Valentine, 1971a).

On a related matter, Simpkins *et al.* may have a valid point when they question whether Blackston is typical of Black communities in the United States with respect to its internal diversity. This is of course an empirical question which will not be settled until students of Afro-Americana in this country drop their common assumption of drab uniformity within Black communities. While Afro-Americans from varied national origins may be disproportionately represented in ports of entry, it may also hold true that Blacks spread out from such entry points to other cities more rapidly than is generally recognized. Moreover, the majority of large metropolitan areas in the country include ports, and some of these such as New Orleans have been centers of Afro-American diversity for a long time.

The critics' quarrel about how to define and use the term *Afro-American* is without substance. The term simply designates the various peoples of African derivation or extraction who reside anywhere in the Americas. It is generally understood as such in the usage of anthropologists, specialists in Black Studies, and contemporary Afro-American political thinkers ranging from Carmichael to Cleaver. This broad canvas of ethnic-regional variety is the real ground on which issues of Black unity and diversity must be explored. Of course there is a meaningful sense in which Anglo-Caribbeans, Guyanese, and others insist on their

distinct regional identities. It is respect for precisely these sensibilities which led me to designate these groups as such. At the same time, however, the very problem of Afro-American unity-diversity makes it important to transcend such provincialisms as realistically as possible. This is not only required for valid scientific understanding; it is also constructive in terms of group interests.

In another context, Simpkins and his collaborators do eventually take cognizance of the unifying effect of Euro-American oppression, as when they quote Killens. Yet this leads them nowhere except to a defensive rejection of my point that one danger in the difference model is that professionals may use it to justify their existing bigotry. Contrary to the critics' reasoning, this observation does not in the least imply that Afro-Americans will gain anything by attempting or pretending to be Euro-Americans. Rather the implication is that the poor and minority peoples cannot achieve significant gains without a radical restructuring of the entire social system which oppresses Black people as well as others.

Simpkins *et al.* do not specify where in my article they found an implication "that Black culture is not worth experiencing or knowing by whites." The *HER* piece is not specifically addressed to this question. No such evaluation appears elsewhere in my writing for the simple reason that I regard it as an absurd position. My critics are perfectly correct, however, in saying that I have no faith in re-educating mainstream professionals—as long as existing institutional structures persist. Yet they are quite wrong in suggesting that this means I accept the ethnocentrism and racism of such professionals as "an unchangeable given." My position is that such biases can be expected to disappear only when the institutional, class, and caste structures supporting them are done away with.

When Simpkins *et al.* discuss the case history presented in *HER*, I find myself again in radical disagreement. Contrary to their imputations, my discussion does deal with both "survival" and "change." They correctly declare that "the system" is responsible for the injustices to the small boy whose case is at issue, but somehow they fail to comprehend that this is precisely what is meant by my diagnosis (which they quote) of "mainstream institutional failure." Presumably it must be this misunderstanding which leads them to the extraordinary misinterpretation that I am somehow calling for "one-way change, on the part of the victims rather than the victimizers," as they put it.

Herzog believes that the intervention by anthropologists in a case of institutional failure involving a young boy was ill-advised. My wife and I do not believe that refusing to intervene in the affairs of a social unit under study is necessarily required for objective and valid scientific research. Nor do we feel that it is always possible to avoid intervention, especially in participant ethnography which requires that one constantly interact with the community, not just as observer but also as fellow citizen. Far from being without consequences or neutral in its effect, non-intervention necessarily results in passive support of the status quo.

With respect to the possibility that intervention may have been a harmful "catalyst" to the youngster in question, it must be noted that most of the damage to this human being had already been inflicted by the educational and medical agencies involved. As it

turns out, the boy was saved from commitment to a state hospital, his release from temporary psychiatric incarceration was obtained, and he was admitted to an effective community-controlled school where he was soon learning successfully for the first time. When he and his family were forced by economic circumstances to move to another city, he enrolled in the public school system, where his general adjustment continues to be better than it was when we first came to know him.

As for treating the institutions in question as "objects of study," it should have been clear that this is precisely what we were and are doing (Valentine, 1971a; Valentine and Valentine, n.d.). Moreover, it is exactly because we *have* studied these institutions, carefully and at length, that we grant them very little "human worth and dignity" as far as their effect on our community is concerned.

Simpkins, Williams, and Gunnings misinterpret my position as assimilationist, coupling this with the equally mistaken suggestion that my use of biculturalism is pejorative. I certainly agree with Simpkins *et al.* that the analyses and interpretations associated with "cultural deprivation," as well as the other phrases they cite in this context, are both scientifically invalid and insulting to their human subjects. As I have argued both in *HER* and elsewhere, both deficit formulations *and* difference theories are associated with assimilationist assumptions and carry pejorative implications.

* * * * *

There may be one fundamental misunderstanding which underlies both the errors of Herzog and the misinterpretations by Simpkins and his fellow critics. This is the notion, expressed or implied, that I have somehow presented biculturalism as a programmatic solution, even a "slogan" as Herzog calls it at one point, for dealing with the problems of oppressed peoples. I must say in the plainest way possible that this is not the case. Bicultural socialization is simply a fact. That this phenomenal reality is no solution to outstanding social problems may be seen quite clearly from the existing condition of the many bicultural peoples surviving in today's complex societies.

That dual enculturation might be more constructive and humane than it has been for Afro-Americans or native Americans is suggested by the relatively fortunate position of Asian-Americans who seem to be among the most thoroughly bicultural minorities, though they are by no means assimilated. Yet biculturalism is simply a social mechanism or process which should not be confused with a cause or a program. The results in terms of human welfare which flow from this process are determined by the material conditions and social structure within which it operates.

If biculturalism should become a banner or a slogan, it would be wise to suspect an underlying motive or a probable outcome supporting the status quo. For example, in Canada where Anglo-French "biculturalism" is official policy, it gives every appearance of being an establishmentarian maneuver to counter the threat of revolutionary socialist

movements among the French underclass. It may not be unreasonable to perceive incipient signs of a comparable policy in the positive or at least neutral attitude of the United States government toward non-revolutionary tendencies in Black cultural nationalism. So the critics are no doubt right to beware of anyone presenting biculturation as a solution to inter-group problems, but they are quite wrong to find such a presentation in my work.

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Essay Reviews

ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: PAPERS DERIVING FROM THE HARVARD UNIVERSITY FACULTY SEMINAR ON THE COLEMAN REPORT.

edited by Frederick Mosteller and Daniel P. Moynihan.

*New York: Random House, forthcoming.**

The Coleman Report¹ went off like a Chinese firecracker in July 1966 with a number of muffled little pops followed several months later by many loud and contradictory reports. Some exclaimed that it was the most significant document since Myrdal's *American Dilemma*. Others decried it as potentially dangerous and destructive. It was often cited in selective and misleading ways in the heated educational debates of the 1960's. The most generous view of the early reaction to the Coleman Report may be that education critics "attacked this fresh meat enthusiastically, having little else to get their teeth into" (John P. Gilbert and Frederick Mosteller, Ch. 8).

Partisan interpretations, which draw upon the Coleman data for the ammunition it offers, have not disappeared. But they gradually have subsided, and scholarly efforts to assess the policy implications of the Report have gone forward over a five year period.

At Harvard, a distinguished group of social scientists has conducted an ambitious interdisciplinary reassessment of the Report. Beginning as a small faculty seminar in the 1966-67 academic year, it expanded to include nearly sixty sociologists, psychologists, economists, statisticians, law professors, and interested persons from the government, testing organizations, and the Carnegie Foundation, which funded the seminar and other re-analyses of the Coleman Report. Coleman and several of his colleagues also participated in the seminar.

* Since the book was read in galleys for this review, references to it in the text (in parentheses) do not indicate page numbers, but refer to chapter number and chapter author.

For their helpful criticisms and comments, which improved this essay at numerous points, I am indebted to Nathan Glazer, Alexander Mood, and Gary Orren.

¹ James S. Coleman, Ernest Q. Campbell, Carol J. Hobson, James McPartland, Alexander Mood, Frederic D. Weinfeld, and Robert L. York, *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966).

The reanalysis of the Harvard seminar will soon be published in the form of a collection of papers by sixteen of the social scientists who participated. The volume entitled *On Equality of Educational Opportunity*, is edited by Professors Frederick Mosteller and Daniel P. Moynihan. The Center for Educational Policy Research at Harvard participated in the seminar and independently reported several reanalyses of the Coleman data to the Carnegie Commission. There were reanalyses of the data at Johns Hopkins as well.

Another major effort was an 884-page reanalysis conducted by the Office of Program Planning and Evaluation at the U. S. Office of Education and reported in *A Study of Our Nation's Schools*.²

Major Outcomes of the Reanalyses

Virtually all of the major findings of the original Coleman Report are confirmed in the later studies. They include:

1. Negro and white school children enjoy nearly comparable school resources (as measured by per pupil expenditures, books, laboratories, and the like) within geographical regions, although the degree of racial segregation remains high. In that specific sense, American schools were virtually separate and equal at the time of the Coleman survey in October, 1965.

2. The average achievement of children who are poor or who are members of minority groups is lower at every level of schooling than that of the average white pupil. This finding holds true for all minority groups in the survey—Indian Americans, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans and Negroes—with the exception of Oriental Americans.³

3. Family background factors are, if anything, even more strongly related to pupil achievement than Coleman originally asserted. It is the "human resources" other children bring to school rather than the traditionally defined services provided by the school that most affect pupil achievement.

4. It is highly uncertain at this point what *school* policies, if any, can compensate for the inequalities in cognitive skills between rich and poor children that are apparent at the time they enter school.

² George W. Mayeske, Carl E. Wisler, Albert E. Beaton, Jr., Frederic D. Weinfeld, Wallace M. Cohen, Tetsuo Okada, John M. Proshek, and Kenneth A. Tabler, *A Study of Our Nation's Schools: A Working Paper*, mimeo (Washington, D. C.: Office of Education, U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1970).

³ "Poor" children should be interpreted here as "low social class." One of the most thorough analyses of Coleman's data on achievement by social class was carried out by Tetsuo Okada, Wallace M. Cohen, and George W. Mayeske and reported in "Growth in Achievement for Different Racial, Regional and Socio-Economic Groupings of Students," mimeo (Washington, D. C.: Office of Education, U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, May, 1969). They defined social class by mother's and father's educational level and father's occupational level and found at the sixth grade that the grade level equivalent for the average middle social class white child was 6.5; the equivalent grade level was 3.6 for Puerto Ricans; 4.1 for Mexican Americans; 4.7 for Negroes; 5.1 for Indians; 6.1 for Oriental Americans; and 5.6 for whites who were lower class. There were similar findings at the ninth and twelfth grades.

The HEW study tended to cast the findings of its reanalysis more in terms of the common influences of the home and the school, but, in general, its findings paralleled the conclusions of the Harvard group.

In addition, the Coleman Report was firmly established as a landmark document in social science. It has had major effects in reshaping the broad directions of both policy and research:

First, the Coleman Report led to wider consideration of a more complex way of measuring educational equality. Attention has been shifted from measuring equality primarily by what goes into a school in the way of money and resources to measuring the relationship between those inputs and the outcomes in terms of pupil growth and achievement.

Second, both policy and research will be more sharply focused on what happens to children before they reach school and on the sources of growth in the family and the environment outside of school.

Third, over time, there will be more concern with social class and less concern with race in American society.⁴

Finally, while the broad findings of the original Report have been generally confirmed, efforts to sift the Coleman data through fine screens to yield more specific remedies for educational inequalities have been largely unsuccessful, except insofar as those efforts have led to a useful skepticism about the effectiveness of current practices.

This essay is largely devoted to an elaboration of this final conclusion. In the larger work from which this essay has been extracted, the considerable effects that flow from the first two conclusions are explored in more detail.⁵ Another major theme, which this essay does not pursue, but which is explored at length in the larger work,⁶ is the way in which ideological bias sharply influenced early interpretations of Coleman's work. Such bias is not at all characteristic of the volume under review. The worst of the reanalysis is an exercise in ingenuity rather than persuasion. The best of it strengthens our sense of modesty about how little we know about educating children. My concern is to identify ingenuity for what it is, and to deflate the tendency to expect more from the "policy sciences" than they can presently deliver.

The Shortcomings of Survey Research

What we have after five years of analysis and reinterpretation is a confession of ignorance,

⁴ Cf. the opinion of the Federal Court in *Beckett v. School Board of the City of Norfolk*. Basing its opinion in part on Coleman's data, the Court found: "We cannot believe that the Supreme Court in requiring 'desegregation' has merely ordered a mixing of racial bodies without consideration of the social class factor. What the courts are now overlooking is that the primary variable is social class, not race."

Beckett v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 308 F Supp 1274, 1969. See also, *Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver, Colo.*, 313 F Supp 61, 1970.

⁵ Gerald Grant, "The Politics of the Coleman Report," Diss., Harvard University, 1972, particularly chapters 1, 4, 5.

⁶ Grant, Chapter 2.

an appeal for more research and an enlarged sense of mystery about what the nation's educational policy should be. More than that, a sober look at the history of the reanalysis of the Coleman data gives little cause for optimism about the capability of social science to provide very clear guidance to policymakers in the near future.

There are two principal reasons. The first is the weak power of survey research to explain the complex processes and causes of educational achievement. Let us leave aside for the moment the criticisms that can be raised about any "one-shot" survey that measures reality at only one point in time. The Coleman survey provided both the most extensive data and the most sophisticated empirically-based description of the nation's educational process. Yet it inadequately represents the complexity of variables on which policy should be based and its measures, while offering more precision than was previously available, often do not reveal what is most crucial to deciding questions of policy.

While there have been some significant advances in research techniques since James Coleman wrote the following in 1964, his judgment seems to be largely borne out by the reanalysis of his own Report:

It is painfully evident to anyone who attempts to study a social system that our quantitative research techniques are in their infancy. For, by sensitive observation and description (as exemplified, say, by William Foote Whyte's *Street Corner Society*), we can trace the functioning of a social system. Yet, when we attempt to carry out quantitative research in such a system, we find ourselves stymied. We shift from a sensitive examination of events, in which intimate sequence in time suggests causal relations between events, to a crude measurement of 'characteristics' and a comparative cross-sectional analysis that relates one characteristic to another. That is, when we shift from qualitative reporting to quantitative analysis, we change our very mode of inference.⁷

Second, the processes by which the investigation of the Coleman Report and its policy implications were conducted reveal the weak collaborative modes among social scientists. Social science does not appear to be adequately enough organized, or adequately coordinated, to mount a systematic and sustained attack on the crucial questions of public policy that are raised by the Coleman Report.

Discussion of the somewhat catch-as-catch-can style of collaboration among social scientists will be taken up again at the conclusion of the essay. The sections that follow explore the difficulties of drawing inferences because of what the Coleman survey did not measure as well as the problems of basing policy on what was measured but whose meaning is only imperfectly understood.

What Was Measured?

Time and again, when confronted with the specific task of teasing a policy implication

⁷ "The Adolescent Society" in *Sociologists at Work*, ed. Phillip E. Hammond (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 192.

out of the data, the analyst must admit or face up to an unstable basis for his inferences deriving from the imperfect nature of his science.

One of the qualifying phrases in many of the conclusions drawn from the Coleman Report is "measured differences." In considering the implications of the Coleman findings that differences in teacher characteristics had relatively little effect on either Black or white student performance, for example, one must note that the measured differences include almost no information about the relationship that might exist between teacher attitudes and student achievement. The survey collected information on a wide range of teacher characteristics: family background, education, field of study, experience, salary, certification, age, and the like. It found virtually no relation between any of these characteristics and student achievement, and a slight relationship between a teacher's verbal ability and student performance. Although the survey did ask a few questions that would shed light on teacher attitudes (for example, teachers were asked whether they would encourage Negro students to apply for jobs from which Negroes had been traditionally excluded), it did not really provide an adequate basis for discerning such attitudes. Thus while the measured characteristics tell us that there may be no difference in teaching effectiveness between teachers with master's degrees and those who have normal school certificates, there may be surprising differences between teachers who believe that if children do not learn it is largely the children's fault and teachers who believe it may be largely the teachers' fault. There are tantalizing indications in Coleman's Report of such attitudinal linkages in the finding that in schools where teachers reported high morale, students "over-achieved," and in schools where teachers had many complaints, the pupils "underachieved." There is also the research of Rosenthal and Jacobson that suggests teacher expectations heavily influence pupil learning.⁸

Similarly, the survey gathered very little data on the allocation of resources or application of policies within schools. It found that there were great differences between schools in the Black belt of Washington, D. C., and those in Chevy Chase, Maryland. But it also revealed that if all the school-to-school inequalities between slum and suburb could be removed, less than a quarter of the variation in children's achievement would be affected. That is, most of the variation is accounted for by the differences among the children *within* the slum school. We have some basis for supposing that in addition to these differences of individual endowment and background there may be significant policy differentials within schools. For example, would school officials be more reluctant to assign an upper class child to special classes for "slow" learners than they would to assign a poor child to such classes? If children were habitually discriminated against in such ways, this could be a school characteristic that mattered a good deal. But it would not show up as a school-

⁸ Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson, *Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teachers' Expectations and Pupils' Intellectual Development* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968).

to-school difference. The difficulty of obtaining such information by means of survey research is obvious.

Coleman's finding that there are few significant associations between measured school resources and pupil achievement has often been grossly misstated as "schools don't matter." This is absurd. Simply because smaller classes do not consistently result in higher achievement scores in algebra does not mean that schools have no effects. On the contrary, it is very unlikely that any child would learn algebra at all outside of schools. Coleman was trying to specify the resources that are effective in reducing inequalities, not merely the resources that have some demonstrable effect on children's learning.

The more common argument in opposition to Coleman has been that he did not measure big enough changes in school resources—that if class sizes were radically reduced, say from thirty pupils to twelve, then effects would show up. Some dramatic compensatory education experiments, such as the More Effective Schools in New York City, do not support this theory, but the argument is still maintained by some.

In the reanalysis of Coleman, a few researchers have argued that there is a relationship between resources and achievement. The Center for Educational Policy Research, which carried out one of the most thorough reviews of the Coleman Report and other data on this issue, reported that its members came to different conclusions. However, the Center researchers said that even if there was such an effect of resources on achievement, generalization would be difficult to make:

... the effects are too complex and subtle for researchers to find any general 'laws' that affect large numbers of schools, or for legislators, school boards and school superintendents to make general policies that will make sense across the board. Additional resources may result in higher achievement in some cases, but they may also be followed by a decline in achievement in others. At present, nobody has the slightest idea what differentiates the first set of cases from the second.⁹

Yet, of course, the issue cannot be left there either—because one wants to know in what kinds of settings and for what kinds of pupils certain kinds of resources have the most important impact toward what ends. It is precisely the interaction of certain configurations of teachers, pupils, and settings which are most apt to reveal interesting differential effects. We simply are unable to answer questions surrounding such interactions from available survey data. Other research shows that children of similar background and ability in the same school settings achieve at different levels in different classrooms.¹⁰

⁹ *Education and Inequality: A Preliminary Report to the Carnegie Corporation of New York*, mimeo. (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Educational Policy Research, Harvard University, 1970). Stephan Michelson, an economist and research associate at the Center, argued that certain school resources do have a significant effect on achievement, p. 52.

¹⁰ Nancy St. John reported this as a result of a longitudinal study of 956 sixth graders in 36 Boston Classrooms. "Thirty Teachers: Their Characteristics and Outcomes for Black and White Pupils," *A.E.R.J.*, Vol. 8, No. 4, Nov. 1971, pp. 635-648.

The unsolved problems involve not only the crudity of available measures, but conceptual problems as well. That is, have we thought deeply enough about ways to define the resources that might matter?

It should be noted in passing that the Coleman Report sought principally to measure the relationship between resources and cognitive achievement, as Coleman has emphasized. Thus, while pupil expenditures for swimming pools and violin instruction may not raise mathematical or verbal scores, they undoubtedly teach many children to swim and to play the violin, and perhaps enable them to lead richer lives as a result. It is also possible that learning to play a violin—or even to swim—has indirect, long-range effects on cognitive development.

Establishing Causality

The reanalysis of the Coleman data did not support in general those early (and often loud) critics who said the report was compromised because of sloppy data or non-response bias (a technical term that means those who didn't answer a questionnaire somehow differ from the group who did). A more troublesome aspect of much of the analysis involves the fundamental statistical distinction between causation and association. We may be able to say that two variables seem to be associated but we can seldom be sure which is affecting the other. If we find that providing more reading specialists seems to have a negative impact on raising reading scores, is this because the presence of such teachers actually depresses achievement, perhaps because the classroom teacher feels less accountable for reading? Or does the presence of such teachers merely reflect the fact that this school, for some other reason, has many poor readers and thus was assigned more specialists? Jencks, who has worked with Coleman data as much as anyone, concludes at one point, "It is almost never clear whether a school characteristic affects achievement or vice versa. . . . Ambiguities recur everywhere" (Christopher Jencks, Ch. 2). Is more teaching experience associated with slightly higher achievement because experience really matters or do teachers with more experience use their seniority rights as leverage in obtaining assignments that enable them to teach brighter children?

Furthermore, almost any finding can be confounded if the analyst is imaginative enough. This applies to one of the most central findings of the Coleman Report: that lower class pupils benefit from going to schools where there are a majority of middle or upper class children. The reanalysis raises some questions about whether the data show this association at all. But assuming for the moment that the association does hold, could it be that the supposed peer association benefit or rub-off effect does not explain the association? Robert C. Nichols first raised the plausible argument,¹¹ repeated in various fashions by several of the authors of the *On Equality* volume, that perhaps the higher achievement is really explained by family influences. Could it be that such children, while lower

¹¹ "Schools and the Disadvantaged," *Science*, 154 (December 9, 1966.), p. 1314.

class in gross economic terms, are perhaps quite different from other lower class pupils because they come from more educationally conscious homes? That is, their striving parents sought placement in "better" schools.

James Beshers raises another intriguing possibility. Would the peer effect be more meaningful if one considered interaction with classmates who are also out-of-school playmates? "The peer group effects are not readily disentangled unless the social psychology of the classroom can be related to the community context of the school... the extent to which street gangs interpenetrate the peer group structure of the school system is not clear" (James M. Beshers, Ch. 10).

Elsewhere in *On Equality*, Gilbert and Mosteller acknowledge "that many different causal schemes can usually be proposed to 'explain away' the results of an observational study." They then suggest: "The number of alternative explanations should certainly be weighed, but it is well to put one's faith in simple direct explanations rather than elaborate circuitous ones" (Ch. 8).

This advice seems to make intuitive sense at first glance. But their statement of the problem assumes the existence of a simple explanation on the one hand and circuitous ones on the other. More often, the explanations are all equally circuitous and the "simple direct" policy implication just cannot be stated with much certitude. They argue that in many cases where society cares about establishing a firm causal relation, it will need substantial experiments to "settle some of the arguments." In addition to the considerable difficulties which large experimental studies in education entail, even such experiments frequently fall short of establishing firm causal relations. Take Gilbert and Mosteller's own example: "We know that richer people are better educated, and so we conclude for the moment that if poorer families get more money their children will later be better educated than they otherwise would have been. But this conclusion will always be tantalizingly and endlessly arguable... Therefore, we need substantial experiments" (Ch. 8). Let us suppose such an experiment were conducted. Some families are given more money, others are designated as a control group, and we look at the results twenty years later. Perhaps the experimental children are slightly better educated at the end of this period. Can we conclude that money was the direct cause? If it can be shown that the families used the funds to buy better housing, and moved into a better neighborhood, then one theory would have it that this new neighborhood presented their children with peer influences which raised their educational aspirations. Hence it could be argued that the income supplement strategy was uniquely successful because it changed the child's peer group, and this peer group, in turn, changed the child's attitudes toward education. But it should be clear that no such conclusion is justified unless we entertain the possibility, within the same research design, that conventional bussing, righting racial imbalance in the schools alone without changing the location of the child's home neighborhood, would have had the same effect.

Likewise, if the effect of such an experiment were slight, we would want to conclude

that money was not an important causal factor. But if the lack of immediate effects on the first generation of children prompted us to end the research after a single generation, we would rule out the possibility of discovering sizable effects which only emerged with a second generation of children. As a result of the initial strategy, the original experiment group, now parents, might confer benefits on their children which they themselves had not received. Giving people more money does not enable us to conclude very much about the psychological linkages that would occur if the first generation of recipient children were trained for better jobs where they could earn more money, leading to a new sense of dignity and self worth that might bear on the kind of attitudes that their children in turn would inherit.

Learning What Doesn't Work

Generally it is more likely that an analyst can rule out some theories than it is that he can establish with much confidence a particular explanation as the correct one. In *On Equality* we encounter statements like the following: "Overall, I will make a number of negative inferences about the effect of school characteristics on achievement, but no firm positive inferences" (Jencks, Ch. 2). That is, I will tell you what doesn't seem to work but not what will or might. Often, even a negative conclusion can be doubted. The Coleman Report concludes that school facilities seem to make very little difference. But it also suggests that the socioeconomic mix does. In order to attract a socioeconomic mix to a school, a new and modern school plant might be of value. Thus, in that sense, the quality of the facility would be related indirectly at least to achievement.

Senator Walter Mondale's complaint has been echoed by many others:

I had hoped to find research to support or to conclusively oppose my belief that quality integrated education is the most promising approach. But I have found very little conclusive evidence. For every study, statistical or theoretical, that contains a proposed solution or recommendation, there is always another, equally well documented, challenging the assumptions or conclusions of the first. No one seems to agree with anyone else's approach. But more distressing, no one seems to know what works.¹²

Styles of Analysis

The social scientist cannot be faulted for being honest about the shortcomings of his art, except when he goes on to state conclusions with more certainty than is really justified. He seldom misrepresents the data outright; but often the conclusions sidestep the basic conflicts that have arisen in the analysis, and go off in new directions. Instead of conclusions, we have a new set of hypotheses which may bear only incidental relation to the data and analysis under discussion.

¹² Senator Walter Mondale, Address before the American Educational Research Association, February, 1971.

Occasionally, the lengthy review provides a surprise ending. Feeling guilty for having led the reader ever more deeply into the thickets of inconclusiveness, the writer concludes with a firm dismissal of the evidence that has been so laboriously marshalled, and offers another method of settling the issue. Thus a review of the research on the effect of integration on achievement ends this way:

We therefore conclude on a familiar note. Policy with respect to racial integration should be made on the basis of moral, legal, and political consideration, not on the basis of integration's alleged effect on the short-term careers of either white or black students. Such effects are at best problematic, certainly modest, and possibly non-existent.¹³

To the policymaker, such a conclusion tends to be exasperating, whereas the social scientist is likely to shrug it off as the price one pays for using the world as a laboratory.

More typically, what happens is that conclusions are stated, then modified, hedged, picked apart, doubted, even contradicted in some ways, and finally restated with more modifiers. The reader then must decide if a bucket with so many holes in it holds water. Often it does not, but the conclusions are stated with a sort of hopeful air, trusting the reader to make some good use of them. The bucket still holds some water, doesn't it? Or, if it doesn't, perhaps there is a way to make use of it as a sieve.

New Paradigms?

Yet it may be that the most we can hope for at this stage of inquiry into complex human processes is that able social scientists think through all the contrary interpretations and possible contingencies. Total pessimism is not justified. Social science hopefully may be at the stage of painfully recognizing the inadequacy of old theories and methodologies. The resulting confusion, most evident perhaps in policy studies, may be the necessary outcome of achieving new levels of complexity and sophistication of thought from which creative new research paradigms will emerge.

The editors of *On Equality* express more optimism than may be justified about how soon such designs will emerge. They note the need for "a model that will show the process by which inputs affect educational achievement, if they do." And they conclude, "We can confidently look forward to the development and appraisal of such models in the future" (Ch. 1). Others, such as Alexander M. Mood and R. Powers, speak with much less confidence, emphasizing the "considerable range of unsolved and often sticky problems that stand between system theory and its practical application in the near future."¹⁴

Several preliminary outlines of the shape such future studies might take are presented in the *On Equality* volume. James M. Beshers describes a model of a nonstationary sto-

¹³ *Education and Inequality*, p. 147.

¹⁴ "Cost Benefit Analysis of Education," in *Analysis for Planning Programming Budgeting*, ed. M. Alfandary-Alexander (Washington, D.C.: Washington Operations Research Council, 1968).

chastic process, a probabilistic model that generates a time series (Ch. 10). Henry Dyer sums up the need for five interlocking attitudinal and observational studies (Ch. 9). Their sketches suggest not only great theoretical and technical problems, but astonishing political problems as well.

Consider Dyer's scheme. The first of his five studies would focus on the pupils' perception of themselves, their parents, and their teachers. He suggests querying pupils to find out how often parents help with homework and how often the parents disagree with the teacher's way of doing things. Dyer also would want to obtain the pupil's perception of the "teacher's knowledge of the subject being taught, her ability to get the subject across," her interest, fairness, degree of individualized attention, and her "patterns of likes and dislikes within the class." Pupil reporting on such sensitive questions about their parents would be quite touchy politically, and, if attempts at student evaluation in the universities have met great resistance from teachers, one can imagine the outcry from third grade teachers and their unions. Dyer's second study would focus primarily on the parents' perception of the child and would ask how much attention they give to homework, their opinion of the teacher's competence, and their aspirations for the child. The third study would be directed at the teachers and would ask them to report on parents: Did the teacher think parents were interested or disinterested, threatening or unintelligent? They would give their opinions on the competence of colleagues and rate principals on such issues as whether they were supporting, constructive, and able to obtain parent support for the school. The fourth study would attempt to divine the peer-group structure in greater depth, including pupil ratings of other pupils' personalities and the fifth study would put emphasis on actual classroom observation by outside observers. While such information might provide a high yield to social science, the difficulties in collecting it on a large scale are enormous, although the Coleman survey and Project Talent¹⁵ collected some attitudinal measures, and the Plowden Report¹⁶ in England included parent interviews.

The Process of Collaboration

The Harvard seminar reanalysis of the Coleman survey represents an advance in that it was an interdisciplinary effort that attempted to involve a wide range of social scientists and policymakers in its deliberations. The seminar itself, though it grew to unmanageable size, was an uncommon effort to provide a common forum to assess the policy implications and other questions that were raised by the survey. The memoranda that were exchanged among members of the seminar, including many tables of reanalysis of data,

¹⁵ *Project Talent: Identification, Development, and Utilization of Human Talent*, ed. John C. Flanagan (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1966).

¹⁶ Central Advisory Council on Education, *Children and their Primary Schools: Volume I. The Report; Volume II. Research and Surveys* (London: H.M.S.O., 1967).

when bound into one volume, make a stack three inches thick. "Before long the evening seminar assumed near conference proportions, with fifty to sixty faculty members, and other interested persons, swarming about among panels, committees, groups and subgroups. It was a spirited and rewarding experience," wrote Mosteller and Moynihan (Ch. 1).

Undoubtedly it was. And more sustained, for at least a core group, than most such efforts among social scientists. The Harvard group attempted to sort out some of the most relevant policy questions, and to reanalyze the data, often in ingenious ways, to reveal other policy insights. An effort was made to make the substance of the Coleman Report more accessible to non-specialists by stating findings in a simpler language and by explaining technical terminology necessary to understand the Report. The imaginative explanation of the meaning of variance which Mosteller and Moynihan offer in a few pages is an example.

And yet, without faulting what was achieved within the limits of such an effort, it should be recognized that it is not nearly enough. What we have in the end is another collection of papers, a necessary step, but an insufficient development of the process of policy assessment.

While there has been some collaboration, some conflicts among the authors are merely stated, with little effort to weigh the evidence of one against the other as to what seems the wisest course for public policy.

On one key issue, Dyer argues that further investigation of the relation between teacher attitudes and pupils is quite important. Noting that the Coleman survey did not obtain adequate information about the relation of teacher variables to pupil achievement because it was not possible to tie together the data on teachers with those on the pupils they had actually taught, Dyer goes on to say:

The consequence is that the amount of pupil achievement variance 'explained' by these teacher variables is vanishingly small. Common sense, however, insists that the way teachers feel about the children they teach and the amount of skill they possess in adapting instruction to individual pupils *must* be strong factors in determining what the children learn. (Ch. 9)

Jencks' conclusions point in the opposite direction:

While experimental studies would show that teachers differ in effectiveness, they would show that not only the variables measured in the EEOS but other more complex variables (such as teachers' scores on attitude and personality scales) are only slightly correlated with teaching effectiveness. (Ch. 2)

Resolving Contradictions

Other conflicts could be enumerated, and we should not be surprised by them. But a thorny question remains regarding the responsibility which collaborators in such an ef-

fort bear for indicating their best judgment of policy implications, especially where there is conflict on key issues. The differences should be recorded, in full, for other researchers to make their own judgments about. But policymakers ought to be better informed about what the collaborators agree are the strengths and weaknesses of contrary findings. Gilbert and Mosteller touch upon this issue:

We can expect controversy even in the presence of good data. Conflicting advice will be available from highly regarded experts. This calls for some innovations in the appreciation of science for policy decisions and we might hope that political scientists would suggest and appraise some ways that administrators could use to help choose between competing programs. (Ch. 8)

They draw attention to a proposal made by McGeorge Bundy and others that administrators would benefit from an adversary procedure in which experts would argue the policy options. Presumably the administrator would then have to decide which was the best course. One would wish that somehow the "administrators" of this procedure involving the often conflicting advice of the experts would similarly indicate their best judgment not about how to settle these conflicts, since they can't be settled in any realistic sense, but about how to clarify the costs and benefits of conflicting policies.

Surprisingly little work has been done towards the end of providing better models and procedures to resolve the contradictions among research studies. In one of the most thoughtful analyses of this problem, Richard Light and Paul Smith conclude, "Evidence and knowledge should be cumulative. But for evidence to be cumulative, there must be accessible procedures for accumulating it. Currently, there appear to be few systematic efforts to accumulate gradually developing information from a set of disparate studies."¹⁷

Light and Smith outline a strategy for synthesis that flows from the statistical concept of cluster sampling. They view each study as though it were a sample from a large population. After obtaining data from carefully designed existing studies, they would recombine it into relevant clusters. They argue that this would enable the researcher to analyze the data to see the differential effects among programs. He should be able to draw more complex inferences from the data rather than to settle for more simplistic styles of summing up the literature. Thus it is a preventive strategy which protects against premature and superficial exclusion of contrary evidence. But such a strategy cannot supply the missing links that are needed to provide an adequate model of the educational process. Nor would the authors argue that any recombination of existing studies can resolve the more general difficulties discussed previously, such as the problems of measurement, and causality.

¹⁷ "Accumulating Evidence: Procedures for Resolving Contradictions among Different Research Studies," *Harvard Educational Review*, 41 (November, 1971), pp. 429-471.

The Recommendations

Aside from the policy implications pointing toward the benefits of socioeconomic integration and the faint reassurance provided by the knowledge that by 1965 the nation's largely separate schools were roughly equal by Coleman's definition (a finding which was emphatically felt not to be true prior to the publication of the Report), the most clear-cut conclusions about schools are essentially negative. Hence the summary recommendations of both the HEW study and the *On Equality* volume are predictable in their emphasis on the need for obtaining better measures of educational achievement and on the need for more research and experimentation.

The HEW report cited three major areas that hold promise for improving the schools:

1. The trial of new programs and approaches in situations so structured that the results of the innovation can be clearly ascertained.
2. The incorporation of successful innovations as operational programs in a school management system that periodically monitors all ongoing programs against specified objectives.
3. The promotion of greater socioeconomic and racial balance in the schools (as well as in housing and employment), so that the opportunity structure of American society can be more accessible to all its members.¹⁸

The editors of the *On Equality* volume made these principal recommendations:

1. Both nationally and locally we should reappraise the aims, goals and measures of success in education. We should adopt equality of educational opportunity, defined for the moment as equality of educational achievement for the several racial/ethnic groups, as a national goal.
2. Long-range research programs. We recommend that the nation launch a vigorous program of educational research for the purpose of improving national, state and local educational policy.
3. Periodic assessment. At regular intervals, the nation should measure the state of the schools, its students and teachers, with a view to appraising progress toward its goals.
4. Employment and income programs. We recommend increased family-income and employment training programs, together with plans for the evaluation of their long-run effects on education.
5. New kinds of schools. We recommend that new kinds of schools be developed and evaluated, and that in existing schools new sorts of educational policies substantially different from those of the past be tried in a research and development manner.
6. Optimism. We recommend that the electorate maintain persistent pressure on its government agencies, school boards, legislatures, and executives to set specific targets, develop and revise programs, and report on progress toward local, state and national goals in education with an attitude that optimistically expects gains, but, knowing their rarity, appreciates them when they occur. (Mosteller and Moynihan, Ch. 1)

¹⁸ Mayeske *et al.*, p. 10.

A randomly chosen panel of educational researchers and administrators, asked to date these recommendations with no knowledge of their actual origin, might not suggest any date later than 1960, with the exception of integration as a goal. For the other recommendations, almost any year since at least 1930 would do. This makes them no less right, of course. And while the reanalyses are not intrinsically related to all of these recommendations, they support them in the sense that they reveal we do not understand the educational process.

These central recommendations may be unarguable. But we can ask what can be learned from this collaborative effort so that ensuing research might yield the greatest benefits. Mosteller and Moynihan raise this crucial issue in passing, but do not assess their own efforts in the light of it:

The social science critique of widely held social beliefs is not something that is wisely left to random and intermittent initiatives, whether by governments, foundations or individual researchers. Once begun, a kind of collective commitment to keep at the task is necessary if new truths are not to cause more mischief than the old myths. (Ch. 1)

Theirs was something more than a "random and intermittent initiative," but it was far less than a "collective commitment." While it was more ambitious than most, it was far short of what is needed. It was a part-time effort for most of the contributors. They were, to name a few of their more full-time preoccupations, counselor to the President, teachers, developers of the tuition voucher plan, a vice president of a large testing organization. One cannot quarrel with the individual priorities, nor with the quality of the work that was actually undertaken. Nor should there be any reason why we should expect this particular group to have created the structure for the collective commitment that has yet to be evolved. But we should not shrink from concluding that it is not enough and to ask in a practical way how such commitments will become a reality. Researchers can always be expected to recommend more research. That is in the nature of things. But the issue being raised here is the need for vastly greater scope in defining the research task, sustained commitment to achieve it, and the willingness to set targets by which to measure progress.

Accountability

It is significant that in their final recommendation the *On Equality* editors spoke of the need for the electorate to pressure government agencies, school boards, legislatures, and executives to set specific targets, but said nothing about researchers or social scientists. Presumably the pressure on the research community would be exercised indirectly through these agencies.

But we need to be more explicit. It is precisely in the area of research and research results that we need to set specific targets and to begin to build the kind of comprehensive, sustained, collective commitment that is necessary.

Some of the major scientific breakthroughs have come about—in the Manhattan project, in the efforts to put a man on the moon, in polio research and other medical research—when targets were set, public attention was focused on the scientific quest of a problem, and stronger elements of accountability and even scientific competition were introduced.

Michael Polanyi has been one of the most vigorous defenders of the autonomy of science in charting its own progress. Commenting on the 1943 statement of the Association of Scientific Workers in England that research should no longer be conducted as an end in itself, he said:

I appreciate the generous sentiments which actuate the aspirations of guiding the progress of science into socially beneficent channels, but I hold its aims to be impossible and indeed nonsensical Any attempt at guiding scientific research towards a purpose other than its own is an attempt to deflect it from the advancement of science.¹⁹

But even one who takes such a staunchly classicist view grants that, "Emergencies may arise in which all scientists willingly apply their gifts to tasks of public interest."²⁰

A Better Rationale for Research

Funds for educational research have grown at a snail's pace. Although such funds increased during the 1960's, the increase began from a base very close to zero. Currently, only a fraction of one percent of the monies spent on education is allocated to research. This compares to an allocation of five to ten percent in major industries. It may be that one of the most beneficial outcomes of the Coleman Report will be that it provides a factual basis upon which to dramatize the need for educational research at the same time that it destroys the twin myths that educators know what works and that the schools have been reducing inequalities. For example, the Coleman Report incontrovertibly establishes the fact that poor Negro children in the big cities of America are half a grade below national norms by grade three, a year behind by grade six, and three years by high school. They "graduate" from high school with less than a ninth grade "education."²¹ And the Report and its reanalyses establish the fact that none of the presumed strategies of school equalization seem to have any effect. Yet we are beginning, though considerably distant from achieving, a more scientific grasp of what are the real causes of unequal achievement. We may learn that the greatest source of cognitive inequality is native endowment and is relatively unchangeable. But even the most conservative scholars would indicate that at least twenty percent of the variance in an individual's I.Q. can be attributed to

¹⁹ Michael Polanyi, *Knowing and Being* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 58-59.

²⁰ Polanyi, pp. 58-59.

²¹ This does not mean they are regressing, necessarily. Children who are achieving at a lesser rate in third grade would be expected to fall relatively further behind as the years accumulate, although they may be going at the same relative rate. In a rough analogy, a car that is traveling at 40 miles per hour will be only 10 miles behind a car traveling at 50 miles per hour at the end of the first hour, but would be 100 miles behind at the end of ten hours of travel.

environmental influences. We have hardly begun to reveal the ways to maximize that potential change. Far more important is the discovery of the ways that children can fully develop the potential they do have. Finally, we need to know a great deal more about the wider network of factors that interact with cognitive skills to determine an individual's life chances. Obtaining better answers to these questions does not require that "all scientists willingly apply their gifts" to these tasks. But the record points out that intermittent initiative won't do either.

While we have emphasized the shortcomings of survey research and its inability to answer most of the questions policymakers are most concerned about, it is at a stage of potentially rich development. The time may be imminent when social science will profit greatly from increased coordination and launch a concerted attack on such a broad problem as constructing workable models of the educational process. One should not be overly optimistic. The political hurdles that stand in the way of practically testing and evaluating such models are themselves sizable barriers to overcome.

The challenge demands thought on a scale seldom considered. The shape such an enterprise might take ought to be the first object of research. It would probably require a large testing organization and a major research organization that coordinate work at a number of centers and universities. It would need close links with government agencies, some measure of legislative authority at several levels of government, national visibility and status to attract distinguished talent. It should draw together a critical concentration of such talent in a long-term commitment to accomplishing a set of targets. The difficulty, of course, will lie in setting realizable targets and resisting the tendency to over-promise that often accompanies appeals for funds. It will need assured long-term funding, independent management, and a legislative mandate to provide a foundation for nationwide testing programs. The National Institute of Education proposed by President Nixon might be such a vehicle.

The reanalysis of the Coleman Report has informed us anew of how great a distance remains between the kind of models social science can at present construct and the reality it seeks to describe. Impressive achievements may be fifteen or twenty years away. But they are unlikely to be hastened by resting the case on demonstrating the need for more research. The task now would seem to be to devise ways to bring the constituent elements into the most harmonious and productive relationship on a scale that holds some promise for making measurable advances within five-year periods.

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THE NEIGHBORHOOD-BASED POLITICS OF EDUCATION.

by Harry L. Summerfield

Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1971.

128 pp. \$1.95 (paper).

An individual's preference for a particular type of educational approach (e.g., tuition vouchers, performance contracting, decentralization, the present system) reflects the value he places upon the public accountability of educators and his judgment of the degree of accountability that would exist under various administrative systems.* Taking the position that "the public . . . bears considerable responsibility for the shape of its educational institutions" (p. 103), Harry L. Summerfield addresses the question of whether the existing system of public education in a single city is "open" and accountable to its public.¹

Reviewing the literature that describes the politics of local public school systems, the author notes:

... recent research now asserts that local educational decision makers are out of touch: that they neither respond nor reflect the public will. Quite reputable scholars report that local educational authorities are 'unpublic officials' because of their insulation and autonomy. In systems theory parlance, these researchers contend that the educational decision-making system is essentially closed, that is, clients of the system have neither access to nor influence upon the educational decision making process. (p. 98)

Summerfield goes on to assert, however:

... Based on the findings about neighborhood-based politics of education, a preferred hypothesis would be that the decision making system of public education is essentially open rather than essentially closed. (p. 101)

If Summerfield's hypothesis of "openness" holds, then one of the major arguments of advocates of tuition vouchers, decentralization, and community control loses its power. In this essay I argue, however, that: a) Summerfield has failed to present adequate evidence that the school system he has studied is an open system; b) even if the openness of this school system were not in question the closed system hypothesis generally would still be more persuasive; c) the question of whether school systems are open or closed is inadequate in itself and should be reformulated; and d) reformulating the question should redirect our research effort from isolated case studies to comparative input-output analyses.

* My thanks to James Cox, Daniel Rich, Francis Tannian, and Stanley Turner for reading drafts of this essay and contributing to my understanding of the issues discussed herein.

¹ A briefer version of Summerfield's views were recently published in his article, "Cuing and the Open System of Educational Politics," in *Education and Urban Society* (August, 1971), 3, 4, pp. 425-439. His discussion of cuing, "the behavior of the process of authority-constituent engagement," is not presented in *The Neighborhood-based Politics of Education* nor reviewed in this essay.

Summerfield's contribution is not only the explicit raising of these issues but also the identification and discussion of a variety of findings that will help analysts determine the causes and possible immutability of school system closure. My arguments derive from my analysis of the community power literature, input-output analyses in political science, and recent research conducted in the Boston Public School System and reported in part below.²

Summerfield's Research

According to Summerfield, this book "is an analysis of the means of public control of public education at the grass roots level." The research was conducted in Dewittown, a major central city in a large metropolitan area. Dewittown is a pseudonym, the real "name does not matter." Perhaps the most distinguishing demographic characteristic of Dewittown is the small proportion of Blacks in terms of the general population (2.4 per cent and school enrollment (6 per cent at the elementary school level).

Four of the city's seventy elementary school neighborhoods were studied by Summerfield:

² Summerfield's disagreement with the recent educational research he cites (Lawrence Iannaccone and Frank W. Lutz, *Politics, Power, and Policy* [Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1970] and Marilyn Gittell and T. Edward Hollander, *Six Urban School Districts* [New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968]) reflects a larger disagreement among analysts of community power. While those viewing community power as held by a power elite argue that the public plays an insignificant role in most communities, advocates of the pluralist model hold that political decisions are influenced by public demands and activity. See Nelson W. Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963) for one summary of this literature. This debate is associated with the normative question of the extent to which the United States is a democracy.

This essay review reflects changes in the nature of the power elite-pluralist debate and political science research in the last decade. The theoretical and research focus is shifting from asking "who governs" to dealing with Harold Lasswell's entire definition of the field of political science, "who gets what, when, how, and why?" See his volume, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (Cleveland: World Publishing 1958). For example, several authors have recently argued that political scientists should shift their focus to the consumer's evaluation of governmental output. See Kenneth Dolbreare, "Public Policy Analysis and the Coming Struggle for the Soul of the Post Behavioral Revolution," in *Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science* ed. Phillip Green and Sanford Levinson (New York: Vintage Books, 1970, pp. 85-111). In my opinion, Steven M. David and Jewell Bellush ("Introduction: Pluralism, Race, and the Urban Political System" in *Race and Politics in New York City: Five Studies in Policy-making*, ed. Bellush and David (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), pp. 3-24, have written the most appropriate review of the literature with respect to the assumptions of pluralism and the evaluation of public bureaucracies.

The Boston study cited in this essay was funded in part by the U. S. Office of Education, Bureau of Research, and was a component of a policy study of the Boston Public School System directed by Dr. Joseph M. Cronin and Richard Hailer. The results will be contained in a report to the Office of Education and my Ph.D. dissertation in the Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. A summary of the parent survey will be included in the Danforth Boston School Board Study, manuscript, Harvard Graduate School of Education, and parts of the research and conclusions can now be found in the final report of the Boston School Department Study, Joseph M. Cronin and Richard M. Hailer, *Organizing a School System for Diversity: A Study of the Boston School Department* (Boston: McBer, 1970).

King neighborhood and school has a high rate of transience, large black majority, high incidence of AFCD, and low reading scores. It is a racially unbalanced setting with widespread poverty (black and white) and deep-seated learning problems among its pupils of both races.

Lawrence neighborhood residents are virtually all white, but disregarding race, the neighborhood and school is similar to King in terms of poverty, transience, and difficult learning problems. Some residents of Lawrence may be a step above poverty—the working poor; but at the same time they are well below the mainstream of American middle-class life.

Truman is populated by middle-class blacks and whites. Families have regular income. Students are about average in reading and academic ability, but the neighborhood has a special characteristic as indicated in the transience and AFDC figures. It is a borderline community with many poor blacks moving into the northern sector of the attendance zone.

Larsen is upper-middle class, stable, and white. It is the kind of neighborhood where prevailing educational techniques work and children learn in a suburban aura. (pp. 4-5)

The central research questions were:

Is the neighborhood, as a geographic unit, an important political unit?

What accounts for political success in some neighborhoods (even in the case of educational failure) and political failure in others?

What accounts for one neighborhood being able to get a new schoolhouse while another neighborhood school crumbles under the children's feet?

In terms of the total city education system which political characteristics differ and which are shared among neighborhoods?

Do politics make a difference in the quality of education delivered? (p. 6)

Summerfield assumed that the school principals were "the person[s] most knowledgeable about a neighborhood's educational affairs." Accordingly, they were the first to be interviewed in each of the four neighborhoods and they were asked to identify people and groups involved in the educational affairs of the school. A purposive sample of those identified, as well as several higher administrators, were then interviewed and in all over fifty interviews were completed. On the basis of these unstructured interviews Summerfield analyzes the educational attitudes of community residents, the nature of education at the schools, the neighborhood groups that play a role in the educational process, the role of the principals, and the relation of the system's central office to the local school and community.

After describing each school separately, Summerfield concludes:

... the unique flavors of four out of seventy neighborhoods in the one large city have been sampled. Each of the four provides for the education of children; none bear the same responsibility or capability. Their styles differ. Each neighborhood selects and develops its own political patterns. In turn, central school decision-makers tailor their

responses to each neighborhood situation. So, neighborhood-based politics of education exist. (p. 83)

A theory of neighborhood-based politics, based on interest group theory and the relation between petitioners and allocators, is then outlined.

Summerfield chooses the pseudonym Dewittown, for the city recalls for him the legacy of John Dewey and indicates "that neighborhood-based politics of education in part fulfills his belief that members of an open society must influence the authorities who administer public institutions, particularly the public schools" (p. 2). Unfortunately, Summerfield's evidence on the degree to which the Dewittown public school system is either engaged by demands or influenced by them is questionable on three levels—on methodological, empirical, and conceptual.

Methodological Problems

The methodological first difficulty is generalizing from data collected at four schools about the Dewittown public school system, which includes seventy elementary schools. Since only four cases are presented and apparently were studied, the uniqueness of response, demands, and political activity that Summerfield finds is virtually assured. There is no indication of variation beyond that within the four schools. How much does the study of four schools tell us about the handling of demands in a system of seventy schools?

The problem of generalization from a few schools is compounded by the lack of information about the method by which the four schools were selected. If one is to make a generalization about the uniqueness of parental activity in segments of the Dewittown school system, one would at least have to know if the four schools were selected because of their uniqueness. More importantly, if one wants to make a generalization that school officials in Dewittown listen or respond to parental demands, one would have to know if the four schools were selected on the basis of the educational philosophy of the principal, differing parental activity, or other characteristics possibly related to community-school relations.

My own data on the Boston public school system illustrates both these failures. Included in the sample of ten elementary schools were two serving Black children, two Chinese, two a mixture of Italian and Irish lower-middle to middle class, and two working class (one Irish, one Italian). In each pair large differences in parent-school relations exist. One school serving Blacks has an advisory council of parents, teachers, and administrators. Demands have been made continuously for several years. At the second predominantly Black school, parents have for decades had difficulty maintaining an organization, let alone making demands. Parents are inactive in the current school operations at both schools serving Chinese students, yet one school is an innovative and "democratic" school while the other has a very authoritarian atmosphere. At one of the two schools serving middle class parents there is an active, influential parent organization. Its counterpart is a school where the principal must appoint parents to serve on the board of the

larger (two other schools are included) parent organization. Finally, parents at one of the schools serving working class children accept the authority of the principal and limit their activity to bake sales. Parents at the other school, while also accepting the authority of the principal, have tried to play a more influential role in school operations.

If the school with more active parents described in each pair served as the basis for analysis of parent-school relations, one would be more likely to view the school system as an open system. The existence of great heterogeneity among neighborhoods, which both Summerfield and I have found, requires an analysis of more than four (or ten) schools within a large school system.

Summerfield's method of data collection is also suspect, especially in light of his conclusions. The data is highly dependent on the observations and aid of the four school principals. As noted earlier Summerfield reports "... the principal was asked to identify by name the people and groups who had been involved in any of the affairs discussed. The names mentioned by the principal served as leads to interviews with community actors or school people ..." (p. 7, fn. 4).

The degree of dependence on the views and suggestions of the school principals assumes Summerfield's conclusion. In a school system where parents' demands are articulated and heard by school officials, the principal would be a logical place to begin data collection. But if one wants to determine whether educators in a school system hear demands it is self-defeating to ask the principal the identity of who makes demands. Even if circularity were not a major difficulty, the reputational method, where the researcher declares that "after a point ... there are clearly diminishing returns in pursuing further interviews" and thereby averages less than fifteen interviews (including school officials) per school, presents the problem of misperception and bias on the part of the principal. How much do school personnel know about the desires and activities of parents?³

The Boston study sheds some light on this question by including data collected from school personnel and a random sample of parents at each school. School personnel are disturbingly inaccurate in their perceptions of parents along certain dimensions, and the magnitude of perceptual inaccuracy varies by the parents being described. The most depressing example involves expressed parental aspirations. The teachers responding to a written questionnaire at the ten schools estimated that an average of 46 per cent of the parents in their school wanted their child to graduate from college. Almost three-quarters of the parents (73 per cent), however, expressed college aspirations. At the two schools serving Blacks, over three times as many parents expressed college aspirations as the per-

³ A similar criticism has been made about the pluralist contribution to community studies. Herbert Jacobs and Michael Lipsky, for example, criticize pluralists for their almost exclusive focus on elite activity in community politics in "Outputs, Structure, and Power: An Assessment of Changes on State and Local Politics" in *Political Science: Advance of the Discipline*, ed. M. D. Irish (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 236-238.

centage estimated by the teachers in the school.⁴ (For example, at one school the teachers estimated that 22 per cent of the parents wanted their children to graduate from college, but 88 per cent of the parents expressed this goal.

A further difficulty with Summerfield's data lies in its qualitative base. The reader is highly dependent upon the author's interpretation of his data. It would be helpful to know the number of demands articulated to school personnel, the number considered but never discussed openly, the targets of articulated demands, and the number of parents supporting and acting in support of each demand. Summerfield is not able to discuss the quantitative distribution of parental attitudes and activity at a given school although he does emphasize their heterogeneity at each of the schools.

Empirical Problems

Even discounting the methodological drawbacks mentioned above, a detailed re-analysis of Summerfield's presentation of the four cases also creates doubts that the open system hypothesis is warranted in Dewittown.

At the Larsen School, there is a vigorous PTA that serves to support school policy and programs.⁵ The "parents acquiesce to neighborhood school policies without questions." Larsen parents have not organized to affect internal school matters. They have willingly accepted the school as an authority; the principal is seen as a reliable authority to be trusted with internal school management. Thus parents have not sought to change the operation of the Larsen School. Parents have been involved in three "important" conflicts with central school authorities. Open enrollment and busing, the building of a swimming pool, and the allocation of educational funds are cited as examples of parent-school system administration conflict. In each instance, parents have brought their case to the administration without favorable results (at the time of the book's publication).

The Lawrence School principal is not well regarded and has a negative image. Summerfield summarizes the situation at the school as follows:

Just as the principal has little impact on the community and the community has little impact on the principal, the neighborhood-based advocates for education, being almost nonexistent, have virtually no impact on central school authorities. This includes the principal. (p. 41)

⁴ Teachers were not asked, "How far will parents at this school say they want their children to go in school?" but rather, "How far do parents *want* their children to go in school?" It is certainly possible that the discrepancy between parental aspirations and teacher estimates of aspirations actually measure the difference between parental *expressed* aspiration and parental *behavior* to support these aspirations in the eyes of teachers. However, teachers held perceptions at variance with parental views on several items including whether parents had influenced teachers on a one-to-one basis.

⁵ The Larsen School is discussed on page 67-82, Lawrence on pages 39-44, Truman on pages 45-66, and King on pages 9-38. It helps Summerfield's argument to discuss the King School first and it aids my point to discuss it last. The problem with studying four schools is thus reemphasized.

This situation exists despite a long list of major educational difficulties at the school. Parents in the PTA did have one battle with the school staff: they were victorious in seeking a natural rather than an artificial Christmas tree. The major accomplishment of the principal has been to improve janitorial services in the school. According to Summerfield, "Lawrence is a school without a political constituency" (p. 43).

At the Truman School, Summerfield characterizes the political process as a) the politics of passivity for many parents and b) political action resulting in "verbal baths" by parents toward themselves or the powerless principal. "When measured, the politics of Truman neighborhood have not lessened the degree or difficulty of the school's problems" (p. 65). The current principal serves as a "dignified, neighborhood punching bag," with the major responsibility of reducing conflict and parental activity. The central office did transfer the previous principal because of the level of parental activity and concern, although parent activity was not directed specifically at removing the principal.

The King School probably comes closest to Summerfield's general model of political activity, but the role of parents here too is quite constrained. "The residents are not very active in the politics affecting their own lives, and they have developed heavy dependence on the wisdom and benevolence of professionals or paid community leaders" (p. 18). "Parental esteem for the school is not accompanied by parental participation in school affairs" (p. 15). The principal of the school has taken the initiative in a wide range of successful attempts to improve the school. It does not appear that parents directly petition for these improvements although they have been activated to support the principal's efforts and some community leaders (professionals) have played a role.

Thus, at the Larsen School parents have not petitioned at the local school level and have petitioned with unfavorable results at the central level. At the Lawrence School parents have not petitioned and at the Truman School parents petitioned several years ago, the principal left, and now the parents continue to petition without success. At the King School parents have not petitioned, they have supported the principal who has succeeded in gaining resources for the school. In short, the lack of parental activity at the local schools studied calls into question the openness of the system and the lack of successful petition makes conclusions about effective grass roots politics appear unwarranted.

Generalizing from Dewittown

Even if one accepted Summerfield's interpretation of the events at the four schools as being characteristic of the Dewittown Public School System, one would have difficulty generalizing the results to other school systems. Presumably in an effort to mask the identity of the city, Summerfield has limited his description of Dewittown. For example, the reader could profit by more information about the size and structure of the school system, the ethnic breakdown of the city's population, and the degree of competition for the elected school board. Furthermore, the low percentage of Black children in the school system (and city) makes the city atypical. Since the politics of neighborhoods appears most ef.

fective at the King School, one wonders if success is a function of the small Black population in Dewittown.

Furthermore, as noted earlier, Summerfield's assertion of an open system hypothesis runs counter to evidence from other studies he cites and to my recent Boston research.⁶ For example, although the Boston study did find a limited correspondence between parental preferences and school functioning in one area, teaching methods, only a negligible relation was found in educational content and parental role. As noted earlier there were large differences in parent-school relations between pairs of schools serving clientele with similar educational preferences. The schools in each pair also differed widely in their internal functioning even where parental preferences were similar. For example, in one school serving middle class children the teachers were actively engaged in team teaching, multimedia approaches, and a loosening of traditional classroom authority relations. At the corresponding school teachers did not stray from the physical row setup, lecture methods, or hierarchical authority patterns. Where teachers were functioning according to the preferences of parents, teachers were not more accurate in perceiving parental preferences, more willing to see parental influences as legitimate, or more likely to feel that parents could control school functioning. The sources of congruence lay elsewhere.

Further, in only two schools (both serving middle class white children) did parents appear to have influenced the selection or retention of personnel, curriculum, or teaching methods. At several schools, parents have failed to gain control of the Home and School Association, let alone the functioning of the school.

Conceptual Problems

Openness, accountability, and responsiveness are used frequently as criteria for evaluating public school systems. But the meanings of these words are far from standardized.⁷

"Conclusions reached by studying Dewittown might change our support for the open rather than closed school system hypothesis if the study site was selected for theoretically appropriate reasons. For example, David and Bellush chose to study New York City because of its reputation as 'the most 'liberal' city in the United States,' the demands of Blacks because 'pluralists expressed confidence that urban government would be as responsive to the demands of black citizens as it had been to the claims of the immigrant groups that had preceded them,' and the areas of welfare, police, housing, education, and health because 'it would seem logical that the controversies selected should be those that the black community felt were most important.' Thus their finding that the political system of New York City has failed to respond to significant Black demands gives strong support to a general closed system hypothesis. Unfortunately, Summerfield offers no theoretical justification for choosing to study the Dewittown school system. One cannot construct a post hoc justification for the identity of Dewittown is not revealed and Dewittown is not sufficiently described.

⁷ See Charles E. Gilbert, "The Framework of Administrative Responsibility," *Journal of Politics*, 21 (1959), pp. 373-497, for a discussion of twelve values associated with the concept of responsibility, each of which could serve as a criterion for evaluating public school bureaucracies. The list includes responsiveness, flexibility, stability, competence, and accountability. Also of interest is James Q. Wilson's discussion of "The Bureaucracy Problem," *The Public Interest*, 16 (Winter 1967), pp. 3-9, and the conflict inherent in simultaneously applying the criteria of accountability,

Summerfield's conclusion, that an open rather than closed system hypothesis fits public school system operations, is in part a result of his definition of open system. That is, even disregarding the methodological and empirical problems described above, there are conceptual problems which limit the value of Summerfield's major finding.

Summerfield states that "the test of openness is... whether public education decision making elites can remain impervious to public demand. Can educational decision makers insulate themselves from engagement with interested publics?" (p. 99). Later he writes,

... the concept of openness emphasizes the capability of petitioners to engage a political system. At the simplest level this means communicate and be heard; make the petition known and comprehended. ... Engagement ... is often mistakenly equated with successful use of power. ... But, openness of the system is not measured by the ability of any particular systematic actor to win. ... (p. 101)

Thus Summerfield's criterion of openness requires the articulation of demands (he calls this engagement) but not system response to articulated demands (I call this response).

Summerfield argues for this less stringent criterion of openness, engagement rather than response, on several bases. He notes that the success of a demand depends on resources available to decision makers, e.g., money and technology. Further demands always exceed resources and conflict among demands often exist. Every demand cannot be satisfied. He points out that demands may not be met because the school political system is designed to delay response. Thus one would be hard put to measure openness on the basis of demands that are not met at a given point in time. Finally, Summerfield implies that a demand may be rejected because a majority opposes it (pp. 101-102).

I find Summerfield's definition of openness and its application to public school systems of limited utility. Moreover, his reasons for using the criterion of engagement rather than response are inadequate.

First, under Summerfield's criterion a dictatorship could be an open political system. Demands could be made, perhaps as a ritual or form of catharsis, and the dictator could reject them all. The dictator presumably would be engaged but not influenced. Oligarchies and other political systems serving the few at the expense of the many might also be open systems. The articulation of demands in a political system may be of interest, but it is the process of fulfillment of demands which makes a political analysis of education fruitful.

Second, Summerfield's arguments concerning the problems of school systems in meeting demands may modify the operationalization of the more stringent criterion of openness but do not support its total rejection. Not all demands made upon a school system neces-

equity, efficiency, responsiveness, and fiscal integrity to the federal bureaucracy. I believe more discussion should be given not only to listing, defining, and measuring the performance of school systems on similar dimensions, but also investigating the theoretical and practical conflict among the criteria. Summerfield's work would have benefited from a more explicit analysis of concepts like openness, politics, and system.

sarily involve the commitment of limited resources, e.g., money or revised technology. An unknown percentage of demands require changes in values, attitudes, and behaviors on the part of school system personnel. For example, is the problem with rigid curriculum a financial one? One could investigate the openness of a system across a variety of demands, differentiating demands on the basis of the type and extent of "cost" to the system of meeting them.

Moreover, the resources available to meet demands are in part a function of the school system's relation to the public. How many public school systems delayed adopting federal funds and programs? How many school systems failed to increase their resources by encouraging volunteer classroom assistance or cooperation with local cultural agencies? Indeed, insofar as he accepts the constraint of limited resources, Summerfield unwittingly admits evidence for the closed nature of many school systems.

Finally, many demands made upon a public school system need not result in conflict with other demands, even given limited resources. The issue is not whether a majority opposes a demand, but rather what group shall constitute those who decide the issue. For example, a majority of parents in a city may well oppose a specific program. But at a single school within the city, parents may well favor the same program. What is the meaning of majority opposition in this case? Frequently school systems can meet the demands of individuals or groups opposed by a "majority" of the constituency by decentralizing operations.

While examining only the engagement of the allocators by the petitioners is inadequate, an analysis limited to engagement and the allocator's policy response is also inadequate. The relationship among needs, preferences, and demands, between stated policy and the actual implementation of policy in the schools, and the effect of the entire political process on the potential petitioners in a school system all should be studied.

Demands are the overt expressions of the needs or preferences of individuals.⁸ The transformation and filtering of needs and preferences into demands are often crucial to describing the nature of a political system. One cannot, as Summerfield does, view a lack of demands or apathy as necessarily indicating satisfaction with the system (p. 103).⁹ As David and Bellush point out preferences may not become demands because "a group feels it lacks sufficient influence to affect governmental policy and thus takes no action to promote its interests, . . . it fears the use of sanctions were it to choose to get involved. . . . Community norms which are supportive of the interests of particular groups, lead either to the failure of a group to initiate a controversy or to the exclusion of a whole range of alterna-

⁸ In *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), David Easton defines six terms (expectations, public opinion, motivations, ideology, interests, preferences) which may be transformed into demands within a political system. In this essay review I use the term preferences to indicate conscious desires and demands to indicate articulated preferences. I am among the many political scientists indebted to Easton's work.

⁹ See also Summerfield's article cited above.

tives during the course of a conflict."¹⁰ Thus some Boston parents felt that the activity of some parents was limited by their fear of criticizing teachers or administrators who had (or would have) authority over their children.¹¹

Similarly, the analysis should not end with the statement of policy. The actual implementation of a policy may change one's conclusions about whether demands have or have not been met. For example, it has been charged that Boston's open enrollment program, presumably adopted to meet the demands of those pressing for racial integration, has been used more by white parents for transferring out of integrated schools than by Black parents seeking integrated schools. A related issue involves the relation between the needs, preferences, and demands of parents and their views concerning the implementation of school system policy. As David and Bellush argue, "It is not enough to validate empirically that a participant received something he had sought from the decision. To conclude that the participant has been accommodated by the outcome, one must make a judgment that the benefits received were, in some sense, satisfactory. This judgment should be made by the participants, not by the researcher. . . ."¹²

A further difficulty arises independent of the criterion used to analyze a school system. The problem is whether it is sufficient to attempt to use any gross measure of openness.¹³ This problem arises whether one samples or takes a complete enumeration of the schools. For example, if research indicates that three of four schools are open, can one characterize the school system as open? This is not only a matter of degree, i.e., is the system more or less open, but also of specificity—the significant question is not whether or not the system is open, but to what groups of individuals on what issues is the school system open? Thus Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau in a study of "representation," where representation is analogous to my use of the concept responsiveness, divide city councils into the categories of responsive to alternative publics, responsive to ad-hoc issue groups, and entertaining a self-defined image (i.e. nonresponsive).¹⁴ Similarly, David and Bellush note

¹⁰ David and Bellush, p. 85.

¹¹ The Boston Public Schools have been studied with respect to response to preferences in my study, response to demands in the Danforth School Board Study manuscript, *op. cit.* and response to needs in *The Way We Go To School: The Exclusion of Children in Boston*, Report by the Task Force on Children Out of School (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).

¹² David and Bellush, pp. 11-12.

¹³ In this respect the concepts of openness and responsiveness are like the concept of power; they all require specificity to be operationalized successfully. However, the intuitive appeal of all three concepts is greater in the general sense than specific. One would prefer to say that the school system is "open" rather than the school system is "somewhat open to whites and not open to Blacks in the area of personnel." See Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 39-54 for a discussion of the concept of power.

My thanks to Dr. Paul Dolan for explicitly raising this question, originally in terms of the relationship of parts to wholes, about my research.

¹⁴ See Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau, "Political Matrix and Political Representation: Prolegomenon to a New Departure from an Old Problem," *American Political Science Review*, 63, June 1969, 2, pp. 427-441.

that particular groups may be systematically closed out of the policy process.¹⁵ One might thus distinguish between "systematic closure," where a specific subset of groups are denied access, and "high closure," where access to the system is limited for all groups. Characterizing school systems as merely open or closed is too simplistic.

Summerfield's concern for differentiating between a slow response and no response is constructive. But without explicit criteria about adequate or varying times for response, each absence of response can be viewed as potential responsiveness. To be more precise in future research, school systems could be viewed on the basis of the speed of its responses to demands entailing varying costs to the school system.

In summary, a broader and more explicit criterion of openness would be more useful in evaluations of the politics of local school systems. For example, my study of the "responsiveness" of the Boston Public School System focused on the educational preferences of parents at ten schools and the relationship of parental preferences at each school to the functioning of the school. Thus engagement (and articulation of demands) is an intervening variable, descriptive of parent-school relationships within the school system, while the role local parental politics play in satisfying parental preferences is a central concern.

Factors Inhibiting Open Systems

In spite of his finding of "openness" in the Dewittown school system, Summerfield also provides a useful description of some of the factors that tend to create school system closure. In the preface, Summerfield states that if there is a message in the book it is that the failure of education is shared by educators and the public. He presents a strong case in support of the public's failure. Parents in Dewittown generally do not become active in the local politics of education. Activity seems to be least where educational needs are greatest. When they do get involved, their involvement is often misdirected and trivial rather than stimulating and constructive. In deferring to school authorities, parents generally accept mediocrity. His descriptions at each school document the failure of parents to organize and act in concert to successfully achieve quality education.

What Summerfield and others documenting parental apathy neglect to consider, however, is that the failure of parents may be largely a result of the failure of educators. Why don't parents participate? How much does the answer lie in the education they received (or did not receive), the lack of opportunities for participation within the public educational system, and the chance of success or reward for these potential efforts? If active parents fail to gain what they seek, why should inactive parents become active?

It is also unfortunate that Summerfield never discusses the role that the personal and, in part, professional interest of educators play in inhibiting the articulation of demands or responses to demands. His interest in the grass roots politics of education has led to a

¹⁵ David and Bellush, p. 9.

neglect of the professional politics of education. His use of a petitioner-allocator model fails to include the importance of the professional schoolman and school board member as allocator and petitioner in one. Recent research suggests that the rewards (allocations) due those controlling and working within the educational system must be considered in an analysis of the politics of education.¹⁶ As a minor example, did the King School principal fight strongly for air conditioning in the proposed school because he will have to work in the summer in that school? In stating "whatever the pattern... school district officials, like most other American governmental officials, obtain a reading of the 'public will,' respond to demands, and if necessary and possible, implement reforms" (p. 100). Summerfield neglects the issue of the extent to which fulfilling public demands will have positive or negative effects on the benefits accruing to school personnel.¹⁷

What Research is Needed?

Hopefully, Summerfield's work will ultimately accomplish two principal tasks. First, somewhat by default, it will encourage observers of the politics of local school systems to change the nature of the question they try to answer. No answer to the generalized question: "Are public school systems open?" would be satisfactory. A definition of openness which includes a broader notion of inputs (e.g., preferences, needs) and outputs (e.g., implementation of policy), takes the process of demand formulation into account, and measures openness with respect to the specific sources of inputs (e.g., Blacks) and issue areas (e.g., low monetary cost to system, high cost to system professionals) is required. Thus the complex research question that must be framed is *What kind of school systems respond in what ways to what kinds of needs, preferences, and demands by what kinds of groups or individuals?* Any simpler question is inadequate and ultimately of limited utility.

Second, Summerfield's work will be a rich source of data for those trying to classify the kinds of demands, responses, and groups and individuals found at the neighborhood level. Similarly his work will yield hypotheses about the relationships among the nature of demands, their sources, and school system responses.

¹⁶ Danforth Manuscript. Non-professional employees may also play a significant role in school politics. See James Haughton, "The Role of the Board of Education in Perpetuating Racism in the Building Trades and Vice Versa," ed. Annette T. Rubenstein, *Schools Against Children: The Case for Community Control* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 159-173.

¹⁷ Summerfield states that the existence of an elite does not necessarily indicate that the system is closed. On page 100 he argues that "when a public commodity like education is distributed to all citizens, the vast complexity of the process requires that only a relatively few people spend the time, develop the skills, and responsibly manage the ongoing specialized governing operations.... The test of openness is not whether there is elite management, but whether public education decision making elites can remain impervious to public demands." Unfortunately Summerfield does not discuss the possibility of inherent conflicts between public control and participation on the one hand and professionalism and bureaucracy on the other. See Robert R. Alford, *Bureaucracy and Participation: Political Cultures in Four Wisconsin Cities* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 25-27, for a discussion of this issue.

Answering the restated question, however, requires comparative analyses of school systems rather than case studies, and these comparative analyses will be most fruitfully accomplished within the systematic input-output framework now being utilized by political scientists. These studies already bring the role of the impact of the formal political process upon public policy into question, suggest which governmental forms foster the greatest amount of responsiveness to heterogeneous populations, and indicate which environmental and political factors are related to the response of city councils to attentive publics.¹⁸ Further case studies will be required to generate new hypotheses and to improve our selection and measurement of key variables.

Analyzing current school systems in terms of openness and responsiveness will help us to evaluate proposed school system reforms (e.g., community control, decentralization, performance contracting, tuition vouchers) and, ultimately, to design an improved educational system.¹⁹

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¹⁸ Bratt W. Hawkins, in his *Politics and Urban Policies* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971) offers an excellent review of the input-output urban policy analysis literature.

¹⁹ For example, the Center for the Study of Educational Policy report, *Financing Education by Grants to Parents* (Cambridge: Center for the Study of Educational Policy, March 1970), p. 1, argues for tuition voucher plans because "effective control over the character of the public schools is largely vested in legislators, school boards, and educators, not parents," parents "cannot rely exclusively on political processes" to determine the nature of their children's education, and thus they "must also be able to take *individual* action on behalf of their own children" (p. 1). After discussing alternative voucher plans, the authors argue (p. 125) that "multiple measures of schools' responsiveness should be made." Thus the argument that schools are now not responsive and alternative educational systems should be evaluated on the basis of responsiveness has been explicitly made by advocates of tuition voucher plans.

Book Reviews

LANGUAGE AND LEARNING.

by James Britton.

Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1971. 295 pp. \$6.95.

Despite the seemingly endless stream of volumes on the teaching of English, the discipline has chronically suffered from the lack of organizing principles—it has never had an adequate psychology. Mired in lifeless notions of what literature is and how language functions, the profession's first response to the new "discoveries" in linguistics, for example, was to ossify in kind. Chomsky was mistakenly transformed into Roberts,¹ and claims were made that at last true knowledge about language was being taught. In the face of such attitudes and practices it is only the rare English teacher who has a dynamic sense of what he is about, who judges the results of his classroom in terms of how his students go on to live their respective lives.

In *Language and Learning*, a synthesis of the most recent findings and observa-

¹ Noam Chomsky's transformational grammar represents a revolution in linguistic thinking, but it continues to be exploratory in nature. Paul Roberts, among others, rigidly poured these "findings" into graded English series which in some cases have been adopted on a state-wide basis.

tions in the field of language and psychology, James Britton sketches out a clearer picture than we have had to date of how our use of and confrontation with language, both inside and outside of the school, consciously or otherwise, is such a crucial factor in both our mental and personal development. Through his delicate insistence upon the humanizing function of language, Britton, who has been teaching English in Great Britain since 1930, challenges us to make English education, and all education for that matter, the liberating and on-going process it ought to be.

Britton's chief purpose is to elaborate the conception that we spend much of our lives ordering the confusion that surrounds us, a process that involves creating for ourselves a coherent and workable picture of how the environment impinges upon us;

... by various means of representation, and with the aid of language as an organizing principle, we construct each for himself a world representation: that we modify this representation in the light of further experience in order that our predictions may be better; and that we improvise upon it for a variety of reasons. (p. 31)

This idea for building up successive representations is borrowed from George Kelly.

whose work, Britton emphasizes, provides a new way of looking at learning, especially as it might be stimulated in the English classroom. Britton quotes Kelly extensively:

Man looks at his world through transparent patterns or templates which he creates and then attempts to fit over the realities of which the world is composed. The fit is not always very good. Yet without such patterns the world appears to be such an undifferentiated homogeneity that man is unable to make any sense out of it. Even a poor fit is more helpful to him than nothing at all . . .

Experience is made up of the successive construing of events. It is not constituted merely by the succession of events themselves. . . . It is not what happens around him that makes a man's experiences; it is the successive construing and reconstruing of what happens, as it happens, that enriches the experience of life. . . . The constructions one places upon events are working hypotheses which are about to be put to the test of experience. As one's anticipations or hypotheses are successively revised in the light of the unfolding sequence of events, a construction system undergoes a progressive evolution.² (pp. 17-18)

What Kelly is describing is a transactional model of human experience. As our experience accumulates with interactions with the environment, we continue to construct and demolish explanatory constructs. Just as at some point new scientific data require new scientific theories, so, too, as we develop, new experience taxes the thresholds of our old constructs, and this forces

us to create new models of the world. Men are always reconsidering events, trying to interpret them and attach meaning to them, but unfortunately for many people the growth process stops and they become locked into patterns which they use over and over again to understand the continual influx of experience. However, from birth until the onset of this rigidity, the individual dynamically orders and reorders his experience as his personality is being formed.

With the idea of templates in mind it is easy to see the crucial importance of language, for language is the stuff out of which we represent experience. Most of Britton's book is centered upon this integral use of language to symbolize what is occurring around us. To operate with some modicum of efficiency, the individual needs to build up some sense of stability and predictability. Language, being one step removed from the actual sensing of experience in the environment, grants us this lead time. It allows us to explore and play with the meanings and possibilities of experience, freed from the realities of onrushing time.

Language, of course, is expressed in many modes and serves countless ends. The distinction Britton expands upon is between participant and spectator language. A "participant" is "participating in the world's affairs" (Can you help me find the glue? Top drawer . . . etc.). A "spectator" is "contemplating experiences, enjoying them, vividly reconstructing them perhaps—but experiences in which he is not taking part" (Last week when I was in church. . . .) (p. 104). There are many gradations along this continuum, but what is most important to remember is that at times we are in the midst of action while at other times we are enjoying or analyzing the representation of actions, real and imagined, ours

² From George A. Kelly, *A Theory of Personality* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963).

and others. To explain these categories more precisely Britton fills his book with numerous examples and transcripts of language being used in its various forms by children and adults. And in presenting this evidence, Britton synthesizes much current research from Piaget to Bruner; but although a framework is sketched out (how children first discover and extend their language, the importance of talk at all stages of development, and so on), Britton, like the thinkers he refers to, is careful to point out that our knowledge in these areas is still rudimentary.

The implications of Kelly's schema for the teaching of English are profound. The conventional conception of education whereby one's experience and knowledge result from the linear accruing of events and data is no longer valid (and to be sure this static conception has already been attacked on many fronts by many of the people whose work Britton cites). Rather, learning is much more a matter of the successive discovery, construction, and modification of symbolic models. To take a specific example of how this would influence current practices, let us consider Britton's approach to reading instruction. Reading is too frequently viewed as a word upon word buildup until some conclusion is reached at the end of a particular piece. *In contradistinction to this, Britton tells us reading is the filling in of details for a pattern of focused expectations. "The meaning is an emergent pattern of relationships—more like a negative in the developing dish than it is like a train coming out of a tunnel"* (p. 161). As we read at any level our anticipation is either borne out or jarred. If the latter, we must construct a new pattern as we re-read and re-interpret. Consequently any teaching which involves the piecemeal presentation

of items simply does not match the dynamic psychological process the student undergoes when he is reading (or learning). Thus Britton predictably comments:

The notion of 'providing vocabulary' is a limited and misleading one, suggesting an all too static conception of language. Language in use is a flow, a current of activity, and not any sort of reservoir. The words a child can come by in this deliberate fashion at the teacher's providing—in the course of a vocabulary lesson—will tend to be those of limited use, necessary at times but with little power to vitalize the current of speech. Teachers need to care about the flow—about reading 'as though it made sense', and writing and talking—and when they do, the reservoir will look after itself. To put it another way, it is from successive experiences of words in use—words used for some actual profit or pleasure—that a child builds up his resources, and there is little point therefore in our dragging things in by their names. (p. 163)

It is in the area of literature, it seems to me, that Britton is most helpful for the English teacher. For too long we have lived amid a herd of sacred cows, squeezed between the revered classics and the rigid canons of literary criticism. In this tradition literature is an object, something to be collected and classified, and dutifully passed on like the periodic table in chemistry. Britton's view is transactional in nature (something Louise Rosenblatt, among others, has been telling us for years,³) i.e., literature is an object requiring a subject, and, furthermore, it is the *written form*

³ See Louise Rosenblatt's *Literature as Exploration*, rev. ed. (New York: Noble and Noble, 1968).

of language in the role of spectator. Such a notion at first glance debases accepted literary standards, but Britton anticipates such criticism:

I think it is helpful to have a way of defining literature which refers to the sort of thing *it is* rather than one which brings in the judgment as to how good it is of its kind. It is not that I feel the question 'how good is it?' is not a highly important question, but I think it should come *after* and not instead of the question, 'what is it?'. (Picasso is a better painter than an average child in the Infant School, yet they both *paint*.) If we operate only with a normative definition of literature—one that begins to apply above a certain threshold of excellence—we are left with the difficulty of deciding what a piece of writing is that tries but fails to rise above the threshold. It must be *something*. We have only to think of the kind of writing done every day by thousands of children in school to see that this is not an entirely frivolous objection. (p. 108)

Given that written language in the role of spectator describes the kind of thing literature is, we next see that its use in and out of the classroom ought to be concerned with how human contingencies are presented and subsequently with the refinement of our templates of experience. As David Holbrook,⁴ borrowing from the "object-relations" school of psychoanalysis, has argued, the development of a secure and loving identity is a function of the extent to which the individual is able to build a coherent picture of external reality which matches his internal reality

(what he sees vs. what he feels). Literature provides much symbolic content which allows for the verification of these psychic realities. And it is only when we step back as spectators that we can work on the meanings of and create patterns for the experience that continually confronts us. This is the central purpose of literature (which includes children's writings) and ought to be the goal of English instruction.

Naturally, this notion of literature and English teaching sounds very liberal and free-wheeling—relevance and the child are the thing! Yet Britton easily transcends the merely voguish practices and facile rhetoric of the educational romantics. He is for trusting students, to be sure; still, he is very clear about the teacher having a professional role, one which is neither the "subject-specialist" nor the "pseudo-parent." The relationship between the teacher and student, despite its inevitable closeness, must never be an object in and of itself; rather, it is a means to the end of the student's learning and personal growth. Similarly, Britton is clear about what children or adolescents can and cannot handle emotionally. Relevance is not keeping up with the *avant-garde*, but using material which offers sufficient predictability to the student so as to be accessible and challenging, without being overly threatening. Such a view, for instance, gives us a better perspective on "trash" literature, which teachers have been castigating for years. Many books, although not necessarily noteworthy for their style or message, might be entirely appropriate in terms of the themes and situations they allow the student to contemplate. This is not to say that anything goes, but that some works make more demands upon us as readers (spectators), and that the road to a mature response (not just to literature

⁴ See David Holbrook's *Human Hope and the Death Instinct* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1971).

but to life) is long and circuitous. Again the point is to work on our representations, not to find easy formulas.

With regard to the contemporary propensity to impose a disjunction between cognitive and affective modes of representation, Britton writes:

Psychologists in general have traditionally concentrated upon cognitive organization and tended to regard emotion as itself disorganized and possessing a disorganizing influence. We need to recognize the value and importance both of the discursive logical organization and at the same time that of the undissociated intuitive processes, the organization represented in its highest form in works of art. (p. 217)

It is this split which causes much harm in English education today. In advocating the "free expression" of the child (the affective revolt against the long reign of cognition) too many romantics forget that to create we need content to work upon, and that the literary process involves more than freedom—it is the exploration of inner modes of representation symbolized in language as they compare to outer forms of reality. The result is so much relativity; yet Britton has illuminated some philosophical boundaries which we can make use of as we attempt to order our language and, one hopes, our lives.

At the end of *Language and Learning*, Britton cautions us against overestimating the role of language in the representation of experience: "There will always be a gap between our total response to what confronts us and any formulation we can make of what was there and what took place." And so he returns to Kelly:

A person is not necessarily articulate [Kelly says], about the constructions he

places upon his world. Some of his constructions are not symbolized by words: he can express them only in pantomime. Even the elements which are construed may have no verbal handles by which they can be manipulated and the person finds himself responding to them with speechless impulse. Thus in studying the psychology of man-the-philosopher, we must take into account his sub-verbal patterns of representation and construction. (p. 277)

And to this end Britton discusses the role of dramatics in English. Still, in expressing both our conscious and unconscious tendencies, language is of central importance. It is the chief means by which we can develop increasingly more valid constructs of our experience. This, it seems to me, is what English teaching should be about—helping children (and adults) to use language and literature to better enjoy and control their lives. And Britton's book helps us to be much more aware of how we might go about this.

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THE URBAN EDUCATION TASK FORCE
REPORT. FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON URBAN EDUCATION TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE.

by Wilson C. Riles, Chairman.

Praeger Special Studies in U. S. Economic and Social Development. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970. 190 pp. \$12.50.

This Report, published shortly after Chairman Wilson C. Riles became "Ex-

hibit A" in the case for the failure of the Nixon strategy for the 1970 elections, is a classic liberal establishment document. At a time when neo-liberals are turning away from schemes that propose reform on a grand scale through massive, bureaucratic government programs, the Riles Report brings forward a set of proposals designed to make the public education system the chief instrument of a national policy goal of "up and out of poverty in a generation." Focusing upon urban poor members of racial and ethnic minorities, the Report proposes a major infusion of Federal funds on a sustained basis into a radically restructured public school system. A new Federal role in urban education is spelled out in the framework of an "Urban Education Act" which features the concept of a master plan.

The master plan would tie allocation of federal funds to performance criteria such as advances in student achievement and the transfer of decision-making power to local communities. The proposed monetary allocations would be substantial—\$300 to \$500 per pupil. The total projected cost would be between \$7.5 billion and \$14.5 billion annually by 1975, depending upon the scope of the program.

When Riles defeated the conservative Max Rafferty for the office of Superintendent of Public Instruction in California in 1970, he became one of a growing number of Black elected officials with a broad political base and responsibility for a major public institution. But when he was chosen to chair the Urban Education Task Force in March 1969, he was Rafferty's Director of the Division of Compensatory Education of the State of California. Together with John Hughes, Director of the Division of Compensatory Education in the federal Office of Educa-

tion, Riles presided over the process of preparing the Report, submitted to the Office of Education in early January, 1970.

The report was buried for several weeks after its initial submission until Jeffery Cohelan of California injected it into the Congressional debate on education appropriations. The Report was a useful weapon in the fight to maintain spending levels at a moment when the Administration was threatening a veto of fiscal 1970 education appropriations on the grounds that they were inflationary. The publication of the Report as a Praeger Special Study, coupled with Riles' newly achieved political prominence, may increase the Report's use in future debates on education although it is hardly likely to outsell the Pentagon Papers. And yet, like the Pentagon Papers, the Riles Report is more than a suppressed government document unofficially released to the public: it too documents a significant national failure.

More than half of the Riles Report devotes itself to documenting the failure of the public schools to produce appropriate programs for the urban poor—that is, programs that result in a salable education. The causes of the failure are three-fold: lack of money, absence of a clear policy goal, and lack of capability in the system and its personnel.

Money is a prescription as common as aspirin. The Riles Report focuses on two major aspects of financial need. The first is that urban schools are almost invariably at a fiscal disadvantage in both absolute and relative terms when their per pupil expenditure is compared with that of their more affluent neighbors. This relative disadvantage goes beyond the budget figures since costs for schooling are higher in urban areas both on an item-for-item basis and in terms of the extra cost that

should be expected for programs appropriate to the impoverished urban student.

Lack of sufficient funds for urban school systems also stems from their increasing dependence upon funds from state and federal programs with differing (and sometimes conflicting) priorities and uncertain duration.

The second major cause for the failure of urban education is absence of clearly stated and implemented policy. Public schooling is highly decentralized from a national point of view. Federal and state programs have neither redressed the resource imbalance noted above nor required any results based on clear goals and measurable performance standards. The Riles Report argues that federal money—the only money that can reach the urban poor because of the poverty of local sources—can therefore be used to entice and coerce the mounting of effective public school programs on a national scale. Thus, ending urban poverty should become a national priority, with schools as the key instrument of policy.

So far so good. Most school promoters would buy the argument that more money directed toward schooling for the poor is a desirable thing. The description of the incapacity of the system rooted in decentralization and fragmentary programs causes no surprise. But the Riles Report does not end there. It goes on to emphasize with equal stress the failure of the public schools to see the impoverished student "as he is," without the aid of mediating negative stereotypes—concepts that rely on various deficiency models of poor, Black, Spanish-speaking and Indian students, usually entailing invidious comparisons with their white suburban counterparts. In short, it directs its attention to

institutionalized racism and class stratification in the public schools.

To meet the schools' establishment-based professionalism and failure to see the strengths of the urban poor, the Report builds various mechanisms for local community participation and control into its educational master plan. Particularly noteworthy is its warm espousal of strategies designed to build ethnic group power in its definition of integration, arguing that such strategies are consistent with a goal of interdependence.

The "education establishment" reacted unfavorably to the Riles Report because of its critical approach. Indeed, their unfavorable reaction provides a fulcrum for the Report's argument. For a Task Force Report such as this is not solely, or even primarily, a description. It is an argument in favor of a policy and, in the case of the Riles Report, an extraordinarily detailed program to put that policy into effect. The rejection of the policy and program by the Administration that requested it in the first place does not remove it entirely from the field of consideration.

The Report is laudable, and, I believe, accurate in pinpointing the racism and professionalism built into the school system. Its discussion of the "negative mediating stereotype" is enlightened and sensitive. Its positive view of community involvement—even to the point of embracing "ethnic solidarity" or "nationalist" strategies in an overall integration policy—is refreshingly confident rather than nervous. In this respect, its greatest fault is the introduction of a "positive mediating stereotype" that emphasizes the strengths of the urban poor families portrayed in Claude Brown's *Manchild in the*

Promised Land rather than the richer and more realistic variety pictured in Andrew Billingsly's *Black Families in White America*.

A more serious question arises out of the Report's failure to identify those aspects of the schools themselves which cause urban poor students to fail. The peculiar logic which sends U. S. soldiers to Vietnam in order to "Vietnamize" the war is paralleled by a proposal to greatly increase the resources of an institution which has excelled in insuring the failure of the poor. The problem didn't exist until the solution was applied. The very evidence the Report provides is a basis for concluding that the public schools cannot deliver the result the Task Force would require of them. The Riles Report briefly but generously includes a variety of alternatives to the public schools as useful pressures from outside the system, and in the long run these alternatives may have a much greater importance. It is difficult to conceive of a Federal initiative that would bring about a fundamental change in the system such that it would not only move around machinery but also profoundly alter the values and assumptions brought to the schools by all the participants. Local control and participation seem too slender a reed to bear the weight of such a task.

The role of money in this process must also be reviewed. Are funds in the amounts proposed sufficient to bring about the redistribution of educational resources which the Report finds necessary? If one takes as a norm the resources invested in education in the most affluent suburbs, plus the higher costs for the same resources in urban areas, plus the higher costs of effective programs for impover-

ished urban students, then it is doubtful that the \$7 billion to \$14.5 billion figures even approach the magnitude of the need.

Furthermore, we must recall the policy goal articulated—up and out of poverty in one generation. U. S. tradition has consistently viewed the schools as an instrument for economic redistribution, yet a transfer directly to people of resources of the magnitude projected by the Riles Report would immediately eliminate a considerable proportion of the poverty that is at the center of the Report's concern. Surely such a strategy commends itself as an alternative for those who view the central fact of poverty to be the absence of money.

The Report of the Task Force on Urban Education was rejected by an Administration anxious to present an image of austerity. The Report's proposal of a policy goal of ending poverty in a generation is laudable and dramatic. But the description of the state of the public school system, accurate as I believe it to be, invites skepticism. Can the system which has contributed so much to the failure of the impoverished urban student be relied upon as an instrument for such an ambitious program?

The Report is impressive in its brutal documentation of failure as well as in the ambition of its proposed solution. But, finally, it remains insufficiently critical of the social system in which the public schools are imbedded. The schools' failure to educate the impoverished urban student appropriately is really the reverse side of our society's success in using the schools to obscure its failure to equitably distribute its resources. Distributive justice seems to require that the public resources allocated to public education

should be equitably shared, with a bias toward those most in need. However understandable it may be that the professional educators responsible for the final shape of the Riles Report would assert that redistribution of public school resources will resort in a redistribution of jobs and income, the assertion remains a misleading illusion. Neither high school diplomas nor Ph.D.'s inevitably produce jobs or incomes except for the school personnel who are employed to produce them. The Riles Report has the considerable virtue that the very honesty and accuracy of its description of the problem convinces the reader to look elsewhere for a solution.

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COMPUTER-ASSISTED INSTRUCTION,
TESTING AND GUIDANCE.
by Wayne H. Holtzman, ed.
New York: Harper and Row, 1970.
402 pp. \$8.50.

COMPUTER-ASSISTED COUNSELING.
by Donald E. Super, ed.
New York: Teachers College Press,
1970. 133 pp. \$7.50, \$4.50 (paper).

Computer-Assisted Instruction, Testing, and Guidance presents twenty-six papers prepared for a conference at the University of Texas in Austin in October, 1968. These papers are divided into nine parts:

1. system design;
2. instructional design;
3. optimizing learning;
4. individually tailored testing;
5. language processing;

6. the Stanford programs (in arithmetic, logic, and Russian);
7. simulation of science experiments;
8. complex man-machine systems;
9. guidance and counseling.

This book provides the reader with a broad, though somewhat uneven, treatment of the topics mentioned in the book's title. Most readers with a rudimentary statistics background and some familiarity with the topic will comprehend the selections quite easily (with the possible exception of Smallwood's treatment of optimizing learning and Lord's treatment of tailored testing).

Holtzman introduces the papers with a clear, concise treatment of "Computers in Education." Unlike many anthology editors, he also provides an introduction to each of the parts of the book and follows each part with a discussion of other participants' responses. In addition, each major paper is followed by an extensive critique by one of the participants. Most of the critiques are excellent and some provide more insight than the papers they criticize. (Glaser's critique of Bunderson's paper on instructional design and Lambe's critique of Lagowski's paper on the simulation of science experiments are two cases in point.)

Although Holtzman's book covers a broad range of topics, relevant to the use of computers in instruction, testing, and guidance, no area is covered extensively and not all relevant areas are included. For example, the book fails to discuss artificial intelligence and heuristic programming and only touches upon computer hardware, software, programming languages, the use of computers in testing, and the evaluation of computer-aided instruction.

The only papers that treat computer-assisted testing discuss Lord's work on tailored testing (a testing technique whereby the difficulty level of a test is adapted to the test-taker's ability); yet the title of the book would seem to imply a much more thorough treatment of the subject. While the articles on tailored testing are excellent, this topic is, at present, of little import outside the realm of large scale testing programs (e.g. Educational Testing Service). The absence of any other papers on computer-assisted testing is indeed unfortunate, especially since, in the opinion of this reviewer, one can make even now very strong arguments about the desirability, feasibility, and cost-effectiveness of many applications of computer-assisted testing.

Holtzman's book indicates some procedures for evaluating computer-assisted instruction; for example, Suppes and Morningstar present data with regard to the Stanford programs in arithmetic, logic, and Russian. However, the topic of evaluation *per se* receives no extensive treatment. Anyone familiar with the literature knows that Holtzman's book is not unique in this respect. Hopefully, the topic of evaluation (in both the formative and summative senses) will receive much more thorough and thoughtful treatment in the future, reflecting the necessity for and development of new measurement techniques and evaluation instruments that are appropriate for computer-assisted instruction.

Computer-Assisted Counseling, a book of readings edited by Donald Super, is a quite thorough treatment of the topic covered in the last part of *Computer-Assisted Instruction, Testing and Guidance*. Super's book reflects the thoughts and work of eleven researchers (e.g., Cooley, Minor,

Myers, Tiedeman and Super, himself) in computer-assisted counseling. As Super says in his Introduction, the book describes "all of the known interactive computerized educational and vocational guidance systems designed for student use" (p. 3). Inclusiveness is probably the book's most outstanding feature, but the potential reader should be aware that very detailed information about any particular guidance system is not available in Super's book.

While Super provides a good overview of present and projected developments in computer-assisted counseling, his book does not contain the kind of detailed critiques that characterize Holtzman's book. The critiques that are presented come from Super and Myers who are themselves intimately involved in the development of one particular guidance system. Even though Super and Myers seem to maintain their objectivity, this reviewer would have appreciated at least one critique by someone less intimately involved with any particular guidance system.

Super's book emphasizes three guidance systems:

1. Tiedeman's *Information System for Vocational Decisions* (ISVD);
2. Super, Minor, and Myers' *Educational and Career Exploration System* (ECES); and
3. Cooley's system which, as yet, has no particular name or acronym, although it might be characterized as a computer measurement support system in the context of computer managed instruction.

While several other systems are discussed, they clearly are given a secondary role.

Much of *Computer-Assisted Counseling* focuses on Tiedeman's work (also discussed

in the last part of Holtzman's book). Some researchers consider Tiedeman's ISVD philosophy as the criterion to be met, while others consider it the mountain to be levelled. Whether one agrees with Tiedeman or not, it is quite clear that present and future researchers cannot afford to overlook the fundamental ideas behind ISVD.

ECES represents a less ambitious effort than ISVD, but ECES, unlike ISVD, is operational. Furthermore, ECES has been field-tested (although on a limited scale) as reported by Bohn in Super's book. Since ECES has run the gamut from drawing board to field-testing, many readers will find a fairly comprehensive view of the development of a computer-assisted counseling system in the discussions of ECES by Bohn, Minor, Myers, and Super.

Cooley's system differs somewhat from what is typically considered to be a counseling system. Cooley's system views guidance in the present context of the school in which students are enrolled, rather than concentrating upon the students' future vocational, educational, or career goals. Cooley is concerned about the support his system can offer for the individualized instruction process, and the kinds of measurements needed for such a system. It seems clear that Cooley's system highlights an important limitation of most of the other counseling systems that are described in Super's book, i.e., most systems neglect, or relegate to a secondary position, any significant consideration of guiding a student through his immediate educational environment.

In summary, Holtzman's book of readings exhibits commendable editorial quality, good depth of treatment, and reasonably broad coverage of relevant topics. It is probably, for most purposes, the best book of readings in its field. Super's book

of readings is characterized by reasonably good editorial quality; however, the outstanding feature of Super's book is breadth, not depth.

One final comment. The perceptive reader of either (or both) of these books will notice that most of the computer systems discussed fall into one of two categories: 1) systems based on some theory of the process of instruction or counseling, or 2) systems modelled on some concept of an expert instructor or counselor, systems that mimic classical teaching techniques or counseling methods. For example, Bunderson, Glaser, and Tiedeman clearly fall into the first category, while Loughary, Friesen, and Hurst (who discuss the simulation of a particular "expert" counselor in Super's book) fall into the second category. The differences between these two approaches are very real and important, though often overlooked.

It seems to me that only the first approach offers real promise for advancing the state of the art in computer-assisted instruction, testing, and counseling. The "expert" approach has several questionable features. First, it focuses on teacher, not student, performance when the latter should be the goal of instruction. Second, in the expert model, one overlooks the possibility of other equally (or even more) successful experts. Third, even if this approach works, it provides very little basis for generalization to other situations or areas of study. On the other hand, the development of a theoretical framework for instruction is independent of any particular teacher and focuses directly on pertinent student performance. If properly constructed, a theoretical framework can pass through a cyclic process of evaluation, updating, and revision based upon student data which will produce both an increas-

ingly better instructional system and systematic advances in the state of the art. However, the evaluation and revision of the model of a particular expert will not necessarily result in an improvement in student performance. Thus, the development of a theoretically-based instructional system is a much more scientific (and potentially rewarding) endeavor than the modeling of a particular expert instructor.

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RELATIVE ACHIEVEMENT: SCHOOL
PERFORMANCE IN RELATION TO
INTELLIGENCE, SEX AND HOME
ENVIRONMENT.

by Allan Svensson.

Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell,
1971. 176 pp.

As one Western nation after another undertakes a major survey of the determinants of school achievement, a striking series of parallel findings is emerging. The patterns suggest significant cross-cultural consistency in the relationships among children's measured intelligence, their sex, their home background, and their school achievement. Allan Svensson's *Relative Achievement: School Performance in Relation to Intelligence, Sex and Home Environment* is an impressive addition to this literature, echoing trends which have been found in American and English research. It is a thorough analysis of the determinants of verbal and quantitative achievement among a representative sample of sixth graders in Sweden in 1961 and 1966.

With respect to sex differences, for example, the book tells us that differences

between boys and girls are small in both verbal and quantitative intelligence. Controlling for verbal *intelligence*, girls score better on verbal *achievement* tests than do boys, after which they are awarded higher *marks* than boys for similar achievement test scores. In the quantitative domain, differences in *marks* between girls and boys of equal intelligence are negligible, although boys score higher on *achievement* tests than do girls of equal quantitative intelligence.

The parallels between Svensson's findings and results from American and English research are noteworthy, although incomplete. Fine-grained data from either country comparable to Svensson's data on the relative achievement test performance of girls and boys of equal measured intelligence are not readily available. There are, however, numerous studies from this country showing superiority among females throughout the school years in the verbal areas of grammar, spelling, and word fluency.¹ Other studies demonstrate that boys generally score higher than girls in the quantitative areas of arithmetic problem-solving and numerical reasoning, beginning in the later elementary years.² With respect to marks in school, girls in this country do better than boys throughout their formal education, even in subjects in which boys score higher on standardized achievement tests.³ Many similar patterns among English children have

¹ E. Maccoby, "Sex Differences in Intellectual Functioning" in *The Development of Sex Differences*, ed. E. Maccoby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 26.

² G. Lesser, G. Fifer, and D. Clark, "Mental Abilities of Children from Different Social-Class and Cultural Groups," *Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development*, 30, No. 4, 1965, p. 9.

³ E. Maccoby, p. 28.

been reported by I. M. Smith in his book, *Spatial Ability: Educational and Social Significance*.⁴

In the relationships among intelligence, achievement, and family background, Svensson again presents noteworthy data. He reports differences in *marks* of the same magnitude in verbal and quantitative subjects between children of varying educational backgrounds. In the verbal domain, differences in marks are accounted for as follows: differences in verbal *intelligence* between pupils from different parental educational groups are large; controlling for measured intelligence, scores on *achievement* tests do not reflect educational backgrounds, but higher *marks* relative to comparable achievement test scores are given to children of highly educated parents than to children of equal intelligence whose parents have less education. In the case of quantitative skills, children having highly educated parents score somewhat higher on *intelligence* tests than do children of less educated parents. In addition, children of better educated parents score higher on *achievement* tests relative to their measured quantitative intelligence than do children whose parents are less educated, with the distribution of

⁴ I. M. Smith, *Spatial Ability: Educational and Social Significance* (San Diego: R. R. Knapp, 1964).

marks in quantitative subjects in accordance with these achievement test scores.⁵

These relationships among intelligence, achievement and family background, like those Svensson reports concerning sex differences and others he reports concerning students' attitudes towards education, appear to correspond, in part, to American and English findings.⁶ Again, however, differences between the studies undertaken in each country leave relatively few areas where adequate comparisons can be made. In sum, reading Svensson's thorough analysis is in itself a rewarding and informative experience. In addition, it makes one acutely aware of the potential benefits from collaborative research which explores the similarities across countries in the predictors of scholastic achievement.

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⁵ These patterns may reflect a partial confounding in the measurement of intelligence and achievement.

⁶ The American findings come principally from re-analyses of the data initially collected for J. Coleman *et al.*, *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Education, 1966). The English findings are principally from the Smith work cited above and from B. Plowden *et al.*, *Children and Their Primary Schools* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1967).

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Harvard Educational Review Vol. 42 No. 1 February 1972

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
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
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
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
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
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Harvard Educational Review

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NUMBER TWO

MAY 1972

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ARTHUR E. THOMAS

The Having of Wonderful Ideas

ELEANOR DUCKWORTH


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1972

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
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
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Community Power and Student Rights:
An Interview with Arthur E. Thomas





Law has traditionally influenced education through the precedent-setting power of key judicial decisions. The *Tinker*¹ and *Serrano*² judgments, to name only two, have generated new concepts of what student rights and educational equality might mean. Within this framework, a citizen petitions the courts with the expectation that the decision will affect individuals across the country with similar grievances. Judicial decisions can thus be used as instruments to initiate large-scale changes in policy.

During the past year, the Center for the Study of Student Citizenship, Rights, and Responsibilities in Dayton, Ohio has been exploring additional strategies for using the law to promote significant social and educational changes. Rather than relying on the legal profession to secure rights for others, the Center relies on the ability of students, parents, and citizens in the community to understand and use the law for themselves. This gives the phrase "taking the law into their own hands" a new meaning: by learning to handle the law, people can gain a sense of efficacy in dealing with their present situation and can envision new possibilities for their individual and collective futures. In this way, the law is transformed from an alien tool that controls and represses to a resource for self-construction and for confrontation with the social and political world.

Our interview with Dr. Arthur E. Thomas, founder and director of the Center, follows.³

Art Thomas himself began to teach in an elementary school in Dayton in 1962. In his first school, in the center of the Black community, he found himself faced with a conflict between his impulse to "paddle" his "disruptive" students to keep order and his desire to become involved in the concerns and lives of his students. When three years later he had become an eighth grade teacher and a coach in track and football, he had given up paddling. "I refused to believe that my eighth graders could not learn and could not behave; the results were that they did learn and that they did behave." He had begun to reconsider other things too—and began helping his students to get scholarships, to get out of jail, to think about their own futures, and to begin to "love, trust, and respect" themselves. He also instituted a series of Black History Lectures, which he was allowed to conduct after school. In 1967, he was promoted to assistant principal of MacFarlane Elementary School, where for a year he attempted to create an environment in which students and their parents could learn and could establish an atmosphere of mutual trust with teachers.

In September, 1969, when the Dayton School System began to integrate its schools, Thomas was Director of the Model Cities Education Program. He

and others from both the Black and white communities had warned that sudden integration in the racially tense city would be dangerous, but the school administration persisted in sending students from an all-Black urban community to an all-white Appalachian school. Severe trouble erupted at the school and one Black student was seriously hurt. On the next day, Thomas accompanied the Black students to school and attempted to help officials and parents keep order. Informed of the possibility of more violence, school officials promised to send a bus to take the Black students home. The bus did not arrive and tensions between Black and white students increased. Hoping to avoid more physical confrontations, Thomas persuaded the Black students to walk with him to safety in the administration building. When he returned to the school to collect a few Black students who still remained there, he was arrested—along with several of the Black students. Thomas left the jail only after all the Black students were released. He was subsequently fired by the Dayton Board of Education for "exceeding his authority."

Thomas decided to appeal the Board's decision and with the help of Dr. Ruth Burgin and three lawyers—the late Mr. Charles S. Bridge, Ms. Jean Camper Cahn and Dr. Edgar Cahn, he argued his case before administrative hearings. After three months of hearings, the Board of Education ruled against him.

No longer permitted to teach and work in the public school system of Dayton, Thomas began to consider alternative strategies for continuing his work with Black and poor children in the public schools. "The night the board ruled against me, we sat down and carefully analyzed my role; Dr. and Ms. Cahn kept reminding me that I had been an advocate for the children ever since the first day I had started teaching. Ms. Cahn, who had had long conferences with parents and students in the community, told me that the children perceived me as their advocate—someone who would stand behind them to defend their rights, no matter what. She said that no genuine advocate could work effectively from within the school system, that the system tends to mediate to the point where it co-opts all positions of advocacy, and that only in the legal system is it permissible to be an advocate. We decided on an O.E.O. legal services program led by an educator."

What has been the strategy behind the Center?

The Center was developed with several strategies in mind.

Our overall purpose was to educate students and parents about their human and constitutional rights as they relate to the institution called school.

This goal in itself might have led us in several directions, but we had one thing in particular that we had to deal with first. After the Dayton Board of Education and the school administration fired me, they wanted to prevent me from working with the students and parents. I was too effective from their point of view. School boards have a record of trying to eliminate teachers who seriously challenge them.

They kept trying to secure court orders to bar me from the children. Therefore we—all the parents and children and lawyers who were involved—decided that we needed a way for my skills and support to be useful to the community, even if I couldn't work directly in the system.

So we chose to develop the role of parent ombudsman who would be in continuous touch with the schools—the teachers, administration, counselors—and with the children and their families. Now the important thing to note about the way this strategy developed is that, though we started out from a simple need to replace me, we've ended up with a stronger, long range strategy. For one thing, while it is relatively easy to stop one individual, it is difficult to stop a growing number of informed, determined people.

Even more important, we now have begun a process through which we have our ten ombudsmen teaching others—parents and students—in the community. We're creating a ripple effect that will prepare many people to understand and deal effectively with the types of physical and psychological violence imposed upon the children by the school system and its agents. It's impossible for community people to have a lawyer with them whenever a child is injured. Our idea is to get the students and their parents to be their own lawyers—to help them have some control over their fate.

Another strategy was to make sure that the Center would be an independent institution. Students have learned the variety of forms of oppression that come down from the school system; one of the reasons they're beginning to trust us is because they know we stand completely apart from it.

As we work now, our lawyer develops legal tactics to deal with the inequities that are pointed out by me and our ombudsmen. What we're trying to do is to make the rights guaranteed by the Constitution real to and for children. The *Tinker* decision was important for this in theory—it said that your constitutional rights don't stop at the school door. We're trying to bridge the gap between theory and practice.

But how can you explain to students about their rights?

Many children seven years old, or nine years old, or fifteen years old, don't have any idea what basic rights are all about. They don't know what a Constitution is, or what a Declaration of Independence is. They don't have a conception of a right because the school teaches them that the only right they have when they walk into a school is to sit down and

do as they are told. As the Cahns* point out, this situation affects the child's whole conception of what chance he or she has for fair play, for justice, for reciprocal relationships in the wider world. They, like Coleman, say that even the child's academic performance is influenced by his sense of whether he has any chance to control his own destiny.

When you start communicating to a young child or to a 16-year-old that he has certain basic rights, you're saying that he is human and that with that humanness comes real power for him to begin to have some control over his whole life. We tell him, "Look, you have certain basic constitutional rights. There are certain things that a teacher *can* do and *can't* do. We don't want you to react violently, we don't want you to use this information to start dehumanizing or destroying the teacher. But you do have certain control of your fate. Come to us and we will help you." Now he can begin to control what happens to him. He feels differently. Sometimes by teaching a student a basic right you get him into reading, sometimes you interest him in college, in medicine, in the law—you teach him to love, trust, and respect himself and his fellow man.

How then do you begin to help students implement their rights?

The first thing you do is teach them to love, trust, and respect themselves. Then you teach them to study the oppressor, the school, and its agents. For example, we start educating children and parents and teachers about the fact that words are sometimes used violently and that words sometimes result in a child's not wanting to learn, or in a child's not wanting to be anything, or in a child's not believing that he can be anything. They learn that the word thing has to be changed. Therefore we say that if you've been called dumb that is verbal abuse and there's an Ohio statute that protects you from verbal abuse. If you are suspended you are entitled to a hearing. You have the right to face your accusers. If you are not learning anything from eight o'clock in the morning until three o'clock in the afternoon then somebody has to be held accountable for the fact that you are not learning anything. *You* have a responsibility also—you have to get in there and try to learn. But if you are in that building from eight o'clock in the morning until three o'clock in the afternoon, and your teacher is forcing you to read a racist book that destroys your self-worth or that is not preparing you for the real world, you are

* All authors and works referred to in the text are cited in the bibliography.

not in school—you are in prison. It is a violation of the Constitution of the United States to incarcerate a person unless he has committed a crime.

We are going to have to institute various methods of accountability. I think you can deal with it very basically. No matter how bad his home conditions are, a child should know more at 3 o'clock in the afternoon than he knew at 8 o'clock in the morning. He should know more in June than he knew the preceding September, and he should certainly know more in 1972 than he knew in 1967. I think that the critical thing is that we have to stop assigning blame to the child. When we say, "The child is culturally deprived; the child is culturally disadvantaged," we are merely stereotyping a child; we are not blaming the institution. I am saying there is something wrong with the school, not the child.

As William Ryan says, we have to stop *Blaming the Victim*. A rapist is looked upon in this society very negatively. So is an embezzler, right? So is a murderer. So is a robber. But teachers who dehumanize? What about them? We are experts at making children the criminals, and adults and penal institutions, like schools, the saints. We hear people say, "The reason that the society is so messed up is because of the young." We've got to start assigning criminal names to criminals—and I'm not talking *only* about institutions because we've been doing that for too long. We say, "It is the school system," and that is correct.—the oppression *is* systemic. But how do you identify who's wrong *within* an institution? From the child's perspective, it is the principal or the teacher who is destroying him or her, not the system.

Let me give you a very specific example of how this thing operates. A second grader was going around a school with the zipper down on his pants. Now the principal said that the child, a second grader, had "deviant sexual behavior." Now, a little research showed that his mother was on welfare, and his mother did not have enough money to buy him some pants, or even to buy him a zipper. She was trying to feed him. And the reason that he was in school was because his mother had impressed upon him the need to go to school every day so that he could *be somebody*, so that he could make some money. Therefore he was in school and he did not have a zipper on his pants. The principal sent him home and said that he was going around exposing himself and that that was deviant sexual behavior. The principal had no basic concept of what it was like to be poor. He did not have sense enough to ask the child if he had another pair of pants at home. That kind of behavior, in my opinion, means that the principal is guilty of *misfeasance*, *malfeasance*, and

incompetence. What we're saying is those kinds of acts of atrocity have to be eliminated. Potentially, that child could be the doctor with the cure for cancer. Teachers who see his office card marked "deviant," however, will treat him like a criminal, not like a future M.D.

How does your work at the Center attempt to deal with examples like this?

When we can develop a strategy whereby teachers and administrators are held criminally responsible for the kinds of atrocities they are guilty of creating and implementing in the public schools, then we'll get to protecting that child's right to an education. What we're trying to develop is a legal strategy for actually documenting and charging that teacher or principal or administrator with being an accessory to whatever crime the child commits in later life as a result of a teacher's or administrator's cruelty. Lawyers will always say, "Why, that's ridiculous." Many lawyers have been programmed into thinking a certain way, too. But I see no basic difference between a warden in a prison and a principal. There are psychological dimensions of violence and I think that the law and lawyers and the courts have got to redefine violence.

It's violent to dehumanize a person. You can be very violent with words. You can be very violent with nonverbal types of communication. To refuse to touch a child is a form of violence. We have a case in our files where a teacher was a very effective teacher in terms of teaching the skills—reading, writing, arithmetic, etc.—and that's hard to find today. But she was getting no results with fourth graders because every morning she went into the room and sprayed disinfectant. She was just a clean teacher who liked everything to be perfect and she was very methodical. But the point is, the children perceived that as being a negative thing and they perceived that she felt that they were dirty and that she was much better than them. Therefore they responded to her negatively. Our staff is working with her now. She put the disinfectant can down and she's working a lot more effectively with the children.

Then you don't always go to court with the problem?

No. Our strategies have to be flexible. The most important thing is for us to communicate effectively to the oppressed what their rights are. The only way that we're really going to have the kind of impact we need is for everybody to have the same kind of information so that they can start affecting what happens to them.


Knowledge is power—so when a nine-year-old or an elev-

Student governments should have real, as opposed to symbolic, power to make the vital decisions that affect the lives of students in the school—curriculum, discipline, etc.

—Recommended by an individual student from the Student Board of Inquiry into High School Discipline.

en-year-old comes to me and says, "I'm tired of that teacher yelling at me. Next time she does it, I'm going to knock her down," I say, "Listen. The next time that teacher is mean to you, be cool. Just sit there in the classroom and don't say anything for 20 minutes. Then, when you are completely calm and in control, raise your hand. When she calls on you, tell her coolly and calmly, "Ms. Jones, what you did a few minutes ago, the way you talked to me, has psychologically dehumanized me, has made me feel like an animal, like a stupid animal. If that happens often enough, a child like me grows up thinking of himself as stupid and ugly and he can never function as a human being again. So unless you refrain from treating me in such a manner, I may have no alternative but to take you to the U.S. District Court and explain all this to the judge. And let me remind you, Ms. Jones, that there is a good possibility that I can win a \$100,000 damage suit against you if I charge you with a 'psychological tort.'"

We work on this statement and practice it just like practicing for the Christmas play. We've tried this. It works. The child develops a new sense of power and fate-control. The teacher develops a new sense of responsibility relative to her behavior.



This is quite a different consequence from what usually happens. When Ms. Jones hollers at him, his immediate reaction is to holler back at her, or Ms. Jones hollers at him, and his immediate reaction is to put his head down and turn off everything that has happened, or Ms. Jones hollers at him, and he internalizes it and goes out on the playground and slaps another student and then gets into trouble in another way. Then Ms. Jones, the oppressor, has won, and there is no way of letting her know that she may have started an armed robbery that will occur in two years or five years or that she may have contributed to that child's graduation to Attica or San Quentin, or dope or welfare or psychological death.

Imagine the impact we could have if we could show this kind of example on television or film or even on recordings. We could get to the students—and maybe even the teachers.

I'm trying to work on other examples of using the law—like taking a tort, and phrasing it in a way that a young child, a second grader, can understand. So that he can then start explaining these things to the teacher. I strongly believe that one of the basic problems is that teachers do not understand children. Teachers do not understand the child's perception and only a child can teach the teacher how he feels and in that way change the teacher's behavior towards that child.

Let me give you another example of how we try to teach law to the brothers and sisters as a tool to protect them. An eighteen-year-old brother came into our office last year and said, "Look, Art, that jive teacher keeps messing with me and I am going to knock him down if he doesn't get off my back."

I said, "Dig, Brother, if you hit the teacher he can sue you for assault and battery and he might be able to have you arrested." I said, "Why don't you just lay back and be cool, and



let him hit you and when and if he does, don't hit him back—just get your witnesses together and then you can sue *him*."

He came into our office one day. He was smiling and he said, "Hey, Art, you are a jive cat. I waited all year for that dude to hit me and he didn't hit me and I was planning on suing the dude so I could use the money to buy me a short [car]." He is in college now—so you can see that our approach is useful in many different ways.

Of course another effective way to deal with the problem is to take those individuals responsible for racism, dehumanization, and oppression to the courts or to the public and hold them accountable for their atrocities against children. We do not need to look for scapegoats in the poor Black community or the poor white community, or the Indian community, or the Puerto Rican community or the youth community. The policy makers and the administrators of that policy must be held accountable.

It sounds as though you're relying on criminal statutes and law. Why not bring civil cases?

First of all, we're exploring the civil statutes as well. We aren't counting on one thing to be the panacea. One reason why criminal suits are appealing is that district attorneys and county prosecutors are political creatures. You have about fifty registered voters down swearing out a warrant charging a teacher with something like criminal neglect of a child—then the D.A. sees perhaps a sensational case that will enable him to advance his political future. The other thing to remember is he is not about to reject the desires of fifty or sixty or a hundred registered voters. Also, don't forget, criminal cases can be brought without money—a poor mother can bring a case. All she has to do is swear out a warrant.

But suppose you don't win in court?

But, look, I'm dealing with another thing. Even if the case doesn't get one inch in a courtroom, what we're doing is re-defining what a criminal is. It's not the child who is the criminal—it's the teacher or administrator who destroys the child's humanness that is the criminal. The word game is very important. By assigning criminal definitions to what so-called educators are doing, I'm trying to get both the oppressed and the oppressor to see that certain acts committed by school people are criminal.

But won't you have to prove premeditation—and isn't that a hard thing to prove?

Yes. This idea is a very radical, even unsound strategy, as the law is now used. But I'm saying that there is premedita-

tion. Black and poor children are being deliberately destroyed so that they cannot compete with middle class and rich white children for jobs.

I'm also saying that this country has a habit of responding very quickly in some situations and responding very slowly in others. For example, as a result of the rebellions that occurred in the 60's and 70's, many state governments and the federal government moved swiftly to pass legislation that dealt with restricting the right to freedom of assembly, interstate travel, etc. A great deal of this legislation dealt with limiting the young or protecting institutions from the young, the poor, the Black—the oppressed.

If it was logical to deal with a crisis situation in order to preserve institutions in the manner I just described, then is it not logical to deal with the physical and psychological destruction of children, which in my opinion is in the crisis stage, by redefining our concepts of who the criminals really are and what the consequences of criminal actions are relative to the survival of our children?

Furthermore, at no time in the near future will all oppressed children be able to have their own lawyers. Therefore, it is very important that we find ways to communicate to children and their parents that *they* are not the criminals. If we do not do this, the self-fulfilling prophecy will once again force them to act like criminals and later to become criminals. On the other hand, we have to develop a strategy to protect their right not to be destroyed. We have tried everything from money to sensitivity sessions to in-service training for teachers to performance contracts to get accountability. Why not try criminal statutes? Teachers are not doing children a favor if they teach them effectively and treat them as human beings—that's their *job*. We have tried moral persuasion already, and it hasn't worked well. But nobody wants to be fined or to go to jail.

We have to develop strategies for massive attitudinal

Distribution of printed materials in school should not be restricted except when the literature incites the reader to physical violence by instructing him to do something which will physically harm someone else. Although the principal should not censor in-school publications or restrict the distribution of outside material within the school building, he should receive a copy of any material distributed in the school, not for his approval but for his information. As far as a principal trying to suppress petitions or inflammatory literature in his building, it's a waste of time . . . the ideas will be inside the building anyway. . . .

—Recommendation from the Dayton Student Board of Inquiry into High School Discipline.

Knowledge
is power...
be the best
of
whatever
you are.

Student Rights Handbook for Dayton, Ohio

1. SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
2. STUDENT EXPRESSION
3. COUNSELING
4. PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT
5. POLICE IN THE SCHOOLS
6. MARRIAGE AND PREGNANCY
7. VERBAL ABUSE OF STUDENTS
8. RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION
9. ARRESTS
10. CONCLUSION

In any event, a student-mother, whether married or unmarried, may return to her regular school in her regular program in the semester following the birth of her child. No student may be excluded from the regular day school program because she is a mother.

7

Verbal Abuse Of Students

Some teachers and school officials insist upon calling students "dumb," or other derogatory terms. This must be stopped. Students have the right to be free from the psychological damage which comes from verbal abuse. "Dumb," for example, should be applied only to those students who lack the power of speech, and then not in a derogatory manner.

When a teacher calls a student "dumb," or any other dehumanizing word, the student should immediately make a complaint to the principal, as well as inform his parents of the incident. If the principal does not act upon the matter (at a minimum, an apology would be appropriate) the complaint should then be brought to the attention of the superintendent's office or the Board of Education. If no action is taken at this level, or if the verbal abuse continues, the student should contact an attorney or the Student Rights Center (223-8228) to consider further action.

Further, the provisions of Sections 2901.20, and 2901.21 of the Ohio Code may be applicable. Section 2901.20 provides that no student or person in attendance

at a school shall engage in hazing or commit an act which injures, degrades, or disgraces a fellow student or person attending such school. Violators may be fined up to \$200.00, or imprisoned up to six months, or both. Section 2901.21 provides that no teacher or other person in charge of a school shall knowingly permit hazing or attempts to haze, frighten, degrade, or disgrace a person attending such school. Violators may be fined up to \$100.00.

8

Right To An Education

Every student has the constitutional right to an education. As the Supreme Court of the United States has stated, "Where the state has undertaken to provide it (an education), (it) is a right which must be available to all on equal terms." (Emphasis added.) *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The dimensions of this right are still unclear. However students, as the consumers of education, should demand that the education to which they have a right be a reality.

The Dayton Board of Education has made a general statement on student involvement in educational policy. "Students should have a voice in the formulation of school policies and decisions which affect their education and lives as students. Through such participation, students can be a powerful resource for the improvement of the school, the educational system and the community." Students should accept the Board's challenge.

change. The oppressed have to change their attitudes and behavior toward self and the oppressor. The oppressors have to change their attitudes and behavior toward the oppressed.

So part of the strategy is that you're redefining who the criminal is. Are you also redefining who the defenders of the law should be?

Yes. Chief Justice Burger and others in the legal profession are talking about the fact that the administration of justice is reaching a crisis stage because of tremendous case loads, administrative problems, new regulations, etc. Jean and Edgar Cahn have stated that there are many things that citizens or trained technicians can do to take the pressure off the courts and to enhance the possibility of more people receiving justice. Like Thomas Jefferson said (even though he wasn't talking about Black people), educate the masses and tyranny and oppression will disappear!

What we are trying to do is to take mothers on welfare, take young students and provide the opportunity for them to develop their own survival strategies. We are trying to get young students who understand the kinds of oppression that are going on to teach the community what's going on. It's a matter of teaching, it's a matter of effective communication.

It's a matter of the so-called professional learning from the people as well as teaching the people. It's a matter of loving, trusting, and respecting the people and it's a matter of doing *with* rather than doing *for* the people.

It's also a matter of winning.

For example, our parents go to school hearings and talk to principals, and they point out to the principal that he's wrong on this and wrong on that.

Our parents are learning how not to be manipulated by the principal. The principal will almost always try to convince the parents that he has the most difficult job in the world. Then he'll go back to what this child's brother did, and what the child's mother and father did, and what his grandmother's mother did to point out that they've given the child every possible chance.

We are trying to get our ombudsmen to orient themselves thoroughly to how some principals and teachers lie and deliberately deceive people. We want parents to always move from a *child advocacy* perspective. The principals and teachers have associations to protect their rights. This is a society of checks and balances, so children should also have an association to protect their rights. We hope that the parent ombudsmen check the "new sovereign immunity" that the "public servant" has over the child, the parents, and the community.

So the ombudsmen are the real link with the community?

Yes, but not just that. Because the ombudsmen are deeply involved, sometimes they come up with the most important legal points, just as some of the best criminal reform law has come from prisoners and not the dudes that sit in the big law firms. The jailhouse lawyer type dudes are living what's going on—not reading about it. For example, Ms. Robinson, one of our ombudsmen, is a state chairman of the Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO). She's been working with me for quite some time—since way back in '62. The only way we could get results then was to picket, shout at, and threaten the oppressor. Now by sitting in sessions with the lawyers, analyzing school law, and studying the oppressor, she and other ombudsmen have developed other strategies for dealing with the establishment. Let me give you an example—it wasn't our lawyer but Ms. Robinson who read the school code, the Ohio State Statute as it related to school expulsions. She said, "Look, this thing says that if a child is expelled, he has a right to a hearing." When one of her children was expelled she pointed out the rule to our lawyer. The Center is probably one of the few places where the oppressed can go and read law books. You usually have to be a lawyer to get into the law library downtown. Many of our people don't have access to or know how to use the library. But at the Center we have law books right in the community and people come in and read those books. So Ms. Robinson read the book and it said, "If a child is expelled, he is entitled to a hearing."

Now, let me tell you what the school administration's strategy was. Whenever a child was expelled, the assistant superintendent in charge of pupil personnel would send out a copy of the part of the regulation which dealt with his right to expel a child. But he did not send out the section of the regulation which dealt with the child's right to a hearing before the Board of Education. As a result of Ms. Robinson's discovery, the staff attorney asked for a hearing before the Board of Education. The Board of Education held the hearing and the Board of Education directed the assistant superintendent in charge of pupil personnel to review its expulsion policy. There had been a number of expulsions from the Dayton School system in the previous eighteen months and the Board of Education sensed that the Student Rights Center could very easily bring every child that had been expelled in for a hearing before the Board of Education. That would take a lot of time and effort and energy on the part of the school board and administrators.

They don't expel many students any more. Now what they do is suspend them. They always change their strategy—and so will we. That's another reason that we have to be very care-



ful—as you get freedoms for the young brothers and sisters, the administrators and teachers find other ways, maybe more subtle ways, to oppress them.

Why do you think they concentrate so much on getting the children out of school?

Some of it is just overt racism. Some of it is institutionalized racism. Subconsciously they feel, "Dirty nigger, I don't want you in here anyway. So get out." That's what it boils down to. Other reasons are connected to administrative convenience. Some administrators don't necessarily hate children, but they see children as inconveniences. They see a child who is mistreating another child as a problem who has to be sent home so they can do their quarterly reports. Or they see a child who cuts a class as somebody that is walking around the hall that should be sent home so that he won't pull the fire alarm. I'm convinced, I'm totally convinced that if you explain to a child the reason why you want him to do something, he will respond positively.

But most administrators don't feel that they have any obligation to explain anything to a student. They don't treat students as consumers or customers; they treat them as criminals or as prisoners of war or as the enemy.

The child who is extorting money from another child did not have that ability to extort when he came out of his mother's womb. It was obviously taught by someone. It was probably taught by an adult. But do the teachers attempt to deal with the problem of extortion? Hell, no! They're too busy dealing with Columbus discovering something that some Indian brothers had already inhabited, and telling lies about Abraham Lincoln freeing us when he really pawned us. Now wouldn't it be more practical, in terms of the seriousness of conflict situations in our society, for a teacher to deal effectively with the problem of mistreating one's fellow man? But the reality of it is that teachers do not know *how* to deal with those things.

In not dealing with the problem the teacher implicitly contributes to it. The teacher has no information or strategy or knowledge whatsoever in solving the problem of extortion. She sends the child home so he can then go to another school on the way home to extort from another child. Rather than teaching this child that it is important that he learn to love, trust, and respect the other child, she sends him home. Instead of sending the child home she could go through a thing like "Stand up here, Johnny. Now, three of you go up and take Johnny's money. Just take Johnny's money from him. Now, how do you feel about that, Johnny?" That doesn't happen. That never happens.

No programs are developed to teach the young brothers and sisters how to relate to each other. No. Because it's very simple for teachers to open that one textbook, say "Read Chapters 3 and 4," and that's it. Sit down and be a good boy and you can pass—stand up and try to be a *man* and you get kicked out.

What we are doing is attempting to develop an entire society of robots. But a society of robots or yes-men doesn't correspond with our stated objective of democracy. As Barbara Sizemore says in her testimony before the Mondale Committee, if we don't get about the business of establishing systems for participatory democracy in institutions that socialize our children for a so-called democracy, there will be little chance for having a real democracy.

Ermon O. Hogañ has written in *Racial Crisis in American Education*, "Although our schools have provided a quasi-common heritage, they have not provided a common experience out of which youth could learn to develop the responsibilities of freedom, to respect universal equality, and to acquire the skills necessary to guarantee prosperity through the years to come."

Some students are learning, though. They are learning that teachers make mistakes, they are learning that administrators lie, they are learning that some of our institutions are oppressive. They are responding by trying to free themselves so that they can free others, so we can build a free society.

I believe that some children condition themselves to take out the anger and frustration that they feel toward a teacher or an administrator or a parent on other children rather than the adult. Experience has taught them that they will lose in a confrontation with an adult. Children, like any oppressed group, sometimes behave like the oppressor. Any individual who is being oppressed has developed a way to get back at something or someone. If he doesn't, he may easily lose his sanity.

The child learns that the principal is always right, even when the child knows that he is wrong. The child knows that the principal will always say that the teacher is right even when the child knows that the teacher is wrong. And often the child's parents will make the same assumption.

Why would the parents tend to assume that the child is always wrong?

Parents are sometimes very repressive. In fact they are in many respects just as repressive as teachers. They don't do this intentionally—it's because they see education as the one thing that can improve the conditions in life for their children. They want their children to do well in life so



they see the school, the teacher, the principal as a ray of hope and a way out of slavery and oppression. Because his parents will not accept the fact that it's *possible* that a teacher might be wrong, the child will get very up-tight because he says, "Where else can I go—I ask my mother and father to listen to me and trust me and they won't. I can't deal with the school alone." So often the results are a gang or possibly some drugs, or a robbery and eventually a cell in Attica or San Quentin. And whenever the parents have to come to the principal's office, they get a game put on them. The warden always asks them, "What about your child's responsibility? Look at the thing objectively." And when they run

Student courts should handle all disciplinary cases in the school. . . . Student judges should be elected by the student body. A set of rules should be formulated by student committees, then voted on by the entire student body. Students could function as attorneys in student court. Students could make sure other students followed the directions of the court. The emphasis should be on corrective, rather than punitive, measures. If a child is acting up in class because he's a slow reader, for example, students could be assigned to tutor that child intensively until he catches up.

—Recommendation from the Dayton Student Board of Inquiry into High School Discipline.

that on a parent, what they're really saying is, "Accept my point of view."

How are you dealing with this?

The biggest job is getting adults to look at children as human beings who have rights. We don't have our lawyer running to court every day because we think it's more important to have him explaining the law to parents. Parents respect lawyers, and teachers, and preachers. The lawyer's real job is to give the parents backbone and insight. The parents can say, "We've got our lawyer—he can lay some information on us and then we can deal." So the lawyer's there, backing them up, giving them information.

Remember, a lot of violence occurs in the Black community—folks are scared. So when the Man talks about law and order and responsibilities, Black folks listen and poor folks listen. There is a tendency for people to speak the same words—the words of the oppressor—back to us at the Center and say, when we start talking about the rights of children, "What about their *responsibilities*? Why are you helping the hoodlums?" They have trouble seeing that a child, when he has been in trouble, deserves legal representation.

So we have to remind them first that they don't get upset about a murderer or a rapist having a lawyer. Why should they think that we're protecting criminals when all we're saying is that a child, even though he may be wrong, has a right to be represented? Or even though he may be wrong in terms of his actions, we have to deal with the reason for his actions. Why should they get upset when a child who misunderstands and therefore gets into trouble has someone to represent him? I'm saying you have to develop within the community a new appreciation for the fact that children are oppressed and you have to show the community that if a child does something, he does something for a reason. You have to get the community out of the whole scapegoat syn-

drome, where they automatically start blaming children for atrocities that adults are responsible for.

So the ombudsmen really have to educate the community in a new way to see how the schools treat children?

The ombudsmen spend most of their time working with individual students and parents. For example, if a child is suspended, the ombudsman calls up the principal, and asks him why the child was suspended. Just the fact that an ombudsman calls up a principal and questions the fact that he has suspended a child changes that principal's behavior. Just the fact that the Student Rights Center exists changes teachers' and administrators' behavior. For example, just before school opened last September we worked with a local newspaper reporter, explaining the negative aspects of corporal punishment. The reporter then wrote a full-page article on corporal punishment. Many teachers told me that they are now apprehensive about paddling children because now they know what the state statute is on corporal punishment. Many parents read the article and said, "The next time my child is mistreated I'm going to do something about it." If we had merely taken it to court, it would have been a legal exercise between two lawyers and a judge.

The fact that students have rights has simply never occurred to many people—and that's rich people and poor people, Black people and white people. We don't even see a child in the context of "rights." We see a child in the context of somebody whom you tell what to do, and somebody who is supposed to do as he or she is told.

When the parents do catch on, it must really help their children.

Yes, it does. Alvin Poussaint, the Black psychiatrist, pointed this out in an article in *Ebony* magazine when he said that the Ocean-Hill-Brownsville incident was one of the best things that had ever happened in education because, oppressed, Black children saw their parents going up against police officers and the system for them to have the right to go to school. A Black child—standing outside one of those schools in Ocean-Hill-Brownsville watching his mother and watching his father confront policemen—started getting things going around in his head about the importance of school and about the need for him to go to school. And he started learning with a new kind of enthusiasm because his mother and his father went in there and fought for him to have that right to go to school. School for those children became an important part of life, not just a prison they were forced into.



The Center's parent ombudsmen include parents who have been on welfare, and parents who have a fair income. There are Black and white ombudsmen who work with Black and white families. When the children see the ombudsmen confronting the system on their behalf, the children show a new desire and have new hope. The ombudsmen help the children develop a positive attitude. The children begin to believe that they are not always wrong and that they have some degree of fate control.

I'm saying that children—like Blacks—like Chicanos—like Puerto Ricans—like Indians—like women—are recognizing that they are human beings as a result of the fact that some of us have been telling them that they are. "You're beautiful, you have a right to this, you have a right to that." If you keep telling somebody that they're good or that they can control what happens to them, then they start believing it and doing it.

While I was assistant principal at MacFarlane School, I used to ask the young Black men to stand up and clap for the young Black women in the school. I still use this method to impress upon young Black men at an early age—like 3 years old—that they should love, trust, and respect Black women. Black men must not fall into the trap set by racist social theorists like Daniel P. Moynihan. Moynihan asserted that Black society is dominated by Black women. He called Black society a matriarchy, and left the impression that Black men must seek to dominate Black women. Dr. Jac-

quelyne J. Jackson pointed out in a recent issue of *Ebony* magazine that part of Moynihan's thesis was dead wrong: one of the reasons, she said, that more Black women head households is not that they are domineering, but that there simply have not been enough Black men to go around.

Because they have accepted Moynihan's racist thesis, some Black men have seen strong Black women as a threat to their manhood. This is a tragic waste. Black men should not try to prove their manhood by trying to destroy the strength of Black womanhood. The future of Black people depends, not on Black men dominating Black women, but on cementing their partnership with them. We must revere the courage and brilliance of our women and support and join their actions toward effecting Black liberation.

To get back to the issue of student rights, things like the Students Rights Handbook help too. We've tried to get those books out into the community. The young brothers and sisters walk through the school hall. The teacher says, "Shut up, Johnny." Johnny gets the book out and says, "Hey, man, I can't read this thing. Look in here and see what it says I should do when the teacher hollers at me." So a student who can read reads to him about what he can do about the verbal abuse of a student. Johnny raps to the teacher about Section 2901.20 and 2901.21 of the Ohio Code, and the teacher gets off his back.

But what about the abuse—physical or verbal—of the teacher?

Usually you find that when a child hits a teacher, the teacher has passed the first lick. We're trying to explode the myth about George Washington and teachers and principals never telling a lie. Let me give you another example of how the ombudsmen work. A student came to the Center who had been suspended twelve times. So a student ombudsman worked with him. The student ombudsman's name is James Phillips. James said, "Look, man, what are you going to do when you go back to school?" "I'm going to make sure that the cat doesn't hit me again." "What are you going to do if he hits you?" "I'm going to try to knock his head off." So James said, "Look, man, you've been out of school twelve times for fighting. And you're talking about going back to fighting. Now, isn't it obvious to you that the man, the principal, is running games on you? And what can you do to make sure that you and this cat don't fight but at the same time you can get something out of school, 'cause you're just wasting a lot of time and risking getting yourself ripped off. Do you understand that, man?" One of the reasons the student under-

stood was that James is the same age as he is. So he says, "Yeah, I guess so." So then he and James sat down and they developed a strategy to get five students together so that they could work with each other to protect themselves from the principal and from the teachers of the school.

Have you thought about sending in teams of lawyers?

The one thing that I recognize about a law and order society, about the way we've been trained and programmed, is that we only respond when we become personally involved. Most lawyers analyze the problem. They take the problem through ninety-nine research steps, and they think that they then have all the answers. I'm saying that a mother who has seen her child victimized, a mother who has in fact been victimized herself, feels a lot more compassion. A mother can't go home at five and say, "Well, we'll finish this tomorrow." She stays there until six or seven or eight in the evening until that problem is solved. The other thing is that she's a part of that community. Many of our cases come to our ombudsmen at home, not to the Center. A child with his parent will call up one of the ombudsmen at home, or go knock on the door, and say, "Look, Ms. Wiley, they're doing this to us—what can we do?" And they sit down right there in the home and solve the problem.

Because that ombudsman is in the community, because that ombudsman has come through the whole Civil Rights struggle, because the ombudsman knows and understands the child, because the ombudsman knows the principal and teachers and the kinds of games they run, the ombudsman can relate and deal effectively with the problem. Another important thing is that parents don't feel that they have to speak perfect grammar to be able to talk to the ombudsman about the problem. The ombudsman gets a lot of information, a lot more insight, into the problem, I think, than a so-called professional would. We try to work with the ombudsmen on certain interview techniques. We try to teach the ombudsmen about the importance of confidentiality and follow-up. But I'm saying that the ombudsman is a very emotional, intricate part of that community and the ombudsman responds to clients like human beings rather than like rats running through mazes, which is what most professionals—lawyers, social workers, teachers, administrators, doctors, judges,—tend to do.

Is it possible for the legal profession to be deprofessionalized?

Let me answer this way. We are developing a model statute for due process which we will present to the Board of Edu-

cation and I think that it might work like this: a student is suspended, let's say, for hollering at his teacher. And let's say that we have not necessarily an ombudsman, but maybe one of the women from the League of Women Voters who's hearing the case. Well, the first thing that would be different is that the teacher would have to state why she kicked the student out of school. And then the child would have an opportunity to respond to the teacher's charges. Then the principal would be asked in what kinds of detail he investigated the case prior to the time that he sent the child home. Then the mother would probably be asked, "Has the child had problems with other teachers?" And the child would be asked how he feels about the whole thing. So it's quite possible that in that whole process the child has to take a look at himself or herself, the parent has to take a look at himself or herself, the teacher has to take a look at himself or herself, and the principal has to take a look at himself or herself.

Yes, it is possible for the legal profession to deprofessionalize, but it is also possible for everybody to have access to the strategies used now by the legal profession mainly to protect the rich and the powerful.



What's your feeling about para-professionals and auxiliary personnel of that sort?

I think that some of the best guidance counselors are students—students who don't have Master's degrees in guidance. They sit down and they say, "Look, man, you don't need to do it like that, you need to do it like this."

Frank Riessman, at the 1969 Career Opportunities Conference in Denver, pointed out that of 1000 federal programs that they examined, students in 23 of those programs showed noticeable gains in cognitive achievement. And out of the twenty-three programs where students showed noticeable gains, eleven of them were programs that involved para-professionals. So maybe we should pay students and parents to teach, and let the teachers who are ineffective seek employment elsewhere.

When I directed the Model Cities Education program we had an excellent program where Black and white Vietnam war veterans worked as teacher aides at the second grade level. They were working toward degrees in education. Some have already finished. They had excellent rapport with the students. They also greatly influenced the attitudes and behavior of the teachers. I think all auxiliary type jobs should enable folks to develop to the very maximum of their potential and not lock them in so that they can advance only so much. One of the veterans in our program is now working on his Ph.D.

But if you want to affect all the children in the country, don't you have to deal with the professionalization in the schools?

Yes. Teacher organizations in my opinion are mainly concerned with making as much money as possible for doing as little work as possible.

One way to deal with the so-called professional is to simply wipe out compulsory attendance. I agree with Edgar Friedenberg that compulsory attendance as it exists today functions as a Bill of Attainder. We have to develop the kind of learning atmosphere where the child learns to love, trust, and respect himself and his peers and others, and to develop skills that will enable him to survive as a human being and to develop to the very maximum of his or her potential. My first inclination is to wipe out compulsory attendance, but at the same time I want to make sure that we develop some kind of mechanisms that will protect children and maximize their life chances.

On the other hand I have very serious problems with de-schooling, as Ivan Illich calls it, because it doesn't, in my opinion, adequately deal with the question of institutionalized racism. If you're going to have a de-schooled society run by the racist oppressors who are running this one, then

I'm opposed to it. At the same time I see great benefits in developing very special skills in a period of six weeks and not keeping people off the job market by insisting that they go through a number of worthless exercises to be certified. I don't see any magic about going to a building every day, and I believe students learn by doing, not by listening to a teacher who may or may not know what he or she is talking about.

It's hard to decide about programs and changes that look good on the surface. For example, even if Head Start is in many respects a good program, the positive aspects seem to get wiped out anyway. When I consider something like de-schooling, I have to wonder what will happen to the children who are catching hell now. One of the things that I recognize is that, as a result of the whole Civil Rights movement of the 1960's, Black teachers have become a lot more aware. Despite the fact that there's a tremendous amount of pressure being exerted on them to make sure that Black children are not taught properly, Black teachers are beginning to take care of business just the same. As Black children become more aware and start becoming more knowledgeable, all of a sudden we hear talk about reading not being important and arithmetic not being important, and de-emphasizing schooling and de-schooling.

It's the same thing with some white "educators" telling us what is *good* for the Black child. White teachers have developed missionary strategies for slavery 1960-1970 style. When I was directing the Model Cities Education program, I visited a kindergarten class and the children were taking a nap. They got there about eight. They took a nap at 8:45, a nap about 10:30, and another nap at 11:30 and they went home at twelve. I asked the teacher what was going on. She said, "Well, you have to let *these* children develop at their own leisure because you can't psychologically frustrate them." My response to her was, "Well, when these same children get to the third grade and put their heads on the desk and start taking naps because they can't read or because they are in the habit of sleeping all day they will have been taught to sleep and waste time by you. You will be responsible for their being suspended or expelled. Now it seems to me that those who are behind in a race 'must forever remain behind or run faster than the man in front.' So what I want you to do is to get those damn blocks out of the way, stop those half-day naps and siestas and start teaching them to read, write, and do arithmetic. If you push them and they learn, at least they will be able to get a job and afford a psychiatrist. If you go at the rate that you're going and they learn absolutely nothing, then they won't be able to get a job

and they won't know anything and at the same time they'll be mixed up and confused because they won't be able to compete in society." The point I'm making is that's another form of racism. Many white teachers assume Black children can't learn and so they let them sleep, play basketball, or not come to class.

As things are now I agree with Mario Fantini and Donald Harris: we have to provide as many alternatives as possible and we have to stop looking for a panacea. The only thing that could be worse than what we have now would be Hitler's concentration camps, and I believe that they are on the way, American style.

Do you have the same kind of mixed feelings about the voucher system or alternative schools?

The voucher system points up another legal point I'd like to deal with—the whole business of school systems functioning as monopolies. One of the reasons the school systems are so ineffective is that they have no competition. One of the things I liked about vouchers is that they have the potential to destroy the monopoly of the public school system. What other alternative does the poor child have? We need competitive models, we need community-controlled schools, we need free schools, university-run schools, welfare-rights-run schools, schools run by militant organizations, voucher schools, etc.

There are good educational models for Black children. Imamu Imiri Baraka has a good model; Elijah Muhammad has a good model; the Roxbury Free Schools in Boston, Harlem Prep, and the Nairobi Schools in California are good models. The voucher system, if not controlled by the oppressor, *could* make it possible to expand these models.

But the critical issue that has to be dealt with is a redistribution of power. Poor folks need power and money to operate different kinds of schools.

Committees composed of parents and students should interview prospective teachers. This should be done on an individual school, rather than a system-wide, basis. The students and parents could ask the teacher questions based on the needs of the school. This is especially needed when race is a real factor—for example, when white teachers apply to predominantly Black schools. This committee arrangement would not inhibit racial integration, but would make teacher selection more intelligent and more democratic. It would also give the particular school's community a direct say about its teachers.

—Recommendation from the Dayton Student Board of Inquiry into High School Discipline.

As for alternatives to the schools, there are a couple of questions to be dealt with. One is that the big oppressive institution called the school system is responsible for educating our children. So what you're doing if you start a free school, even though *that* free school may have the interest of the children at heart, is relieving the public school of its responsibility. The over-all strategy should be to stay on their cases and make sure they educate the children as they should be educated. But if there were enough alternatives, the school system would be forced either to produce or become obsolete, I would support the alternatives.

Are you saying that if the school system were doing its job right, alternatives wouldn't be necessary?

Schools *are* doing their job though. In fact, the schools in urban communities are doing *precisely* what they're designed to do. They are designed to transmit the cultural heritage. The cultural heritage in this country is one of racism. Urban schools are designed to make sure that you always have busboys, dishwashers, and folks for white people to look down upon psychologically.

The superintendent is paid to be sure that Black children do not learn because the system does not want Black children to be in a position to compete with white children for jobs. It's a perpetuation of the class structure in this country.

Schools are also designed to make sure that banks keep getting money placed into those banks by teachers. You see 85% of the schools' budget goes into salaries. And they're designed for the wax companies to sell wax, for the toilet paper companies to sell toilet paper, and for the food companies to sell food. Schools are a 61 billion dollar a year business. Poor children are used as tools for that business.

The role of the education lobby, and its self-interest in any educational expenditures, cannot be overlooked. For instance, the Southwest Region of the Ohio Education Association gave an appreciation dinner for members of the state legislature who voted for the latest school appropriations bill in the state legislature. Had any other interest group done this for their legislative benefactors, there would have been a public outcry. Not so with the educators.

As of January, 1972, some 28 suits in 18 states, all modeled on *Serrano*, had been filed. It is being discovered, however, that in state after state, urban schools will receive less money per pupil in any plan proposed for equalization of per pupil expenditures. Also, the Ohio Education Association is the plaintiff in the Ohio suit modeled on *Serrano*. Their legal fees, as in all these cases, are very high. So is the OEA's self-interest. To equalize per pupil expenditures

across the state would of necessity increase the teacher salaries across the state.

Do you think the busing will make any difference to this system?

As Lerone Bennett points out in *The Challenge of Blackness*, integration and separation should be looked upon as strategies for liberation. I am opposed to any strategy that is going to damage children—psychologically or physically. It really amazes me how we have such little regard for the rights of children and how in most instances we have such little regard for the abilities of children and yet on the question of integration we ask *them* to deal effectively with the problem that *we* have not effectively dealt with ourselves.

If we can put them on buses at age seven to deal with institutionalized racism—why can't we put them in voting booths at age seven to vote on whether or not they want to be bused? It's easy for us to say how we feel about it, but then we are not being bused. Why can't children be elected to the Board of Education at age seven? Are 7-year-olds or 14-year-olds or 16-year-olds represented by or judged by their peers in our society? I think we should be asking the students how they feel about it.

As I stated at the Conference on Education for Blacks sponsored by the Congressional Black Caucus, I seriously doubt the utility of busing to improve the education of Black students. "Racial balance" and "desegregation" do not ensure that Black children learn; such goals do ensure that Black children will be in the minority in every school. These goals do ensure that Black children will continue to be oppressed by the white-controlled racist school system.

Barbara Sizemore said in her testimony before the Mondale Committee that the first *Brown* decision was racist because it implied that segregation does no harm to white children, segregated schools are seen as good schools for whites. She said, "If an institution supports the folk who give the inference of authority to another folk, how can that institution help the so-called inferior folk?"

Black children today are very different from the Black children of 1954. To tell a Black child today that he will profit by sitting next to a white child in a white-controlled school is to lie to him. And he knows it. The only thing that child will gain is more knowledge of white racism. This is a learning experience for him but it does not help him learn how to read and write.

In light of this, and in light of the student's "rights" which

have been shown to exist only in theory, three points can be made about busing children for "racial balance":

First, it appears that busing insures that Black children will always be in the minority, thus providing an ideal climate for racist practices to continue.

Second, the terms "busing," "desegregation," and "racial balance" are used by the power elite in this country to keep poor whites and poor Blacks from joining together to demand a decent life and the right to survive. If the people who are paid to educate children don't do it, what better way to divert attention from their failures than by stirring up the folks, calling poor whites "racists" and forcing both white and Black to go to a school in which no one will ever learn anyway?

Third, "racial balance" is used to curtail the authority of Black teachers and administrators. In Dayton, the community word is that, in balancing the staff of the schools to a 70-30 ratio, the good Black teachers went to the white schools and the incompetent white teachers came to the Black schools.

Because of these effects of "desegregation," it is a denial of a Black student's right to an education to move him to a white school. We are putting the burden on children, both Black and white, to eradicate the mental illness of 300 years in American society. This "racial balance" is easy for the power elite to support because it puts the burden on the children, not on their own racist shoulders where it belongs. True integration, as Sizemore says, would bring about an open society in which segregated housing, economic racism on all levels, and unequal educational and medical services would be eliminated.

I believe in freedom of choice for Black people. If Black parents wish to send their children to white schools, the law should facilitate that wish. If, however, Black parents, having developed a sense of nationalism and racial pride, decide that Black-controlled schools would better educate their children, the law should protect that decision.

As I see it, when we talk about busing we are talking about institutionalized racism. And I believe that urban schools are merely an extension of the slave system. In many respects Black people are still enslaved. In many respects, *poor* people are enslaved. In many respects all oppressed people are enslaved.

Do you think it's possible for Blacks and oppressed white people to join together in a common struggle?

There has to be some kind of cooperation and understanding between poor white and poor Black students. I think that if there is racial violence in this country, initially it would not

be between middle-class Black and middle-class white people; it would be between poor white people and poor Black people, and they are both oppressed in many of the same ways.

I have been through an experience where I had to rescue some Black children from a white Appalachian school. One strategy would be to be angry with poor white folks for the rest of my life, but another strategy would be to understand that *they* are oppressed in many of the same ways Black people are oppressed. In many ways they are victims of the news media and victims of the powerful and the rich. I am not saying that poor white people and poor Black people have to love each other, but I am saying they have to get together on things that they agree on to prevent potential genocide of both. I think that that can be done, not by what some expert says, but by giving them power and giving them some money



and letting them make their own decision about how they can relate together and how they can live together.

I agree with Lerone Bennett, however, when he talks about the fact that you have to be strong before you go into any coalition. Black folks have been ripped off time and time again in coalition situations. The emphasis has to be on Black folks getting together with Black folks first and poor whites getting themselves together too. The immediate strategy with white folks has to be one of peaceful coexistence.

I think the same thing's happening within the public schools that happened during slavery. For example, during slavery Black people were told that we were dumb, that we were dirty, that we were silly, that we were thieves. That gave us a negative feeling of self. How does the institution called school work? The institution calls students socially disadvantaged, culturally deprived—now don't think that those terms don't have ramifications in terms of how teachers deal with those students, how administrators administrate for those students, how other institutions that are serving those students view those students. The institution also stereotypes to cover up its failure, to cover up its inability to produce. Earl Kelly said it very clearly—adults always blame powerless children for their inadequacies. Institutions always find a scapegoat for the fact that they can't produce, or that they are deliberately not producing.

It sounds like there's no way out.

That's what the oppressor wants us to believe. In this country today, Black men who want to be men have few alternatives. We can go to Algiers, we can end up in jail, we can end up destroyed psychologically or physically if we stand up for our rights. In my own case, the Stivers High School incident documented by Dr. Ruth W. Burgin in the book, *An Experiment in Community School Control: An Evaluation of the Dayton Experience*, speaks of a form of genocide, a form that seeks to eliminate Black men from positions of power or potential power. As a result of incidents of this kind, young Black and other oppressed people are forced into despair. Many feel, "Why learn and why study when in a few years I'm going to be destroyed anyway?"

There is a growing concern among Black educators and community leaders that, since there is no more cotton to pick and there are no more ditches to dig, Blacks as a people are no longer necessary to this country, especially in view of the population control themes being developed. Some believe that the billions of dollars being pumped into programs like the Title I Elementary and Secondary Education Act to provide funds for assistance to so-called educationally disadvan-

tagged children are merely being used to prove the racist theory of genetic inferiority of Black children, as espoused by men like Jensen. The argument runs something like this: "You see, we have given billions and look, those children still cannot learn."

How does this oppression actually work itself out in the school?

The school is a certified agent of oppression. There are many similarities between urban schools that I've been associated with and Attica. At Attica they shot people down physically; in the public schools they shoot children down psychologically. The result is the same, death. In fact, as Dr. Martin Luther King stated, psychological death can be even more painful than physical death. Let me give you an example. This nine-year-old brother was watching the Today show. He was Black. A very brilliant Black Ph.D. was on the show. The young brother didn't understand what the Ph.D. was talking about. But he was impressed by his sharp clothes and the fact that he was on television. He ran to school. He was late because he had been watching the Today show. He asked his teacher, "How much money do it cost to be a doctor, so I can be on television and be like that man I saw on television, and be sharp, and be talking like he was talking?" His teacher told him, "Sit down—sit down because you don't have enough money to be thinking about school and you can't read anyway." He was nine years old. He didn't come to school the next day. He started stealing little petty stuff, hub caps, routine stuff. Then he started getting into more serious trouble. Then he started becoming aggressive in social situations. He eventually got into serious trouble—and he is, in fact, doing time now for a very serious crime.

You can multiply that example in one form or another for every child who gets trapped in the general course, or gets pushed out of a college preparatory course, or learns how to sit in class and be a good "boy" or good "girl" and graduates, but can't read. Or gets pushed out of school.

What are the consequences of being in the general course?

Counselors are among the greatest violators of the equal protection granted to all people under the United States Constitution. They can deprive children of this protection with one statement: "You are not smart enough to take the college preparatory course."

When a counselor makes this statement, he often deprives the student of a good job, good housing, good medical treatment, and a happy and healthy life. If the student doesn't

drop out, he winds up in another dead end—the general course.

You take a student in an academic course and ask him what he wants to be. He'll say: a doctor, a lawyer, a chemist. You ask a student in the business course what he wants to be and he'll tell you an office manager, a banker, a real estate man, a salesman. Ask a student attending one of the few good vocational schools what he wants to be and he will say a draftsman or machinist.

You ask a student in the general course what he wants to be and he'll say, "I dunno." I look at the classified want ads in the Dayton papers every day and I see ads for all kinds of jobs. But I don't see any ads for "General Jobs."

The general course is a combined concentration camp, babysitting service, and mental graveyard. It is excellent preparation for the future junkies of America, the future jobless of America.

The general course, like the poor conditions of performance and services and supplies and material resources in Black and other oppressed communities, exists not by chance, but by design. I think that those of us who are in constant contact with the people who are suffering in this country must repeat and repeat and repeat the essence of that suffering—institutionalized racism.

I have personal experience with how teachers try to program Black children into failure. The one lesson that I learned well in junior high school only took about two minutes to teach and I have never forgotten it. A math teacher told me that I would never be any good, that I was dumb, and that I would never finish school. I believe today that I made up my mind right then and there to make a damn liar out of him.

Now he told my best friend the same thing, and that friend didn't see that it was the system that was no good—he believed it was him. For shortly after that teacher hit my friend with the same cruel, harsh, and criminal words, my friend started staying away from school, getting in trouble and is, in fact, in trouble today, serious trouble. He is in jail. As far as I am concerned—whatever crime my friend is accused of—the teacher who made that statement to him way back in 1950 is equally guilty and should be serving the same time under the same conditions.

Now, I had a sense of what was happening, but it was still very hard for me. Because of some racist IQ test, when I got to high school, my mother had to spend about three weeks convincing white folks that I should take the college preparatory course. When she finally fought hard enough for me to get into the college preparatory course, they had already psychologically destroyed my will to take algebra and geometry

In questions of student violations of school rules, the student, like any citizen, should be regarded as innocent until proven guilty. The burden of proof should rest with the school. The student has a right to full due process of law. . . . When discipline is arbitrary, as it is, for the most part, now, it prepares students to live in a society where they will have no control over forces that affect their lives. It encourages an acceptance of impotence, an acceptance of the individual's inability to change a given situation. It is time to give students the constitutional rights they already, in theory, have—including the important right to a fair trial in questions of rule violations.

—Recommendation from the Dayton Student Board of Inquiry into High School Discipline.

and all college subjects. So when I went into those college preparatory courses I went in there with the feeling—"I can't really do this because the teacher said I couldn't do it, and the counselor said I couldn't do it, and the principal said I couldn't do it, and the assistant superintendent of the district said I couldn't do it. I must be stupid."

But my main point is that by making sure that most Black children end up in the general course with no belief that they can do or be anything else, the system is committing psychological genocide and perhaps even getting ready for physical genocide. There's hardly a chance that any of *us* are going to be in positions to control the new technologies—those that may mean the difference between survival and death. You have to think seriously about why our children aren't being trained for the future.

Do you want to start educating children for the future or for dealing, first of all, with their present condition?

One without the other is meaningless. Right now we should be teaching children how to make their own worlds more livable. They should learn about legal redress against slum landlords. They should learn about taxes and how they are levied. They should learn consumer law and credit and how to protect themselves in the marketplace. They should learn about due process so that they can protect themselves and their parents from a society that does not look kindly on them.

Besides this, our children must be schooled in the future. We must have architects who can plan low-cost housing. We must have children who can learn oceanography and assure our people a place in submarine communities. We have seen from experience that the white establishment will leave its decaying cities to Black people while fleeing into the

suburbs. They will not automatically, out of brotherhood, indulge in integrated submarine communities. Our children must be taught about space flight—so that they will not be left on a pollution-clogged earth while whites hit the moon and beyond. Black children must learn the new medicine so that their children will not be used as spare parts when some white man needs a heart. Our children must learn genetics so that the race is not bred out of existence when the era of test-tube babies becomes a reality. Our children must learn about psychology and the media so that they will not be manipulated back into slavery.

Instead of the general course, why not substitute a curriculum that produces skilled craftsmen in oceanography, genetic research, atomic fusion, chemistry and biology, medicine, computer science, machine design, the media, urban space planning, agronomy, economic planning, and political science as it applies to design models for the survival and liberation of oppressed peoples?

Black people, in the eyes of many people in this country, are no longer necessary. I'm especially pessimistic after reading Sam Yette's brilliant book, *The Choice*. There he deals with *The Issue of Black Survival in America*, the reality that our people are considered obsolete by racists because there is no more cotton to pick, and there are no more ditches to dig. And I see the school as an agency that initiates and perpetuates genocide.

Concentration camps are public schools. Public schools are prisons. You never really do get out of school—because the oppression that you endure during that school day follows you all through your life. When people start talking about population explosion—when they start talking about the density of population, when they start talking about there not being enough resources to feed people—they're talking about getting rid of somebody. Now that's a reality! The majority group, on the basis of its proven record, damn sure doesn't want to volunteer to be eliminated.

Suppose, for example, some high-level government official would say "The environment is so critical that we have to eliminate 25 million folks immediately in order for all of us to continue to breathe. Now would you suggest that we rip off 25 million white folk over 75, if we have that many? Or would you suggest that we just eliminate 25 million Black folks." What would the answer be?

It's easy for white people to say that's paranoid. Many Germans probably said the same thing in Germany just before many Jewish people were destroyed. Black psychiatrists Grier and Cobb point out in *Black Rage* that if a man is Black in America and is not paranoid, he is not normal. It's as nor-

mal for a Black man to be paranoid in America as it is for a banker to be prudent or a hunter to be cunning.

Given the fact that the "sane" Black person must acknowledge the psychological genocide that exists and the physical genocide that is possible, what has to happen now, as you see it?

I have to deal with that question on several different levels. One initial step might be to deal directly with the oppressive school-connected agents of genocide. A group of Black educators suggested just recently that we provide school people with two alternatives: either say (1) our children are genetically inferior, or (2) you do not have the ability to educate them.

Most oppressive educators have trouble dealing with those alternatives because even though they *believe* in the genetic inferiority of Black children, they would be reluctant to admit to others that they do not have the capacity to educate our children because that would mean they would no longer be necessary in our schools or in our communities. They would no longer be able to use our children for the purpose of making a living.

If oppressive educators admit that they cannot educate our children, that would mean that they should no longer have access to Black children and other poor and oppressed children. If they no longer had access to our children they would not be able to deliberately destroy them psychologically for the purpose of protecting the myth of white superiority and the reality of institutionalized racism.

To prevent psychological genocide of Black, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Indian, poor and oppressed children, we must remove them from the physical and psychological control of the oppressor. We must also teach them to protect and defend themselves while at the same time not copying the cruel and vicious tactics of the oppressor.

On another level, some of the most brilliant people alive are Black people who have become political prisoners because of the events of the 1960's and 1970's. They possess the insight and the love for their fellow man to deal effectively with the issue of "bringing us together." I believe that legislation should be introduced to grant amnesty to all those who are currently incarcerated because they have fought for the human and constitutional rights of their fellow man. I suggest that they be employed to work toward making this a truly open, democratic society.

Everett Reimer in *School Is Dead* says that, despite the record, the possibility for democratic institutions remains—men, however, must make up their minds to use insti-

tutions for democratic purposes. In order to avoid genocide for some and in order to make democracy a reality for all, we must start practicing what we preach from the womb to the tomb, from the pre-schooler to the Supreme Court justice, to the Congressman.

Everett Reimer contends, of course, that school is dead. He may be right. While it is being buried, however, children are still being destroyed.

We must protect our children by any and all means necessary. For example, the local, state, and federal governments of this country have the responsibility of stopping the psychological and physical genocide that is occurring through the schools, the media, health care, drugs, housing, and law enforcement. We must hold individuals who are responsible for racism within the educational system accountable for their actions by initiating criminal court actions or through para-legal avenues of arbitration. We must institute specific programs to develop positive self-image. The Black, poor, and oppressed must be told repeatedly that they are good, they are beautiful, they can do anything they make up their minds to do. Like Huey P. Newton says, "The will of the People is greater than the Man's technology." We must redistribute money, knowledge, and power, and provide alternatives through community-controlled schools, free schools, welfare rights schools, university-run schools, student-run schools, computer-centered schools, schools without walls, home-based schools, etc. We must reform the decision-making bodies of public education to include students between the ages of seven and seventeen with full rights and responsibilities. We must institute student fact-finding commissions—like the Center's recent models, the Student Boards of Inquiry into discipline and into curriculum—to deal with racial issues, discipline, curriculum, guidance, and all other areas of public education. We must federally fund student groups to initiate their own programs relative to rights and responsibilities and education in general—programs, for example, where students help the blind, the poor, the aged. We must federally fund programs for "Black militants," conservative white, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Indian, poor, and oppressed students, so that they can develop their own strategies for peaceful co-existence and survival.

We must strive to make Oscar Handlin's definition of integration a reality. That definition, as interpreted by Barbara Sizemore, is that condition of society in which any individual has the opportunity to make a multitude of voluntary or involuntary contacts with any other human being based on his own preference, taste, or ability. This definition, rather than racial balance, must be our goal. We must federally

School security guards should definitely have more requirements than simply "a clean record" to be placed in a school situation. There should be some history of work with young people, and some intensive training on how to relate to young people under potentially dangerous or explosive conditions. Security guard power in a school should be specifically outlined in writing. Guards should be held personally and professionally accountable for any violations of their written powers.

—Recommendation from the Dayton Student Board of Inquiry into High School Discipline.

fund TV, cable TV, and radio networks throughout this country that can broadcast information to the masses of oppressed people about student rights, welfare rights, and the right to believe in oneself and to love, trust, and respect oneself and others; we must also broadcast the information necessary to eliminate racism, poverty and oppression, and genocide. Although federal grants for compensatory education have failed in the past because money was given to the same racist administrators to help Black children whom they had failed to educate in regular programs, massive expenditures of money could aid Black education—if it were distributed properly, and controlled by the local community, not by the state or the school system.

We must also abolish corporal punishment.

How is it possible to finance these programs?

How is it possible to finance wars? How is it possible to subsidize large corporations? How was it possible to rebuild Germany and Japan?

A number of ideas on how to use such grants have been expressed in Dayton a number of times by myself and others. The ideas were recently re-stated one more time, by the Dayton superintendent who fired me three years ago for developing these same programs.

These ideas include: federal grants used for rent or loan supplements for all poor people—once housing is available to all in all parts of the cities, true integration may be possible. Federal grants for clothing allowances for poor children—the type of clothes a student wears significantly affect teacher attitudes toward the student, and therefore that student's performance. Federal grants for medical and dental service for every poor child—this money could erase some of the outside factors that hinder a poor child's learning. Federal grants to provide part-time jobs for all

poor children 12 years and over—if a child can earn his own spending money, he will be less apt to drop out of school. Federal grants for paid transportation either to a special course or a job opportunity for all these children. Federal grants for green space and good playground equipment for all inner-city schools—to alleviate at least the appearance of inner-city schools as prisons. Federal grants for educational travel, camping, and environmental exploration by inner-city pupils.

Then do you feel that such programs could profoundly alter the fate of Black and other oppressed people in this country? Is this the kind of revolution you hope for?

No program for change and liberation can be successful, truly successful, in making equality and democracy a reality unless the people are involved from the beginning. I believe that the only real revolution that can take place in this country, and indeed in this world, is a revolution of peace—love, trust, and respect for each other. There is nothing revolutionary about Black folks and young folks dying in this country. Life is a very precious and dear thing. We have, in this country, made dying as routine as going to the bathroom, and that is a shame. We must somehow emphasize the importance of living and developing strategies to see to it that our young are able to develop to the fullest of their potential. To strive for anything less is to say that all of the Black people who have bled and suffered and died, and all the young people who have bled and suffered and died, have done so for nothing.

I hope Reich is correct in terms of the *Greening of America*, but I believe Sam Yette is correct in terms of *The Choice: The Issue of Black Survival in America*.

In her book, *If They Come in the Morning*, our beautiful, brilliant, and courageous sister Angela Davis states that her life is at stake and that it is not just an individual life but a life that has been given to her people in the struggle against poverty and racism.

James Baldwin, in his letter to Angela Davis, says, "We must fight for your life as though it were our own because if they take you in the morning they will be coming for us that night."

Angela Davis is on trial, Black people are on trial, oppressed people are on trial, and the potential for democracy is on trial. For the sake of our children and for the sake of us all, I hope Angela wins, I hope Black people win, I hope the oppressed win, I hope democracy wins.

We must trust each other. In the end, the oppressed will save themselves and their oppressors. The children, if we allow them to be human, will lead the way.

Footnotes

¹ *Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District*, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969). This decision is discussed in Richard L. Berkman, "Students in Court: Free Speech and the Functions of Schooling in America," *Harvard Educational Review*, 40 (November, 1970), pp. 567-595.

² *Serrano v. Priest*, 5 Cal. 3d 584 (1971). The text of this decision is published with commentary by William N. Greenbaum, *Harvard Educational Review*, 41 (November, 1971), pp. 501-534.

³ The interview took place in Cambridge, Massachusetts in February, 1972. Interviewers were John Butler, Margaret Marshall, Tom Marx, and Ellen Solomon of *HER*.

⁴ While the Center has received grants from the Office of Economic Opportunity, Washington, D.C., 20506, the opinions expressed here are those of Arthur E. Thomas and should not be construed as representing the opinions or policy of any agency of the United States Government.

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My mother—who taught me at an early age to always remember that whenever I saw someone who was suffering or oppressed, "there but for the grace of God, go you." She told me that I should always try to help them, because, were it not for oppression, they would be able to help themselves.

My wife—who is brilliant, Black, and beautiful and best described by Isaac Hayes on the record *Black Moses* in the song "Brand New Me."

Ms. Wilhelmina Robinson, Dr. Ames Chapman, Mr. Isaac Sappe Lane, professors Central State University, Wilberforce, Ohio—they taught me and many others that we were not dumb and that we could learn.

Mrs. Margaret Irby, teacher, Dayton Public Schools; my students; the Black community of Dayton—who taught me and many others to always strive to love, trust, respect, and protect our children and our people.

Ms. Jean Camper Cahn and Dr. Edgar S. Cahn—who helped us fight the racist, oppressive school administration of Dayton at the risk of their lives—and who were instrumental in the development of the Student Rights Center.

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Ombudsmen—Mr. Edward Campbell, Rev. David Gilbert, Ms. Elizabeth Robinson, Ms. Betty Moore, Ms. Corine Tucker, Ms. Mable Wiley, Ms. Judy Mathis, Mr. Robert Turner, Mr. James Phillips, Mr. Ellis Jacobs, Ms. Gail Stewart, Carroll Boswell.

Some of our best friends are white: the late Charles Bridge—our lawyer, who

labored unselfishly against racism, oppression, and injustice; Dr. Larry Hillman, Dr. Arthur Eve, Dr. James H. Pelley, Mr. Albert Rosenberg, Mr. Ray Hruschka, Dr. Neal Shedd, Mr. Gregory Favre.

Records—"Save the Children" as performed by Marvin Gaye, *What's Going On*; "Reach Out and Touch (Somebody's Hand)" as performed by Aretha Franklin, *Live at Fillmore West*; "The Impossible Dream," as performed by Roberta Flack, *Chapter Two*, "Martin Luther King at Zion Hill," "Malcolm X Talks to the Grassroots," "Malcolm X: Ballots or Bullets," "I am Somebody," Rev. Jesse Jackson, *The Country Preacher*; "To Be Young, Gifted, and Black," as sung by Nina Simone, *Black Gold*.

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Appendix

The following are sections of the Ohio Revised Code. Most states have similar laws which have never been applied to educators and the education system. Because of the novelty of the proposed use for these laws, it might be difficult for citizens to swear out warrants against educators, and for prosecutors to prosecute violations of these laws. Such use of these laws may be a few years away, but citizens may have to

resort to the criminal law, and use it in the way proposed here, to force constructive change in the education of our children—A.E.T.

ORC 2919.05—Embezzlement by Municipal and School Officers

"No member of the council of a municipal corporation, or an officer, agent, or employee of a municipal corporation, or board of education, shall knowingly divert, appropriate, or apply funds raised by taxation or otherwise, to any use or purpose other than that for which said funds were raised or appropriated, or knowingly divert, appropriate, or apply money borrowed, or a bond of the municipal corporation or part of the proceeds of such bond, to any use or purpose other than that for which such loan was made, or bond issued. Whoever violates this section shall be . . . imprisoned not less than one nor more than twenty-one years."

ORC 2919.05—Usurpation of Office

"No person in an office or place of authority without being lawfully authorized to do so, or by color of his office shall willfully oppress another under pretense of acting in his official capacity.

"Whoever violates this section shall be fined not more than two hundred dollars."

Boards of education and educators willfully defraud parents when they say they are educating their children. Children are willfully oppressed by the educational system.

ORC 2911.41—Fraudulent Advertising

"No person shall directly or indirectly make, publish, disseminate, circulate, or place before the public, in this state, in a newspaper, magazine, or other publication, or in the form of a book, notice, handbill, poster-circular, pamphlet, letter, sign, placard, card, label, or over any radio station, or in any other way, an advertisement or announcement of any sort regarding merchandise, securities, service, employment, real estate, or anything of value offered by him for use, purchase, or sale and which advertisement or announcement, contains any assertion, representation, or statement which is untrue, or fraudulent.

Whoever violates this section shall be fined not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than twenty days or both."

Are not boards of education and educators guilty of violations of this law? Is not every school tax levy campaign a violation? School people advertise education. Children and parents are consumers of education induced by false advertising.

ORC 2907.21—Larceny by Trick

"No person shall obtain possession of, or title to, anything of value without the consent of the person from whom he obtained it, provided he did not induce such consent by false or fraudulent representation, pretense, token, or writing.

"Whoever violates this section is guilty of larceny by trick, and, if the value of the thing so obtained is sixty dollars or more, shall be imprisoned not less than one nor more than seven years.

School boards and administrators have been taking public money for years with public consent. Indeed, they ask for more and more money. The public consent is induced by representations made by administrators that children's education will improve, and the pretense that children learn in proportion to the dollars spent. These representations are false. The proof of their falsity is that high school diplomas are awarded to people who read and write at an eighth grade level.

ORC 2903.08—Torturing or Neglecting Children

"No person having the control of . . . a child under the age of sixteen years shall willfully . . . torture, torment, or cruelly or unlawfully punish him . . .

Whoever violates this section shall be fined no less than ten nor more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than six months, or both."

School systems claim to have control of children during school hours. Willful torture and torment occurs when children are harassed and molded to conform to the system's model of the perfect student. To keep a child in school eight hours a day, listening to a teacher who says nothing relevant, is cruel punishment.

ORC Section 2901.12—Robbery

"No person by force or violence, or by putting in fear, shall steal from the person of another anything of value.

"Whoever violates this section is guilty of robbery, and shall be imprisoned not less than one nor more than twenty-five years."

Our system of education puts children in fear, and steals from them their desire to learn, their inquiring minds, and their individuality.

ORC 2921.14—Conspiracy to Defraud the State

"If two or more persons conspire to defraud this state, or any political subdivision thereof, in any manner, or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."

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*The Having of Wonderful Ideas**

ELEANOR DUCKWORTH

Atlantic Institute of Education

Explaining that no definitive pedagogy flows from the developmental theory of Jean Piaget, the author explores ways that classroom teachers can nevertheless make powerful use of that theory. For her, the essence of the child's intellectual development lies not in the progressive accomplishment of Piagetian tasks, but in the child's testing out the ideas that she or he finds significant. This process of testing out ideas, she argues, is critical for the child's cognitive growth. Teachers can assist this growth primarily by accepting the child's perspective as the legitimate framework for generating ideas—allowing the child to work out her or his own questions and answers. This approach—and the importance of providing varied settings and materials which suggest ideas to children—is discussed with particular reference to the author's classroom experience and her evaluation of an elementary science program.

Kevin, Stephanie and the Mathematician

The other day I was going over some classic Piaget interviews with a few children to show a friend what they were like. One involved seriation of lengths. I had cut ten cellophane drinking straws at different lengths, and was asking the children to put them in order, from smallest to biggest. The first two seven-year-olds did it with no difficulty and little interest. And then came Kevin. Before I

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said a word about the straws, he picked them up and said to me, "I know what I'm going to do," and proceeded, on his own, to seriate them by length. He didn't mean, "I know what you're going to ask me to do." He meant, "I have a wonderful idea about what to do with these straws. You'll be surprised by my wonderful idea."

It wasn't easy for him. He needed a good deal of trial and error as he set about developing his system. But he was so pleased with himself when he accomplished his self-set task that when I decided to offer them to him to keep (ten whole drinking straws!) he glowed with joy, showed them to one or two select friends, and stored them away with other treasures in a shoe box.

The having of wonderful ideas is what I consider to be the essence of intellectual development. And I consider it the essence of pedagogy to give Kevin the occasion to have his wonderful ideas, and to let him feel good about himself for having them. To develop this point of view, and to indicate where Piaget fits in for me, I need to start with some autobiography, and I apologize for that. But it was a struggle of some years' duration for me to see how Piaget was relevant to schools at all.

I had never heard of Piaget when I first sat in one of his classes in Paris in 1957. I was fresh from a B.A. in philosophy, and it was Piaget the philosopher who won me—won me to such an extent that I went on to spend two years in Geneva as a graduate student and research assistant. Then, in 1962, I began to pay attention to schools when, as a Ph.D. drop-out, I accepted a job developing elementary science curriculum. I began the work chiefly because it was a job, but fortunately for me I had happened into an exciting circle of educators, and I got hooked.

The colleagues I admired most got along very well without any special knowledge of psychology. They trusted their own insights about when and how children were learning, and they were right. Their insights were excellent. Moreover, they were especially distrustful of Piaget. He hadn't yet appeared on the cover of the *Saturday Review* or the *New York Times Magazine*, and they had their own picture of him: a severe, humorless intellectual confronting a small child with questions that were surely incomprehensible, while the child tried to tell from the look in his eyes what the answer was supposed to be. No wonder the child couldn't think straight. (More than one of these colleagues first started to pay attention to Piaget when they saw a photo of him. He may be Swiss, they thought, but he doesn't look like Calvin: maybe he can talk to children after all.)

I myself didn't know what to think. My colleagues did not seem to be any the worse for not taking Piaget seriously. Nor, I had to admit, did I seem any the bet-

ter. Compared with psychology labs, schools were such complicated places that I couldn't find a way to be of any special help. Not only did Piaget seem to be irrelevant, I was no longer sure he was right. For a couple of years, I scarcely ever mentioned him, and simply went about the business of trying to be helpful, never, as I recall, drawing directly on any of his specific findings.

The lowest point came when one of my colleagues gleefully showed me an essay written in first grade by six-year-old Stephanie. The children had been investigating capillary tubes, looking at the difference in the height of the water as a function of the diameter of the tube. Stephanie's essay went as follows: "I know why it looks like there's more in the skinny tube. Because it's higher. But the other is fatter, so there's the same."

My colleague triumphantly took this as proof that six-year-olds can reason about the compensation of two dimensions. And I didn't know what to say. Of course, it should have been simple. Some six-year-olds *can* reason about compensations. The ages that Piaget mentions are only norms, not universals. Some children develop slower and some develop faster. But I was so unsure of myself at that point that the incident shook me badly, and my explanation only sounded like a lame excuse.

I do have something else to say about that incident, but I'll get to it a little later. For now, I simply want to describe the struggle.

Even if I did believe that Piaget was right, how could he be helpful? If the main thing we take from Piaget is that before certain ages children are unable to understand certain things—conservation, transitivity, spatial coordinates—then what can we do about it? Do we try to teach the children these things? Probably not, because on the one hand Piaget leads us to believe that we probably won't be very successful at it. And on the other hand, if there is one thing we have learned from Piaget, it is that children can be left to their own devices in coming to understand these notions. We don't have to try to furnish them. It took a few months before I straightened that out for myself and concluded that this was not a very good way to make use of Piaget.

Another alternative was to keep in mind the limits on children's abilities to classify, conserve, seriate, and so forth when deciding what to teach them at certain ages. But I found that this was an inadequate criterion for deciding what to teach. There was so much else to keep in mind. The most obvious reason, of course, was that in any class of children there is great diversity of levels. Tailoring to an average level of development is sure to miss a large proportion of the children. In addition, a Piagetian psychologist has no monopoly here. When try-

ing to approximate the abilities of a group of children of some given age, able teachers like my colleagues could make as good approximations as I.

I found it appealing that the people with whom I was working judged the merits of any suggestion by how well it worked in classrooms. That is, instead of deciding on *a priori* grounds what children *ought* to know, or what they *ought* to be able to do at a certain age, they found activities, lessons, points of departure which would engage children in ordinary classrooms, with ordinary teachers. In their view, it was easy to devise all-embracing schemes of how science, as it was in this instance, could be organized for children, but making things work pedagogically in classrooms was the difficult part. They started with the difficult part. A theory of intellectual development might have been the basis of a theoretical framework for a curriculum. But in making things work in a classroom, it was but a small part compared with finding ways to interest children, to take into account different children's interests and abilities, to help teachers with no special training in the subject, and so forth. So the burden of this curriculum effort was classroom trials. The criterion was whether or not they worked, and their working depended only in part on their being at the right intellectual level for the children. They might be perfectly all right, from the point of view of intellectual demands, and yet fall short in other ways. Most often, it was a complex combination.

As I was struggling to find some framework within which my knowledge of Piaget would be useful, I found, more or less incidentally, that I was starting to be useful myself. As an observer for some of the pilot teaching of this program, and later as a pilot teacher myself, I found that I did have some good insights into the intellectual difficulties that children encountered. I had a certain skill in being able to watch and listen to children and figure out how they were really seeing a problem. And this led to a certain ability to raise questions that made sense to them and to think of a new orientation for activities which might correspond better to their way of seeing things. I don't want to suggest that I was unique in this. Many of the excellent teachers with whom I was in contact had similar insights. So did many of the mathematicians and scientists among my colleagues, who, from their points of view, could tell when children were seeing things differently from the ways they did. But the question of whether I was unique is not really pertinent. The point is that my experience with Piaget, working closely with one child at a time and trying to figure out what was really in his mind, was a wonderful background for being sensitive to children in classrooms. I feel that a certain amount of this kind of background would be similarly useful for every teacher.

In my own development, it was this sensitivity to children in classrooms which continued to be central. As a framework for thinking about learning, my understanding of Piaget has been invaluable. This understanding, however, has also been deepened by working with teachers and children on questions of how they can best spend their time together. I may be able to shed some light on that mutual relationship by referring again to six-year-old Stephanie's essay on compensation.

Few of us, looking at water rise in capillary tubes of different diameters, would have bothered to wonder whether the quantities were the same. Nobody had asked Stephanie to make that comparison and in fact it is impossible to tell just by looking. But, on her own, she felt it was a significant thing to comment upon. I take that as an indication that for her it was a wonderful idea. Not long before, she believed that there was more in the tube where the water was higher. She had recently won her own intellectual struggle on that issue, and she wanted to point out her finding to the world for the benefit of those who might be taken in by preliminary appearances.

This incident, once I had figured it out, helped me think about a point that bothered me in one of Piaget's anecdotes. You may recall Piaget's account of a mathematician friend who inspired his studies of the conservation of number. This man told Piaget about an incident from his childhood, where he counted a number of pebbles he had set out in a line. Having counted them from left to right and found there were ten, he decided to see how many there would be if he counted them from right to left. Intrigued to find that there were still ten, he put them in a different arrangement and counted them again. And he kept rearranging and counting them until he decided that, no matter what the arrangement, he was always going to find that there were ten—number is independent of the order of counting.

The problem for me was this: in Piaget's accounts of his subjects, if ten eggs are spread out so they take more space than ten eggcups, a classic non-conserver will maintain that there are more eggs than eggcups, even if he counts and finds that he comes to ten in both cases. Counting is not sufficient to convince him that there are enough egg-cups for all the eggs. How is it, then, that for the mathematician, counting was sufficient? If he was a non-conserver at the time, counting shouldn't have made any difference. If he was a conserver, then he should have known from the start that it would always come out the same.

I think it must be that the whole enterprise was his own wonderful idea. He raised the question for himself, and figured out, for himself, how to try to answer it. In essence, I am saying that he was in a transitional moment, and Stephanie

and Kevin were, too. He was at a point where a certain experience fit into certain thoughts, and he took them a step forward.

I think a powerful pedagogical point can be made from this. These three instances dramatize it, because they deal with children moving ahead with Piaget notions, which are usually difficult to advance with any one experience. The point has two aspects: first, the right question at the right time can move children to peaks in their thinking which result in significant steps forward and real intellectual excitement; and second, although it is almost impossible for an adult to know exactly the right time for a given question for a given child—especially for a teacher who is concerned with thirty or more children—children can raise the right question for themselves when the setting is right. And once the right question is raised, they are moved to tax themselves to the fullest to find an answer. The answers did not come easily in any of these three cases, but the children were prepared to work them through. Having confidence in one's ideas doesn't mean, "I know my ideas are right"; it means, "I am willing to try out my ideas."

As I put together experiences like these and continued to think about them, I started developing some ideas about what education could be, and about the relationships between education and intellectual development.

Hank

It is a truism that all children in their first year or two make incredible intellectual advances. Piaget has documented these advances from his own point of view, but every parent and every psychologist knows this to be the case. One recurring question is why, for such vast numbers of children, does intellectual development slow down so? What happens to children's curiosity and resourcefulness later in their childhood? Why do so few continue to have their own wonderful ideas? I think part of the answer is that intellectual breakthroughs come to be less and less valued. Either they are dismissed as being trivial—as Kevin's or Stephanie's or the mathematician's might have been by some adults. Or else they are discouraged as being unacceptable—like seeing how it feels to wear shoes on the wrong feet (witness *Sesame Street*), or asking questions that are socially embarrassing, or destroying something to see what it's like inside. The effect is to discourage children from exploring their own ideas, and to make them feel that they have no important ideas of their own—only silly or evil ones.

But I think there is at least one other part of the answer, too. Wonderful ideas

cannot spring out of nothing. They build on a foundation of other ideas. The following incident may help to clarify what I mean.

Hank was an energetic and not very scholarly fifth-grader. His class has been learning about electric circuits with flashlight batteries, bulbs, and various wires. After the children had developed considerable familiarity with these materials and what they do, the teacher made a number of mystery boxes. Two wires came from each box, but inside, unseen, each box had a different way of making contact between the wires. In one box the wires were attached to a battery; in another box they were attached to a bulb; in another box they were attached to a certain length of resistance wire; in another box they were not attached at all. By trying to complete the circuit on the outside of a box, the children were able to figure out what made the connection inside the box. Like many other children, Hank attached a battery and a bulb to the wire outside the box. Since the bulb lit, he knew at least that the wires inside the box were connected in some way. But since it was somewhat dimmer than usual, he also knew that the wires inside were not connected directly to each other and that they were not connected by another piece of ordinary copper wire. Along with many other children, he knew that the degree of dimness of this bulb meant that the wires inside were connected either by another bulb of the same kind or by a certain kind of resistance wire.

This was as far as the teacher expected them to be able to go. But in order to push the children to think a little further, she asked them if there was any way to tell whether it was bulb or a piece of wire inside the box. She herself thought there was no way to tell. But after some thought, Hank had an idea. He undid the battery and bulb that he had already attached on the outside of the box. In their place, and using additional copper wire, he attached six batteries in a series. He had already experimented enough to know that six batteries would burn out a bulb, if it was a bulb inside the box. And he knew that once a bulb is burnt out, it no longer keeps the circuit complete. So he then attached the original battery and bulb again. This time he found that the bulb on the outside of the box did not light. So he reasoned, with justice, that there had been a bulb inside the box, and now it was burnt out. If there had been a wire inside, it would not have burned through, and the bulb on the outside would still light.

Note that to carry out that idea, Hank had to take the risk of destroying a light bulb. In fact, he did destroy one. In accepting this idea, the teacher had to accept not only the fact that Hank had a good idea which even she did not have, but also accept that it was worthwhile to destroy a small bit of property for the sake of following through an idea. These features almost turn the incident into a

parable. Without these kinds of acceptance, Hank would not have been able to pursue his idea. Think of how many times this acceptance is not forthcoming in the life of any child.

But the other important point to be made here is that in order to have that wonderful idea, Hank had to know a lot about batteries, bulbs, and wires. A good deal of previous work and familiarity with those materials were a necessary aspect of this occasion.

David Hawkins has said of curriculum development, "You don't want to cover a subject; you want to uncover it." That, it seems to me, is what schools should be about. They can help to uncover parts of the world which children would not otherwise know how to tackle. Wonderful ideas build on other wonderful ideas. They are not had without content. In Piaget's terms, you have to reach out to the world with your own intellectual tools and grasp it, assimilate it, yourself. All kinds of things are hidden from us—even though they surround us—unless we know how to reach out for them. Schools and teachers can provide materials and questions in ways that suggest things to be done with them; and children, in the doing, cannot help being inventive.

There are two aspects to providing occasions for wonderful ideas, then. One is being prepared to accept children's ideas. The other is providing a setting which suggests wonderful ideas to children—different ideas to different children—as they get caught up in intellectual problems that are real to them.

What Schools Can Do

Recently I had the chance to evaluate an elementary school science program. It happened to be in Africa, but for the purposes of this discussion there is nothing special about the African setting. The program might have been anywhere. This program was by no means a deliberate attempt to apply Piaget, as that is usually understood. But it was, to my mind, an application of Piaget in the best sense. The assumptions that lay behind the work would correspond very well with Piaget's views of the nature of learning and intellectual development. In fact, they correspond with the ideas I have just been developing. The program set out to reveal the world to children. They wanted the children to be familiar with the material world—with biological phenomena, physical phenomena, technological phenomena—flashlights, mosquito larvae, clouds, clay. When I speak of familiarity, I mean feeling at home with these things—knowing what to expect of them and what can be done with them; knowing how they react to vari-

ous circumstances; what you like about them and what you don't like about them; how they can be changed, avoided, preserved, destroyed, enhanced.

Certainly the material world is too diverse and too complex for anyone to become familiar with all of it in the course of an elementary school career. So the best one can do is to make such knowledge, such familiarity, seem interesting and accessible to the child. That is, one can familiarize children with a few phenomena in such a way as to catch their interest, to let them raise and answer their own questions, to let them realize that what they can do is significant—so that they have the interest, the ability, and the self-confidence to go on by themselves.

Such a program is a curriculum if you will, but a curriculum with a difference. The difference can best be characterized by saying that the unexpected is valued. Instead of expecting teachers and children to do only what was specified in the booklets, without missing anything, the aim of the program is for children and teachers to have so many unanticipated ideas of their own about what to do with the materials that they never even use the booklets. The point of developing materials at all is to get teachers and children started producing their own ideas and following through on their own, and if possible getting beyond needing anybody else's suggestions. This goal is never likely to be completely realized, of course. But as an ideal it represents the orientation of the program. It is a rather radical view of curriculum development.

It is just as necessary for teachers as for children to feel confidence in their own ideas. It is important for them as people, and also important if they are really going to feel free to acknowledge the children's ideas. If teachers feel that their class must do things just as the book says, and that their excellence as a teacher depends upon that, they cannot possibly accept children's divergence and children's creations. A teacher's guide must give enough indications, enough suggestions, so the teacher has ideas to start with and to pursue in some depth. But it must also enable the teacher to feel free to move in directions of her own when other ideas arise.

For instance, the teachers' guides for this program include many examples of things children are likely to do. The risk is that teachers may see these as things that the children in their classes must do—whether or not the children do them becomes a measure of successful or unsuccessful teaching. Sometimes the writers of the teachers' guides intentionally omit mention of some of the most exciting activities because they almost always happen even when they are not arranged. If the teacher expected them, often they would be forced, and they would no longer happen with the excitement of wonderful ideas. Often the writers include

extreme examples, so extreme that teachers wouldn't really expect them to happen in their own classes. These examples are meant to convey the message that "even if the children do this it's OK! Look, in one class they even did that!" This often seems more fruitful than putting in more common examples, whose message is more likely to be "this is what ought to happen in your class."

The teachers' guides dealt with materials which were readily available in or out of schools, and suggested activities that could be done with these materials so that children became interested in them and started asking their own questions. For instance, there are common substances all around us which provide the essential basis of chemistry knowledge. They interact together in all sorts of interesting ways, accessible to all of us if only we know how to reach out for them. This is a good instance of a part of the world which is waiting to be uncovered. How can it be uncovered for children in a way which gives them an interest in continuing to find out about it, a way which gives them the occasion to take their own initiatives, and to feel at home in this part of the world?

The teachers' guide suggested starting with salt, sugar, cassava starch, alum, lemon juice, and water. Some of these when mixed together cause bubbles. Which combinations cause bubbles? How long does the bubbling last? How can it be kept going longer? What other substances might cause bubbles? If a combination is bubbling, what else could be added that would stop the bubbling? Other things change colour when they are mixed together, and the same sorts of questions can be asked of them.

Written teachers' guides, however, cannot bear the burden alone, where this kind of teaching is totally new. To get this program started, a great deal of teacher education was necessary as well. I will not try to go into any detail, but there seemed to be three major aspects to such teacher education. One is that teachers themselves learn the same way that children in their classes will be learning. Almost any one of the units developed in this program is as effective with adults as with children, so the teachers learn through some of the units themselves, and they can see what it feels like to learn in this way. Another major aspect seems to be working with one or two children at a time, so that teachers can observe children closely enough to realize what is involved for the children. The third major aspect is seeing films or live demonstrations of a class of children, so teachers can start to feel that it really is possible to conduct their class in this way.

There is a fourth aspect of a slightly different nature. Except for the rare teacher who will take this leap entirely on her own, on the basis of a single course and some written teachers' guides, it is important to provide most teachers with the

support of at least some others nearby trying to do the same thing, with whom they can share notes. It is even better when there is somebody experienced whom they can consult when problems arise.

An Evaluation Study

What children do in one of these classrooms may be lively and interesting, but it would be nice to be able to know what difference it makes to them in the long run. I thought it would be important to compare in some way the children who had been in this program with children who hadn't, and to try to show in some standard situation that they now act differently.

I had two thoughts about ways in which these children might be different. The first was based on the following fact: many teachers had told us that when they taught this way, children improved in generating their own ideas of what to do, at raising questions, and at answering their own questions. That is, they improved at having their own ideas and being confident about their own ideas. My first thought, then, was to see whether this was really the case.

My second idea was more ambitious. If these children had really become more intellectually alert, so that their minds were alive and working not only in school but outside school, they might, over a long enough period of time, make significant headway in their operational thinking as compared to other children.

In sum, these two aspects would put to the test my notion that the development of intelligence is a matter of having wonderful ideas and feeling confident enough to try them out; and my idea that schools can have an effect on the continuing development of wonderful ideas. The study has been written up elsewhere, but let me give a summary of it here.¹

The evaluation study had two phases. The procedures for the first phase were inspired in part by a physics examination that was given to students at M.I.T. by Philip Morrison, in which each student was given the same set of materials but was given no specific problem. Instead, the problem was to *find* a problem, and then to work on it. For Professor Morrison the essential task was finding the question, just as it was for Kevin, Stephanie, and the mathematician. In this examination clear differences emerged in the extent of knowledge and inventiveness revealed in the problems the students set themselves, and the work they did was only as good as their problems.

¹For a full report, see Eleanor Duckworth, "A Comparison Study for Evaluating Primary School Science in Africa," African Primary Science Program of Education Development Center, Newton, Mass., October, 1971.

In our evaluation study we had to modify this procedure somewhat to make it appropriate for children as young as six years of age. We wanted to see what children with a year or more of experience in our program would do with materials when they were left on their own, without any teacher at all. We wanted to see whether children who had been in this program in fact had more ideas about what to do with materials than other children.

The materials we chose were not, of course, those which children in the program had spent time studying. We chose materials of two sorts. On the one hand, there were imported materials which none of the children had ever seen before—plastic color filters, geometric pattern blocks, folding mirrors, commercial building sets, for example. On the other hand, we chose some materials that were familiar to all the children whether or not they had been in the program—cigarette foil, match boxes, rubber rings from inner tubes, scraps of wire and wood and metal, empty spools, and so forth.

From each class we chose a dozen children at random, and told them—in their own vernacular—to go into the room and do whatever they wanted with the materials they found there. We told them they could move around the room, talk to each other, and work with their friends. By way of brief—and inadequate—summary of this phase, let me say that we found that the children who had been in the program did indeed have more ideas about how to work with these materials. Typically, the children in these classes would take a first look at what was offered, try a few things, and then settle down to work at something, with involvement and concentration. Children sometimes worked alone and sometimes collaborated. They carried materials from table to table, using them in ways we had not anticipated. As time went on, there was no sign that they were running out of ideas. On the contrary, their work became more and more interesting, so that it was always a disappointment to have to stop them after forty minutes.

By contrast, the other children had a much smaller range of ideas about what to do with the materials. They tended to copy a few leaders and tended to leave one piece of work fairly soon and switch to something else. There were few instances of elaborate work where a child spent much time and effort to overcome difficulties. In some of these classes, after thirty or thirty-five minutes, all the children had run out of ideas and had nothing left to do.

We looked at two things: diversity of ideas in a class, and depth to which the ideas were pursued. The experimental classes were clearly ahead in each of these two dimensions.

Our procedure was actually a substitute for what we would have liked to do. Ideally, we wanted to know whether the experience of these children in the pro-

gram had the effect of making them more alert and aware of the possibilities in ordinary things around them, questioning and exploring, during the time they spent outside school hours. This would have been an intriguing question to try to answer directly, but we did not have the time to tackle it. The procedure which we did develop, as just described, may have been too close to the school setting to give rise to any valid conclusions about the children's activity outside school. But if you can accept with me, tentatively, the thought that our results might indicate a greater intellectual alertness in general—a tendency to have wonderful ideas—then the next phase takes on a considerable interest.

I am hypothesizing that this alertness is the motor of development in operational thinking. No doubt there is a continuum. No child would be without any at all. But some would be far more alert than others. I am also hypothesizing that a child's alertness is not fixed. By opening up to children the many fascinating aspects of the world of ordinary things, and by enabling them to feel that their ideas are worth having and following through, I think that their tendency to have wonderful ideas could be affected in significant ways. This program seemed to be doing both those things, and by the time I went to evaluate, some classes of children had been in it for up to three years. It seemed to me that we might—just might—find that the two or three years of increased alertness which this program had fostered made some difference in their intellectual development.

In the second phase, then, we examined the same children individually, on Piaget-type problems, administered by a trained assistant who spoke the language of the children. A statistical analysis revealed that on five of the six problems we studied, the children in the experimental classes did significantly better than the children in the comparison classes.

I find this to be a pretty stunning result on the whole. It is the only program I know of which even suggests that something happening in schools might make a difference to operational development.

But I want to insist on one particular view of the result. I do not, in any way, want to suggest that the important thing for education to be about is acceleration of Piaget stages. I want to make a theoretical point. My thesis at the outset of this paper was that the development of intelligence is a matter of having wonderful ideas. In other words, it is a creative affair. When children are afforded the occasions to be intellectually creative—by being offered matter to be concerned about intellectually and by having their ideas accepted—then not only do they learn about the world, but their general intellectual ability is stimulated as a happy side effect.

Another way of putting this is that I think the distinction made between

"divergent" and "convergent" thinking is over-simple. Even to think through a problem to its most appropriate end-point (convergent) one must create various hypotheses to check out (divergent). When Hank came up with a closed end-point to the problem, it was the result of a brilliantly imaginative—divergent—thought. We have to conceive of the possibilities before we can check them out.

Conclusion

I am suggesting, in this paper, that children do not have a built-in pace of intellectual development. Or I would be willing to temper that to say that the built-in aspect of the pace is minimal. The having of wonderful ideas, which I am suggesting is the essence of intellectual development, would depend instead to an overwhelming extent on the occasions for having them. I have already dwelt at some length on how important it is to allow children to accept their own ideas, and work them through. I would like now to consider the intellectual basis for new ideas.

I react strongly against the thought that all we need to provide for children is a set of intellectual processes, a dry, contentless set of tools which they can then go about applying. I believe that the tools cannot help but develop, once children have something real to think about. And if they don't have anything real to think about, they won't apply tools anyway. That is, there really is no such thing as a contentless intellectual tool. If you have some knowledge at your disposal then you can try to make sense of new experiences and new information related to it. You fit it into what you have. Let me make it clear that by content I do not mean verbal summaries of somebody else's knowledge. I am not urging a return to textbooks and lectures. I mean a person's own repertoire of thoughts and actions and connections and predictions and feelings. Some of them may have their source in something the child has read or heard. But he has done the work of putting them together for himself, and they give rise to new ways for him to put them together for himself.

The greater the child's repertoire of actions and thoughts—in Piaget's terms, *schemes*—the more matter he has for trying to put things together in his head. The essence of the African program I described is to increase children's repertoires of actions they might carry out on ordinary things, which in turn gives rise to the need to make more intellectual connections.

Let us think of a child who has had the world of common substances opened to him, as I described earlier. He now has a vastly increased repertoire of actions and connections to make. He has seen that when you boil away sea water, a salt

residue remains. Would some residue remain if he boiled away beer? If he dissolved this residue in water again, would he have beer again—flat beer? He has seen that he can get a colored liquid from flower petals if he crushes them. Could he get that liquid to dissolve in water and make colored water? Could he make colored coconut oil this way? All these questions and the actions they prompt are based on familiarity he has gained with the possibilities contained in the world of common substances.

I think intelligence cannot develop without content. Making new connections depends on knowing enough about something in the first place to be able to think of other things to do, of other questions to ask, which demand the more complex connections in order to make sense of it all. The more ideas a person already has at his disposal, the more new ideas occur, and the more he can coordinate to build up still more complicated schemes.

Piaget has speculated that some people may reach the level of formal operations in some specific area which they know well—auto mechanics, for example—without reaching the formal level in other areas. That fits into what I am trying to say. In an area you know well, you can think of many possibilities, and working them through often makes demands of a formal nature. If there is no area in which you are familiar enough with the phenomena to have to make sense of complex relationships, then you are not likely to have to develop formal operations. Knowing enough about things is one prerequisite for wonderful ideas.

And one closing remark. The wonderful ideas I am referring to need not necessarily look wonderful to the outside world. I think there is no difference in kind between wonderful ideas which many other people have already had, and wonderful ideas which nobody has happened upon before. That is, the nature of creative intellectual acts remains the same, whether it is an infant who for the first time makes the connection between seeing things and reaching for them, or Kevin who had the idea of putting straws in order of their length, or a cook who conceives of a new combination of herbs, or an astronomer who develops a new theory of the creation of the universe. In each case, it is a matter of making new connections between things already mastered.

The more we can help children to have their own wonderful ideas, and feel good about themselves for having them, the more likely it is that they will some day happen upon ideas that nobody also has happened upon before.

*Learning, Teaching, and Television Production for Children: The Experience of Sesame Street**

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The author discusses how educational goals are translated into the actual television programming of Sesame Street. Dr. Lesser serves as chairman of the National Board of Advisors to the Children's Television Workshop, which produces Sesame Street. He reflects here on the experience of researchers and television producers working together to develop television for children on the basis of knowledge (and hunches) about how children learn.

Sesame Street is an experiment joining the technical capabilities of television with some premises about children's learning. The experimentation extends not only to the television product itself but to the production process as well, which has allowed academics, teachers, creative artists, and television producers to reflect

* Adapted from the forthcoming book, *Children and Television: Lessons from Sesame Street*, by Gerald S. Lesser. Copyright © by Random House, Inc. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

This paper discusses some informal ideas about learning and teaching and certain suggested strategies of television production for children. The ideas about learning and teaching have been available for some time, but the observations of children responding to various forms of television production are new. They are the property of my colleagues at the Children's Television Workshop: Edward L. Palmer, Samuel Y. Gibbon, Barbara Reeves, David Connell, Patricia Hayes, Joan Ganz Cooney, Jon Stone, James Henson, Jeff Moss, Joe Raposo, Vivian Horner, Norton Wright, Joan Lufrano, Sharon Lerner, Barbara Fowles, Joyce Weil, and others.

In addition, Maurice Sendak, the children's author and illustrator, has contributed to the Children's Television Workshop's projects since their inception. During our early planning sessions, Maurice periodically slipped into states of reverie, producing the illustrations used throughout this paper. I am most grateful for his permission to use them here.

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upon and reshape their own assumptions in dialogue with each other. This essay discusses one aspect of our experiences: the translation of educational goals and ideas about learning and teaching into actual television programming.

Defining Educational Goals for Television Production

Sesame Street has sought to provide a supplementary educational experience to help prepare children for school by stimulating their appetite for learning. Its specific goals include instruction in (1) symbolic representation—letters, numbers, and geometric forms; (2) cognitive process—perceptual discrimination, relationships, classification, and ordering; (3) reasoning and problem-solving; and (4) “the child and his world”—concepts regarding the self, social units, social interaction, and the man-made and natural environment.

How a child develops a view of him or herself as competent and effective remains a profound mystery. Surely the process does not proceed in a neat succession of discrete steps, but there must be important effects upon a child’s self-concept when he acquires certain elementary symbolic skills (letters, numbers, the names of geometric forms), exhibits them in the presence of someone who cares about him, and receives attention and admiration. The child then knows that he is capable of learning something worth knowing, and thus acquires a sense of competence that motivates further learning.

Our emphasis on cognitive skills was based upon a series of important premises which also guided our work as we translated goals into television programming. Because television reaches a mass, national audience, we had to aim to teach only certain universal goals that we hoped all children would achieve. We assumed that all children would learn to read and to write, for example, but we did not expect each child to play the violin or to become an architect or a poet, these being particular goals defined by the individual child’s aptitudes, interests, and experiences.

We assumed that television is a special and limited kind of educational medium, that it is unable to provide sequenced instruction, that it needs to be entertaining as well as educational, and that television does not control the behavior of either parents or children in the viewing audience as a classroom teacher might. All of this led us to the premise that television can serve only as one additional alternative to supplement other forms of early experience, that its curriculum cannot cover the full range of preschool objectives. Television must never be designed to replace or compete with other educational experiences. It can only aspire to complement whatever else the child has available.

Our decision to establish preparation for school as a goal of *Sesame Street* did not presuppose an uncritical attitude toward the schools. Nonetheless, preparation for schooling seemed a plausible goal. We were aware that the parents of inner-city children, toward whom our efforts were primarily directed, want their children to be competent in reading, writing, and arithmetic, even though many of them perceive that schools do not function to their children's benefit. Perhaps it is not always best to give people what they say they want—but knowing what they want is not a bad place to start if you intend to help.

In our attention to inner-city children, we rejected the "deficit" model of what these children need. Our contrasting premise was simply to give children what they could use in order to cope with and improve their own environments.

Arriving at these relatively general goals and writing a curriculum statement defining our specific education objectives was a long, collaborative process. The Children's Television Workshop brought together both academics and non-academics, creators of ideas and materials as well as critics, professionals with confidence in the schools and persons who believed schools too corrupt to reform, professionals who approached their work intuitively and those who depended upon explicit, analytic problem-solving approaches, professionals whose disciplines contained a specialized vocabulary and those without any special professional language. At the seminars in which the premises and goals of *Sesame Street* were hammered out, these differences produced diverse suggestions for educational goals, but also led to repeated conflicts.

Early in our discussions we did not allow ourselves to be constrained by what the production staff thought feasible in the production of a show. But as we came to setting priorities this became a primary concern. The creative producers and writers reminded us that our task was the concrete and practical one of constructing a set of educational goals that could be understood clearly and converted into actual television programming. They were especially insistent when other seminar participants used esoteric jargon. On these occasions, the staff resembled a Greek chorus, intoning repeatedly, "What do you mean by that? What do you mean by that?"

We had made a fundamental decision to do our best to meld production and research activities into a single force directed towards continuous program improvement. Still, there was skepticism. As production and research began to search for ways to collaborate, writers and producers expressed some doubt that it could be done; perhaps there were some very good reasons why it had nev-

er been done before. David Connell, Vice President of the Children's Television Workshop and its executive producer, described his early skepticism:

My background was in commercial television where we felt we had developed a pretty good set of instincts about what kind of show would appeal to children of any given age. I frankly was skeptical about the idea of researching every moment of a television show, and certainly of being told how to design it. There was the risk of intellectualizing the material to death and ending up with a program most notable for its monumental boredom. It would be like trying to analyze the elements of a joke, only to find that when we had isolated all the pieces, there was nothing learned and nothing to laugh about. But if *Sesame Street* was an experiment—and it very definitely continues to be one—this notion of broadcaster/researcher cooperation was the most bold experiment within it. I kept thinking of the biologists who crossbred a crocodile with an abalone in hopes of getting an abadile. Only something went wrong and they ended up with a crocoblone. Nothing quite like this had ever been attempted before. (Connell and Palmer, 1970, p. 3)

As the project progressed, both the researchers and producers learned a great deal about how to be useful to each other. The researchers not only learned to make useful observations about what worked or did not work with children but also how to convey this information to the producers. The producers learned how to absorb and use this information and how to ask reasonable questions of the research staff.

Early on, the researchers took the producers' question "What do you mean?" very seriously. What did we mean by "symbolic representation" and "cognitive process"? Statements of goals were clarified in terms of behavioral objectives for the child. What would the child actually be able to do, what behavior would an observer see, if the child had mastered a particular skill? For example, one of the limited number of social goals we selected was the ability to take another person's point of view—to understand that another person may see and feel things differently from the way you do, and then to be able to imagine yourself in that person's place. Although some estimates in the psychological literature suggest that taking another person's physical or social perspective is an advanced skill that, roughly speaking, cannot be acquired before age seven, we decided to experiment with it for several reasons: it seemed especially suitable to treatment through a visual medium; its importance for school preparation could be defended; and it appeared to be a general skill that could help a child to acquire other specific skills and information. The behavioral objectives for this goal were described as follows:

Social interactions: Differences in perspective. The child recognizes that a single event may

be seen and interpreted differently by different individuals. Ex.: given a picture showing one boy in a bathing suit and another boy in a snowsuit, the child can express the feelings of both boys in the event of snow.

To further clarify the meaning of this goal for the producers and writers, some general teaching strategies also were proposed:

(1) Start with the child's point of view and then present the opposing point of view in juxtaposition with his; (2) have the child pretend he is someone whose point of view is obviously different from his own; (3) start with a two-person situation where one person is totally oblivious to another's point of view and develop a need for communication; (4) keep the situation constant and have several characters enter, in turn, and react differently in the same situation. (Reeves, 1970, p. 4)

Even with the behavioral objectives and illustrative teaching strategies, the goal statements still did not specify at which levels the producers should begin. The producers and writers obviously needed some indication of the initial level of competence of their potential audience and how high these children might be expected to reach. Occasional normative data are scattered throughout the educational and psychological literature, but estimates of initial competence in most of our goal areas were not available, particularly for urban disadvantaged children, and therefore they had to be collected by the Children's Television Workshop research staff (Reeves, 1970). These data gave the producers rough estimates of the levels of skills they should aim to present.

The research staff made another resource available to the producers and writers, the Writer's Manual. This Manual suggests an array of situations familiar to young children in which each goal could be played out, along with specific teaching strategies that might be used in those situations. Without expecting that all or even many of the ideas in the Manual eventually would be used by the producers, the researchers prepared it to serve as another bridge between statement of goals and script development.

Thus, script writing was tied to goals and priorities, the translations of these goals into behavioral terms, the data on competence levels in different goal areas, and the suggestions for familiar situations and teaching strategies contained in the Writer's Manual.

The instincts of the creative staff and the early observations of children by the researchers suggested some guiding principles for television production. These principles were continually modified as the program developed and can be understood retrospectively as the scaffolding on which *Sesame Street* was erected. The fol-

Following sections discuss our assumptions and observations, some deeply felt, others hesitantly advanced—some carefully researched, others spontaneously developed. All of them concern how to teach through television, and how children can use television to learn.

Some Assumptions about Children's Learning

Some children can view television for hours with their eyes rarely leaving the set. We were so struck by this viewing style . . . that we coined the term 'zombie viewer' to refer to the child that sat seemingly hypnotized, in front of the set. Other children constantly keep a check on all outside activities in the room while they view. We found these styles to be no guarantee of how much the child was absorbing from the program. (Reeves, 1970, p. 11)

Styles of television viewing differ so much among children that no single program should be expected to teach all children with equal impact. We probably never will understand precisely what goes on in the minds of young children when they watch television, but variations in overt viewing styles began to appear early in the researchers' observations. These different overt styles, however, do not seem to relate closely to how much a child will learn; each style can be effective or ineffective, depending on how the child uses it.

One viewing pattern, in which children seem able to watch television while simultaneously keeping track of other interesting events around them, has been described as "dual attention" in other psychological research (e.g. Maccoby, 1967, 1969; Maccoby and Konrad, 1967; White, Watts *et al.*, 1972) and seems to characterize competent young children. What may appear to be distractibility in the child may in fact be a constant alertness and monitoring of many events. Of course, in other children what appears to be distractibility is just that. Similarly, "zombie viewing" may reflect either intense concentration or stupor.

In addition to "zombie" and "dual attention" patterns, another common viewing style displays overt, active physical and verbal participation in the televised action. Certain children sing or talk along with (or even talk at) the televised characters, reply to questions directed toward the children on the program or toward the viewing audience, yelp or tremble in mock fright at monsters or cliff-hanging sequences, offer delighted or disdainful comments on what they see, and generally respond with a high level of both physical and verbal activity. Although active participation is encouraged through numerous programming devices, we do not yet know how it facilitates or inhibits learning. It does ensure



the child's orientation to the set, interrupts a period of physical passivity, and reflects active rehearsal by the child. On the other hand, participation can become so compelling or engrossing in itself that some children seem carried away by their own activity, losing contact with the material that initiated their participation in the first place. How this viewing style relates to the effectiveness of learning also remains to be established.

Some people work hard at odious tasks because they have acquired an exotic taste for doing so. But most children probably learn best what they want to learn. Thus the fact that television is a nonpunitive medium becomes important. Children have nothing to fear when tuning in, no threat of humiliation, no possibility of disappointing others' expectations for them. If they do find television threatening or simply uninteresting, they can tune it out, literally and mentally. This principle of personal initiative in television viewing, allowing children to control the direction of their own attention, seems crucial to children's learning, but it is in sharp contrast to our hardy belief that children never do what is good for them unless they are forced to. Since we always have seen entertainment (acceptable when it is momentary relaxation earned by diligent work, but not really good for you) as competing with education (which is good for you, but is earnest and hard), we have little experience in combining them to reinforce each other. In discussing production techniques, we shall return to the idea that entertainment and education need not be "either-or" alternatives.

Modeling

We presently do not understand the exact mechanisms by which "observational

learning" or "modeling" occurs. We do know that simply watching others—without any direct reinforcement for learning—can teach a child a wide variety of both socially desirable behaviors (e.g., Bandura, Grusec, and Menlove, 1967; Bandura and Menlove, 1968; Bryan and London, 1970; Bryan and Schwartz, 1971; Bryan and Walbek, 1970; Rosenhan and White, 1967) and socially undesirable behaviors (e.g., Bandura, 1969; Berkowitz, 1962; Bryan and Schwartz, 1971; Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and Social Behavior, 1972).

Our early observations of children watching television contained innumerable instances of specific modeling. It became obvious that children frequently imitate the physical motions of televised characters. When *Sesame Street* cast members count on their fingers or use their fingers or other parts of the body to shape letters or forms, many children copy them. In particular, one device used on *Sesame Street* has evoked a remarkable amount of physical imitation: all the viewer sees on the screen is a hand trying in various ways to make a noise. As the hand tries snapping its fingers and making other movements, children often imitate these actions. When the hand delightedly discovers that, with the cooperation of the other hand, it can make a clapping sound, the hands of young viewers tend to share in this gratifying experience. Giggling, washing, scratching, hopping, rubbing, and various comical actions also evoke considerable imitation. If a character on television does something absurd, such as stepping in a bucket, children will get up and pretend to walk around with buckets on their feet, too.

Modeling, of course, extends far beyond simple physical imitation. Modeling of effective verbal communication has been a guiding principle behind many writing and production methods. Whenever possible in the production of the show, attempts are made to demonstrate models of constructive communication among the live characters, both adults and children. For example, televised children are shown asking questions as a way of acquiring information, talking together until they solve a problem, or simply enjoying the feel and the sound of words. Since modeling effects are strengthened through children's identification with the character they are watching, we decided to introduce varieties of speech forms on the program, including some spoken dialect and a considerable amount of informal "street" language. Several forms of Spanish speech and culture also are presented. In order to enhance their identification and to contribute to their self-concepts, viewers are implicitly assured that their speech patterns are recognized and accepted. Children are also encouraged to accept speech forms different from their own.

Observational learning does not demand direct teaching to be effective. Simply displaying activities that convey an implicit or underlying attitude also can produce effective modeling. In this way, altruism, kindness, courage, and tolerance can be communicated indirectly through the actions of the televised characters, without explicit labeling. The discovery of writing and production methods that will convey these attitudes effectively to young children has only just begun, but the principle of modeling provides another powerful base for writing and production efforts. It is conveyed succinctly by the young Black child who exclaimed while watching *Sesame Street*, "Look! He's Black like me and he knows the right answers!"

Narrow-focusing

In communicating a message to a young child, the less "noise" masking the message, the better (Reeves, 1970). In many learning situations, preschool children will have difficulty discriminating what is essential or relevant from what is incidental or irrelevant to the specified goal, and this certainly is true when they respond to film or television. Young children are readily distracted from the central content of a program and often respond to peripheral details. As children get older, they become more capable of attending selectively to those features that have the greatest potential utility (Collins, 1970; Stevenson, 1971). In a confused situation, older children can more easily pick out what matters and ignore what does not, an extremely important skill identified as "distinctive feature learning" (e.g. Pick and Pick, 1970). Since we know that young children have difficulty making such discriminations and attending selectively, special care must be given to make salient what the child is expected to learn. For young children, television's special capacity (Deutschmann, Barrow, and McMillan, 1961) to isolate and highlight the central concept must be exploited, and this becomes an important principle behind many writing and production techniques.

Television can be designed to screen out irrelevancies, reducing the extraneous material, either visual or auditory, that confuses the child and causes him to lose interest. For example, "The Triangle and the Square" presents two animated geometric forms against a solid background. To a musical accompaniment, they each demonstrate what they can do and how they differ from each other. The episode is deliberately bare of irrelevant or peripheral detail.

Total stripping of irrelevance from the material to be learned must be handled judiciously, because several risks are involved. At times, children seem to

learn most from what are considered irrelevancies by adults. One man's irrelevancy may be another's primary source of learning, and this especially may be true when an adult decides what will be trivial to a child. Second, total stripping may render the material so bare and unembellished as to be simply uninteresting. When a televised episode is repeated, children will seek new aspects and meanings and sufficient embellishment is necessary to supply these new meanings. Third, if an entertaining way cannot be found to teach the central content without adding a nonessential but amusing feature to hold the child's attention, the risk of adding this peripheral element may be worth taking. Then the writing and production problem is to tie this non-essential feature to the central content, or, at worst, to keep the peripheral content from totally distracting the child from the content to be learned. Whatever the risks, however, television can provide for the young child a narrow, precise focus on central content, carefully eliminating irrelevancies and distractions. This provides another useful principle for children's television production.

Learning from Format as well as Content

Every communication medium has its conventions. Starting with the simple understanding that books written in English are read left to right, with lines read in descending order, many more subtle conventions affect the ways in which books are written and read. Television's conventions seem to have evolved without deliberate design, but operate strongly to expedite a viewer's understanding. Certain conventions have become so conventional that their triteness no longer expedites but instead intrudes upon the viewer's attention; swelling music, dramatic pauses, fade-outs and zoom-ins, and freeze-frames now elicit groans from adolescents who have grown up on television and regard these conventions as unimaginative and archaic.

But format cues can provide important prompting devices to facilitate learning. For example, in *Sesame Street's* first year, speech balloons were introduced in ten-second segments to teach letter names; soon viewers learned that the appearance of the balloon itself was a signal to the learning of letters. During *Sesame Street's* second year, we decided to expand the reasoning and problem-solving curriculum to teach children that their minds can perform several essential functions for them, including pretesting alternative solutions to problems imaginably before acting, planning a sequence of steps to solve a problem, guessing intelligently from progressively-revealed clues, etc. We adopted another convention to signify

the mind at work, in which the televised thoughts appeared above the character's head, signalling the viewer that the character was thinking and working through a problem in his mind before acting.

The educational uses of other common television conventions remain to be exploited. Can zoom-in techniques teach a child who has difficulty in discriminating salient cues to attend more selectively? Can the format in which a speech balloon appears above a character's head to display his thoughts be used to teach children the value of mental mediation in solving problems? Can slow-motion techniques help an impulsive child to develop a more reflective mental pace? Split-screens can visually juxtapose two or more events that actually are distant from each other; can the technique teach the child to juxtapose objects or events in his or her own mind? We are familiar with the use of television-format conventions to supply a setting for learning (e.g. the consistent use of a song or a particular visual display) but we have not experimented yet with their possible effects on a child's mental operations. Will the visual representations of television foster corresponding mental representations in the child? It seems overly simplified to expect such direct effects upon a child's thinking, but, given the importance assigned to the development of mental representations (or Piaget's "schemata"), it probably is worth finding out how the visual and mental representations connect.

In contrast to these positive cases, format clues, including music, can be distracting and interfere with learning. For example, a child may concentrate on the music or on the quality of a voice and miss what the speaker is saying. In evaluating the appeal of stories read on television, Lauren Bacall's voice "sounded funny" to many children and they concentrated on this voice quality instead of the story itself. These children may have been engaging in significant incidental learning about variations in vocal patterns, but their attention had been diverted from the intended focus.

Visual and auditory formats can provide valuable vehicles to facilitate the learning of content. The "either-or" form of argument should be avoided. We do not ask if a child learns more effectively from format or content; instead, we seek to discover how format and content can be melded into the most effective combination.

Cross-modal Reinforcement

Another of the perennial "either-or" arguments in which researchers have entangled themselves is "Which works better, words or pictures?" They have not

solved this one either (Lumsdaine, 1963; Yamamoto, 1969). The search continues, however, based on theories that human information-processing is characterized by low capacity and a single-channel transmission system (e.g. Broadbent, 1958; Travers, 1964, 1970), suggesting that there is no advantage to supplying redundant information through more than one sensory modality and thus flooding the learner with more information than he can handle. According to these views of information-processing, messages fed simultaneously through two modalities will tend to interfere with each other. Although there are rare occasions when television will present either pictures or sounds, one without the other, its special capacity is in their coordinated combination. For instance, in a segment designed to teach letter discrimination, Big Bird, an eight-foot-tall feathered puppet who tends to be confused easily, is shown painstakingly drawing an E and an F side-by-side on a blackboard. Viewing children attend to Big Bird's efforts until the letters are completed (they are alert to Big Bird's tendency to make mistakes, which they enjoy correcting); then their interest fades. Soon, however, while Big Bird watches in befuddlement, the bottom line of the E migrates mysteriously to the neighboring F, making an E of the F and an F of the original E. As the bottom line of the E begins its magical move, a slide-whistle sound accompanies its jerky progress.

In this example, the principle of synchronizing sight and sound to provide cross-modal reinforcement instead of interference is clear. Carrying the principle into actual writing and production required that we learn how one modality can be used to support another, instead of cancelling out or interfering with the other. Since most existing research asks how the different modalities compare when considered singly, much remains to be learned.

Some Assumptions about Teaching

We always have regarded entertainment and education as competing for a child's attention. We view entertainment as frivolous; too much entertainment produces flabbiness and decadence. Education is seen as serious and earnest, but awfully good for you if you have the strength of character to persist in tedious, hard work; not only does education teach but it builds character by forcing children to work at what is not, and should not be, much fun. Entertainment can only contaminate education, robbing children of the opportunity to learn how to do things that they really do not want to do. And doing things that you do not want to do is what life is really about, isn't it? How will a child learn, after all, to accept the confinement of a job and other responsibilities if we do not start early

to teach him to accept tedium? In this view, making education exciting or entertaining is a disservice to the higher purpose of producing disciplined character. To use entertainment in the service of education is tantamount to coddling.



1 Minute of Educational T.V.!

Since we have been maintaining this lunatic view for some time, it is not surprising that we do not understand how to combine entertainment and education to the mutual benefit of each. We have begun to recognize that they need not be incompatible but have not pursued or found ways to make them compatible. We perhaps acknowledge that entertainment need not be empty of educational value and that education need not be unentertaining. What we now need to discover is how to make entertainment instrumental to learning and how to frame a child's learning experiences so that they contain the excitement and joy that he or she has experienced only while not being "educated."

Television Tutelage

Teachers always have known that new learning is expedited by starting from a base of objects and experiences that are familiar to the child and then building and extending into new and unfamiliar material. Several examples of using the familiar as a bridge to the unfamiliar are provided by our televised episodes on letter recognition, in which similarities are illustrated visually between the letter forms and the shapes of familiar real objects. At the start of one animated

film, two boys are invited by an unseen narrator to watch a story about the letter "J." As a large, upper case "J" descends between them, one of the boys remarks that the "J" looks like a fishhook. The voice of the narrator intones, "It's not a fishhook, it's a J." This is followed by a rhythmic sequence in which the letter is used as part of a short story filled with "J" sounds and with words beginning with "J." At the end of the story, the second boy says, "So that's the letter J." The first boy replies, "It still looks like a fishhook to me." Similar analogies are developed between other letters and familiar shapes. "Y," for example, has on different occasions been compared visually with a fork in a road and a branching trunk of a tree.

Another example of a bridge from the familiar to the unfamiliar is the search for letter forms embedded in the child's real environment. In one *Sesame Street* segment, a puppet finds the letter "E" repeated in the structure of a door, and in another, "T" is discovered embedded in the railing around the basement windows of an apartment house. When such embedded letters are found, a cutout letter is latched to the embedded letter to confirm the presence of the embedded form for the child who may not have seen it. This search for embedded letters not only teaches letter recognition but also provides practice in another essential cognitive skill, distinguishing between figure and ground by isolating relevant characteristics. In all these instances, the child's familiarity with his or her real environment is used as a base upon which new and unfamiliar concepts are introduced.

Only a small part of what children learn is taught to them directly. The importance of informal learning opportunities in undirected play is beyond dispute. On television, direct teaching might be expressed by both telling and showing the children what you intend to teach them, then teaching them again what you have shown it to them, and finally by telling them and showing them again what you have taught them. Many television commercials use this direct approach: here is the product, here is what it does better than any other product, buy it (please).

In contrast, most of television's messages are covert and indirect; the message is illustrated in action but not taught directly. On commercial television's family-situation comedies, father is bumbling and helpless, but lovable—doubly so if he happens to be a professor. We are not told this in words but we watch him constantly bumble. On game shows, women are greedy, grasping, and hysterical with gratitude when receiving a refrigerator or dishwasher for nothing. On soap operas, only bad people have sexual impulses; good peoples' sex is apologetic and engaged

in solely for purposes of reproduction. Good children are respectful and reverent, dogs are heroic and loyal, fish are clever (dolphins) or vicious (sharks). The stereotypes abound, but are communicated indirectly through action.

Indirect teaching on television indeed can be extremely effective. Recall the long list of behaviors that children can learn by modeling the behavior of others without any direct reinforcement, deliberate teaching, or overt practice, ranging from self-sacrifice to aggression and back to altruism. *Sesame Street* uses direct methods to teach basic intellectual skills, but adopts indirect teaching methods to display certain social attitudes, such as people treating each other with kindness and courtesy, respect for racial differences, taking another person's point of view, modes of conflict resolution, and accepting rules of justice and fair play. Indeed, almost all the aspects of social development that *Sesame Street* experiments with are approached in this way. We decided to employ the full range of direct and indirect teaching methods on television, trying to discover how to fit the approach to what we were trying to teach.

Showing the World

One of television's great powers is its capacity to transport, to show the world to children—to display people, events, and ideas that they have never encountered before and are unlikely ever to have the opportunity to confront in person. Granting this capacity to transport, difficult choices still remain: What parts of the world, and what events and experiences? If a child lives in a city ghetto, what do we gain in using television to depict its harsh realities? What does the child gain if, instead, we show the brighter and gentler, indeed, the sweeter side of how things are and what they could be? In our early planning of *Sesame Street*, we tried to keep the full range of options open on these questions, but as we went along our drift toward the sweeter side of life emerged. We knew that if we persisted in this drift, we would be criticized for sugar-coating and distorting the unpleasant realities, and for abdicating the responsibility to show conditions that children must learn to change rather than tolerate passively. Our judgment, however, was that *Sesame Street* should not add more stridency and bitterness to the harshness already present in the child's environment. The drift continued toward showing the warmth and kindness that might exist. With all its raucousness and slapstick humor, *Sesame Street* became a sweet show and its staff maintains that there is nothing wrong in that.

The issue of showing the world as it is or as it might be centers on how to depict the difficulties of urban living. *Sesame Street* has taken children visually to

an automobile assembly plant, a fishing ship, the back of a bakery, an African play area for children, a farm, a junkyard, several zoos, down a mail chute, and to several other places that they could not visit on their own. One such trip is a bus ride around town, showing what the driver does and how the passengers handle things. Now, we all know that a bus driver often is not society's best example of someone who is kind and courteous. But on *Sesame Street's* bus trip, the driver responds to his passengers' hellos and thank yous, tells a child who can not locate his money, "That's all right, you can pay me tomorrow," and, when seeing a young woman running after his bus just as it has left the curb, actually stops to let her on. Why present to gullible little children such an outrageous misrepresentation of the realities of a city transportation system?

Here are two extreme options: (1) display how people can and even sometimes do act with decency toward each other, or (2) display common uncivil and inconsiderate behaviors so that children will recognize these occasions and be prepared to cope with them more effectively. Although we did decide to include on *Sesame Street* some incidents of conflict among people in order to display possible forms of conflict resolution (the curriculum contains a major section on "conflict resolution"), our basic position was to show the child what the world is like when people treat each other with decency and kindness and altruism—faith—supported by some evidence on the modeling of kindness and altruism—was that young children will learn such attitudes if we take the trouble to show them some examples, even if we stretch familiar reality a bit in order to do so. The harsh realities of a child's world surely are out there. We lose credibility to the child if we ignore them entirely and no effort to teach can afford this. But, even at the risk of sugar-coating these realities, perhaps we can suggest a vision of better things.

While modeling positive behaviors seems worthwhile, preaching on television does not. We have qualms about directly lecturing children on how they should conduct themselves. Many of us still believe we know what is right for others, especially for children, but we are not quite so sure any more and we have begun to wonder about the justice of preventing children from struggling through to reach their own conclusions about virtue and morality. Even without these general reservations about preaching, we know that preaching on television, in particular, simply does not work. Maybe preaching demands a captive audience and television's audience exercises free choice. Maybe the difference between preaching and what people have come to expect from television is too great. In designing *Sesame Street*, we never did consider preaching to children but we did give

considerable thought to the various forms that preaching on television has taken, in order to avoid slipping into them. Others before us had done so. Our assumption about teaching by television was that children abhor preaching and that our first inadvertent excursion into it would be the last time that many children would watch the program.



For some reason, when adults on television speak to children, their voices often assume a strange "talking to children" quality. Although we have no evidence of how children perceive the "voice talking down," its unctuousness seems inescapable and as belittling as any other continuous, undeserved punishment.

Equally unctuous is the common practice on children's television of trivializing or reducing a topic in the misguided effort to present it at the child's level of understanding. It is often quite necessary to simplify material for children, extracting the essence of the message and presenting it without distracting irrelevancies. But simplifying and trivializing are not synonymous, and children probably know the difference when they see it.

Production Techniques

Many of these ideas about learning and teaching are incorporated in the writing methods and production techniques used on *Sesame Street*. Several principles converge in pointing to the importance of catching, directing, and holding the

child's attention and of providing extensive and varied opportunities for active mental rehearsal.



Catching Children's Attention

Given the child's natural motivation to explore, finding ways to elicit his attention should be less difficult than finding ways to direct and sustain it. This should



Training the child to attend (focusing on the problem and on data collection skills)

be especially true with television viewing, since most children apparently have a natural attraction to the medium. But when a child turns on the television set, he usually has many programs from which to choose, some worthy of his attention and some unworthy. What does it take to get the child to watch an "educational" program instead of something else?

Children are accustomed to watching television that is expensively produced, with high quality in visual appearance and form if not in content. The primary exceptions are the inexpensive, locally-produced children's shows (Bozo the Clown, Romper Room, and many others) and the "instructional television" programs that are created locally for in-school use. Neither example of inexpensive production seems to elicit much attention from children; the programs simply do not resemble the expensive look of the television that is most familiar to them. Indeed, instructional television produced for school use (showing teachers lecturing in front of blackboards and science instructors demonstrating experiments from behind laboratory tables) is not regarded by some children as "television" at all.

Recall that commercial advertisements use animation, appealing music, and other sound effects, all designed to get the viewer's attention quickly and to hold it tightly for the commercial's short duration. The situation comedies that the child knows so well use skillful professional actors, attractive and realistic settings, and a variety of camera techniques to hold attention. Science fiction shows are full of visual gimmicks, often slickly contrived and convincing in appearance. The young viewer's attention will not be diverted to an educational program by the program's good intentions. The show must compete for his attention with others that spend large amounts of money on professional, high quality production.

Music and sound effects seem to play an especially important role in eliciting children's attention. Music in films and television often is referred to as "background," and perhaps for adults its primary function is to provide accompaniment to action and dialogue. But for children it plays more essential roles.

Music's most obvious function on television is to regain a child's lost attention by signaling the entrance of a familiar, appealing character or episode. In viewing television, young children tend to drift in and out of visual attention. As this happens, the "dual attention" abilities of most young children allow them to listen without quite listening, even when they are not actively watching. Auditory cues, usually in the form of music or sound effects, then signal them that an uninteresting sequence has ended and that a new character or episode, recognized by a consistent musical signature, has begun.

Equally obvious is music's function as an aid to memory in learning material in sequence. Almost any child can more easily sing the alphabet than recite it, and the learning of other sequenced materials, such as counting or recalling the order of the days of the week and months of the year, seems easier for young children when put in rhythmic and musical form.

Music and sound effects also provide a direct means of teaching basic skills. For example, the *Sesame Street* curriculum suggests teaching "auditory discrimination" skills, one sub-category being "sound identification: the child can associate sounds with familiar objects or animals, e.g., car horn, wood saw, moo of a cow, etc." Here sound effects can provide one direct teaching device, as in the following episode. One puppet character, dressed in hat and overcoat, comes to the door of another puppet's house asking if he may use the telephone to call an auto repair shop for help. The puppet making the request looks and acts perfectly normal and explains that when he stopped his car to wait for a train to go by, his car stalled and he was unable to get it started again. As he talks, however, he displays one unusual characteristic—whenever he arrives in his narrative at a key phrase (e.g. car driving, train going by, car stalling) he delivers this part of his message in the sound effect representing what he is describing. His story involves a baby crying, a cow mooing, and other distinctive sounds, all of this delivered with accompanying sound effects as the other puppet listens in increasing amazement. When the other puppet then tries to repeat the message to see if he has heard it correctly, he finds to his own surprise that he also speaks in the same sound effects.

The use of sound effects in direct teaching can also be more subtle. An example is provided by one of our efforts to communicate a basic reasoning and problem-solving skill. Instead of prompting children to act upon the first problem solution that occurs to them, we wanted to show them that they could try out different possible solutions, pretesting them in their minds before choosing one to act upon. In one episode, a puppet (Ernie) approaches another (Bert) to ask his advice on where to place a large vase. Ernie has to decide among several different-sized shelves, only the largest shelf being sufficient to accommodate it. Bert, distracted from reading his newspaper, tells Ernie to "figure it out for yourself." Ernie then imagines what would happen if he were to place the vase on the small shelf. We see no action; all we see is Ernie's face as he thinks about possible consequences. But as we watch Ernie thinking we hear the vase falling (a slide-whistle sound effect), breaking (crashing sound effect), and Ernie's ejection from the house (Bert's angry voice, door slamming). Having pretested this option imagi-

nally and rejected it, Ernie then imagines the likely consequences of placing the vase on the shelf of correct size; sound effects again play out the placing of the vase, exaggerated congratulatory voices, a trumpet signaling success, and finally a magnificent fanfare. Having imagined the consequences of this option, Ernie proceeds to act it out, successfully, in reality.

One reason for music's great impact on young children is its capacity to evoke physical participation. Variations in musical style evoke different forms of participation. Simple melodies tend to induce rocking and swaying in young viewers. The bouncier the tune, the more intense the physical reactions. With some songs the child almost seems compelled to "get up and dance." The more the child knows the words to a song, however, the greater the verbal as well as physical response. Thus, a song with a bouncy melody might at first induce dancing; then, as the child becomes more familiar with it, he is more likely to rock back and forth in his chair while singing along.

There is one essential condition that must accompany the use of music. A child's attention will be lost if the music is associated with static visual material. To be effective, music and sound effects must be integrated carefully with movement in the program's visual content. If the visual elements are static (e.g., a seated orchestra playing, a stationary folk-singer accompanying himself on his guitar), the music—no matter how appealing in itself—will not attract or hold the child's attention. A static visual presentation apparently stymies physical participation and violates a child's expectation that televised visual action will accompany what he hears. Whatever the reasons for the failure to respond to music unaccompanied by visual action, the principle of synchronizing sight and sound to provide cross-modal reinforcement is once again apparent.

Another factor in eliciting children's attention is the use of repetition. It is impossible to produce television material that is always new and unfamiliar to all children, and our child-watching suggests that children would not like such material very much even if it could be produced. The reappearance of a familiar character, episode, or format often will recapture a child whose attention has drifted away. Repetition also provides opportunities to practice tasks as they become increasingly familiar, teaches the television formats and conventions that facilitate learning, and provides the bridge from familiar to new and unfamiliar concepts.

What pieces of material should be repeated and on what schedule? Segments can be repeated often or infrequently, with longer or shorter intervening intervals between repetitions, in their entirety or only in part, within a single program

or across several programs, and exactly in their original form or with variations on that original form. We do not have detailed answers to these practical production decisions, but child-watching removes all doubt about the general importance of repetition.

Children seem to like certain pieces of televised material better after they have seen them several times. This seems especially true of short films or animation that build step-by-step to a humorous or incongruous outcome. This progression permits a child to anticipate each step in turn, while still holding the denouement in abeyance, saving the humorous outcome for the end but giving the child the safety of knowing that it indeed will occur after the child has followed the episode through its earlier steps.

Another factor determining increasing appeal with repetition is the child's initial reaction to a televised segment. If this first viewing contains some surprise for him, and also contains more elements than he can grasp in a single viewing, repetition permits the child to confront the grounds for his surprise and to sort out some of the complexities. In general, repetition thus offers opportunities to introduce the relatively complex concepts or situations which a child cannot easily understand fully from a single exposure. Far from being merely a vehicle for simple, rote, or memorizable material (although it certainly accomplishes that purpose very well), the repeated segment can act as a "mind stretcher," permitting the child to return repeatedly to a subject incompletely explored during its first presentation. Even exact repetition of a segment being repeated without change is probably experienced differently each time, giving the child the opportunity to explore all of its facets.

On *Sesame Street* the more common form of repetition has been to keep the content constant and to vary the formats in which that content appears. For example, teaching recognition of the letter "W" was the subject of three different animated films, four different segments video-taped for repetition, and a number of incidents using the live characters on *Sesame Street*. The letter "W" appears sometimes as a three-dimensional object, sometimes as a line drawing, sometimes as a cardboard cutout, etc., but always retains its distinctive features as a letter despite its different surrounding format. Almost every curriculum objective is presented in several different formats so that the child learns to generalize what he has learned across several different forms of appearance. Another form of variation in repeated segments, of course, is to keep the format constant while varying the content.

As with most other production and writing methods, the use of repetition car-

ries its own list of limitations and *caveats*, and it must be used judiciously. Although repetition enhances some television approaches and adds to their appeal over time, other material suffers badly when repeated. For example, interest in slowly paced segments tends to decline with repetition. The length of the segment also seems a factor in how well it stands up with repetition; longer segments generally do not maintain attention as well with repetition as shorter ones. Lastly, when a segment presents many facets or perspectives that can be explored over repeated viewings, its appeal with repetition will be maintained; but when the child has exhausted these different facets, and no new elements are injected into the segment, its hold, upon repetition, is diminished sharply.

Directing Attention

We now have identified some of the elements of television production and writing methods that help to capture the child's attention or recapture it if it has drifted away. How do we take advantage of that attention to the television screen once we have captured it? Are there production and writing methods that will help the child to focus or direct his attention to the salient features of the material to be learned?

If such methods as music, sound effects, and repetition work to elicit the child's attention, other production and writing methods must be used to direct that attention, taking advantage of the narrow-focusing capability of television (to highlight relevant material and screen out or eliminate irrelevancies). At least three related methods provide some leverage here: (1) the use of surprise and incongruity, (2) the value of animation and pixilation techniques as means of directing a child's attention, and (3) the inclusion of the symbolic material to be learned within the televised dramatic action.

Children will direct their attention to what surprises them, to an image or event that violates their established expectations about the order of their world. They focus upon these deviations from their expectations because the deviations pose a puzzle. They are forced to confront them in order to reestablish a sense of order and regularity. The incongruity demands unraveling. Did the child actually see the surprising event correctly? If so, how could it have happened? Few people can let such violations of expectation rest without working hard to resolve them, and this motivation is a powerful one for children, apparently operating as early as the first year of life (Day and Berlyne, 1971; Kagan, 1970, 1971; Piaget, 1952).

Television provides several means of confronting children with such surprises

and incongruities. Slow-motion and fast-action techniques show people and objects moving at unaccustomed speeds; one of the most appealing devices for children is the "pixilation" technique that produces the kind of speeded-up comic movements used so well by Buster Keaton and others in the days of silent movies. Also, stop-action technique is used, for example, to stop a horse's jump in mid-air, giving the child an opportunity to observe more closely the characteristics of the jumping horse, but also surprising the child through the novel experience of watching an animal in flight suddenly fixed in space. Running videotape backwards runs people and events backwards, providing other strange and unexpected visual experiences; for example, water flowing forward in a stream is suddenly stopped, and then magically flows backward into its source. Other camera and editing techniques permit appearances and disappearances to occur far more suddenly than they do in the child's normal experience. This abruptness catches and directs attention. Close-up shots show unexpected characteristics of common objects; looking really closely at the skin of an orange or the surface of an automobile tire or a manhole cover reveals unanticipated properties of these objects. Long-shots, allowing views from unusually great distances, are another source of discrepancy. Who has not been stunned by the view of the earth from the astronaut's perch on the moon?

Since adults often spend considerable time in the effort to convince children of adult infallibility, one of the most remarkable and pleasing novelties for children is to observe adults making errors that children easily identify as such. One series of segments on *Sesame Street* was designed to exploit the interest for children of adults making obvious mistakes while trying to solve simple problems. "Buddy and Jim" are two adults who confront a series of such simple problems, but can never seem to get the obvious solution quite right. They attempt to place a picture on a wall by hammering the blunt end of the nail into the wall, but fail to observe that the nail should be turned around, and then conclude that they must walk to the wall on the opposite side of the room in order to point the nailhead into the wall. In another segment, they conclude that making a peanut butter and jelly sandwich is an impossibly sloppy undertaking because both the peanut butter and the jelly always seem to end up on the outside of their sandwich. Here the source of incongruity is the spectacle of adults failing to solve problems which most viewing children already understand easily. And the element of surprise is augmented by the special appeal to the child in knowing that he, for once, knows more than the adults seem to know. These ingredients have a long history in children's programs; "Laurel and Hardy" and "The Three

Stooges" traded on the same combination of incongruity and the child's occasional thrill of finding that he knows more than an adult.

We have experimented with other devices for surprising the child. Using the television screen as a magical drawing-board creates the same kind of surprise as when an adult makes a mistake, adding to it the opportunity for the viewer to observe children correcting mistakes. For example, the viewing child sees the beginnings of a line drawing being formed on the set, representing the familiar form of an animal or an object. A group of unseen children is heard giving instructions in how to draw the object. In effect, the artist is the television set, since the lines appear as if of their own accord. As the line drawing is formed, however, certain lines are drawn incorrectly and the viewing child hears children's voices spontaneously commenting on the composition of the drawing and correcting mistakes as they appear. The television set making mistakes and the children correcting these mistakes provide an unanticipated experience that seems to hold special appeal for young children.

Another powerful production technique for creating incongruity is animation. It generates a wide variety of illogical surprises that fascinate young children. "In animation, anything can turn magically into anything else and children love it for the illogic that is a visual equivalent of their nursery rhymes and jingles and word games" (Kael, 1970, p. 229).

Certain animation techniques exert their magic by giving abstract symbols life and movement, permitting them to become part of the dramatic action. For example, in producing "clay animation," clay is molded in successive stages, each photographed on a single frame of motion picture film. When the film is projected, the clay appears to reform itself into a succession of shapes. In a typical piece of clay animation produced for *Sesame Street*, a small blob separates itself from a larger narrator blob and forms into the letter "E." Next, two "G's" are rapidly produced from the clay "E" and the three letters are aligned to spell "EGG." A clay egg forms behind the word and hatches to produce a baby eagle. The word "EGG" changes to "EAGLE," and the eagle eats the word.

But animation is only one way of directing attention. All forms of television production for children must find functional ways to bind educational content and visual events. If the content remains superimposed or peripheral to the dramatic movement that children expect from television, that content surely will be ignored.

The forms of televised inaction that children almost always ignore are familiar. Most common is the "message monologue," where a single character appears

on the screen, facing the camera from a more or less stationary position, telling the audience something. (Most in-school instructional television is forced to take this form due to insufficient funds; its failure to attract children's attention now is legendary.) Adding another stationary character to give the first stationary character someone to talk with does not help much. Such segments remain heavily loaded with verbal content that is not integrated into any form of visual action. Soap operas generally follow this format with, for example, two women seated on a living-room sofa, sipping coffee (which often is the extent of the action) while discussing their misadventures or the unseen misadventures of their acquaintances. Although these soap operas are not designed for children, and the tolerance of most adults for sheer, second-hand gossip far exceeds that of children, the static quality of their visual conventions is an excellent example of televised inaction that will not hold children's attention.



Action, then, is a key ingredient in children's television, and it assumes many forms and styles. One of its most familiar forms is perhaps the most criticized: zany, slapstick comedy that often also displays one person harming another. Our premises regarding the use of slapstick comedy for children are that the elements

of zaniness and harm are not inseparable and that forthright, absurd comedy, even when the elements of harm are extracted from it, will retain its great appeal for children. Behind these premises is the speculation that slapstick's appeal lies mostly in its incongruity and surprise and not in its harmful outcomes. Thus, action on *Sesame Street* is, from time to time, just as nonsensically slapstick as the real world can be. Our general aim on children's television is for larger doses of wit, whimsy, and useful knowledge; but small doses of good, honest, forthright silliness can only make us more credible to our children who, after all, know as well as we do how absurd life sometimes can be.

Instructional content can be engaged directly in the visual events instead of being imposed upon them superfluously. In one episode, Kermit, the saturnine but gentlemanly puppet frog, involves the letter "W" in the action accompanying his lecture describing the letter's attributes. Indeed, in this instance, all of the action is initiated by the letter "W" itself, and Kermit becomes more and more perplexed by the letter's antics. In the first segment, the "W" deteriorates into its component parts as a consequence of the Cookie Monster's voracious appetite (W, to N, to V, etc.), with Kermit desperately trying to retain his composure and continue his lecture. In the second segment (illustrated by some episodes in Figure 1), the "W" comes to life as Kermit offers words beginning with "W," and the "W" itself acts them out. After such words as "walk" and "wander," the "W" engages Kermit in mock battle when Kermit continues with such words as "war," "weakening," and "woe is me!"

Sustaining Attention

To teach effectively, children's attention must not only be caught and focused, but also sustained. Often children's attention is caught momentarily, but they do not hold still long enough to persist in completing the task at hand. This "attention-span" notion is contained in the common complaint of teachers and parents that "I just can't get him (her) to pay attention!"

One obvious and appealing device in holding attention is humor. Since we traditionally have regarded humor as a slightly disreputable diversion from the hard, serious work of education, however, and since we often have accused teachers who indulge in it of coddling or currying favor with their students, we know virtually nothing about how to make humor instrumental to learning. Forms of education that rely upon captive students perhaps can continue to survive without such knowledge, but the televised teaching of children is so completely de-



a. Kermit the Frog delivering his lecture on the letter W. As Kermit says that the letter W is used in the words Walk and Wander, the W approaches him.



b. Kermit is surprised by the letter's behavior.



c. The letter begins to pummel Kermit.



d. Kermit, about to succumb to the W's attack, sighs, "W is for weakening. Woe is me!"

FIGURE 1.
Scenes from Kermit the Frog's lecture on the letter W.

pendent upon the effective use of humor that some understanding of it is demanded.

Can humor be analyzed? Humor probably is as much a matter of individual taste in children as it is in adults, and therefore it seems to defy neat generalization. Recall David Connell's admonition, when he was worrying about over-intellectualizing children's television, about the risks in analyzing the elements of a joke: nothing is learned and nothing remains to be laughed at. But since there is no more important ingredient in children's television than humor, it may be worthwhile to identify a few consistencies that do appear in what children find funny.

Several of these sources of humor contain the same surprising and farcical incongruities that I described earlier as being so useful in directing a child's attention. Slapstick comedy is a favorite with preschoolers and they find it more amusing than any other comedy form we have observed. They laugh when Ernie out-smarts Bert, when Bert retaliates, when the Cookie Monster foils one of Kermit's lectures, and when a chef falls down with his cakes and pies. The exaggerated physical action characteristic of slapstick seems related to its success with children. Although there are some forms of play with words that young children do find amusing, what seems funny to young children tends to be physical rather than verbal. Stand-up comedians attract little attention until they fall down, not necessarily because falling down is injurious but because it is unexpected.

Trickery always has been an essential element in slapstick comedy, where one person, through guile, takes advantage of another. But today a more advanced level of morality seems to characterize the slapstick comedy that amuses young children: the "underdog-turns-the-tables" form of justice. Here the person who is attempting to take advantage of another through trickery ends up at a disadvantage himself—being tricked through his own guile or cunning. For example, on *Sesame Street*, Ernie (innocent and guileless in this episode) encounters a shifty Salesman puppet dressed in trench coat and slouch hat, who tries to sell Ernie a collection of cut-out number 8's. The Salesman's manner is insidious and fraudulent; he flatters Ernie, agrees with everything Ernie says with a soothing "Riiight," and engages in other forms of persuasion that clearly communicate his belief that Ernie is an easy mark. In earlier days of slapstick comedy, the episodes might have ended with the Salesman's successful sale. But today the episode results in Ernie gently frustrating the Salesman by having already acquired a large stock of cut-out numbers, although he has no 8's. Explaining that he has no money, Ernie offers to exchange his own number collection for the Salesman's 8's, depriving the

Salesman of his opportunity to make a profit. The innocent Ernie has turned the tables and the would-be trickster instead becomes the victim. Justice is restored. Although *Sesame Street's* producers and writers had some early misgivings about how well young children would understand the intended salesman characterization and the justice represented in the "worm-turning" outcome, this and similar episodes, with repetition, were understood by young children, and were entertaining to them.

Another source of humor for children stems from the suspense of waiting for the incongruous to occur. Viewing children cannot predict the exact outcome, but they know that a particular format will follow a predictable sequence in its early stages and then proceed to an unexpected conclusion. For example, a series of short animated films is designed to teach counting backwards from ten. In these films, an identical situation—a countdown to a rocket blast-off—results in a variety of comic endings. The launch director counts off the seconds in a solemn voice as surrounding dignitaries wait expectantly. The numbers appear at the top of the screen as the countdown progresses. In every film but one, something catastrophic happens to embarrass the launch director: the rocket blasts off prematurely leaving the charred launch director sheepishly completing the countdown for his disgruntled audience; the rocket blasts off at the right moment but in the wrong direction and disappears into the ground; the launch director himself blasts off, his panic-stricken count of "Oooooone" fading in the distance, and so on. The naturally suspenseful situation of the rocket countdown is enhanced by the additional suspense of waiting for a particular form of disastrous pay-off, with the child's attention being drawn to the number sequence. The one exception to the consistently catastrophic launches is a successful launch which is greeted with cheers and waving of banners. This straight version itself becomes comic. The viewer who has come to expect incongruous disaster, in what precise form he cannot anticipate, now is surprised further by incongruous success.

Language can be a source of humor for children. Although play with words, divorced from action, must be used cautiously, most children do take pleasure in playing with language and certain emphases on verbal humor in *Sesame Street* are designed to promote this pleasure. Several catch-phrases used repeatedly for comic effect have been widely recognized and repeated by viewing children as part of their spontaneous play away from the set: for example, "Cookie!" repeated in guttural tones by the voracious monster puppet who plagues Ernie and Kermit the Frog; or the insidiously soothing "Riiiiiight!" uttered by the mysterious salesman puppet. Children also enjoy certain large words or nonsense words that

seem to roll around on the tongue: "bubble," "vigilante," "ukulele," "propeller," and "mumps" all seem to possess this magic.

Alliteration and rhyming in language also can be used to produce comic effects. One such use of alliterative word play is contained in "The Story of Wanda the Witch," an animated film designed to teach recognition of the letter "W" and its associated sound. Included in this film is a brief section at both beginning and end in which the witch uses her wand to write the letter "W" as an off-camera voice announces: "This weird story of Wanda the Witch is brought to you courtesy of the letter 'W.'" The story includes fifty repetitions of the sound of the initial "W" in one minute and sixteen seconds. The female narrator employs a harsh, penetrating vocal quality, appropriate to a story about a witch, amusing to children watching the film, and also effective in making salient the sound of the letter "W."

Again, a caution: although young children seem to enjoy word play, they do not respond well to puns and other plays-on-words. Puns inevitably depend upon the double meanings of words and phrases, and, perhaps because young children do not possess enough verbal sophistication or perhaps because puns generally are unrelated to television's visual action, they do not seem to interest or amuse young children.

In addition to sustaining the attention of young viewers, it should be emphasized that humor serves another function on *Sesame Street*: attracting parents and older siblings to share young children's viewing. Television's potential for providing shared experiences within families is great, but such sharing tends to be infrequent. To capture the interest of older family members, several forms of humor are used: verbal humor, spoofs on familiar television game shows and soap operas, etc. This principle of parent and sibling involvement, however, has its upper limits. Although every effort is made to induce family involvement instead of using *Sesame Street* as the traditional baby-sitter, nothing is included in the program solely to attract this older audience and nothing is made to depend entirely upon their participation with the young child.

The use of humor is one way to get parents and older siblings to watch with younger children. The appearance of well-known guest celebrities is another. Some celebrities, for example Batman and Robin, are enlisted because of their unassailable authority with four-year-olds. But others not so familiar to the preschoolers, like Burt Lancaster, Carol Burnett, and Odette, are used for their appeal to the older members of the family. James Earl Jones was one of the first

celebrities to offer to help by appearing on *Sesame Street*, and his performance yielded some unexpected returns.

We asked Mr. Jones, a stage and motion picture actor of imposing voice and appearance, to recite the alphabet in any manner he desired, so long as he paused long enough between letters to permit editing of the videotape. Mr. Jones' recitation of the alphabet takes a full minute and a half. He stares compellingly at the camera throughout. At the time the sequence was made his head was shaved for the role of Jack Johnson in the "Great White Hope" and it gleams in the close-up. His immense hollow voice booms the letter names. His lip movements are so exaggerated that they can easily be read without the sound. The performance should be seen by every actor who ever complained about his lines.

As Mr. Jones recites the letters, they appear beside his head. Each letter appears visually for a moment before it is named. Once named, the letter disappears, and another brief pause ensues before the next letter appears and is named. So powerful is Mr. Jones' presence that we were concerned that very young children might be frightened, but observation of viewing children established the contrary, and still further observation confirmed the presence of the "James Earl Jones Effect" (Gibbon and Palmer, 1970).

The effect appears in stages. The first time a child sees the Jones performance, he or she begins almost at once to respond to the implicit invitation to say the alphabet along with the performer. On somewhat later repetitions, the child begins to name the letter as soon as it appears, before Mr. Jones has named it; Mr. Jones' naming of the letter then confirms or corrects the child's identification of it. With still further repetition, the child begins to anticipate the printed symbol. As soon as the preceding letter disappears, the viewer names the next, saying the letter before Mr. Jones does. Even without the capability of two-way interaction between television and the viewer, the child progresses from following the instructional message to anticipating it. The pace of the presentation induces the child to shout out the next letter before it actually appears, its appearance then confirming or disconfirming the child's response.

The apparent value of anticipation in the James Earl Jones sequence led us to try to induce anticipation deliberately. When Pat Paulsen volunteered to perform, he was asked to recite the alphabet and the sequence of numbers with hesitations, as if he were unable to recall the correct sequence. The timing of the performance is roughly the same as Mr. Jones' performance: the letter appears, pause, letter is named, pause, letter disappears, pause, next letter ap-

pears, pause, etc., until Mr. Paulsen falters. At this point, the letter appearing next to his head flashes several times as if to remind him (or to induce him to think hard); Mr. Paulsen sneaks a quick look at the letter, names it in happy relief, and goes on. The pace allows children to anticipate, to respond overtly, and then to have their responses checked against the letter's or number's actual appearance. This anticipation effect, discovered by accident but apparently powerful in sustaining attention, now appears in a number of forms on *Sesame Street*.

Inducing anticipation is one means of inducing active participation. We assume that getting the child to respond verbally or physically promotes both entertainment and learning values, interrupts periods of physical passivity, and insures active rehearsal.

The ability to recite the alphabet is regarded by many as a relatively trivial skill. We had several reasons for including it on *Sesame Street*, however, and it illustrates our efforts to induce verbal and physical participation. We included alphabet recitation because (1) it can become a badge of competence for the very young child—an important displayable skill; (2) it seemed important to include in each *Sesame Street* program all of the letters of the alphabet, lest any viewer be misled to believe that the few letters stressed in each show were the complete list; (3) by presenting the letters visually, as their names are rehearsed, alphabet recitation constitutes a review of letters already learned and a preview of those yet to be taught; (4) presentation of the full alphabet may provide an opportunity to discriminate between visually or orally confusable letters; and (5) reciting the alphabet is a natural occasion for the type of overt participation that we sought in response to the program.

The traditional alphabet song is sung by adults on *Sesame Street* on several occasions, usually with children on the set joining in. On these occasions, the child at home is asked to sing along. The same traditional song has been used with less success in an animated film. This film shows a little girl who walks out on a stage apparently for an audition. An off-camera voice, presumably that of her mother, tells her when to sing and corrects her delivery during the song. The letters appear on the screen as the child sings. The film seemed amusing to the Workshop staff, and it initially tested well for appeal with children. But when children were observed watching the program over a longer period of time, it was found that the film frustrated many of them. Children who had already learned the alphabet song and wanted to sing along found the interruptions confusing. The rhythm of the song was broken and the off-stage comments were distracting. Those who were still struggling to learn the song found the film difficult

for the same reasons. Here is an instance where the intended humor apparently interferes with the intended instructional message.

Some educational conditions demand children's participation whether they willingly offer it or not. However, in response to televised invitations to react or participate, no matter how compelling the inducement may be, certain children will not display an active verbal or physical response. This is part of television's nonpunitiveness; the child may respond less energetically and enthusiastically than we hope, but each child is free to decline the invitation without fear of punishment or of attention of any kind. It should be recalled, however, that since television actors cannot respond in turn to the child's participation, congratulating the unseen audience for their supposed correct reactions may confuse the child who has not found the solution or who has confidently chosen an incorrect solution. It also may confuse the child who had declined to participate at all.

A final consideration basic to sustaining the child's attention over time is the use of a diversity of program elements. Children lose interest when the program dwells too long on one subject or remains too long at one pace or in one style. This "feeling of sameness" (Reeves, 1971) appears in several guises, loses the child's attention in each instance, and clearly indicates the need for diversity in characters, content, style, and pace.

For example, in the early planning of *Sesame Street*, we assumed that if the action on the street itself were tied to a common theme within each program (a pet show, a birthday party, a new character appearing on the street), the story line would link together the elements of each show, carrying the child along throughout the hour. This "story line" device for sustaining attention proved wrong, producing instead a feeling of sameness. Brief reports from the research staff (Reeves, 1971) documents this observation for two shows as follows:

"Show 262: Pet Show. The children were very interested in this theme at the beginning. They were attentive, responsive, and loved Slimy the Worm. But, by the time first prize was awarded, the children were restless and inattentive.

Show 265: Ice Cream Machine. Most of the street action revolved around the installation of an ice cream machine on *Sesame Street*. By the time the ice cream man quit, hardly any children were still watching these segments." (Reeves, 1971, p. 2)

Also, a program tends to have the feeling of sameness if too many programming elements within it are similar in characters (no matter how attractive the performers may be), content, style, or pace.

"Show 274. Folk-Singer. Nearly half of this program revolved around a folk-singer. This in-

cluded his singing of six complete songs and snatches of several others. By the end of the program, only three of the six viewing groups were still intact and few of the children in these groups were watching anything.

Show 267. Animal Films. In this program, five animal films were programmed into the last half of the show: Mandrill Mother and Baby, Tree Kangaroo and Baby, Baby Reindeer, Animal Coverings, and Koala. In such a case, it is difficult to judge how attentive the children might have been to the individual films had they not occurred in the same program." (Reeves, 1971, p. 3)

The dangers of lack of diversity are readily apparent in these observations.

No production or writing technique ever works effectively if the characters shown (adults, children, puppets, animated figures, animals, etc.) are not appealing to children and do not portray a variety of distinctive and reliable personalities. The range of personalities among the several puppet characters (from James Henson's repertory company of "muppet" puppets) perhaps best illustrates the necessary diversity of characters in television for children. These puppets generally remain reliably in character across different episodes (a strong preference of young viewers) and can portray more exaggerated and therefore clearer roles and functions than human figures:

Oscar the Grouch: firmly and insistently contrary; from personal preference, he despises the standard virtues (friendliness, cleanliness, consideration for others, gregariousness, etc.) and thrives on what others reject (disorder, dirt, surliness in dealing with others, total privacy, etc.).

Big Bird: naive; easily flustered and confused; prone to making obvious mistakes while remaining cheerfully undefeated and accepted (but not patronized) by others around him.

Kermit the Frog: half-pitchman, half-courtly-gentleman; tries hard to remain cool in the face of gathering chaos and usually succeeds with only minor, but visible cracks in his composure.

Ernie (most often, but not always, appearing in *Bert's* company): an appealing tease; often trapped by his own craftiness and cunning; retains a true sympathy and fondness for his would-be victims.

Bert: usually Ernie's straight-man, but more intelligent and less innocent than most straight-men; long-suffering and put-upon but retains a personal integrity and refinement that allows him to confront the intrigue and chaos gracefully; capable of delicate double-take and slow-burn acting.

Cookie Monster: voracious; sly in satisfying his incessant appetite yet aware of others

and willing to understand their reasons for frustrating him; usually succeeds despite their efforts.

Grover: cordial and accommodating in a slightly gruff way; seeks opportunities to be helpful even when this places great physical and mental burdens upon him; often ends up in total exhaustion as he amiably extends himself to the utmost to cooperate.

Herbert Birdsfoot (often appearing in *Grover's* company): a careful and knowledgeable pedant: courteously accepts Grover's offers to assist in demonstrating Herbert's lectures by manipulating physical materials, visibly resulting in Grover's overworking and consequent exhaustion.

Roosevelt Franklin: an agile, quick-witted and quick-moving, street-language articulate Black child-puppet; knows a lot, likes to learn more and to show what he knows and can do; a learning-addict.

Roosevelt Franklin's Mother: nags and pushes Roosevelt a little (this does not seem to bother him much) but takes obvious pride in his knowledge and achievements: "Roosevelt Franklin—he sure does know his numbers! !"

Professor Hastings: verging on senility; gives comically confused lectures, interrupting each at unpredictable occasions for short naps; sporadically capable of remarkably clear insights that stand in marked contrast to his general muddlement.

Sherlock Hemlock: a not-quite-competent detective who constantly searches for crimes to solve and prides himself on his detecting prowess; succeeds in deciphering certain clues but never quite arrives at a crime's final solution without assistance.

The Salesman: archetypical trickster who trades on the vanity and greed of others; often ends up as victim of his own avarice.

In addition to these distinctive puppets, an infinitely-expandable troupe of *Anything Muppets* come in all sizes, shapes, and appearances and can play any role from local grocer or postman, to members of a group of small boys and girls, to varied forms of monster, to a hip but somewhat seedy and disheveled musical group.

Beyond responding to puppets and animated figures, children generally prefer watching and listening to other children rather than adults. If the televised children are involved in some activity, especially when they are trying to solve a problem that the viewer can work through with them, attention is especially strong. Also, viewers particularly enjoy hearing other children's voices; several films that originally evoked only mild interest were much more appealing when children's voices were added to the sound track.

Televised children are most effective when they display distinctive and reli-

able personalities, but this is difficult to achieve. On *Sesame Street*, it seems especially important that the televised children be spontaneous and unrehearsed; nothing is more stilted and unnatural than child actors reciting lines from a prepared script. But when the televised children do respond freely and spontaneously, their behavior often is unpredictable and difficult to construct into a set of distinctive personalities. Distinctiveness of character often must be sacrificed for spontaneity and naturalness. If unpredictable behavior by children raises problems for teachers within the classroom and parents within the home, this same unpredictability presents continuous, unplanned crises for the on-screen *Sesame Street* cast. Since these cast members are not professional educators, the televised children's spontaneity of expression poses a constant threat of embarrassment. The adult cast's early reaction was to restrain children by restricting their opportunities to initiate or respond—much like the inexperienced university instructor who does not call upon students who threaten to interrupt his lectures with questions or comments. Slowly, some relaxation is being achieved as the cast learns to respond to the children's spontaneity with spontaneity of their own, even when this forces a radical departure from the planned televised lesson.

Watching adults or listening to them talk—especially when they are presenting “message monologues”—is much less appealing to children than watching other children. In the early planning of *Sesame Street*, we developed a continuing series of episodes called “The Man from Alphabet,” featuring a bumbling adult detective hero and a super-reasoning child who unravels the clues and solves the crimes. Although these episodes seemed appealing to the educators and producers, they never held the attention of young children and the approach was dropped. Apparently, “The Man from Alphabet” simply talked too much.

Some attention to adults can be sustained if, instead of showing the adult speaker on the screen, the camera shows what he is speaking about, or if the adult shares the screen with children, directing his talk to them, or if the adult makes mistakes and provides opportunities to be corrected by children—in these instances the adult seems to use language that the child viewer can understand because he is talking to children. When an adult is on the screen by himself, however, children interpret this as part of adult television, not intended to be understood by them.

Presenting a diversity of distinctive characters inevitably means presenting the diversity of dialects natural to them. Although some misgivings were voiced during the early planning of *Sesame Street* about presenting any other

language models than "correct" Standard English, we do present the full range of dialects, accents, and informal street language appropriate to the range of characters on *Sesame Street*. We have found no evidence that children are confused by this or learn "incorrect" language practices. The natural diversity of language simply reflects the natural diversity of characters. For example, Roosevelt Franklin, the Black child puppet, speaks a Black English dialect; Gordon—the adult Black male-identification figure—speaks both Standard English and Black English on different occasions or even changes his speech within a single segment, depending upon the situation and the other characters he is with.

Beyond these useful diversities in characters, content, and style, varied pace and mood are critical in sustaining attention. The appeal of any single segment is tied closely to the contrasts provided by the episodes preceding and following it. Both fast-paced and slow-paced material will hold children's attention (the common criticism that *Sesame Street* is continuously frenetic simply is inaccurate), but a slow, peaceful episode is more appealing when surrounded by fast-moving episodes than when it follows another slow, quiet piece. Interest in any particular episode is higher if it creates a pace and mood that looks, sounds, and feels different from the one that preceded it. The principle that visual action and contrasts appeal to young children need not mean that the action always must be rapid or frenetic to be effective; instead, the pace of the action should be varied.

Observations of dramatic improvements in intellectual skills around ages five to seven (White, 1965);—including the ability to sustain attention (e.g. Kagan and Kogan, 1970)—suggest that, for children below these ages, only television programs of short duration would be suitable. But, on the premise that only a program of sufficient total length would stand any chance of providing educational benefit, *Sesame Street* was designed to be one hour in length. The most common misgiving of educators was that this would be too long to hold young children's attention. This misgiving turns out to be wrong; when the segments within a program are varied in character, content, style, pace, and mood, young children's attention holds well over a one-hour period.

Conclusions

The list of things that television cannot do—and should not be expected to do—probably is far longer than the list of learning and teaching potentialities discussed in this paper. Television indeed may teach aggression to some children

and induce physical passivity in others. It also may be severely limited as a teaching tool (one-way communication, inability to sequence material, failure to induce active responding, etc.); there is also the possibility that it may cause us to lose contact with each other and instead to seek and accept solitary, vicarious spectatorship as the normal course of human activity. While we should test television's upper boundaries in providing useful learning and teaching opportunities, we also should test its potential negative consequences and appreciate its inherent limitations.

This paper has discussed (1) some informal principles of learning and teaching, and (2) some production and writing methods that have been used experimentally in television for children. Since we have only vague, beginning glimpses both of these principles and of these production possibilities, our understanding of the relationships between them is tenuous and uncertain. Surely the principles of learning and teaching discussed here do not dictate directly the proposed production and writing strategies; all that these informal principles accomplish is to suggest conditions of learning and teaching that, at least, should not be violated in televised presentations for children.

Even this more cautious conclusion, however, is shaky. Developing television materials for children—and then observing children's responses to them—has been full of surprises and mysteries both for the producers and for the researchers using the visual medium to learn about how children learn. But for those of us who are experimenting in the effects of visual media upon children, a hidden impulse operates. Suppose we fail completely to discover anything more about how children learn; suppose television's capabilities and limitations remain a mystery despite our best efforts. Even so—once in a while, with a little luck—we connect, and hear a child laugh. That is worth most of life's satisfactions rolled into one.

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Essay Review

Open Education

THE GARY SCHOOLS.

by Randolph S. Bourne. Reprinted with introductions and annotations
by Adeline and Murray Levine.

Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1970. 323 pp. \$12.50.

SCHOOLS WHERE CHILDREN LEARN.

by Joseph Featherstone.

New York: Liveright Publishing, 1971. 180 pp. \$5.95, \$2.45 (paper).

SCHOOLS ARE FOR CHILDREN.

by Alvin Hertzberg and Edward F. Stone.

New York: Schocken Books, 1971. 232 pp. \$6.95.

ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION.

by Bruce R. Joyce.

Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing, 1969. 247 pp. \$6.25.

THE ENGLISH INFANT SCHOOL AND INFORMATIONAL EDUCATION.

by Lillian Weber.

New York: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 276 pp. \$4.95.

"Open" or informal education has by now generated not only a substantial controversy but also a spate of books. Whether this is a sign that there is a "movement" toward (or away from) informal education is a question which cannot as yet be answered. If there is an open education movement, it is surely a loosely defined one. There is no detailed theory of child development or of pedagogy or of social systems which creates consensus among all those who are now involved in open education. Instead, any movement which exists has grown more from the day-to-day activities of teachers in English infant schools than from the thinking of educational theorists. The definition of informal education exists most fully in the perceptions of teachers who know a good classroom when they see one, but who would be hard put to explain precisely what is good about it. The fact that

informal education is, in essence, a set of practices and not a theory is reflected in the quality of the books which are written about it. Attempts at theory come off rather poorly; descriptions of classrooms are often quite good, and the best are very good indeed.

The most perceptive is probably *Schools Where Children Learn*, by Joseph Featherstone, whose description of British primary schools first introduced Americans to the notion that children's education can and should be interesting and humane. Featherstone's book brings together descriptions of good practices in American classrooms as well as in British infant schools. It gives a feel for the classroom, as well as enough detail to suggest ways for a teacher to make informal education work. The Hertzberg and Stone book is also descriptive, in a very specific and practical way. The authors describe classroom incidents, conveying the life and excitement which exist in the very best of classrooms. They go on to tell their readers "what you can do," with concrete suggestions for teachers who want to experiment with open education, whether or not they must work within a traditional setting. *Their classroom ideas are practical and fun. They are well worth trying, irrespective of educational philosophy.*

These books, like Silberman's *Crisis in the Classroom*, are overwhelmingly favorable toward open education. Though the book has not yet been written which effectively challenges the open school movement, some indications of a contrary position, to be sure, can be found. We have reports of parent groups and school boards angrily rejecting the lack of discipline and academic seriousness which they see in many experiments with open classrooms. We know teachers whose attempts to loosen up classes have been thwarted, not by external pressure or bureaucratic directive, but by children who respond with hostility and destructiveness. We see some of the best practitioners in pre-school education *claiming—and backing up their claims with empirical evidence—that structured teaching is far more effective than informal programs* in raising the achievement levels of disadvantaged children. We have historians showing us that we have tried and rejected the whole idea before. And we have Joseph Featherstone himself, in a series of *New Republic* articles this year, warning that the English experience cannot be quickly and easily transplanted to American schools.¹

¹ For a description of adverse reaction to an open education experiment in an elementary school see the second half of Roland Barth's *Open Education*, (unpublished Ed.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1970). For a report on a high school example, see David Swanger, "For Want of a Real Flag: The Public Hearing of the Cambridge Pilot School," *Harvard Graduate School of Education Association Bulletin*, XV (Spring, 1971). The evaluation literature has come mostly out of pre-school experiments and may not be completely relevant. For summaries of this literature see Miriam Stearns, "Report on Pre-school Programs: The Effect of Pre-school Programs on Disadvantaged Children and Their Families," report submitted to the Office of Child Development, 1971; and Joan Bissell, "The Cognitive Effect of Pre-school Programs for Disadvantaged Children" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1970). The conclusion of these reports is that more structured programs, for example those of Carl Bereiter, or David Weikart, are more effective in raising the cognitive scores of disadvantaged children than unstructured programs like those of traditional nursery schools. Early data from the evaluation of Planned Varia-

Controversy in education is, of course, neither surprising nor evil. This controversy is interesting, however, in that it is not a simple matter of the good guys being irrationally opposed by the forces of wickedness. There are good guys arguing for open education, but there are also fine teachers and thoughtful writers who argue that a structured, predictable, managed environment is the best one for children to learn in. One of the reasons that the controversy is so hard to resolve is that the issue forces a consideration of alternative ways of thinking about schools, with policy implications which are often contradictory.

Lillian Weber's book illustrates one aspect of the difficulty. The first part of her book is descriptive and provides a careful and useful analysis of the physical layout, administrative structure, staff characteristics, and organization of activities which characterize informal infant education. In the second part of her book, however, Weber attempts to justify the "idea" of informal education. Here she is much less persuasive.

The rationale presented by Weber is based on three psychological propositions about how children learn. 1) Children learn differently. Each child has an individual schedule and strategy for learning. 2) Children learn best in a complex, rich environment, which they can interact with and explore in a variety of ways. 3) Children learn best from self-initiated interaction with concrete materials and with other people.

When a program's rationale is based on psychological propositions, it seems reasonable to ask that both the rationale and the results of the program be evaluated empirically. Unfortunately, neither the psychological nor the educational evaluation data clearly support the claims of the open education proponents. Children do, of course, learn in the way described above. But they also learn in systematic, structured, associative ways. Learning is enhanced by clarity as well as complexity. Children are to some extent self-motivated and naturally curious; but they are also fearful of completely unknown experiences and, like all of us, they tend to avoid situations in which failure seems likely. Children do develop idiosyncratically; but they also respond to expectations and social pressure. All of these propositions can be supported by psychological theory and data.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to know exactly how to interpret either the psychological evidence or the evidence which comes from the few educational evaluations which have been done. There are several themes in the data, however, which seem worth noting. First, Piaget's work tells us almost nothing about educational policy. It tells us, for ex-

tion in Follow Through, which compares a variety of structured and unstructured programs for the early elementary grades supports this interpretation, though it is by no means conclusive. See Stanford Research Institute, *Longitudinal Evaluation of Selected Features of the National Follow-Through Program* (Menlo Park, California: S.R.I., 1971). For a historical perspective see Michael Katz, "The Present Moment in Educational Reform," *Harvard Educational Review*, 41 (August, 1971). For cautionary articles on implementation, see Marilyn Hapgood, "The Open Classroom: Protect it from its Friends," *Saturday Review*, September 18, 1971; and Joseph Featherstone, "Open Schools I: The British and Us" and "Open Schools II: Tempering a Fad," *New Republic*, September 11, and September 25, 1971.

ample, that we should not be surprised that children below the age of twelve are not very good at logical thinking. This does not imply either that we should try to help them do it anyway, as some of the Bruner-inspired curricula try to do, or that we should encourage them to operate in the concrete mode until they seem able to move on. The evidence on whether progression through the stages can be hastened is ambiguous. Whether more rapid progression through the stages would be a good thing or not is certainly an unanswered question. Until more work is done with interventions in a Piagetian framework, therefore, applications of his theory to educational practice are largely conjectural.

Second, learning theory cannot be lightly dismissed. Not only rats, but also children, prisoners, and lunatics have been induced to change their behavior through carefully planned reinforcement schedules. Carefully specified tasks, clear steps in performance, and positive reinforcement at every step along the way make for a very efficient kind of teaching. Behavior modification has nasty overtones for many people, but it often does work.

Third, the evaluations which have been done in connection with experimental pre-school programs all support the notion that structured programs are more effective than unstructured programs in producing cognitive gains in disadvantaged children. Most of these programs have compared one or more "structured" programs, like those of David Weikart or Carl Bereiter, with some variant of the traditional nursery school informal program. In some cases, IQ gains resulting from the structured programs have been quite impressive; in no cases have the traditional nursery school programs produced higher gains than the structured programs.²

Data from the first year of evaluation of Planned Variation in Follow Through, which includes a variety of structured and unstructured programs, seem to indicate that the same results occur in early elementary school as in pre-school. None of this proves that structured programs are superior to unstructured programs. Even the measurement of cognitive skills in young children is extremely difficult, and no measures of the kind of non-cognitive development emphasized by advocates of open education are reliable enough to be used. But although the data must be interpreted cautiously, it is fair to say that there are *no* data to support the notion that informal programs lead to superior learning in any area which can now be measured.³

The absence of supporting data presents a serious problem for those who would like to

² See Bissell and Stearns for summaries of this literature.

³ D. E. M. Gardiner, in *Experiment and Tradition in Primary Schools* (London: Methuen, 1966) reports data from England which suggest that experimental schools are superior to traditional schools in some respects. I have given little weight to her findings, because the choice of sample for the study makes it difficult to determine exactly what is being contrasted. Moreover, it is difficult to interpret the pattern of results which she found. The two types of schools were similar on some reading and arithmetic skills, different on some writing and attentional skills. The experimental schools seemed to be superior in such areas as creative writing. The most parsimonious explanation of her findings is that schools teach what they teach.

build a case for informal education on empirical evidence. There are several ways of dealing with this issue. One is to argue that if learning were defined broadly enough, and if sufficiently sensitive instruments to measure various types of learning were available, the superiority of the open classroom would become evident. Although this position is held, implicitly or explicitly, by many of the open educators (probably including Weber), it is a hard argument to make. What evidence there is points in the opposite direction; and although it is true that logical arguments can be made supporting the non-cognitive benefits of open education, logical arguments can also be made on the other side. The development of a sense of self-confidence and competence provides an interesting illustrative example. One argument holds that self-confidence develops in an atmosphere of independent exploration where the only pressure to learn something comes from internal needs. Another argument holds that self-confidence develops after competence has been acquired. In this view, the best way to help a child feel good about himself is to teach him to do something well.

I suspect that if we had a self-concept measure worth using (which we don't) we would come up with two findings. First, self-concept would be correlated with achievement. This is not, of course, an entirely speculative hypothesis since the self-concept measures we do have all show this. Moreover, it makes logical sense, whether your interpretation is that high self-concept produces high achievement, or that high achievement produces high self-concept, or that some mysterious factor produces both at the same time. Second, I suspect that we would find enormous variation in self-concept within classes of children, a small amount of variation between teachers, and almost no variation between types of programs. This reflects my own assumptions that children react more to teachers than to programs, and that children react very differently.

It is possible, however, that we would find that programs which produced higher achievement also produced lower self-concept. We would then have to argue about which is most important, and that would be a very difficult argument. It is also possible that we would find that structured programs produced both high achievement and high self-concept. Even this finding would not resolve the issue, however, since there would still remain a host of other unmeasured competencies and characteristics. In short, it is difficult to imagine an empirical finding which could provide a definitive basis for advocating open education. Thus, this tack for getting around the negative results of existing empirical studies is not particularly satisfying.

Another approach to the issue is suggested by the Joyce book. This is not a book about open education, but it does provide an interesting framework for looking at elementary education. Joyce's book attempts to "develop a rational system for analyzing education" by cataloging goals of education which might be held by people making decisions about schools, and matching them with a catalogue of the means which might lead to the achievement of these goals.

Joyce lists three kinds of goals which a school might have. The first category includes

academic goals: reading, arithmetic, historical information, and methods of inquiry. The second category is that of personal goals: self-concept, "learning to learn," achievement motivation. The third includes social goals: socialization, patriotism, cooperation, human relations. The means for pursuing these goals can be grouped into three different systems: the social system—roles and interaction patterns of adults and children; the technical support system—machinery and materials (like books, projectors, and programmed instruction materials) for organizing, storing, and retrieving information; and the curricular system—the selection of areas and approaches for concentration. Joyce's ideal school is one in which a variety of goals are pursued, each by use of the particular means most appropriate to the goal.

Using Joyce's categories, we can look at the open classroom as a choice of means for achieving certain specific goals. The open classroom philosophy espouses goals in all three areas: academic, personal and social. It places most reliance for achieving these goals on a particular set of relationships between adults and children—a social system, in Joyce's term. Although there would not be complete agreement on this, most open educators would agree that the really important aspects of the classroom are freedom and choice for the child, social interaction among children, and a teacher who guides and does not lecture or conduct recitations. Concrete materials are important, but not as important as the people. An open classroom can exist without *cuisinaire rods*, but a classroom with *cuisinaire rods* is not open unless the teacher and students interact in certain ways. Open education generally rejects both technical support systems and curricular systems which seem incompatible with the emphasis on autonomous learners and non-authoritarian schools. Thus, lectures, movies, and programmed instruction are often rejected because they interfere with the pattern of small groups of children working together at their own pace. Certain kinds of curricular organization—e.g. the teaching, in pre-determined sequential organization, of the structure and methodology of a discipline—are likewise rejected.

One could argue that this limits the efficiency of the open classroom in serious ways. Some goals, for example, presenting the structure of a discipline, must be ignored, since they cannot be pursued within the social structure of the open classroom. Other goals may be pursued inefficiently, since the most efficient means may be antithetical to informality or an integrated day. The most efficient presentation of information, for example, may be a lecture or movie to a large group, rather than an individual explanation or a search through books. Language development is carried on casually in open classrooms, rather than through the structured drills which may be the most efficient way of developing language skills.

One might conclude, therefore, that since the emphasis of the structure in open classroom is on social relationships, the only goals which are really being pursued efficiently are social goals, while other goals are subordinated. The implication could be drawn that open classrooms were only suitable for those children for whom social goals were more

important than other goals, or who would not suffer from relative inefficiency in the pursuit of other goals, especially academic ones. One could also conclude that an open classroom framework ought to be in effect only part of the day. Other parts of the day could be spent in the pursuit of academic goals in the most efficient possible way, normally, but not always, involving structured presentation.

Before a national campaign is mounted to make schools partly open and partly structured, a few other issues need to be raised. Joyce assumes that efficiency in reaching goals is an important characteristic of a school. He also assumes that some means are more efficient than others, and can be shown to be so. Neither of these assumptions is necessarily right. Although it seems logical to assume that the most efficient way to teach a body of information is to break it down into small units and present them in systematic order, empirical evidence that this is true is hard to come by. On the contrary, one of the most fascinating research findings is that children seem to learn just as well when the frames of a programmed instruction sequence are presented in random order as they do when the frames are presented in the carefully sequenced order which the programmers decided was logical.⁴ One man's efficiency is another man's nonsense.

But even if the efficiency of certain approaches could be determined and implemented, it is not clear that anything about schools is thereby implied. We have thought about schools as "learning factories" for a long time now. Even those who manage to avoid the barbaric vocabulary of inputs and outputs still tend to think about the goals and purposes and functions of schools as they might think about the purposes of a business or a Congress. But schools do not have to be thought about as places where something is done to children so that they will come out to be a certain kind of adult. There are other, perhaps more appropriate, metaphors. Schools can be thought of as the embodiment of a community's traditions and values. What is important about schools in this view is not what they do but what they are; the criterion of success for a school is the accuracy with which it reflects the social and value structure of its constituency. A good school for an authoritarian, upwardly mobile community is one which is authoritarian, competitive, and achievement-oriented. A good school for a liberal intellectual community is one which is democratic, and which deals with ideas rather than practicalities.

Schools have, of course, always served this symbolic function. A segregated school system does not cause but reflects a segregated society. The schools of the late 19th century emphasized Americanization because the society saw itself as a melting pot. If we ever decide that we really are a pluralist society, no doubt we will begin to welcome diversity in our schools.

Bourne's *The Gary Schools*, published in 1916 and reissued in 1970, provides an interesting comparison in this regard to contemporary descriptions of open education. Willard Wirt, the first superintendent of schools in Gary, instituted a school system based on

⁴ K. V. Roe, H. W. Case and A. Roe, "Scrambled v. Ordered Sequence in Autoinstructional Programs," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 53 (April, 1962) 101-104.

the ideas of the progressives and a determination to make the schools a "public utility," used around the clock by all the people in the community. The children's day was divided between traditional academic studies, manual work and supervised play. The curriculum was based on concrete laboratory experiences. Discipline was to be self-imposed.

Bourne's highly favorable description of the schools in operation talks very little about the preparative functions of the school. It focuses much more on what the children do, and on what they are like. He talks most about how busy, productive, and self-reliant the children are. That he sees these as the most important qualities of the children is not surprising for his time, or indeed for America at any time. Bourne evaluates the system primarily in terms of the economy of its operation and the efficiency of its management. It is clear that Bourne saw the schools as reflections of the society and that he approved of the Gary schools because they embodied what he considered the best of the society's values.

Today, descriptions of open schools are more apt to emphasize spontaneity, creativity, independence, and the absence of authoritarianism. These are, of course, not universally considered to be the most desirable values. And much like the critics of the Gary schools in Bourne's day, today's critics of open education berate the reflection in the schools of a societal trend they fear, toward a breakdown of traditional respect and order. From the point of view of the school-as-symbol, their criticisms are well-founded. As long as there are differences in values within the society, there will be differences in thinking about schools. Unless we want to symbolize the triumph of the liberal intellectuals, we are forced to conclude that to the extent that schools are symbols, open schools are not for all communities. If we are serious about a pluralist society, we must accept the legitimacy of a community's choice, whether it be authoritarian, academic, agricultural, or Calvinist.

There is, however, still another way of thinking about schools. It takes no great imagination or logical acumen to decide that children are not products, nor are they symbols; they are simply children. Schools are places where they, and a good number of adults with them, spend six hours a day, five days a week for at least twelve years. That quantity of time ought to be spent in a place which is humane, pleasant, and interesting. In this view the measure of a good school is whether the children are lively and happy, whether people deal with each other in a civilized manner, and whether the environment is attractive and cared for. Using these criteria, some open classrooms as well as some traditional classrooms will be judged very, very good and some horrid. The implications of this view are that teachers and principals ought to concentrate their energies on establishing pleasant communities. To the extent that they are comfortable with structure, for whatever reason, then there should be structure. To the extent that open structure generates life and not frustration—and this will depend to no small extent on the values of the surrounding community—flexibility and freedom should be part of the environment.

All of this has implications for thinking and writing about schools. Looking at schools as symbols and as communities as well as learning factories complicates the issues involved in arriving at a position. Also, attempts to argue that one or another kind of school is "best" seem somewhat ludicrous. On the other hand, it allows us to phrase the argument in terms of what we think schools ought to look like and be, and leaves us free to trust our instincts about what looks and feels right. It makes us properly skeptical of data which purport to tell us something, since we can see how very little they really do tell us. And so the books that describe schools for us and give us a feel for what goes on will be the most useful substitutes for extended visits or teaching in open classrooms. And that is where this review began.

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Book Reviews

TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS AND TEACHER EDUCATION: THE SEARCH FOR A SCIENTIFIC BASIS.

by N. L. Gage.

Palo Alto, Calif.: Pacific Books, 1971. 226 pp. \$7.95.

We recognize good teaching when we give or receive it. With our rich and varied intuitions on the nature of good teaching we call upon the methods of experimental, behavioral science to draw out the principles that identify the excellent teacher, text, instructional method, or teaching appliance. So far those principles—if they exist—have not appeared. Crowds of variables thought to bear on effective teaching have been defined and measured; few seem to have even marginal relationships to outcomes of learning. By Gage's reckoning, the yield in new knowledge out of the voluminous research on teaching is paltry. What is wrong?

Gage argues that the dominant, theoretical model which generates most research may be wrong. He calls the model "the Criterion-of-Effectiveness Paradigm for Research on Teaching" and gives directions for its use: "Get a criterion and then find its predictors" (p. 85). Criteria have included ratings of teachers by ad-

ministrators, colleagues or students, and the teachers', or the teachers' students' scores on various tests of personality or cognition. Predictors have included many aspects of teachers' backgrounds as well as measures of their behavior, personal qualities, and academic accomplishments in training and in service. What does education have to show for this labor? "... hundreds of studies, yielding thousands of correlation coefficients have been made. In the large, these studies have yielded disappointing results: correlations that are nonsignificant, inconsistent from one study to the next, and usually lacking in psychological and educational meaning" (p. 91). This statement suggests that few *experimental* studies on teaching have been published. Correlations and statistics derived from correlations are typically used for observations made on naturally occurring events. An experiment, in contrast, is tightly controlled. The investigator randomly assigns subjects to experimental conditions. When the experiment is done correctly, the investigator can attribute differences in the scores on some measure between two or more randomly assigned groups to differences in the treatments they have received. Although correlations and statistics derived from them are sometimes

reported, a t-test or its generalization, analysis of variance, is the quantitative, analytic technique most frequently used to assess differences in the scores. From such an experimental study one can infer that a predictor influences a score, while from the observational study one can only infer a relationship between a predictor and a score.

Gage thinks that the way out of the quagmire of correlation coefficients to the "firm ground" of knowledge about the impact of teaching upon learning leads through small and well-designed experiments (p. 123). We agree. But switching research strategies can only be part of the answer. There is also the question of choosing new "paradigms" of teaching and learning. Gage rejects the simple "Criterion-of-Effectiveness" paradigm and presents a number of new ones to replace it. Several of them are alternative, multi-stage elaborations of the earlier paradigm. Another class of models focuses not on effectiveness but on the classroom interaction between teacher and student. Teaching machines provide the inspiration for a third set.

Perhaps the original proponents of these paradigms rationalize them elsewhere. Gage does not. The models remain, for us, idealizations as arbitrary as the rejected Criterion-of-Effectiveness paradigm which at least had the virtue, according to Gage, of having been "so successful in so many [non-educational] realms [of social science]" (p. 86). Where several paradigms abstract the same reality differently, on which model are we to bet? Or can we reconcile differences among the "competing" models and deepen our understanding of the reality they purport to represent?

By presenting, essentially without comment, a series of complex, flow chart models, Gage puts us in the position of parents who sit down to assemble a complicated mechanical toy on Christmas Eve only to discover, when they open the box, that the instructions are missing. Not only does Gage fail to present the underpinnings of the paradigms reviewed, he does not adequately discuss the consequences of their use. All the interaction paradigms, for example, involve what are known as feedback loops. In one type of feedback loop, the students react to the teacher's behavior and the teacher then modifies her or his behavior after perceiving the students' reactions. The cycle of teacher behavior-student reaction then repeats.

Gage and his colleagues conducted an experiment where teachers in the experimental group received a number of ratings by their students and were shown them, while the teachers in the control group received comparable ratings but were not shown them. Subsequently, students from both groups rated their teachers again. On four of the ten qualities rated, experimental teachers improved significantly more than control teachers although the magnitudes of the differences in improvement between the two groups seems small. The improvement estimates were obtained through a statistical technique called analysis of covariance adjustments (pp. 178-184).

The implicit paradigm for this experiment is not an interaction model but the rejected Criterion-of-Effectiveness model. The predictor is the initial rating received by the teacher, the criterion the second rating. But feedback is a continuous process and its impact on behavior

after a number of cycles may be different than its impact after a single cycle. This experiment, by measuring behavior only at the end of the first cycle, neither confirms nor discredits the interaction paradigms that incorporate feedback loops.

Moreover, if Gage accepts the implications of the interaction paradigms, he must discard analysis of covariance as a statistical technique. Analysis of covariance and all the other quantitative analytic techniques mentioned elsewhere (p. 148) rest upon a mathematical model that assumes linear, additive relationships among variables. These relationships can be expressed by a linear equation. Feedback, however, requires another mathematical model: the differential equation. This is so because teacher behavior must be described as a mathematical function of student behavior and *vice versa* and both behaviors change over time. To describe precisely the relation between rates of change, where both rates are also mathematical functions of time, implies an underlying differential equation model. While a differential equation sometimes lends itself to linear representation, it is not the usual linear representation that leads to the estimation techniques of ordinary, multiple regression or analysis of variance. To test whether experimental data is "well-fitted" by a differential equation—that is, to test whether in fact we have a feedback loop—we must employ more complex estimation techniques or invent new ones.

But perhaps we are taking the interaction paradigms more literally than their authors or Gage intended. The virtue of embracing these alternatives, Gage would argue, is that they encourage researchers to break down or discard the global vari-

ables that have arisen through fixation on the simple, Criterion-of-Effectiveness paradigm. The more elaborate predictor-criterion paradigms and the interaction paradigms lead to "micro-criteria" of effectiveness. The notion here is to strip teaching down to some relatively pure goal, prescribe to the teacher the ground rules for reaching it, monitor the teacher's performance closely, and relate the teacher's effectiveness to his or her behavior during the performance. Effectiveness is measured by ratings of the teacher's performance or test scores of students on the content.

In a series of experiments applying these ideas (p. 118) the micro-criterion was the teacher's ability to explain a topic to a class in fifteen minutes as measured by the mean score of the class on a subsequent test of understanding. These mean scores were related to various teacher behaviors—the predictors—taken from videotape, written transcripts, and auditory records of the lesson. After cross-validation, three sets of behavioral variables remained: the number of times the teacher used "explaining links" like "because," "in order to," and "so that"; the frequency with which the teacher generalized ideas, gave examples of the generalization and then synthesized the examples at a higher level of generalization; and the amount of gesture and movement by the teacher.

These are interesting findings. Of course they may be "symptoms" of underlying qualities having to do with confidence, cognition, and so forth. But that is a testable experimental hypothesis. And even if the deeper traits manifested in overt behaviors should turn out to be what really counts, this does not foreclose

the possibility that learning specific behaviors might result in an increase in teacher effectiveness or even influence the deeper traits themselves over time.

Less hopeful strains for teachers are also sounded: "Adequate analyses of teaching for cognitive objectives show that, properly done, such teaching is extremely complex. Such analyses reveal demands on the teacher that look well-nigh impossible for ordinary mortals, like teachers, to meet" (p. 133). Though he does not advocate teaching machines or computer-aided instruction, Gage does insist "... that analyses of teaching as the manipulation of cognitive influences lead to programmed instruction just as conditioning theories [of learning] do" (p. 55).

What can the teaching machine—usually a computer—do that a human teacher cannot? Little more than process vaster amounts of information than the human. The computer can: display the content to the learner on a screen or typewriter; receive the learner's response; compare the response to the correct one; feed back the results of the comparison to the learner; collect data on the number and type of errors and the time interval between responses; select the next item after analysis of this data; store the lesson in cross-referenced form (pp. 110-111). And the computer can do this almost instantaneously for a large number of students using it simultaneously.

This list of abilities is awesome. Yet we are told that some people claim "... the programmed instruction bubble has already burst ..." though others hold that programmed instruction "is steadily gaining" (p. 55).

Lest teachers feel obsolete beside these behemoths we should point out that re-

searchers too may find themselves drawn into the game "Who will the computer replace next?"

Consider the following experiment. The computer performs all the feats listed previously. For one randomly chosen group of learners, it selects the next item presented by applying the principles of teaching theory A; for another, equivalent, randomly chosen group it selects the next item after applying teaching theory B. After the lesson is over, the computer tests and scores learners from both groups and performs a t-test on the two mean scores, an item analysis for each question, and a profile analysis of each student.

What is left for the experimenter to do here? He or she must define the teaching principles (usually for someone else to program into the computer) and interpret results. Since computers already interpret results in a rudimentary way before selecting the next item, no theoretical obstacle exists to their producing learned discourse after completion of their statistical analyses. If all the relevant teaching theories are elucidated and programmed, there may be nothing left for the experimenter to do.

There are other ideas in this book worth probing. A plea for the development of teaching theories that are harnessed to the conditioning, modeling, and cognitive theories of learning (pp. 64-65); the breakdown of the research enterprise into logistical, methodological, and substantive domains (p. 146); and the further breakdown of all knowledge into categories of "available and used," "available and not used," "not available and not used" (p. 145).

There are also dull stretches. Chapter 10 seems little more than a restatement

of what Gage thinks is taught in a typical educational psychology course. Chapter 11 dealing with the purposes of teacher evaluation—promotion, self-improvement, and research—seems obvious and textbookish.

One major omission is a discussion of whether we can learn anything at all from past research. Although he reviews the literature on four different dimensions of teaching behavior, Gage offers no guidance in combing through a welter of "opposing" or "non-comparable" studies. Light needs to be cast into these dark corners as the first few beams have shown.¹

Finally, we must question Gage's premise that more precise educational research will result in a more effective technology of education which, in turn, will contribute to the solution of world problems. For Gage, education is an antidote for "population growth, nuclear power, poverty, prejudice, nationalism—and other 'bombs'" (p. 15). But this assumption does not seem warranted. The United States, for example, a nation with the highest average level of education in the world, accounts for forty percent of the total rate of this planet's resource consumption with about six percent of its human population. This is the nation that discovered, created, and then dropped nuclear bombs on Japanese civilians and continues to drop bombs on the poor and hungry in Southeast Asia. And despite its enormous wealth, ten percent to twenty percent of the citizens of this nation live in poverty and amidst legendary

prejudice and nationalism. Gage never tells us how education will contribute to the changing of such misshapen values and the righting of such inequities. Moreover, it is difficult to see how any improvement in the "quality" of education, at least as it is implicitly defined within this book, will make us more rational or humane. We should not forget that the bombs are ordered by national politicians and created by physicists, chemists, and engineers, all people whose education Gage would admit to be of the highest quality.

Perhaps the assumption is that research on teaching will bring forth changes in the content of what is learned and taught. But in this entire book there is no discussion of a different content; rather, the emphasis is on better presentation of the existing content of the school curriculum.

Nor can Gage fall back upon the shibboleth that scientific inquiry is justified even where its social benefits are not apparent. It is one thing for a person whose institution foots his or her research bills to say that. It is another for a person who finances him/herself in large part from the public purse.

In addition, much research on teaching must be seen as an imposition. Many students are badgered in interviews, annoyed by questionnaires, and threatened by tests. Teachers may feel they are under surveillance and, given the present atmosphere of accountability, may also feel that their jobs or promotions are at stake. Surely if research on teaching were seen as a universal good, many administrators would cease to bar the doors of their schools to researchers.

Gage himself ultimately concedes that only "here and there, in research on

¹ Richard J. Light and Paul V. Smith, "Accumulating Evidence: Procedures for Resolving Contradictions Among Different Research Studies," *Harvard Educational Review*, 41 (November, 1971), pp. 429-471.

teaching methods, on teacher personality and characteristics, and on social interaction in the classroom, it may be possible to come up with more sanguine judgments about the meaning of the research findings" (p. 31). Thus is summarized almost three-quarters of a century of research on teaching. Given the enormous number of other inputs, both biological and cultural, into the lives of students, is it reasonable to expect that modifications in teaching will dramatically affect learning?

We are tempted to say "no" to that question, and, as a consequence "no" to further research on teaching. But that would be unfair to Gage and the many other workers in this realm. Many years of Gage's life have been spent doing, thinking, and writing about research on teaching and this excellent book testifies to his and others' tenacity, humility and imaginativeness. As outsiders and non-experts in this area, it is incumbent on us to squeeze the question thoroughly before relegating the careers of so many people to limbo.

Ironically, this retreat from the conclusion implied by our arguments shows that we too are caught up in the "more research" and "on the other hand" syndromes that mark the social scientist. On second thought, it might be a good thing if Gage and we other Hamlets went out into the world and did some work.

T. J. M.

THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF
LEARNING AND THINKING: AN
EXPLORATION IN EXPERIMENTAL
ANTHROPOLOGY.

by Michael Cole, John Gay, Joseph A. Glick, and Donald W. Sharp.
New York: Basic Books, 1971.
304 pp. \$10.00.

In this time of controversy over the relative influence of genetic inheritance and cultural environment on the individual's performance on various IQ tests, research directly concerned with how people's thought processes are related to their culture is both refreshing and rare. Cole and his associates have conducted such research among the Kpelle, a tribal group in Liberia, and this book reports how they went about it and the preliminary conclusions they have reached. Their goal was to study the relationships between an individual's culture and the kinds of cognitive skills he develops. To accomplish that end, the authors found it necessary to create a research strategy, a new approach to the problem, that was consistent with the major methodological and theoretical concerns that the disciplines of anthropology, linguistics, and cognitive psychology bring to bear on the study of culture and cognition. They call their approach experimental anthropology and utilize the experimental methods of cognitive psychology as one of their tools for understanding the cognitive processes and strategies of their Kpelle subjects. As the authors put it:

We have followed the strategy of multiple experiments emphasizing patterning of results. We have, in addition, tried to locate the experiments within cultural contexts that were themselves the objects of study. Finally, we have proceeded on the belief that we are always dealing with normal human beings whose behavior is meaningful

within its natural context. When we encounter behavior that appears inappropriate, disorganized, or meaningless, we have tried to make such observations a starting point for inquiry, rather than proof of inferiority. (p. 24)

The latter point represents an important and rational departure from most studies of cognitive differences between members of different cultures or subcultures. The authors reject the practice of administering batteries of tests designed by middle-class Americans to measure the ability of other middle-class Americans to succeed in middle-class American schools and then concluding from the results that their non-Western subjects are, in some unanalyzed way, mentally deficient. Rather they have designed and utilized experiments which attempt to discover how their test subjects actually do go about performing the cognitive tasks under investigation. If a Kpelle subject does not utilize the semantic categories inherent in a list of items to be memorized, then what strategy does he use? Is he capable of utilizing such semantic categories as an aid to memory under other experimental or natural conditions? If so, under what conditions? What characteristics of this particular experiment militate against the use of semantic categories? The answers to questions like these are what the authors ask of their experiments and tests.

The first chapter presents a brief historical survey of the approaches that anthropologists, linguists, and psychologists have taken in the study of the relationship between culture and thinking. The second chapter is devoted to what the authors call an "unorthodox ethnography" of the Kpelle. It is unorthodox in the

sense that it ignores much of what would ordinarily be contained in an ethnographic report. Rather, it concentrates on those aspects of Kpelle life, such as the lack of verbal instruction in the teaching of traditional tasks, that seem most relevant to the development of a particular cognitive style. Chapter Three deals with the classification of natural-world objects in the Kpelle noun system. The determination of how the Kpelle language categorizes the world was a necessary prelude to many of the experiments which required the subject to sort objects into classes, to utilize semantic classes in organizing recall, and so forth. Learning to identify a known class and learning a new classification are quite different processes. For reasons which should be obvious, but which are often ignored in cross-cultural or cross-linguistic studies of cognition, the authors found it necessary conceptually and experimentally to differentiate these two learning processes.

Chapters Four, Five, and Six deal with the investigation of three major classes of learning phenomena: the role of classification in memory and learning, the processes by which attributes are combined to form concepts, and the procedures of problem-solving. Myriad experiments were performed, the results of which were sometimes ambiguous, sometimes contradictory, and sometimes inconclusive. There is a great wealth of data here, but one is given the impression that the authors have not completely digested it. The reviewer certainly hasn't. Some results are clear, however, and, perhaps even more importantly, the experiments are sound and should provide the data for further analysis.

A great deal of care has been taken to

make tasks as appropriate to the Kpelle experience as possible. Where an experiment involves classification, the Kpelle classification system is used. When problems are to be solved, they are presented in forms, such as riddles, which make sense to the Kpelle. Furthermore, since whether or not a Kpelle individual attends school is not dependent upon such variables as social class but rather seems to be randomly determined, an interesting test sample for the effects of education and literacy upon cognition was available. The experiments were designed to take advantage of this. The technical details of the experiments are presented in a number of appendices and the results are summarized in the final chapter.

As mentioned above, the results of the experiments are often difficult to interpret. They are also too numerous and often too specific to be summarized here. One thing is quite clear, however, and deserves emphasis. A non-literate Kpelle when compared to a literate Kpelle, or a literate Kpelle when compared to an American college student, may not "do as well" on a specific task in the sense that he may not bring the same cognitive operations to bear on the problem, but will be capable nevertheless of those cognitive operations and will use them in other situations, including other experiments. Kpelle high school students, for example, use the semantic characteristics of items on a list to organize their recall of that list under more experimental situations than do Kpelle who have never been to school. Non-literate Kpelle, however, *sometimes* use semantic characteristics to organize recall. That is to say, whether it be in memorizing, learning, forming categories, or solving problems,

the principal difference between groups seems not to be in the kinds of cognitive operations of which they are capable but in the differential application of those operations.

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A PARENTS' GUIDE TO NURSERY
SCHOOLS.

by Jean Curtis.

New York: Random House, 1971.

210 pp. \$6.95.

DAY CARE: HOW TO PLAN, DEVELOP,
AND OPERATE A DAY CARE CENTER.

by E. Belle Evans, Beth Shub, and
Marlene Weinstein.

Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.

337 pp. \$6.95.

During the past decade the demand for preschool child care services has grown enormously, attracting a large and diverse group of advocates. With so much new interest, it is reassuring to find two books offering clear descriptions of programs and suggesting straightforward approaches for establishing centers. Both books will be useful references for parents and teachers, and can serve as how-to-do-it manuals for "getting it all together." They assume the value of high-quality, child-centered programs, emphasize parent and community involvement, and are optimistic that parents can successfully initiate their own child care programs.

Neither book attempts to compare early education philosophies, such as the Montessori method, the traditional nursery

school approach, or those classroom strategies which involve highly-structured interaction between children and teachers. Both, in my opinion, accomplish a more important aim: they demystify the rhetoric of early childhood professionalism and reassure parents that their judgment about what constitutes a good program for their children is basically sound. Teachers are good if the classrooms in which they teach are lively, happy places; teachers are not good if their classrooms produce boredom, chaos, or over-regimentation. Programs should be balanced, not involving overdoses of reading readiness to the exclusion of play. Both authors offer an impressive range of classroom activities and suggest a variety of interesting homemade teaching materials.

Despite the many similarities between the books, their tone and the audiences they address differ substantially. The one concerns itself with nursery schools, which are usually a middle-class phenomenon, and the other discusses day care arrangements, generally associated with custodial care for the children of working-class mothers. The semantic distinction between the two seems to be as much a difference in class values as in program offerings. Curtis writes for the middle-class suburban parent, while Evans *et al.* spend less time assuaging guilt and assume their audience has less information and organizing capacity.

For example, both books detail licensing procedures and point out the importance of meeting regulations. Curtis recommends a charter and bylaws, and advises the reader to "find yourself a friend who is reasonably well acquainted with the local political powers that be" if legal restrictions pose a problem. Evans

et al. do not assume such ready access to power, and they spend considerably more time describing the bureaucratic procedures that will have to be followed. They also assume a center will be "inspected" for wiring, plumbing, building construction, and other health and safety features, while Curtis only suggests "inviting" a member of the public health department to visit the premises and see that things are in good order.

Dealing with fund-raising techniques and strategies, Curtis mentions such projects as an "art-in," puppet or magic shows, book sales, and movies, which parents apparently subsidize in addition to tuition. In contrast, Evans *et al.* list federal and local funding agencies, private foundations, grants and donations before suggesting rummage sales and car washes.

These contrasts result from the different audiences to which each book is directed, and they are symptomatic of the national ambivalence toward child care. Curtis asks at the outset, "Why send your child to nursery school?" Her answer suggests that there are wrong reasons as well as right ones. Wrong reasons include resentment at imprisonment with a demanding child, concern for the adjustment of an overly dependent child, and nervous efforts to get Junior into a good college before he is three. According to Curtis, nursery schools are not suitable substitutes for people who really want "a babysitting service, or a pedigree, or an arbiter of manners" (p. 4). Nursery schools are not, in sum, for parents. Curtis never denies the advantages for busy, pre-occupied mothers, but the rationale is always child-centered. "Any child, whether shy or gregarious, can enjoy and benefit from a good nursery school." By contrast,

Evans *et al.* argue that day care need *not* be "a necessary evil" for the parent, and in fact can be "a positive supplement to family relations" as well as an effective educational experience for children (p. xiii). Clearly, there is a dual concept of preschooling which has very little to do with actual programs and more to do with the social class background and values of parents.

Does the United States really want to increase its commitment to preschool programs, and if so what kinds of programs should receive public funds?

The answer depends in part on how much we are willing to spend. One month after taking office, President Nixon stated, "so crucial is the matter of early growth, that we must make a national commitment to providing all American children an opportunity for healthful and stimulating development during the first five years of life." Yet in December he returned unsigned to Congress the comprehensive child development program (S. 2007), which he said was characterized by "fiscal irresponsibility, administrative unworkability, and family-weakening implications." Mr. Nixon also asserted that "neither the immediate need nor the desirability of a national child care development program of this character had been demonstrated."

The President's view of child care apparently assumes that the piecemeal and generally inadequate funding now available is appropriate to meet the needs of both poor and middle-class families. For the poor, work incentives and welfare reform comprise the child care package; for the middle class, assistance to parents in purchasing services in the "private, open market," with no federal involvement in

providing services, and perhaps a tax deduction for working parents, is the option. Such views have serious implications for the future of a comprehensive program of child care.

The two most crucial issues seem to be the costs involved and the design of appropriate delivery systems for services. Services at present are not generally monetized, and since it is unclear what price people would be willing to pay, demand is difficult to assess. According to surveys, parents want child care that is free or relatively inexpensive, offered at times and for periods that are convenient, and located in places near their homes. There are at present almost six million preschool children of working mothers, and fewer than 700,000 licensed day care places available.¹ Over two and a half million children under six live in families headed by a female, and of these nearly sixty-five per cent reported incomes below the poverty line in 1970. The quality of care received by such children is impossible to estimate, but it seems reasonable to assume it is significantly below that offered in the centers described by either Curtis or Evans.

What is too often ignored is the fact that quality child care is a luxury in the United States, especially for low income families. Evans and others have estimated that desirable day care services cost roughly \$2,500 per child per year. Since preschool teachers earned a median salary of \$3,500 in 1970, and teacher's aides even less, it seems likely that costs will increase substantially with the expansion

¹ See "Economics of Child Care," Testimony of Mary P. Rowe before the Senate Finance Committee, September 23, 1971.

of services and the growth of early childhood professionalism. Similarly, the supply of donated space and facilities and volunteer staff can be expected to shrink if services expand, thus making costs spiral upward. In 1970, over half of American families earned less than \$10,000; if we are talking about high quality child care for a family of four, we are talking about an investment which could be equal to half a family's income.

The situation for poor families is especially bleak. Female heads of households under 25 with preschool children earned a median income of \$2,484 in 1970. Three-fourths of all families on welfare earned less than \$2,000 per year in 1970.² How could such families be expected to be a part of the "demand" for services at the going rates? Why should we expect their children to settle for less than adequate care?

When the President charges child care planners with fiscal irresponsibility it is not clear whether this judgment is based on the assumption that the programs outlined are too "high-quality" for low income needs, or on the assumption that they are "too costly" as subsidies for middle-class children. If the real aim is simply to minimize welfare costs, it would seem more "efficient," in economic terms, for the government to continue to subsidize what is doubtless the largest child care program in existence, Aid to Families with Dependent Children. As Gilbert Steiner points out, "it will inevitably be discovered that work training and day care have had little effect

on the number of welfare dependents and no depressing effect on public relief costs."³ This judgment is based on estimates of how much income could be earned in the labor market by women on welfare, and how much it would cost to establish day care for their children.

Minimally, institutionalizing and monetizing child care arrangements draw attention to how naive or hypocritical current attitudes are toward work and welfare. Since welfare is seen as charity, rather than as the cheapest child care possible, the government is relieved of responsibility for the quality of life produced. If quality child care for American children is not "economical" or "cost-effective," perhaps we should begin to question the values and assumptions which have caused these criteria to predominate.

The authors of both books have demonstrated that high-quality community child care is possible and argue persuasively that a good program can be beneficial for both parents and children. Is it not time that Americans at every socioeconomic level began to regard such programs, on their own merits, as both a necessity and a right?

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² U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-60, No. 80, "Income in 1970 of Families and Persons in the United States" (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971).

³ Gilbert Y. Steiner, "Day Care Centers: Hype or Hope?," *Transaction*, 8 (July/August 1971), pp. 50-57.

HUMAN TEACHING FOR HUMAN LEARNING.

by George Isaac Brown.

New York: Viking Press, 1971.

298 pp. \$8.50.

'The refusal of emotion produces nervousness,' Bill said, dipping into the barrel of decadent absinthe. 'Remember that. You are tense as a wire-walker, Hubert. If it is still possible to heave a sigh you should heave it. If it is still possible to rip out a groan you should rip it out. If it is still possible to smite the brow with anguished forefinger then you should let that forefinger fall. And if there are expostulations and entreaties that meet the case to be found in old books, look them up.'

—Donald Barthelme¹

During the past twenty years, many (perhaps most) American schools, colleges, and universities have fallen into the sad error of mistaking the tree-of-knowledge for the tree-of-life. This error often has resulted in stultified, jaded, apathetic, or alienated students and schools that come more and more to resemble fact-factories. While there is general agreement that something has gone wrong, there is precious little agreement on how things can be reordered to promote a happier, more fulfilled, and more humane society that is also no less efficient and no less productive.

One answer growing in popularity is that we have neglected feelings (the affective) in the interests of facts (the cognitive) and therefore must now redress

the balance by allowing kids to have emotionally significant experiences in school. Proponents of this view urge us to set up situations in which the kids will have emotions, will laugh, cry, feel perplexed, feel hostile, feel delighted, and then talk about these emotions. By adding feelings to facts, they suggest, we will give children a complete mix instead of an unbalanced half.

George I. Brown, connected with the Esalen Institute, gives us in his book an account of how he, colleagues, and friends have been working to promote a confluence of the affective and the cognitive, a flowing together of feeling and knowing. He describes numerous examples of affective techniques in operation, and much of the book consists of journals and reports from various teachers using these techniques in elementary and high schools. All the contributors to the book are clearly (sometimes perhaps too clearly) "dedicated," "loving," and "enthusiastic" teachers.

Apart from the specific attention paid to the use of Gestalt-therapy techniques to promote openness, to reduce anxiety, and so on, there's nothing startlingly new about the book. It simply has the virtue, shared by several other recent books, of demonstrating how generous and sensitive teachers work with kids. Since few teachers, let alone parents, see other teachers in action, it is useful to have such demonstrations; one is grateful that Brown's colleagues were prepared and willing to expose themselves for our benefit. It's also clear that they, as teachers, were sensitized by their involvement in Esalen-type experiences.

Because this book is about a group of teachers who are manifestly on the side

¹ *Snow White* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 139.

of the generous, "open" angels, it may seem churlish to lodge any severe reservations. But I feel obliged to do so. Brown's book strikes me as very parochial—a book that has come out of an "in-group" which seems somehow unaware of what is happening outside America and even, perhaps, outside Big Sur. Brown writes, for example,

After World War II, the problem of high-school dropouts and so-called 'disadvantaged' students dramatically awakened the educational establishment to the obvious fact that what it had been doing for students as a whole did not work for these individuals. The initial response was to give them stiffer doses of the same stuff, and that didn't work, either. Necessarily, then, some educators began to devise different approaches. They began to consider the affective along with the cognitive dimension of learning. They were somewhat handicapped, however, because techniques for teaching in the affective domain were scarcely available. Not until recently has the bridge been made between what workers in humanistic psychology and Esalen-type activities were doing and the needs of these educators." (p. 5)

My most serious reservation here is not about Brown's apparent unawareness of all that has happened to change teaching in the past several decades; rather, I question the curiously naked notion of "techniques for teaching in the affective domain." My quarrel is with the use of one's emotions or feelings as the explicit subject-matter of the teaching-learning situation, and I quarrel with this for a variety of reasons.

Affective education is not and cannot be an end in itself. In life, feelings are intricately and complicatedly embedded in reflection, problem-solving, and action. The emotions emerge incidentally but essentially. For example, we enjoy making a vase or a chair because we attend to the making; the joy is largely grounded in self-forgetting, self-obliteration. In this sense many of our truly consummate affective experiences involve non-awareness of self. Take a look at a beautiful work of art—like Dürer's "The Great Piece of Turf"—and it is clear that Dürer was attending to the blades of grass and not to himself. He was *not* asking, "How do I feel about this?"

I believe that shifting the curriculum to include as many forms of creative art-work as possible, with no explicit mention of feeling but with attention to the processes of making, shaping, and re-shaping, would do more for kids than any amount of sitting in a circle saying nice things about each other. The making of art—be it a poem, sculpture, or whatever—involves a complex and *implicit* confluence of mind, heart, and hand; it also involves a weird and paradoxical impersonality—an obliteration of self, an escape from or transcendence of self-awareness. The evidence is there, in abundance, in the letters and journals of writers, painters, sculptors, and musicians.

The same is true of the child's experience of art as reader, perceiver, or member of an audience. Attention is not directed to the life of the ego, to the fluctuating play of the feelings, but rather to something which is simultaneously outside and inside the self. And again one of the fundamental elements of the experience is self-forgetting. When we are rapt,

say, in reading Ursula Le Guin's *Wizard of Earthsea*²—a novel that beautifully embodies feeling in actions—we are not scratching our own sores or fondling our own feelings. We are absorbed in the experience itself. Such absorption is not merely affective or merely cognitive in the sense employed by taxonomists to separate these dimensions of the mind. It is integral and coherent at a distinctive, intense level.

Such experiences seem to me a much more adequate model for learning than the quasi-masturbatory sessions that Brown gives us. Brown's instruments are, alas, rather blunt. His style is often vaguely rhapsodic or exclamatory, even euphoric, precisely where it should be scrupulous. Thus when he claims, "There is no society within our knowledge that is not in dramatic need of emotional education. This could be our greatest investment ever in world peace," he is giving us a messianic gesture, a slogan, a banner.

This is the message of someone who has just discovered the wheel, unaware that the culture already contains plenty of wheels, some more adequate to the work of wheels than his own. We do not merely have the self and the feelings of the self. What sustains us and what can sustain kids is *out there* in abundance. We lose it, we waste it, if we insist on a self-conscious immediacy and subjectivity. There is a world to be known, there are others to be known. Those others will challenge, provoke, irritate, abrade, knock up against the self. It is thus that we are enlarged and educated. As D. H.

Lawrence put it in his poem, "The Best of schools"³:

. . . and I,
As I sit on the shores of the class, alone,
Watch the boys in their summer blouses
As they write, their round heads busily
bowed:
And one after another rouses
His face to look at me,
To ponder very quietly,
As seeing, he does not see.
And then he turns again, with a little,
glad
Thrill of his work he turns again from
me,
Having found what he wanted, having
got what was to be had.
And very sweet it is, while the sunlight
waves
In the ripening morning, to sit alone
with the class
And feel the stream of awakening ripple
and pass
From me to the boys, whose brightening
souls it laves
For this little hour.

This morning, sweet it is
To feel the lads' looks light on me,
Then back in a swift, bright flutter to
work;
Each one darting away with his
Discovery, like birds that steal and
flee.

Touch after touch I feel on me
As their eyes glance at me for the grain
Of rigour they taste delightedly.

Brown's book is a sign of the times. We are increasingly aware of the dangers of

² Berkeley, Calif.: Parnassus Press, 1968.

³ *The Complete Poems of D. H. Lawrence* (New York: Viking Press, 1971), p. 51.

disaffection from ourselves and increasingly aware that our culture, perhaps more so than any other, promotes a severe separation of the emotional from the rational. The classroom testimonies of Brown's colleagues speak directly to this issue and make the book worth owning. The book should be read, however, more for the problems it addresses than for the solutions it recommends.

GEOFFREY SUMMERFIELD
University of California, Berkeley

ORIGINS OF THE URBAN SCHOOL:
PUBLIC EDUCATION IN MASSACHUSETTS,
1870-1915.
by Marvin Lazerson.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1971. 278 pp. \$10.00.

In nineteenth century England, Germany, France, the United States, and Canada, sharp increases in the scale of industry changed the basic laboring unit from the family to the individual. Abruptly separated from the enfolding routines of the working family, many children ceased to learn their life's work from their parents and found themselves less subject to family discipline. This new condition made little difference to the lives of those children whose parents found new ways of binding them to the world of work. Other youngsters thoroughly alarmed many residents of European and North American cities, however, by taking advantage of their sudden freedom from the traditional web of authority and training to roam the streets, where they often begged, peddled, stole, and pandered themselves.

Municipal and state authorities turned to the schools to take over the rearing, controlling, and training of these idle and delinquent young people. Once they collected such vagrants in the schools, teachers, administrators, school committee members, social reformers, and philanthropists devised programs to nurture such supposedly disappearing qualities as industriousness, thrift, the sense of community, and pride in self and workmanship. In *Origins of the Urban School: Public Education in Massachusetts, 1870-1915*, Marvin Lazerson examines "the assumptions, ideologies and practices" of these school reformers whose efforts served as models for so much of twentieth century education.

Between 1870 and 1915 Massachusetts remade its urban school systems. It increased enrollment of 5- to 15-year-olds from less than 70 to more than 90 per cent, expanded secondary education eight-fold, and introduced modern administrative structures. Increasingly powerful school superintendents enforced certification regulations for teachers, put standard curricula into effect, and ensured that school plants were used efficiently. Lazerson shows how, in the context of this substantial growth, Massachusetts reformers and educators like Samuel T. Dutton of Brookline came "to face the startling fact" that families, particularly poor and immigrant families, were "throwing upon the school" much of their responsibility. By building traditional values into new educational programs like kindergarten and manual training, schools first tried to bolster the failing family. Gradually, however, reformers and schoolmen shifted their allegiance from the family to the new urban and industrial order. They gave practical ex-

pression to their new commitment, Lazerson explains, by changing the purpose of the kindergarten, by turning manual training into vocational education, and by using citizenship and Americanization programs to promote civic loyalty.

In his first two examples—kindergartens and manual training—Lazerson clearly sets forth his main thesis. First introduced by philanthropists and social settlement workers, Froebelian kindergartens became, in the eyes of their champions, the “crucial wedge” to bring order to children’s growth and to their lives at home, in the streets, and in school. After Mrs. Quincy Adams Shaw and others had demonstrated kindergartens as a charitable enterprise, they persuaded Boston, Cambridge, and other Massachusetts cities to add them to their school systems. Between 1890 and 1900, enrollment in public kindergartens in Massachusetts grew from 3000 to 14,000 children. Yet public kindergartens were unable to prove that their unique and expensive efforts were indeed overcoming baneful home and neighborhood conditions. Prodded by critics like State Commissioner of Education David Snedden, kindergarten teachers stopped trying to rebuild the child’s home and worked instead on the less costly and less ambitious task of preparing him for formal schooling. In the long run, while the kindergarten did not provide the Commonwealth with a new kind of home and family, it “revolutionized modern processes of primary teaching” in the state, as Lynn’s Superintendent of Schools explained, by introducing clay, paper-cutting, story-telling, and rest periods to schooling.

Manual training also failed to deliver on the promises its proponents made.

Lazerson explains that the central purpose of this new subject was to restore “the historic tie between pride in work and moral growth,” to provide, as Worcester’s Superintendent of Schools put it, “that continuous bodily effort . . . essential to the establishment of character or the training of the will.” When mundane schemes of handwork proved unable to achieve this ambitious goal, Massachusetts educators felt forced to turn away from the tradition that the common school taught all children, together, “the essentials of citizenship, morality, communication, and thought.” Instead, in training that was directly vocational, they established an alternative definition of equality of educational opportunity in which, as Lazerson points out, “each child was directed toward a different function, his learning part of the specialization necessary for efficient industrial production.”

Lazerson has transformed his doctoral dissertation into an interesting, well-written, and provocative study. Through the effective use of gem-like short quotations he breathes life into now dry-as-dust wrangles over forgotten issues of educational policy and practice. He displays magisterial command of a wide array of sources. While making an important, sharply focused contribution to the history of education, Lazerson also adds to the fundamental re-examination that social historians are giving to this period of American history. One cannot understand the history of nineteenth century social welfare, for example, until one sees with him how urban reformers charged the public schools with central responsibility for solving the problems posed by poor families and their children.

My few differences with Lazerson's excellent study are more with its tone than its substance. While rightly skeptical about the new schooling which Massachusetts cities introduced, Lazerson sometimes gives a feeling that opportunities were lost and earlier ideals betrayed. His chapter on the kindergarten, for example, projects a sense of regret that kindergarteners were forced to abandon a role which, while disguised as professional help for families, looks suspiciously like another version of the middle class woman acting as "Lady Bountiful." I suspect, in fact, that many urban families needed a lot less direct help than the kindergarteners and other schoolmen wanted to give them. In my own study of contemporary developments in Canada I find that with the introduction of compulsory education (which cut into the ranks of street arabs) and slowly improving standards of living, urban dwellers, including the native and immigrant poor, began to forge a new kind of family which made child-rearing rather than work the most important task.

Also, I perhaps have a shade more sympathy than Lazerson for those beleaguered schoolmen and others who tried to come to grips with the new role that industrial society forced on the

schools. Lazerson's discerning analysis, when put together with the recent work of other historians and especially that of Michael Katz,¹ shows that those who established modern school systems were not following some predetermined path; their ramshackle creations illustrate neither the work of the spirit of progress in history nor the conspiracy of one social class against another. Because they did not really understand what was going on around them, those who put together the short term, ad hoc bits and pieces which suddenly grew into modern schooling probably made more wrong decisions than right ones. If this assessment is accurate, however, and if the reader also shares with Lazerson a dislike of many features of modern education, then I suppose our quarrel is not with turn-of-the-century activists who tried and failed but rather with their successors who let failures stand for so long. I now understand this point more clearly than before—further evidence of the fineness of Lazerson's book.

NEIL SUTHERLAND
University of British Columbia

¹ *Class, Bureaucracy and Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America* (New York: Praeger, 1971).

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
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
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
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
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
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NUMBER THREE

AUGUST 1972

A SPECIAL ISSUE Alternative Schools

Strengthening Alternative High Schools
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
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*Notes Toward a Process of Afro-
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Strengthening Alternative High Schools*

CENTER FOR NEW SCHOOLS

Chicago, Illinois

The authors first present a case study of student involvement in decision-making at Chicago's Metro High School, emphasizing the influence of the staff, student subgroups, and the school program upon the development of the decision-making process. They then trace patterns of development common to alternative schools, criticizing the notion of "organic growth" with which many alternative schools begin. Finally, the authors propose a constructive, supportive role for research, evaluation, and feedback to strengthen alternative schools within a framework of shared analysis and decision-making.

For two years we were involved full-time in Metro High School, an alternative school in Chicago. During this time, we taught and counseled students, negotiated with the school system, worked with teachers, helped set up community-based classes, and participated in just about every aspect of starting the school. In addition, we tried out different approaches to gathering information about the development of the school, with the aim of strengthening its operation. Since that time, we

* This article results from the Metro research program conducted by Center for New Schools, 431 S. Dearborn, Chicago, Illinois 60605. It represents the thought and work of many people involved in establishing Metro High School over the past three years. The section "Student Involvement in Decision-making at Metro High School" is based on the work of Stephen H. Wilson, which is presented in full in his doctoral thesis, "A Participant Observation Study of the Attempt to Institute Student Participation in Decision-Making in an Experimental High School," University of Chicago, 1972. Donald R. Moore had major responsibility for writing the article in

have worked directly with five other alternative schools, providing them with technical assistance tied closely to the information-gathering techniques we found helpful at Metro. We are now collecting information about other alternative schools throughout the country and have substantial contact with about thirty additional schools. Most of these schools have the following characteristics:

1. They are urban high schools, some inside and some outside the public school system.
2. They have either diverse student bodies in terms of race, ethnic group, and social class or student bodies composed of low-income white or Black students.
3. They have enrollments of between 20 and 600 students, small by public school standards. The typical school has a student body of 150-200 students, or a series of centers each with 150-200 students.

This article grows out of our experience at Metro and our interest in strengthening other alternative schools like it. Our analysis is probably most pertinent to such schools, but it may have implications for other types of alternative schools or for those who seek changes in established conventional schools. We first present a consideration of the forces operating in Metro High School as it attempted to involve students in decision-making. This case study, based on extensive participant observation, may be of use to other alternative schools trying to find effective ways of involving students in decision-making and will illustrate some underlying patterns of development that have been repeated in many alternative schools. Next, we offer a tentative framework for understanding alternative school development as a first step in thinking about ways to strengthen alternative schools. We conclude with an analysis of the type of research and evaluation that can help to strengthen alternative schools. This final section will discuss substantive issues that warrant study, specific research methods that have proved helpful, and ways that research and evaluation can be incorporated into a much broader process in which alternative school staff and students decide how they can best create a healthy learning community.

its present form with the assistance of Richard Johnson, Stephen H. Wilson, and Thomas A. Wilson.

The Metro research has been supported by three grants from the Urban Education Research Fund of the University of Illinois College of Education at Chicago Circle. Additional support from the Wieboldt Foundation of Chicago also assisted us in completing this manuscript. Copyright © Center for New Schools, Inc., 1972. All rights reserved.

Student Involvement in Decision-making at Metro High School

Metro High School is an alternative high school without walls operating within the Chicago Public School System. A private organization, Urban Research Corporation, convinced the Chicago Board of Education to start the school in 1969 and persuaded a number of businesses, cultural organizations, and community groups to cooperate by providing learning experiences for students. The 350 Metro students were selected from volunteers in a city-wide lottery. The student body closely reflected the diversity of the total school system in terms of race, social class, ethnic group, and previous success in school. The school's twenty full-time teachers all met the certification standards of the Board of Education, although about a third were from outside the school system. The staff was young and strongly committed to Metro, willing to stay until five or six every night to work with students and to discuss problems entailed in this attempt to reconstruct just about every aspect of a school's educational and social organization.¹

Initially, the staff shared many of the assumptions about student participation in decision-making commonly made in the alternative schools that have been started in the past few years. Along with Metro's first teachers, we felt that the lack of student involvement in shaping decisions that affected their lives was a major cause of alienation and disruption within conventional high schools. We believed that students should be prepared to take a strong role in decision-making in their later lives. We felt that a good beginning for an effective learning program with these goals would be to eliminate the restrictive rules that generally govern students' daily behavior such as dress codes and hall passes; to allow students to select their own courses within broad distributional requirements; to involve students in the evaluation and planning of individual courses; and to involve students in making and implementing policies that would affect the entire community. It is this last aspect of decision-making—*involvement at the institutional level*—that is analyzed here.

Staff (including planners and teachers) assumed that students would come forward eagerly to participate in institutional decision-making, given the opportunity. Further, we didn't want to prescribe the form that such involvement would take, but hoped that the students themselves could develop an appropriate form.

¹ For a more detailed description of the Metro High School program, see Moore, Wilson, and Johnson, *The Metro School: A Report on the Progress of Chicago's Experimental "School Without Walls"* (Chicago: Urban Research Corporation, 1971).

A brief summary of the major phases in the evolution of this initial idea follows.

In the first semester of operation, students generally felt that no government at all was best, but that if some form of government were necessary, the only valid form would be one based on direct representation. Consequently, a weekly all-school meeting was initiated which was supposed to function as the major decision-making body within the school. Although it was effective in a few crisis situations, the meeting proved unwieldy for making ordinary decisions. Attendance fell off by the middle of the first semester, and, in the absence of clearcut decisions by these meetings, staff meetings and staff committees became the main arena for decision-making. The staff had been meeting almost daily since the school opened, anyway, trying to cope with the many problems of the new institution, and had established committees to make decisions about evaluation and curriculum.

Several faculty members were upset with the gravitation of decision-making to the staff. After the all-school meeting failed, these staff members encouraged students to form a student government with two representatives from each counseling group (similar to a home-room). However, this organization met only once before it faded from existence.

The important influences on the development of student involvement at Metro during this crucial first semester can be organized under six major topics: students' initial approach to involvement, staff's initial approach to involvement, characteristics of the Metro program, characteristics of the school system and the city, student and staff approaches in the developing program, and variations in approach among student subgroups. Our discussion of these topics is based on data collected and analyzed in a two-year program of participant observation at Metro, using methods described later in this article. Each of the key generalizations presented in the following section (for example, that most students initially felt only governments based on direct representation were legitimate) has been developed using these methods of data collection and analysis. Quotations are used to illustrate various generalizations and are not intended to "prove" any point.

Students' Initial Approach to Involvement

We will not attempt to review other research and theory in discussing student involvement in decision-making at Metro. However, one distinction employed by Etzioni² is extremely useful in understanding the students' initial orientations

² Amitai Etzioni, "Organizational Control Structure," in *Handbook of Organizations*, ed. James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).

toward decision-making. Etzioni hypothesizes that organizations develop two major realms of activity: the "instrumental" realm, which is related to the official functions of the organization, and the "expressive" realm, which is related to people's personal concerns. In the school context, "instrumental" activities deal mainly with the operation of the instructional program, while "expressive" activities center around friendships, dating, athletics, and informal "rapping." In many organizations, two different structures evolve to deal with these two realms, with the expressive realm having leaders, values, and styles of action that may be at odds with the organization of the instrumental realm. In the traditional school context, adolescents often invest most of their energy in the expressive realm, and leadership in expressive activities determines prestige with other students. Administration and teachers often attempt to exert strict controls over not only the instrumental realm, but also the expressive realm, through rules about dress, social interaction, movement, eating, and smoking. To defend their autonomy in the expressive realm, students create separate expressive subcultures, and recently have directly challenged the school's right to regulate their expressive activity.

Coming from traditional schools, Metro students were very concerned to gain autonomy in the expressive realm. Metro staff strongly encouraged this direction because we considered freedom of movement, dress, expression, and association fundamental to the program's design. Thus, in the areas that students cared most about, there was no need for organized participation in decision-making. The battle had already been won. At the end of the first semester of operation, all students were asked in short structured interviews what they liked most about Metro as compared with their old school. The characteristic of the program cited most often was freedom in the expressive realm: freedom to talk to friends, get up and leave if you were restless, wear what you wanted, or eat when you wanted.

In this same series of interviews students also frequently mentioned the closer student-teacher relationship as one of the school's strengths. The staff's willingness to grant freedom in the expressive realm helped establish a degree of trust between teachers and students. Staff members were sensitive to student concerns, and by the end of the first semester many students felt comfortable in openly criticizing those aspects of the program they wanted changed. This freedom to criticize was extremely important to students; they generally preferred a decision-making role in which they could bring problems to the attention of the staff, who would then have the responsibility to develop solutions, rather than one in which they developed and implemented detailed programs themselves.

Student: The way you got to do it is to make decisions. Then if we don't like it, we'll let you know. You do something and we'll react. Students don't dig sitting in meetings and stuff and you don't have any idea what it means.

The major concerns of students with regard to school policies were: to obtain as wide a field as possible for expressive activity; to be able to complain to the staff about instrumental activities they disliked; to establish the right to opt out of instrumental activity if they wished. To a large extent the first objective was achieved. In the few areas of expressive activity where freedom was not allowed (for example, students were not allowed to smoke in the school headquarters because of a Board of Education rule), there was constant minor friction with the staff. The second objective was also largely achieved: almost all teachers were open to students' complaints and effectively communicated this willingness to listen to students, even though they did not always solve the problems posed. Many students initially felt that the third objective had also been achieved because of the staff's stated emphasis on freedom in the program.

With their major objectives largely achieved, Metro students saw little reason to become actively involved in a formal decision-making process. Staff members argued that students should carve out some formal decision-making role for themselves, since the staff might not always act in the students' best interest. This argument, however, was highly abstract, and most students were influenced much more by present reality. They saw little need to expend energy in a decision-making process when things were already going their way.

A major factor in students' reluctance to create a formal decision-making structure was their strongly negative experience with student governments in their old schools. Such governments had had limited power, had been manipulated by teachers and administrators, had made and enforced restrictive rules rather than protected student interests, and had often been composed primarily of students from higher status homes.

Student: The student council was just puppets for the teachers. They pulled the strings and the student council did what they wanted.

Student: There was one clique that got involved. No one else paid any attention.

In the face of this negative experience, staff and those students pushing student government were never successful in communicating an alternative image of what a government could be to the majority of the students.

Student: All government is is some guy going around telling you what to do. There are people here nobody is going to force them to do anything.

Student: If we have a student government, they'll start making rules and pretty soon we'll end up like the old schools.

Observer: Why don't you guys get together in some kind of student government and see what you can do about it (the lack of gym equipment).

Student: A student government couldn't do that shit.

Believing that things were going well, many students cited local and national governmental structures with which they were dissatisfied in arguing against a government at Metro. Politically active "youth culture" students cited the war policies of the national government. Many Black students cited the actions of the police at a local level. In both instances, the form of the argument was the same: "You're copying the kind of government that we already know doesn't work right."

Many students held to the notion that the individual is powerless in acting against larger forces in the society; they maintained that involvement was pointless. When they did get involved, any small setback confirmed their belief that "you can't fight the system." A role in actively planning and carrying out decisions was completely foreign to students' previous experiences; the most many hoped for was a chance to complain. Staff attempts to move students beyond the complaining mode were largely unsuccessful.

Closely related to students' distrust of governmental structures and school-wide policies was a personal ethic that is summarized in two current clichés: "do your own thing" and "hang loose." Student adherence to these ideas came through repeatedly in both our interviews and our observations. The ideal form of government for Metro, many students believed, was none at all. There would be no government, no rules; only "people dealing with people."

Student: We're going to have a beautiful anarchy. Everybody's going to do their own thing and leave everybody else alone. We decided we don't need a government.

Following from this theory, if there had to be some form of government, it could only involve direct representation. Most students felt that people could only speak for themselves, not for other people.

Student: No one can represent me. I'm the only person who knows what I'm thinking and no one else can present my views.

This aversion to representative government was related somewhat to the extreme diversity of the Metro population. However, some students felt that they couldn't even represent their best friends.

Denial of the concept of representation, linked in part to students' negative

experiences with student governments in their old schools, called into question the motives of those students who wished to form a representative government. Thus, students who privately admitted that they were extremely interested in participating in a student government were reluctant to come forward for fear of being branded as power-hungry by their peers.

Teacher: Let's elect a representative. Any nominations. . . . No nominations? I guess we'll have to ask who's willing to be ours.

Student: (feigning great reluctance) I guess if no one wants it, I'll volunteer.

The "hang loose" ethic glorified reacting to the feeling of the moment and coping with each situation as it arose. It opposed planning, rules, and long meetings. It led students to accept whatever happened with equanimity. If no one showed up for a scheduled meeting, the likely response was, "We'll just have it another time." If the person who was supposed to buy pop for a picnic came without it, the explanation "I just couldn't get it together" satisfied many people.

The nature of the staff meetings also hindered student involvement in formal decision-making. Many staff meetings were long, marked by extended rhetorical exchanges, and conducted using procedures unfamiliar to most students. Time was spent discussing details of implementation that students felt were trivial. Attendance at a few staff meetings confirmed the belief that the best way to influence decisions was to talk informally with teachers and let them fight it out.

Student: I'm not going to spend all those hours working on that stuff. These teachers are here till six every day. They're paid to do it.

Student: I shouldn't have to worry about that. I'm getting credit for being a student, not for being a teacher.

The process of decision-making came in dead last in terms of enjoyment, well behind "messing around," "rapping," or "playing ball."

Student: No, can't (come to meeting). Me and Karen are going to mess around downtown today.

Staff's Initial Approach to Involvement

As it became clear that the all-school meeting was an inadequate arena for decision-making and as the problems of inventing an entirely new institution mounted, the staff increasingly felt that the survival of the institution depended primarily on their ability to make decisions and carry them out. Student involvement in institutional decision-making, which for many staff members had been a

top priority initially, became secondary to finding solutions to pressing problems.

Given this context, many characteristics of the staff, some of which have already been touched on, lessened the likelihood of formal participation by students in institutional decision-making.

1. Staff members had a close relationship with students, were willing to listen to students' gripes about the program, and were often sensitive in reacting to and even anticipating students' needs.

2. The staff felt ultimately responsible for the success of the program; we felt that if it failed, its demise would be perceived as our responsibility, not the students'.

3. Unexpectedly, the excellence and creativity of the staff worked against student involvement. Tentative student ideas were often pale in comparison to teachers' well-developed ideas that grew out of long experience and analysis.

4. However much a staff member was consciously committed to student involvement, his or her past life experience as a teacher and earlier as a student had cast students in a submissive role. Especially when harried and overworked, staff tended to revert to old role definitions.

5. Some staff members were ambivalent about the desirability of student involvement in decision-making and unsure of its limits. They communicated this ambivalence, often in subtle ways, by their actions in the decision-making process.

6. Teachers had superior skills in the process of bureaucratic decision-making compared with students. This competence acted as a constant pressure (of which we were generally not aware) that consolidated the staff role in decision-making *vis-à-vis* the students.

7. Even when students were present in staff meetings, staff shaped the event. We were always there, and we knew past history of which students were unaware.

Teacher: Do you know what's going on?

Student: No, I wasn't here when you discussed it last week.

Teacher: See, that's one of our biggest problems. We'll never get anything done if it always goes on like this.

8. The staff itself encountered formidable problems in becoming an effective body for making and carrying out decisions. We had had limited experience in working in this capacity in previous teaching assignments. Personality clashes sometimes obscured issues; an initial rejection of procedural rules allowed discus-

sions to wander aimlessly; those present at meetings were often unclear as to when a decision had been reached; those absent were not always informed about decisions; responsibility was often not clearly assigned for carrying out a decision. When decisions required widespread cooperation of students and staff, staff members were hesitant to confront individuals who violated agreements. A detailed consideration of these issues is in itself a major topic of the Metro research program. However, there are direct implications for student involvement: most staff members, facing difficult problems of dealing with each other in decision-making, often could not cope sensitively with the added issue of student involvement.

This discussion might give the misleading impression that the staff knowingly throttled student involvement. The case was quite the opposite. Most staff members spent considerable time listening to student complaints and trying to deal with them, agonizing over the lack of student involvement and trying to correct it. Had the students exhibited a strong desire for involvement, staff characteristics that worked against student involvement would probably have been a minor influence. As it happened, however, they meshed with prevailing student attitudes to minimize the chances of student involvement.

Characteristics of the Metro Program

It is of course impossible to neatly separate characteristics of the program from characteristics of the students and staff mentioned above. Yet it is useful, at least for the purpose of analysis, to discuss separately several aspects of the developing Metro program that tended to work against student participation in institutional decision-making.

Metro was testing a number of new educational ideas that staff members deemed just as important as the idea of involving students in decision-making. To some extent, these ideas worked against the goal of student involvement. The school without walls concept dispersed students throughout the city and made meetings and communications difficult. The multi-racial and multi-class student body made it hard for the students to speak with one voice on any issue. The attractiveness of curriculum offerings such as film-making, improvisational theater, and internships in political organizations competed with decision-making for the student's time, as did the many opportunities for expressive activity. In addition, the school's commitment to certain curricular innovations (interdisciplinary curricula, use of the city as a learning resource) sometimes limited the field for decision-making.

Student: We told them we didn't like that core course idea and that it just wouldn't work, but it went in one ear and right out the other.

A second area of difficulty was communications within the school. Communications regarding the time and place of meetings, their agendas, and the status of various decisions were often ineffective at Metro. Sometimes meetings were advertised only through informal channels. Sometimes only staff received notification. So many signs and notices were constantly bombarding students that much information was lost and some people completely tuned out these overloaded communication channels. Many communications were of generally poor graphic quality, e.g., blurred dittoes, tiny hand-written signs, or bulletin boards with several hundred nondescript notices. This communication problem discouraged the participation of all but the most committed and undercut the legitimacy of decisions that were made without most people's knowledge.

Student: Who made that decision? I never heard about those meetings; are you sure they told people about them?

As in any institution, many of the discussions and work related to decision-making went on informally. This tendency was accentuated at Metro by the organizational confusion of the new institution and the emphasis on informality that pervaded the school. This informality had the unintended effect of excluding students from many important discussions relevant to various decisions. Even though teachers and students had close relationships, teachers tended to eat and relax together. Key meetings were often called quickly in response to a crisis or impending deadline, and informal channels of communication shaped the group that turned out.

Announcements of meetings were often not fully understood even when students heard or saw the message. Many students had a limited concept of the influence they could have in shaping decisions they were concerned about. They failed to relate their concerns to the expectation that they would get something done by attending an announced meeting. The ability to receive and comprehend communications varied widely among student subgroups, as will be discussed later.

Characteristics of the School System and the City
Metro did not develop in a vacuum. It had to deal constantly with a school bureaucracy whose reaction to the school generally ranged between indifference and open hostility. Few persons in the school bureaucracy and in the city at large

shared Metro's commitment to a new vision of the capacities of adolescents. Key members of the central administrative staff of the Board of Education were consistently opposed to student involvement in decision-making, and their disparagement of Metro's efforts was often communicated to the student body. As these stories circulated, it became unclear whether the disparaging statements were made by central administrative staff or Metro staff.

Principal, to Staff: I showed the plan for the administrative board to the district superintendent. She couldn't stop laughing. Teachers and students have equal votes. She showed it all around the office.

The bureaucracy often blocked or delayed the implementation of Metro decisions. Some students who participated in decision-making did not understand the enervating process of working through and around the bureaucracy and interpreted the delays as a result of the Metro staff's insincerity. Other students came to understand the process, but became discouraged about accomplishing anything in the face of this giant bureaucracy.

The nature of the "school without walls" put students in constant contact with an outside world (including elevator operators, policemen, transit collectors, store and office building guards) that gives limited rights to young people. Metro often took the student's part in these encounters, protesting to the transit authority, for example, about collectors who wouldn't accept students' fare cards. However, the school had limited success in many such instances. Again, delay and failure discouraged students from participating in decision-making.

A final and very important aspect of the larger society that affected Metro was the compulsory nature of schooling. Since students were compelled by law to stay in school until age sixteen and many were under parental pressure to finish high school, some students viewed Metro as the best of a set of limited options. Ideally, they would have preferred not to attend any school at all, so they had limited interest in shaping Metro beyond protecting their expressive activities and their right to opt out of undesirable instrumental activities.

Student: You'll let us decorate our zoo, but you won't let us out.

Student: The only reason I stay is cause my mama says I better. She didn't finish, and she wants me to. She said she'd tan my ass if I quit.

Student and Staff Approaches in the Developing Program

The main factors that influenced the history of student involvement in institutional decision-making at Metro were largely fixed, or became apparent, in the

first semester of operation. During the second and third semesters (September 1970 to June 1971), the actions of students and staff can be seen to flow largely from their initial attitudes and actions.

Near the end of the second semester of operation, a group of staff and students tried to develop a new model for a staff-student governing body. Under this plan, an "administrative board" was to become the central governing unit. The board was to be composed of representatives from "like groups" formed by both staff and students. A "like group" was any group of five people who felt they had common interests they wanted to see represented. Each like group could have representation on the board.

Over a period of several weeks, like groups were formed, procedures were established for the administrative board and a chairman was elected. The board functioned for about six weeks and then quietly expired. Three factors contributed to its demise: (1) student involvement in the administrative board was generally limited to the small group of students who had been active in past government schemes; (2) the board's initiators had hoped the board could incorporate the already functioning staff committee system and coordinate its work with the principal, but this attempt was not successful; (3) the administrative board was overly concerned about the dangers of centralization and so suffered from a lack of organization.

Once again, the staff meeting and its associated committees became the major arena for decision-making and implementation. The staff meeting/committee structure grew increasingly efficient at making decisions and carrying them out, while students continued to be unaware of its overall nature.

Student: I didn't like the way registration worked.

Teacher: You ought to get to work on the curriculum committee.

Student: What's that?

Student: What do you mean curriculum committee?

Participation was greatest in crisis situations when students discussed issues at all-school meetings and turned out in somewhat larger numbers to work within the staff decision-making apparatus. Some students did attend staff meetings regularly, and individual committees met some success in involving students in their work. However, as attempts to turn students out for meetings failed, less and less effort was invested in communicating the times and agendas of meetings to the school at large.

Student: What's that over there?

Teacher: It's a staff meeting.

Student: Can we go hear what they're talking about?

Teacher: Sure, they're open meetings. Didn't you know that?

Observer: How's the committee coming? Have any students come to meetings?

Teacher: I gave up on them. Last year, I put up signs and signs and no one showed. I guess they're not interested.

Students who did decide to come to a staff or curriculum committee meeting confronted a group of people who shared a lot of common experience, controlled the meeting, often felt harried and anxious to make progress, sometimes sent out ambiguous signals regarding student involvement, and were often reluctant to "fill people in" about what had transpired.

Teacher: You know, we've been through five evaluations now. Our committee is just beginning to feel like we know what's happening. It doesn't make much sense to start all over again. Students are welcome to come help though.

The articulate, forceful student could overcome these dynamics since most staff members still talked constantly to students about issues in the school and were anxious to know student views. However, the average student attending a staff meeting came to feel essentially like a visitor.

The solidification of the staff meeting/committee system diminished the chances for survival of the faculty-student administrative board. In the view of some staff members, those who started the ad board were perpetuating the same weaknesses that were embodied in the all-school meeting and student council approaches. Rotating chairmen, uncertain meeting times, and changing representatives reminded them of earlier decision-making vacuums into which the staff had been compelled to move. Further, some staff members who had done considerable work through the committee system on such topics as evaluation and curriculum were reluctant to throw their lot in with the ad board.

Teacher: The way I understand it the ad board is just supposed to recommend things. I don't see the use of the curriculum committee and all the work we've done if it's still got to be voted on.

As time went on, there was a shift in concern from decision-making to decision-implementation. The staff became very efficient at implementing the type of decision that required the work of a few people, such as developing a format for regis-

tration. However, they had much greater difficulty in implementing decisions that required widespread cooperation of staff and students such as a prohibition on noisy activities in the conference areas. Initially, staff members were extremely reluctant to set up clear limits for behavior and act as "policemen" in enforcing them. They had basic disagreements, which they did not start to clarify until well into the second semester of operation, concerning the limits of behavior and a staff member's responsibility in enforcing them.

The issue of enforcing limits within the school raised particular problems for students. Staff had hoped that the entire community of staff and students would enforce agreed upon "understandings." Students did feel a measure of responsibility to deal with students who were clearly out of line, particularly when their action might result in bad publicity for the school. However, students were extremely reluctant to confront their fellows, since this ran counter to the notion that everyone should be free to do his or her own thing.

Student: We'd get together in these meetings and make all kinds of resolutions. Like keeping the TV low or talking to people who were cutting. When it got down to really saying something to someone, no one could do it. It just wasn't done.

The diversity of students in the school made this problem even more severe. If students were asked how a decision should be carried out, they often responded that "everyone will take care of himself."

Student: Who's going to do it? (Put out notes on the results of a meeting).

Student: You know, whoever feels like it will do it.

Even when it was apparent that self-regulation was not working—for example, during a time when there was extensive thievery of girls' purses—students preferred to suffer the consequences rather than institute rules and procedures.

Student: I got some stuff ripped off from my locker. It's something you just live with. You don't bring stuff and leave it around. You don't want cops walking around here, do you?

Those students who did attempt to enforce community understandings were often ignored or belittled by their fellows.

Student: I'm really depressed today. Two times I tried to talk to people who were messing up. Once there were two kids chasing each other around a room. I asked them to stop. Another time there was a guy bouncing a ball against a wall, messing it up. I asked him to stop. His friend

asked where was my badge. Then he said, 'Yeah, you a policeman or something?' He kept on bouncing the ball. Then he said, 'Make me stop.'

Even during the early period when important decisions were made in all-school meetings, many students were not aware of what these decisions were or did not feel bound by decisions they had not taken part in.

Student: Who decided it was going to be done that way?

Teacher: There was a student meeting yesterday afternoon.

Student: I wasn't there and I can name ten other guys who weren't. Now, you know they're not going to go along with that.

As decision-making became centered in the staff meeting/committee system, students increasingly viewed decisions as externally imposed rules.

Student: This place is getting worse. They're beginning to push us around and make rules.

It should be emphasized that most students were enthusiastic about the school and generally satisfied with its operation.³ However, observations and interviews in the third semester revealed that a system in which students communicated informally with staff, while staff dominated the formal decision-making, had some serious short-comings. Staff were extremely overworked, and they could deal only with a portion of the complaints advanced by students. They tended to select those issues for resolution that they deemed most important in the light of their own values. Thus they more effectively served the needs of students with value orientations and backgrounds similar to theirs.

Variations in Approach among Student Subgroups

Metro probably has one of the most diverse student bodies of any high school in the United States. Students were selected randomly from a cross-section of applicants representative of student population of the city as a whole in terms of race, ethnic group, social class, measured ability, interests, and previous success in school. Since the outcomes of education in traditional schools have been closely related to the background characteristics of students, and since Metro sought to eliminate or at least lessen these disparities, variations among subgroups in every aspect of the Metro program were scrutinized closely. Originally, the focus

³ An independent evaluation team from the University of Michigan who spent a week at the school during its third semester confirmed this observation. See Glorianne Wittes *et al.*, *Problems and Potentials of Innovative Governance Structures in Secondary Schools* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Educational Change Team, University of Michigan, 1972).

of the research was on racial and social class subgroups within the school. However, our observations led to some classifications for students based more directly on their attitudes, actions, and patterns of association within the Metro program. These groupings were closely related to the life styles, attitudes toward schooling and patterns of association students had developed in the traditional school:

Black School-Oriented: The Black School-Oriented students conformed to the expectations of their previous schools, in terms of both academic performance and personal behavior. They viewed school in terms of getting a good job and going to college. They tended to complete school work faithfully and had average to superior skill levels and records of past achievement. They came from lower to middle income background.⁴

Black-Consciousness/School-Oriented: These students had many characteristics in common with the Black School-Oriented group. However, they were more aware of the political dimensions of the Black consciousness movement and talked about success in school as a means for gaining skills that would further Black political development.

Black School-Alienated: The previous experiences of these students had been characterized by academic failure and conflict with the school. They identified strongly with black students from similar backgrounds. These students also identified with the esthetic elements of black consciousness in terms of dress and music. They tended to come from low-income families and often lived in large housing projects or physically decaying inner city neighborhoods.

White School-Oriented: These students had the same general characteristics as Black School-Oriented students.

White School-Alienated/Ethnic: These students had a history of past school experience similar to the Black School-Alienated students. Their family income levels fell in the low to middle range. Members of the group generally saw themselves as "greasers," and thus acted out their alienation from the school in a manner that is consistent with the values of urban ethnic white youth. They were particularly hostile to the White School-Alienated/Youth Culture students.

White School-Alienated/Youth Culture: These students, mostly from middle income backgrounds, identified with the "counter culture." They tended to be articulate and expressed radical political views. They may have recently failed in

⁴Income levels were determined on the basis of parents' occupations.

school because they were "fed up with it," but their past school records included periods of high achievement, and they were generally above grade level in basic skills.

Some students can't be clearly classified in any of these groups. Labels for the groups, to the extent of their accuracy, reflect students' orientations *when they came to Metro*. Over two-thirds of the School-Alienated students became much more involved in the program; most School-Oriented students, who were used to slavishly obeying the teacher, developed more independent styles of learning. However, even students who underwent dramatic changes in some respects continued to identify with and employ life styles characteristic of their original subgroup in the school and to interact most with students from their own subgroup.

The existence of these subgroups had a number of effects on student involvement in institutional decision-making. As mentioned earlier, diversity undercut the notion that any student could speak for a significant number of his/her fellows. Further, when a nucleus of students formed around an issue, they generally represented one subgroup in the school. For instance, the White School-Oriented group was interested in obtaining more college prep courses. Such subgroups were often criticized for or expressed doubts about not being representative of the school, but they found it difficult to interest students outside their subgroup in their issue.

White Youth Culture Student: This meeting is ridiculous. You're obviously not representative. Just look around and there aren't any Black students here.

Teacher: I liked what your activity group planned for the school, but you know what you got to do now—you got to let all kinds of students know about it or you won't get any support.

In the heterogeneous student body, informal information about decision-making (meeting times, hot issues, etc.) was generally shared within subgroups rather than between subgroups.

By the second semester of operation, each subgroup had developed a fairly comprehensive view about what Metro was like, how it "really" worked, and what styles of action were appropriate for subgroup members. Each had a definite view about student involvement in decision-making which it reinforced among its members and with which it socialized new students. The existence of this socialization process strongly influenced the chances that students from particular subgroups would become involved.

It is beyond the scope of this analysis to clarify the responses of all subgroups within the school to the attempt to involve them in institutional decision-making. A brief treatment of two groups, however, the White School-Alienated/Youth Culture group and the Black School-Alienated group, will give some understanding of variations in approach to school governance.

Almost every student who became involved in decision-making on a sustained basis came from the White School-Alienated/Youth Culture group.

Teacher: How come it's always the same kids who show up for anything. I haven't seen more than about eight different kids at these meetings.

They shared the class background and life style of the majority of the faculty. They were attuned to the same political issues as many faculty members and shared the same ideas about the need for freedom in education and for the radical alteration of conventional schooling. In a school characterized by close contacts with staff, they were likely to have the closest contacts. Since they were politically oriented, they generally agreed with the argument that students had to organize themselves to protect their interests. They had high reading skills and were the best tuned to informal and formal communication about decision-making within the school. For all of these reasons, it was they who were most likely to see their concerns acted on by the staff. Sometimes they created the impression, usually unconsciously, that their views represented the views of the entire student body. For example, most of the staff shared the feeling of the White Youth Culture students that traditional school activities and symbols, such as dances, class rings, school colors, and cheerleaders, were corny and unnecessary. This convergence of values obscured the strong interest among the School-Oriented and other School-Alienated groups in bringing some of these conventional school elements to Metro.⁵

The Black School-Alienated group and the White School-Alienated/Ethnic group were the least effective in getting what they wanted in Metro's decision-making process. The generalizations below can be applied with minor variations to both these groups, though they are based specifically on the data concerning the Black School-Alienated group. Many past experiences had decreased the likelihood that the Black School-Alienated group would participate in the evolving

⁵ One interesting distinction between the traditional schools and Metro is the influence of the White School-Alienated/Youth-Culture students at the latter. Metro seems to have worked best with the School-Oriented students and the White School-Alienated/Youth-Culture students and to have had the most difficulty in meeting the needs of the other two School-Alienated groups.

formal decision-making process at Metro. In their previous schools, they had generally seen themselves as being at war with teachers and administrators. They had kept their expressive life "underground," rigidly separated from the instructional program. They had almost no past experience with the procedural rituals of formal decision-making. They had generally low reading skills and had largely turned off the traditional school's communication channels. The Black School-Alienated group had a wealth of past experiences that taught them to conserve their energy for activities other than trying to change things. What leverage one obtained in influencing one's destiny was largely the result of individual resourcefulness in seizing momentary opportunities, not the result of establishing a framework of institutional rules within which to operate.

Many students in this group changed markedly after they came to Metro. Over two-thirds became significantly involved in the Metro program. They appreciated the friendliness of teachers and the absence of constant harassment. They identified with the school and wanted to insure its survival.

School-Alienated Female, to two School-Alienated Males who are smoking: Hey, what are you doing, you fool? Do you want the Board to come down and shut this place down?

With most teachers, they were outwardly friendly but extremely protective of their real concerns. With a few teachers, they formed close relationships, and these teachers often advocated their views about the program in formal meetings.

School-Alienated Student: I can trust the ones I'm tight with. I can tell them anything.

Yet their approach to formal decision-making was influenced both by their past experiences and by the middle-class bias of Metro. They retained their suspicion of authority and put most of their energy into expressive activities. They attended few formal meetings, were often silent when they did attend, and often left meetings that dragged on. They were not reached by the school's communication system. (When staff members expressed concern about students who didn't respond to communications, their increased attempts at communication generally reached only those School-Oriented and Youth Culture students who were already attuned to what was happening.)

Black School-Alienated Student: Nobody ever looks at signs. They're always bullshit.

A counselor announced to the counseling group that there would be a meeting after school to try to discover why people were cutting classes. Half the counseling group members were cutting and didn't hear the announcement.

White Youth Culture students' attempt to avoid overcentralization in decision-

making resulted in disorganization (changed meetings, unclear agendas, etc.) that further discouraged participation by the Black School-Alienated group.

Black and White School-Alienated students, as well as some Black and White School-Oriented students, wanted the limits of school behavior clarified and harsh actions to be carried out by the principal if students exceeded these limits. The School-Alienated students expressed this point of view even though some of their number would have been likely targets of this sort of action.

As leaders emerged within the Black School-Alienated group, attempts were made to involve them in formal decision-making. These students usually listened politely but indicated by their later actions that they preferred to pursue activities in the expressive subculture such as dating and sports rather than become involved in governance.

The students in this group liked many aspects of the school and had definite viewpoints about how it could be improved. However, they lacked the skills and the support from staff to work through the staff meeting/committee system. Therefore, they were often perceived as being uninterested in decision-making by some staff members and Youth Culture students or, alternatively, as not deserving of representation if they didn't turn out. The notion that people who really care about an issue will show up for a meeting exhibits a strong middle-class bias. School-Alienated students were more likely to express their dissatisfaction through socially disapproved forms, such as petty vandalism, rather than by signing petitions or attending meetings.

The Black School-Alienated group, along with the Black School-Oriented group, devoted considerable skill and energy to initiating several traditional expressive activities at Metro: interscholastic sports, dances, cheerleading. As suggested above, their interest in these activities ran counter to the majority of the staff and the White Youth Culture students. They worked with a few responsive Black staff members on these projects, but encountered two types of obstacles that weakened their faith in the school. First, they felt the Metro staff didn't give priority to their concerns, and, in a number of cases, this perception was accurate. Second, they were especially discouraged by the bureaucratic delays encountered in dealing with the central Board of Education staff, which confirmed their original beliefs about the futility of working with the system.

Patterns of Alternative High School Development

The previous section is limited to an intensive analysis of a specific school. However, in contradiction to an alternative school ideology that says that each school

is unique and must struggle alone with its particular set of circumstances, many of the problems and patterns of development at Metro have recurred in other alternative schools.⁶ The presence of these strong observable similarities raises two important questions:

1. What is the best way to identify and analyze common patterns in the successes and failures of alternative schools?
2. How can we use such information to strengthen alternative schools?

The remainder of the article addresses these two related questions within a tentative framework for considering the *current status* of alternative schools.

In discussing alternative schools, we find it helpful to distinguish among *process goals*, *outcome goals*, and *specific practices intended to achieve these goals*.

Process goals, or ideas about the qualities of a healthy learning environment, are valued partly because they are expected to foster certain outcomes, but they are also valued for their own sake. This viewpoint stems from the assumption, common to many alternative schools, that school should not be considered merely as preparation, but as a crucial life experience in its own right. Thus, alternative school people often describe a desirable learning community in terms of characteristics like the following:

1. A close relationship based on mutual trust and understanding exists between students and staff.
2. Community decision-making is shared through active participation by students, parents, and staff.
3. The human and physical resources of the entire city become a major resource for learning.
4. The characteristics of the traditional curriculum and educational program are completely reconsidered. Irrelevant subject matter designations, grading procedures, and age divisions are either fundamentally changed or eliminated so that learning becomes a more natural and coherent activity related to individual needs and concerns.
5. Students assume a major role in determining the nature and direction of their own learning.

⁶ Reactions to this study of decision-making at Metro by people working in other alternative schools, along with the results of a recent conference where common problems encountered at seventeen alternative schools were analyzed, underscore these similarities. See Center for New Schools, "Decision-Making in Alternative Schools: Report from a National Conference" (mimeographed, 1972).

6. Students from diverse cultural backgrounds work together effectively and respect each other.

In addition to such process goals, alternative school initiators articulate various outcome goals—capacities they feel students should have when they leave the school. For example, many school founders hope that when students leave the school, they will:

1. Learn and act independently.
2. Effectively employ basic skills of reading, writing, math, and problem-solving.
3. Understand their own emotions and the emotions of others; possess skills and attitudes for effective interpersonal communication and cooperative action.
4. Understand social processes and pressing social issues and participate actively and effectively in the political process.
5. Feel a pride in their own cultural background, coupled with an understanding of and an ability to work productively with students from different cultural backgrounds.
6. Continue to develop strong individual interests and aptitudes.

Finally, school initiators begin with a set of specific practices they feel will be effective in achieving both types of goals. For example, many have felt that in order to promote student participation in institutional decision-making within the school (process goal) and to prepare students for active decision-making in later life (outcome goal), all important decisions about the school's operation should be made in a weekly community meeting of staff and students. To take another example, many have felt that to prepare students to live in a diverse society and to create a school community where there is respect and understanding between cultural groups, students should participate in a two-hour group counseling experience each week with a randomly selected group of fellow students.

As Metro High School's attempt to involve students in decision-making indicates, alternative schools have encountered a number of severe difficulties in efforts to realize such goals through specific, commonly employed practices. It would be premature to present any general theory about the nature of these difficulties—instead we hope to suggest ways that such analysis might proceed. However, there is one prevailing idea to which many of the problems of alternative schools can be traced—the concept of “organic growth.” This key idea deserves special comment,

not only because it contributes to many alternative school problems, but also because it frustrates attempts to analyze these problems. The concept of "organic" or "natural" growth suggests that once people are freed from the oppressive restrictions of the traditional school, a new learning community will evolve naturally as people deal with each other openly and honestly. There seems to be a widely shared assumption that both the individuals involved in an alternative school and the school community as a whole can rather easily shed a skin of traditional habits and attitudes, and that from underneath the old skin will emerge a beautiful new man, new woman, and new community. But the experience of Metro and other alternative schools suggests that what emerges "organically" in an alternative school is not a new person or community, but rather those deeply ingrained patterns of thought and action of the traditional society and the patterns of functioning that govern the operation of any complex organization.

The concept of organic development, when subjected to these harsh realities, has generated a similar pattern of events in one alternative school after another. The school is started in an atmosphere of high energy and good will. The general commitment to a more humane way of operating, the high level of personal dedication, and the good feeling that permeates any new enterprise carry it through a honeymoon period of six months to a year. The positive experience of the honeymoon period sustains the belief that just about any problem—student involvement in decision-making, race relations, moderately severe mental disturbance, the development of a relevant curriculum—can be solved in a free and open atmosphere with a strongly articulated commitment to interpersonal honesty.

As the honeymoon draws to a close, small bits of evidence begin to accumulate that people really haven't changed as much as was hoped. The all-school meeting fails. The school's tape recorders, which people used to be able to leave out, begin to disappear. The first inter-racial fight occurs. People begin to notice that although whites and Blacks are outwardly polite to each other, there is little communication, and friendship cliques are mostly all-white or all-Black. Severe interpersonal conflicts between strong-willed staff members surface, and their conflicts spill over into just about any issue debated in the school. Someone stuffs a roll of toilet paper into the toilet to make it overflow, and a window is broken. Some kids consistently fail to follow through on any of their commitments in classes and other learning experiences; and since these kids have had a year to get themselves together, some people wonder whether the alternative school is doing any more for them than the old school. Community or staff meetings are

held, and strongly felt resolutions are passed. But in practice, both staff and students find it extremely difficult to confront individuals who don't abide by these resolutions, who persist in "doing their own thing."

One way to view this situation is as a conflict between the school's process goals, outcome goals, and specific practices. Particular schools have varied considerably in their commitment to various process and outcome goals. In some cases, there never is any strongly held or clearly stated set of goals, but rather a total faith in the process of organic development, a willingness to follow this process wherever it leads. In other cases, goals which exist clearly in the minds of the school's initiators are only vaguely discussed with the majority of students and staff.

There is also a strong difference in the salience of particular goals or types of goals, although these differences are never clearly spelled out. Thus, for example, in a given school many may be committed at a gut level to the school's process goals, but not to its outcome goals. Or one group may be willing to sacrifice just about anything to involve students in decision-making while to others the goal of using the city's resources for learning is most important.

If the organic theory of alternative school development had worked as people originally hoped, this confusion about goals would not be a serious problem. However, as direct democracy fails, as cooperative effort is frustrated, as the school's cultural bias produces group conflict, the diffuse notion of what the thing is all about produces a crisis in many alternative school communities. For example, many schools have discovered independently that direct democracy is not a feasible way to govern an alternative school and that students initially show little interest in becoming involved in any scheme of decision-making. These realizations create severe conflicts about goals and goal priorities. How much longer do we struggle along with the all-school meeting when it is clearly not working? Is testing this specific practice our highest priority or should we be looking for other ways to achieve the goal of shared student-staff decision-making? How important is concentrating our effort on shared decision-making anyway, as opposed to dealing with some of the cultural bias in our curriculum? Since students haven't come forward to participate in decision-making, do we conclude that student involvement isn't important to the growth of the school community and drop it, or do we keep after students or force them to become involved because it is absolutely necessary to prepare them to be active decision-makers in later life? When the disagreements are perceived as conflicts between various conceptions of the school's goals, then this realization provides a basis for clarification, analysis, and compromise. Often, however, such goal conflicts are perceived by the

various sides as reflecting the bad faith, lack of commitment, or lust for power of the opposition.

For the "pioneers" of the current alternative school movement, the period when such conflicts surface has proved crucial. The healthiest school communities, at this point, begin to identify the shortcomings in the original alternative school ideology, to clarify and establish priorities among their goals, and to develop positive alternative practices to reach these goals. On the other hand, adhering to the philosophy of natural organic development—a belief that "whatever happens is the best possible thing that could have happened"—leads to a rather predictable continuing crisis, often characterized by harsh irreconcilable conflict between various people in the community, low morale, and exhaustion.

This phenomenon of exhaustion deserves special mention, since it is so typical of alternative schools that are a few years old and yet seems so unlikely in the era of good feeling and high commitment in which an alternative school begins. One manifestation of the phenomenon of "burning out" is the withdrawal of individual staff and students into a very narrow area of concern within the school, as contrasted to their initial desire to have a hand in everything.

Teacher: I've decided I'm just going to get the reading lab together and forget about the rest.

Student: I just want to be left alone, so I can get my credits and get out of here.

The final step in the burning out process comes when the student or staff member leaves the school. High staff turnover in alternative schools is a critical problem—in many, the staff has turned over almost entirely in three or four years.

Another disturbing aspect of the recent history of alternative schools is that while new schools are being established at an accelerating rate both inside and outside public school systems, these new schools are, by and large, repeating the mistakes that their predecessors have found so costly. Very little is being learned from the successes and problems of these earlier efforts. The unwillingness to learn from others' experiences is encouraged by the theory of organic development, which holds that each school situation is unique. Yet, as we have tried to indicate, the surprisingly similar patterns of development, including serious problems that recur at certain stages, suggest that alternative schools must begin to learn from each other's successes and failures if they are to become a viable option for a significant number of people.

We must replace the unexamined rhetoric of organic growth with a careful consideration of promising ways for reaching the ambitious goals that we originally

expressed. As alternative schools begin to learn from each other, they must begin to create a *positive alternative tradition*. This tradition should provide detailed suggestions about viable approaches to reaching desired process and outcome goals. It should warn people against dissipating their limited energy in well-documented blind alleys. It can be developed without compromising the sensitivity to individual people and situations that has been a major strength of alternative schools. For example, this type of creative tradition is being developed by the open schools in England at the primary level where analysis of the goals of education, the role of the teacher, the structure of learning environments, and the nature of specific learning materials and activities has clarified key issues in a way that empowers people for future productive work rather than limiting them.⁷

The Role of Research and Evaluation

Success of such a process of clarification demands a general change in the attitudes of people in many roles within alternative schools. In currently healthy alternative schools, almost all of the staff and many of the students share a spirit of self-reflection and critical analysis. We believe that research and evaluation of a certain type can contribute to the necessary change.

There is currently great hostility to research and evaluation in most alternative high schools. As an alternative school director once said, "Anything that is worth evaluating cannot be evaluated; anything that can be evaluated is not worth evaluating." This general hostility results not only from the notion of organic development, but also from the crude and inappropriate approach to evaluation and research that has generally been employed in alternative high schools. For example, researchers have often ignored the range of process and outcome goals and specific practices designed to achieve them that are considered most important by alternative schools staff and students. They have chosen instead to judge schools on the basis of outcomes in skill achievement measured over short periods of time. We lack sufficient space to present a detailed critique of the faults

⁷ The qualities of the open school movement to which we are referring are discussed, for example, in Joseph Featherstone, *Schools Where Children Learn* (New York: Liveright, 1971). One must be cautious, however, in drawing direct lessons for alternative high school development in American cities from the experience of open primary schools. A primary teacher can create a complete alternative learning environment within his/her classroom. However, an adequate alternative learning environment for adolescents requires a complex social organization involving the cooperation of many people. Thus, it is extremely difficult to develop alternative high school education one classroom at a time within traditional schools (or even by establishing a school within a traditional school) as has been done successfully in spreading open primary school ideas.

of past research and evaluation efforts and will touch on these problems only in passing. Our primary aim is to describe a positive helpful role, consistent with the nature of alternative high schools, that research and evaluation might play in strengthening their development. This analysis is presented under three headings: (1) general perspectives on alternative school evaluation and research; (2) productive methods for gathering and analyzing information; and (3) productive methods for feeding back information to participants in alternative schools. This division, which reflects the fragmentary development of these ideas, artificially separates areas that must come together in actual practice.

General Perspectives

Findings from the Metro research and feedback from other alternative schools suggest some emphases for research and evaluation that will increase their potential to strengthen alternative schools.

Studying Social Process: Productive research and evaluation activities should assist alternative schools in clarifying their process and outcome goals and the specific practices that can help them achieve those goals. To this end, any such research activities should include the intensive study of day-to-day interactions—interactions among students, between students and staff, among staff members, and between the school and the outside world. Such studies could document and clarify topics like the following:

1. Varying perceptions of school goals by staff and students.
2. Contradictions between specific practices designed to achieve conflicting goals—for example, freedom in the choice of courses that allows students who can't read to avoid all reading-related activities.
3. The success or failure of specific practices—for example, the fate of a campaign to get students to try to actively change learning experiences with which they are dissatisfied, rather than cutting out on them.
4. Adequacy of specific practices in achieving school goals—for example, the relationship between group counseling of students and the capacity of student groups to make and carry out group decisions.

The emphasis on the broad-based study of social process is consistent with several positions about educational evaluation and research.⁸ First, researchers should

⁸ These positions are supported not only in studies of alternative high schools, but also in studies of such diverse topics as early childhood education programs, effectiveness of specific reading methods, and the relationship between schooling and later political behavior.

base studies of changes in alternative school students on the consideration of a school's particular outcome goals rather than on the availability of standard achievement tests, self-image scales, etc. Further, studying specific outcomes of schooling in terms of student learning is of limited value unless one also studies the formal and informal processes that bring about these results. The specific practices employed by alternative schools should be judged not merely in terms of their short-term effectiveness in achieving specific learning goals, but also in terms of their contribution to creating a desirable school community.

Second, the "hidden" or "untaught" curriculum probably has a greater long-term effect on students than the formal planned learning program. To be effective, a learning program must be consistent in both its formal and its "untaught" aspects. These "untaught" aspects are reflected in the social structure of the school, the expectations people have for each other's behavior, and the daily patterns of social interaction.

Finally, analysis of human behavior in settings created by the social scientist (interviews, group-testing, experimental games and tasks) provides limited and often misleading information. A more adequate analysis must include studying the natural settings in which people carry out their daily activities.

Studying the Perceptions and Behaviors of Social Subgroups: One of the most deeply ingrained characteristics of traditional schools is their strong tendency to reinforce social inequalities between subcultures, so that first the process of schooling and then its outcomes favor the dominant white middle class.⁹

Any significant alternative to the traditional school must alter this dismal pattern. However, the experience of alternative schools to date has revealed that many of the assumptions about freedom and organic growth popular in alternative schools are, in reality, a reflection of the particular world view and economic position of the American white middle class. At its most blatant, this bias is exemplified by a white middle class teacher with a master's degree telling Black urban kids that learning to read, going to college, and getting a good-paying job aren't important. However, the cultural bias within alternative schools is generally much more complex and subtle, as the analysis of student involvement in decision-making by different subgroups at Metro indicates. In many instances, the bias seems to be based more on class than race. Even in alternative schools with

⁹ See, for example, Jacob W. Getzels, "A Social Psychology of Education" in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, V, 2nd ed., eds. Gardner Lindsey and E. Aronson (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1969).

no middle class students, the school's method of operation may still favor those students who exhibit middle class traits.

Thus, in investigating any issue in alternative school development—course selection procedures, communication in the school, counseling, learning experience in the city—it is important to study the perceptions and behaviors of student subgroups. In such a study, the researcher must strive to understand an event or idea as it is typically perceived by students from a particular subgroup. The researcher must also understand events within the school in the context of a student's total life experience.

Differing staff philosophies and efforts to deal with cultural bias in alternative schools (often related to the cultural diversity of the staff itself) also merit careful study.

Studying Specific Practices Needed to Carry Out Crucial Community Functions: The rhetoric of organic development suggests that many traditional institutional functions—for example, enforcing limits on acceptable behavior, monitoring success in implementing institutional decisions—need not be carried out in a true alternative community and that specific practices will evolve naturally and uniquely in each alternative school. In contrast, the experience of alternative schools indicates that the failure to perform certain key community functions will lead to continual crisis. Furthermore, this experience suggests that there are only a limited set of specific practices that can be employed to carry out necessary community functions, and that drifting along “naturally” waiting for such practices to evolve causes irreparable damage to the school community and may drain its energy beyond its capacity to recover. Robert Merton has formulated the problem in this way:

Any attempt to eliminate an existing social structure without providing adequate alternative structures for fulfilling the functions previously filled by the abolished organization is doomed to failure. . . . To seek social change without due recognition of the manifest and latent functions performed by the social organization undergoing change is to engage in social ritual rather than social engineering. . . . It is assumed that there are certain functions which are indispensable in the sense that unless they are performed the society (or group or individual) will not persist. . . .

The range of variation in the items which can fulfill designated functions in a social structure is not unlimited. . . . The interdependence of the elements of a social structure limits the effective possibilities of change or functional alternatives.¹⁰

¹⁰ Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1968).

One of the aims of research within alternative schools should be to clarify further the functions that an alternative school community must carry out to survive and flourish, and specific practices that are both effective in performing vital functions and consistent with alternative school process and outcome goals.

Aims of Alternative School Research and Evaluation: Control of human behavior is widely and uncritically accepted as the ultimate goal in the application of research and evaluation techniques to education. Some researchers envision experimental schools where precise specification of educational "treatments" leads to near-perfect control of results. Entire schools are conceived as treatments, with those aspects of human activity that cannot be controlled being considered undesirable or, at best, irrelevant noise in the system. Within this frame of reference, the evaluator is seen as a neutral and dispassionate measuring instrument, recording the extent to which perfect administration of treatments and perfect control of outcomes is achieved. In applying knowledge from advanced physical sciences, the goal of achieving complete control over the physical environment is being called into serious question. Yet, in applying the primitive knowledge of the behavioral sciences, maximum control of human behavior is still widely and uncritically accepted as the ultimate goal, with only technical and political strategy questions standing in the way.

Given the goal of strengthening alternative schools in a manner that is consistent with their educational goals, we propose a fundamentally different philosophy about the role of the evaluator or researcher, the characteristics of desirable learning environments, and the ultimate goal of evaluation or research. Rather than a "value-free" outsider, the researcher should be a committed but critical participant in a long-term effort to strengthen alternative schools. We wish to make explicit the value-commitment that is implicit in all types of evaluation and research efforts in education. As a participant in alternative school development, the researcher should see him/herself as contributing one of a number of perspectives on the school's growth within a framework of shared analysis and decision-making. His/her claims to understand reality in a special way should be modest in light of the primitive state of behavioral science research in general and the understanding of alternative schools in particular.

In addition, the researcher should see his/her role as helping to create situations that not only encourage certain types of anticipated learning or growth, but also enhance the possibilities for many types of unique and unanticipated learn-

ing and growth. The characteristics of such catalytic situations can be identified through various non-experimental research methods, but such learning situations differ fundamentally from the sterile learning environments created by those who seek only predictability and control.

The overall goal of a researcher operating within such a framework is not to control people, but rather to empower them by helping them understand what types of specific practices are most appropriate for achieving desired goals.

Productive Methods for Gathering and Analyzing Useful Information

We have found that the most fruitful method for research on alternative school development is participant observation and informal interviewing. This approach provides the most effective basis for understanding the complicated interrelationships of specific practices, process goals, and outcome goals as they are reflected in people's day-to-day behavior. It provides the best means for understanding the crucial issues of subgroup behavior and success in carrying out vital institutional functions. Finally, this approach meshes well with the style of alternative schools, where cooperation for extensive techniques, such as testing and structured interviewing, is difficult to obtain, but where people are relatively open to having a researcher hang around to observe what goes on and ask a few questions.

Those unfamiliar with participant observation methods often mistake it for superficial journalistic reporting or the recounting of random anecdotes. On the contrary, there is a rich methodological literature on participant observation that suggests methods for gathering and analyzing information.¹¹

It is beyond the scope of this article to describe the specific methods we have found useful, except in the most schematic fashion. The primary "instrument"

¹¹ A more detailed discussion of the specific methods we have employed in participant observation and mini-interviewing (discussed later) is contained in Center for New Schools, *Participant Observation and Mini-Interviewing: Two Useful Research Methods for Strengthening Alternative Schools* (in preparation). Other helpful discussions of the nature and methods of participant observation (including areas of disagreement) are contained in: Roger Barker, *Ecological Psychology* (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1968); Severyn Bruyn, *Human Perspective in Sociology* (Engelwood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966); William Filstead, *Readings in Qualitative Methodology* (Chicago: Markham, 1970); Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, *Discovery of Grounded Theory* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967); George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons, *Issues in Participant Observation* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1969); Pertti J. Pelto, *Anthropological Research: The Structure of Inquiry* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); Louis Smith and William Geofrey, *Complexities of an Urban Classroom* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968); W. Scott, "Field Methods in the Study of Organizations," in *Handbook of Organizations*; Arthur Vidich et al., eds., *Reflections on Community Studies* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

for participant observation is a person or group of persons who observe alternative school settings, ask questions, and record their perceptions as accurately as possible in a stream of written notes. Of course, this process of observing, questioning, and recording can not be carried out without some selectivity and bias. Therefore, we began the participant observation process with certain broad areas of concern, based primarily on the school's written statements about its goals and proposed specific practices. With these concerns in mind (for example, student involvement in decision-making, intergroup relations), we attempted to collect a large amount of initial data without forming specific hypotheses that would focus our attention too narrowly too fast. The basic unit of observation recorded was a behavior episode, i.e. an action by one or more persons or a social interaction related to one of the broad topics with which we were concerned.

Participant observation involves constant choice. In making choices, the observer strives to achieve both *adequate scope* and *adequate depth*. Adequate scope is necessary to take into account the variability of behavior between one situation and another within the school, on three main dimensions:

1. Variability among behavior settings. Behavior varies markedly in classrooms, informal rap groups, talks with outsiders, etc. Adequate participant observation implies the sampling of all formal and informal behavior settings frequented by school participants.
2. Variability over time. An observer who sees a school only at one or a few points in time may seriously misinterpret particular events. Consider, for example, the variation between the honeymoon period and subsequent periods in the development of alternative schools. Observation during the honeymoon gives an unrealistically positive picture of a school's potential, while observation during a later period of conflict might suggest that people had never sincerely tried to achieve the honesty and openness that they claim is their ideal.
3. Variability among subgroups. As emphasized earlier, variability among various student and staff subgroups is a crucial consideration in alternative schools. Observing only one subgroup (for example, students who enjoy talking to outsiders) will result in an inaccurate picture of the school.

Adequate depth of observation entails the ability to gain access to behavior in various settings and subgroups that is not substantially distorted by the observer's presence. To achieve this aim, the observer must attain a sufficient degree of intimacy with each subgroup without becoming so closely identified with one subgroup that access to others is cut off.

In striving to achieve adequate scope and depth, a participant observer in an alternative school faces countless choices which generally boil down to individual judgment. "Should I spend more time trying to make contact with the group of kids that is seldom at school or follow up on some interesting conversations with another group I know well?" "Should I go to the meeting of the curriculum committee, on the field trip to gather fossils, or just sit around and talk with students in the lounge?"

Through a continuing process of sensitive investigation, enough information is accumulated to develop a set of specific hypotheses about the general areas of concern. For example, through participant observation at Metro related to the topic of decision-making, it appeared that although students expressed a desire to help enforce community understandings about not making noise in quiet areas, in practice they found it impossible to control their fellows. This hypothesis tied in with a number of others regarding relationships between student subgroups and attitudes toward individual freedom and responsibility in the school.

With tentative hypotheses framed, we gathered additional observation and informal interview data related specifically to these hypotheses. Special efforts were made to seek out negative evidence that indicated whether and under what circumstances students *did* confront each other about violations of community understandings. In this hypothesis-testing stage, it was again important to insure adequate scope and depth of observation. Several repetitions of this cycle of framing hypotheses, seeking evidence, and rejecting, revising, and refining hypotheses in the light of new evidence led to the set of generalizations in the case study of decision-making which begins this article.

In addition to participant observation and informal interviewing, several other research methods have been employed in the Metro research program. This use of multiple methods allows a hypothesis to be cross-checked with several types of data, and also yields information on the usefulness of the research methods themselves. The analysis of most of the Metro research data has just started, but preliminary results indicate some further methods for studying alternative schools that seem to pay off.

Mini-interviews are short structured interviews with stratified random samples of staff, students, parents, or others involved in an alternative school. The strata selected for interviewing in different schools have been based on race, ethnic group, friendship group as revealed by sociogram analysis, sex, and length of stay in the school. We have employed mini-interviews to investigate such topics as perceptions of school goals by students and staff; staff attitudes about behavior lim-

its in a school and the best way to handle them; student perceptions of how a school is changing over time; student, staff, and parent perceptions of a school's strengths and weaknesses; and the nature of an individual's contact with people from other racial groups in the school.¹² One useful approach to mini-interviewing is the repeated interviewing of the same set of individuals over time.

Mini-interview responses are recorded in written notes during the interview, transcribed in full immediately after the interview is completed, and analyzed by two raters who extract common themes from the responses and tabulate their frequency. These simple methods of analysis have proved accurate enough and quick enough to provide useful information at a time when an issue is still under consideration in a particular school. Mini-interviews are also a good method for cross-checking hypotheses from participant observation.

Another research method that has proved useful at Metro is the intensive analysis of a subsample of students chosen by the same sampling method used for mini-interviews. The information about this subsample in the Metro research has been collected through periodic in-depth interviews, achievement tests, participant observations, analysis of school records, mini-interviews, and questionnaires about background and attitudes. Preliminary analysis suggests the potential of using these various methods in concert for illuminating a number of important alternative school issues, since they can help the researcher tie together information about a student's classroom experience, behavior in informal settings with staff and friends, and experiences outside of school.

A final useful research tool that we are attempting to develop is a computer-based system for indexing and analyzing information collected using diverse research methods. Such a system seems essential if much of the information collected through research and evaluation is to be analyzed quickly enough to make a difference to students and staff in their planning within the school and in revising the research and evaluation program while it is in progress. At the same time, this computer-based system can handle many problems in registration, scheduling, and keeping track of credits. Although alternative school people are often

¹² Specific examples of the use of the mini-interview techniques are contained in the following studies by Center for New Schools: *The Metro School* (1971); "Career Study Center (St. Paul, Minnesota): A Formative Evaluation" (1971); "Present Status and Recommended Future Development of the Baltimore, Maryland Magnet Schools Program" (1972); "St. Mary Center for Learning (Chicago, Illinois): A Report to the Staff" (1972). A similar approach, employing repeated interviews of the same sample of students by student interviewers, is contained in Wendy Leebov Gollub, "A Case Study in Formative Evaluation" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1971).

initially hostile to the idea of using computers, the Metro experience suggests that computer programs for dealing with these tasks can be operated in ways that are consistent with a school's philosophy and save people from hundreds of hours of drudgery each year.

As the reader can see, the development of specific research and evaluation methods to strengthen alternative schools is in a preliminary stage, and yet a substantial start has been made. The improvement of these methods for gathering useful information is another specific area in which sharing of experience between alternative schools is crucial.

Feeding Back Information

The development of methods for feeding back information to alternative school participants is even less advanced. Yet unless specific methods for such feedback are perfected, research and evaluation in alternative schools will be largely a sterile intellectual exercise. Traditional research and evaluation provides few useful suggestions for information feedback, since the usual process of reporting and publishing results is largely a system for communication and advancement within the traditional research and evaluation community itself.

A crucial issue here is the researcher's power relationship to the school. If the researcher has direct or indirect power to implement practices he or she perceives to be necessary, staff and students will begin to see the researcher as a spy and quickly close off opportunities for obtaining accurate information. In addition, such a power relationship is inconsistent with the concept of shared decision-making that operates in most alternative schools.

On the other hand, if the researcher is merely someone who makes little written and oral reports about the state of the school, experience at Metro and other schools suggests that this information will be almost totally ignored. The press of past attitudes, past experience, and current problems negates any possibility that dittoed reports are going to change deeply ingrained behavior patterns.

In contrast, we suggest that the researcher's role should allow him/her to confront the community with research findings in a forceful way without any formal power to implement his/her ideas. Concretely, this role could imply a series of development sessions for both staff and students, employing case studies built up from research findings, video-tapes, role-playing, or other techniques that can exert strong impact on school participants. For example, in one of the few successful feedback sessions growing out of the Metro research program, the research team first interviewed staff members asking them to give examples of situations where they

had observed another staff member dealing with a student who was behaving in a way that was clearly unacceptable. Methods for dealing with such situations were of great concern to staff members at that time. Based on common themes in staff responses (Black students being treated unfairly, teachers who "walk by" difficult situations), case studies were prepared. Then, in staff development discussion groups, staff members reacted to the problems suggested by these case studies and tried to reach some agreement about how to respond to such situations in the future. Staff members and students are more likely to act on information presented in such development sessions if they have participated in previous stages of problem formulation, data collection, data analysis, and development session planning. Ideally, then, the researcher should mesh his particular skills and interests with the skills and interests of students and staff to increase people's ability to analyze their goals and specific practices.

Even a process of information gathering and feedback that included all of these desirable elements would still have to surmount substantial problems. First, even if the researcher assumes the role we have suggested, some people will still see him/her as a threat and cut off subsequent chances to gather information. Second, while we have suggested that information should be fed back to both staff and students, the approaches we have tried have been much less effective in reaching students than staff. Third, even though the feedback procedures we have suggested may give school participants a very clear idea of their problems and lead to a sincere commitment to change things, it is often difficult for a school community to plan and carry out effective solutions, since many problems result from deep-seated patterns of social functioning.

The alternative school movement will be strengthened not only by feedback of information within particular schools, but also by sharing of information between schools. The type of information worth sharing can be clarified by identifying common patterns in detailed studies of particular schools. Work groups with this purpose, composed of people from different schools, have already met on a limited basis.¹³ Again, communicating accurate information about general problems and patterns of development in a way that will benefit alternative high schools is at least as difficult as collecting the information itself. One approach to this problem is to establish a network of advisors who would translate knowledge about common alternative high school successes and problems into direct personal consultation with particular schools, in a manner analogous to the ad-

¹³ See footnote 6.

visory groups in British open schools.¹⁴ Ideally, such advisors would be people who are also working directly in a particular alternative school. Like researchers and evaluators, they should strive to combine their particular knowledge and skills with those of other alternative high school staff and students, and avoid becoming a homogeneous and elitist group within the alternative school movement.

The alternative schools movement has reached a critical point in its history. The number of public and non-public "alternative" schools is increasing rapidly, and yet most of them are beginning with the same assumptions about organic growth that have proved unworkable in the past. Few are learning from the last few years' experience at schools like Metro.

If the history of previous educational fads provides any indication, the mass marketing of the alternative school idea may spell its end. Therefore, it is imperative that existing alternative schools intensify their efforts to build a viable alternative tradition in education. Perhaps a significant minority of the schools just starting can join in this analysis and avoid some of the potentially lethal mistakes of their predecessors.

¹⁴ For a detailed analysis of an open school advisory group, see Educational Testing Service, *Analysis of an Approach to Urban Education* (Princeton, N.J.: Author, 1971).

The Free School Movement

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The author presents objective data concerning the number, growth, location, staffing patterns, size, and finances of free schools. He then defines four types of free schools: the "classical" free school, the parent-teacher cooperative elementary school, the free high school, and the community elementary school. Distinguishing between pedagogical and political freedom, the author then discusses the varying conceptions of social change associated with each type, with special attention given to socioeconomic factors. The key question framing this analysis is "what role do free schools play—what role can they play—in effecting change in the much larger public school system?"

About nine of every ten American school children attend the public schools. The great majority of the remaining ten per cent satisfy the compulsory school attendance laws in parochial schools, although this number has declined sharply over the past few years. A small number of children are educated in private "prep" schools, which are often small, expensive, and elite. The economic troubles of the past few years have been an important factor in the decline in both the number and enrollments of these non-public schools.

Yet, while the customary American private school education has begun to decline, a very special kind of private school has appeared and grown astonishingly in numbers. These schools have received increasing attention from the media and from people interested in educational reform. They are most frequently called

"free schools," though they are also known as "new schools" or "alternative schools." In five years the number of these free schools has grown from around 25 to perhaps 600; around 200 have been founded in the past year alone. These schools are usually very small: in absolute numbers of participants—students, parents, and staff—the phenomenon is very limited, but their public impact and symbolic significance are relatively great.

This essay presents some objective data about free schools along with a discussion of the various educational and social change concepts which underlie them. Particular emphasis is given to the extent to which differences of social class, ethnicity, and political perspective contribute to the variation of styles within the broad free school movement. My purpose is to give an overview of the movement, to analyze its significance, and to speculate about its future, especially in relation to reform within the public school system.

The basic theoretical concept is, naturally, freedom. The literature of radical school reform associated with free schools vehemently opposes the compulsory and authoritarian aspects of traditional public and private schools. This literature attacks the emotional and intellectual effects of conventional pedagogy and projects a radical theory in which freedom is the central virtue. The most uncompromising form of both the attack and the theoretical alternative is found in A. S. Neill's *Summerhill*. The small number of free schools which existed in the U.S. before the current wave began are almost all explicitly Summerhillian schools. In recent years, the writings of Paul Goodman, John Holt, Edgar Z. Friedenberg, George Leonard, Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner, George Dennison, Herbert Kohl, Jonathan Kozol, and others have popularized the general notion surrounding free schools: that children are naturally curious and motivated to learn by their own interests and desires. The most important condition for nurturing this natural interest is freedom supported by adults who enrich the environment and offer help. In contrast, coercion and regimentation only inhibit emotional and intellectual development. It follows that almost all of the major characteristics of public school organization and method are opposed—the large classes, the teacher with absolute power to administer a state-directed curriculum to rigidly defined age groups, the emphasis on discipline and obedience, the constant invidious evaluation and the motivation by competition, the ability tracking, and so forth.¹

¹ Clearly, these ideas overlap with aspects of the progressive education movement of the early 1900's, which spawned a number of experimental "progressive" schools. But in this current revival of the progressive school reform spirit, we find more emphasis on *participation* in the "freedom" notion—the idea that parents and students should have a much greater part in all aspects of edu-

We can see in this central concept of freedom two distinct ideological sources for an alternative school movement, one political and one pedagogical (or more broadly, cultural). These sources are in real tension, sometimes even contradiction. By the *political* source, I mean the spirit behind the first "freedom" schools—those in Mississippi, in 1964—when groups of people sought control of the oppressive educational processes to which they and their children were being subjected. This spirit is seen in the movement for community control. It views the public schools and most professional educators with great hostility, and it articulately opposes indoctrination in the content and method of the public schools. This spirit has been most extensively expressed in black communities' struggle for control of public schools. But over the past few years some minority community groups have turned their anger and energy toward starting their own alternative schools, despairing of the possibilities of working inside the system.

These schools emphasize control by the local community, black (or brown or red) consciousness in the curriculum, and the schools' participation in the political and social struggle for equality; the pedagogical idea of allowing each child the freedom to unfold his or her individuality is not given so dominant a position as in most middle-class free schools. So, in many of the black community schools, there is a good deal of structure and organization, including, sometimes, required classes, well-organized compulsory activities run by the teacher, intensive drilling in basic skills—items which contradict in varying degrees the more strictly pedagogical concept of freedom.

If one looks back about six or seven years, one can see the two strands in the earliest days of the free school wave—there were a few Summerhillian schools (e.g., Lewis-Wadhams in New York State, founded in 1963) and a few black community schools starting in the ghettos (e.g., Roxbury Community School, 1966).

Each kind of school is an alternative, articulating a profound opposition to the methods and results of the public schools (this is not true of most private schools); each is a "free" school. But one trend emphasizes the role of the school in the community's struggle for freedom and equality (the freedom of the "Freedom now!" cry of the civil rights movement), while the other represents the strongest possible claim for the individual child's freedom from coercive approaches to learning and social development as expressed by the organization and techniques of most public schools.

cational institutions. This clearly implies a negative attitude toward professional educators and teachers, whose authority stems from a dubious though certified claim of expertise.

The complex differences and possible tensions between these two sources of freedom make it difficult to specify clearly what is a free school and what is not. All of the institutions reasonably included in the class oppose the public schools; but the political and pedagogical sources of this opposition are expressed in varied ways across the range of new schools. (See the typology of free schools below.) Moreover, these tensions exist *within* schools and even within individuals, providing a constant source of serious discussion. (For example, Jonathan Kozol's recent acerbic criticisms of counter-cultural, apolitical free schools [*Free Schools*, 1972] were the occasion for renewed intense debate among free school people.)

Free Schools: Some Data and a Typology

The complicated problem of definition should be kept in mind in approaching the data that follows. How "free" must a school be for it to count as a "free school" pedagogically? And if a black school is militant and community-controlled, but has rather traditional pedagogy and methods, is it a "free school"? For most of the schools, identification is not a problem. But there are fairly significant grey areas which have occasioned some subjective judgments in gathering the data. Consequently, the data, though it looks precise, being numbers and percentages, should be taken softly, and it is offered in this spirit. It was gathered between March and August, 1971, by the New Schools Directory Project,² a group of free school people who wanted to compile an accurate and detailed directory of existing alternative schools, since no real data seemed available and a good deal of dubious information was being widely quoted as fact (e.g., that the average life of the schools is 18 months or that there were 1600-2000 new schools).

The Project proceeded as follows: a small central group went over every existing listing of "free schools" to contact free school people in different areas of the country, including regional free school switchboard people. These contacts gathered some rough "objective" information by checking the local lists and visiting other free schools in their area. All leads were checked in an effort to find previously unlisted schools. Rough as the methods were, I think we missed only a few of the free schools then in existence. (Some 200 schools opened in September 1971, and most of these were not included in the survey.) My own check of the data indicates that the range of accuracy was 80-90%.

The survey limited itself to "outside-the-system" schools. Free school-type pro-

² Funded by HEW.

grams within the public school system have proliferated rapidly, with important implications for the free school movement. But the concern of the survey was with the grass roots movement that had begun outside of the state-controlled system.

The number of free schools has increased dramatically during the past five years, especially in contrast to the decline of parochial and traditional private school education. Figure 1 illustrates the emergence of a "movement" between 1967 and 1971.

A few very progressive or Summerhillian schools (less than five) were founded every year during the early 1960's. Then, in 1966 and 1967, the real rise of free schools began, simultaneous with the growth of a widespread movement for social change and an increasingly radical critique of American institutions. Around 20 free schools were founded in 1967 and 1968. Over 60 were founded in 1969. By 1970, the number was around 150, and, as mentioned before, the number of new free schools begun during 1971-72 is substantially greater.

A considerable number of free schools close after one or two or three years of existence. Although the existing data does not present an entirely accurate picture, my sense is that the oft-quoted figure of an eighteen month average life-span is very wrong. Since most of the schools are less than two years old, it is difficult to get a meaningful figure, but it seems that at most one out of five new schools closes before the end of its second year, and perhaps not more than one out of ten.

Given the difficulties of starting schools, this dramatic rise in the number of parents, students, and teachers who are willing to make the enormous commitment needed to start their own school is significant far beyond the actual numbers. It is obvious that if there were a free-choice tuition voucher plan or the widespread possibility of alternatives inside the public school system, the number of new free schools and participants would be much greater than at present.

Clearly, the data is heavily dependent on the kind of definitional problem described above. We tended toward a relatively strict conception of "free school"; that is, we wanted the selection to reflect as much as possible the sense of being part of a conscious movement to create schools very different from the normal public and private schools. This selection process was often quite difficult—almost arbitrary at times. For example, we excluded Shady Hill School in Cambridge and Miquon School in Philadelphia, two well-known and established "progressive" schools, but included Miquon Upper School, a free high school started by Miquon last year. Such decisions are obviously complex; in general, we tried to avoid inflating the figures by including schools which, though progressive, are not really participants in this new wave of radical school reform.

The following figures are based on the survey of 346 schools. Lacking complete




FIGURE 1
Number of New Schools Founded by Year (1957-1971)

information from every school, the percentage figures given are often based on smaller numbers. Also, it should be clear that figures such as enrollment statistics change constantly. No systematic attempt was made to find schools opening in September, 1971, though some are included. There are other institutions and projects which are clearly related to the free school impulse—community-control day care centers and pre-schools, after-school “liberation” high schools, community-based “free universities,” but these have not been included. The survey was limited to full-time schools for kindergarten through high school.

Distribution by State

Figure 2 shows the distribution of schools by state. Thirty-nine states have at least one free school. It should be noted that four states—California, New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois—have fifty-two per cent of the total surveyed. California alone has twenty-seven per cent. There appear to be several particular areas of free school concentration—the San Francisco Bay area, the Chicago area, the Boston area, Madison-Milwaukee, and Minneapolis-St. Paul. There is good reason to think that cosmopolitan urban areas, especially those with high concentrations of university and college-associated people, generate the critical masses of people who share the philosophy of free schools and have the willingness and capability to commit the necessary time, energy, and resources to such efforts.

TABLE 1

Enrollment and Student Characteristics^a

Total enrollment: 11,500-13,000

Total number of schools: 350-400

Elementary	51%		
High School	29%		
Elementary-high	20%		
Day	91%		
Boarding (and day-boarding)	9%		
Student characteristics:			
Male	53%	White	77%
Female	47%	Spanish surname	4%
		Black	16%
		Other	3%

^a For all figures, read “approximately.”




FIGURE 2

Distribution of Schools by State

Staff Characteristics

The data on staff are especially vague (See Table 2). In most free schools there are part-time and volunteer teachers, as well as parents, who participate in teaching and other staff activities. In many schools some of the volunteers and part-time teachers share community governance and policy-making with full-time staff. It is impossible to ascertain precisely either the number of volunteers or the time that part-time and volunteer staff put in. What can be said is that free schools generally emphasize the importance of individual attention and small intimate groups, and the staff-student ratios bear this out. A rough estimate which included all volunteers and part-time staff would be about 1:3, while a figure which involved only full-time staff would be 1:7.

TABLE 2

Staff Characteristics*

Number of staff: 2,600

Ethnic characteristics of staff:

85% white	11% black	4% other
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Age distribution:

Under 20 years of age:	6%
20-29	: 63%
30-39	: 20%
Over 40	: 10%

* Exclusive of volunteers.

Black teachers are concentrated almost completely in the relatively small number of black community schools and street academies. It is obvious that free school teachers are a considerably younger group than teachers in general. As compared to the national mean age for teachers of thirty-seven years, almost seventy per cent of free school teachers are below thirty, and it is safe to say that at least eighty-five per cent are below the national mean age.

This age distribution suggests some fairly obvious speculations. First, a significant part of the free school movement is related to the youth and student movement of the 1960's, both political and cultural. Second, many schools are started by young parents of very young children, and some of them become the teachers. Finally, the financial situation of most free schools makes it difficult for older people with families to participate, given their need for job security and dependable income. Young people, mobile and without encumbering family responsibilities, constitute the most obvious pool for very low paid and volunteer staff.

School Size and Finances

The data on school size and finances are especially interesting and revealing. A discussion of these figures will serve as a basis for a detailed typology of the free schools.

Most urban Americans think of schools as institutions housed in large expensive buildings, containing anywhere from a few hundred students (elementary) to two, three, or four thousand students (high schools). In contrast, the average size for the free schools in this survey is approximately thirty-three students. Approximately

two-thirds of the schools have an enrollment of less than forty. Figure 3, below, shows a percentage distribution of schools according to enrollment and reflects some important facts about the variety of free schools.

The fact that two-thirds have enrollments of under forty can be explained mainly as a conscious commitment to a special kind of intimate community. Many free school people value the idea that everyone in the school knows everyone else fairly well; that staff people can truly relate to each other and to all the children, thus avoiding the impersonality associated with mass education institutions. Many free schools refuse to expand beyond thirty or forty, fearing that some of the essential qualities of the free school atmosphere would be lost. Some schools have actually




FIGURE 3
Percentage Distribution of Schools by Pupil Enrollment

decided to reduce enrollment from around thirty down to twenty because the people involved felt that even thirty was too large a group.

All of the schools with enrollments of around 100 and up deviate from the mean for specific reasons. Some, like Peninsula School in California (230 children) or Shady Lane School in Pittsburgh (101) are fairly established progressive schools that have stayed sufficiently experimental and innovative to justify inclusion in the study. Others are predominantly black or integrated community schools, which emphasize community participation, service in the larger community, and parent involvement in governance. These schools place a much lower priority on a warm, intimate, personal atmosphere than do the more numerous and smaller white, progressive, middle-class, and often isolated free schools.³

The data on school finances needs especially careful interpretation since free schools do not, in general, keep very accurate, detailed, or complete financial records. Since resources come from very diverse sources—tuition paid on a sliding scale (and often irregularly), small contributions, a very few large contributions from individuals and foundations, bake sales, rummage sales, donated equipment, and even, in the case of one school, panhandling—accurate accounting is not often available.

The main source of income, as one would expect for non-public schools, is tuition. Eighty-one per cent of the schools charge tuition, with almost all of them stating that they give scholarships. Since the great majority of these schools use a sliding scale for tuition, the concept of “scholarship” is quite hazy. Most schools ask people to pay what they feel they can afford, hoping there will be enough high tuition payers to balance the people who can afford little. This is important since most free schools do not want to see themselves as “elite” private schools providing a special form of education for those who can afford it. Tuition for most traditional private schools ranges from \$1500 to \$4000 per year, while a sampling of schools in the survey shows that the normal range for free schools would be \$0 to about \$1200 per year. It is impossible to determine the average paid tuition, as we were unable to get accurate data concerning how many paid what.

³ In this category are Michael Community School in Milwaukee, formerly a Catholic school, now a community school moving rapidly to libertarian methods (290 students), the New School for Children, a black community school in Roxbury, Mass. (140 students), and East Harlem Block Schools, a group of mainly black and Puerto Rican elementary schools in New York (a total of 220 students in four sites). A related category is that of predominantly black street academies for high school people, such as C.A.M. Academy in Chicago (250 students) and Harlem Prep (500 students). A very special category is that of experimental demonstration schools run by colleges which, after some serious hesitation, were included in the study—Margaret Sibley School for Educational Research and Demonstration, Plattsburgh, N.Y. (275 students), run as part of the state university system, and Webster College School, St. Louis (150 students), are examples.

Almost all the schools which do not charge tuition are true community schools and street academies serving poor and minority groups. There is no tuition because the people starting the schools intended to involve groups who can not afford it. The founders wanted to provide true alternatives to the public system rather than private schools that are alternatives only for those who can afford them (and a few scholarship cases). A good example of the tuition-free school is the Children's Community Workshop School in Manhattan. An elementary school with around 125 students, it is completely integrated racially and by class, and is parent controlled, with many poor black and Puerto-Rican parents involved. The school has been supported (with a large, well-paid staff) by contributions from foundations, but financial hardships during the past year have threatened its survival. However, the local school board has voted to grant the Workshop School "public" status, and stability may be achieved with public money.

Other tuition-free community schools include Highland Park Free School, Roxbury Community School and the New School for Children, the three schools forming the Roxbury Federation of Community Free Schools. Over the past couple of years, they have managed to obtain substantial foundation help, including a \$500,000 grant from the Ford Foundation, and thus to stay in operation without charging parents. Some dropout-oriented free high schools also do not charge tuition: Genesis II in Springfield, Mass., Independent Learning Center in Milwaukee, Independence High School in Newark, Freedom House in Madison, Wisc., City Hill School and Northside Street Academy in Minneapolis, and Harlem Prep in New York. Funding sources for such schools are diverse: local, state, and federal programs for delinquency prevention, Model Cities and other poverty agencies, church groups, foundations, and corporations. But such funding is difficult to find and very chancy. For example, the Providence Free School began with the hope of being a tuitionless community school supported by individual contributions and foundation help. By the second year they were forced to charge tuition in order to stay in existence.

The data on free school expenditures are very revealing. Figure 4 shows the distribution of per capita expenditures (excluding schools where the data was so defective or special, e.g. boarding schools, as to make the computation misleading or meaningless).

The mean and median are somewhere in the \$500 to \$600 range, closer to \$600 per year. The curve, however, is far from the normal bell-shaped distribution that would be expected for the public schools in any given state. Instead we find a rela-




FIGURE 4

Percentage Distribution of Schools by Per Pupil Expenditure

tively even distribution all along the spectrum. Rather than a rapid tapering off at the high and low extremes, one finds a distinctive peak in the highest range (over \$1000), with nineteen per cent of the schools in this category. At the other extreme, although the curve does taper off slightly, twenty-nine per cent of the schools report per capita expenditures below \$300 and twelve per cent report below \$100.

It is hard to compare these figures to public school data. For free schools, rent is a major expense, while public school figures, as usually reported, do not contain an equivalent charge. Even so, we do know that the public schools show much greater expenses in general (as do traditional private schools). For example, at the top of the public school scale, localities like Beverly Hills spend \$2000 per student per year while urban averages usually fall in the \$1000 to \$1500 range (if some category equivalent to rent were added in, these figures would be even higher).

Although there are some public school districts in the \$500 to \$1000 category, there is no parallel in the traditional public and private school experience to the

well-organized, well-equipped, fairly expensive, and rather professional about staffing. In contrast, parent cooperatives tend to have looser organization, less equipment, and fewer "professional" teachers.

Another type, the *free high school*, includes several variants, again determined by the social class constituency and the way the political and the pedagogical aspects of the "freedom" idea interact. They are high school counterparts to the Summerhillian schools, oriented toward the white middle class and hip youth counter-culture. In contrast with the types mentioned above, prospective students usually provide the initial impetus, along with some committed adults who are potential staff. Deeply disenchanted with the public schools, these young people want to be involved honestly in the planning and governance of their own school. Several of these middle-class high schools project a politically radical perspective in their rhetoric, curriculum, and other activities. This does not mean that all the young people in such schools are activists, but that some of the originators and staff are, and that activism is in the atmosphere. These schools often participate in anti-war and civil rights activities, and the classes often focus on the Vietnam War, draft resistance, women's liberation, and the legal rights and difficulties of youth.

In the past couple of years, several white working-class high schools have formed, a development with no parallel in the earlier progressive education movement. These schools involve mainly drop-outs and potential drop-outs who feel very hostile to their public high schools. Whereas the middle-class high schools can charge tuition, working-class schools do not have this option, for neither the students nor their parents have the money. Moreover, their parents do not usually find the political and pedagogical style of such schools familiar or appealing. The permissiveness of the free school is often congenial to progressive middle-class parents, but has much less appeal to working-class parents who suspect that such experimental schools will not serve the needs of their children. (Neither do the public schools, of course, but parents persist in the hope that the American dream of working hard, getting skills and credentials, and making it in the world will somehow come true for their children.)

These working-class schools differ from their middle-class counterparts by directing a much greater focus on vocational help and remedial work and by exhibiting a real concern with thinking through what it means to be of the working class. For example, "Self Worth and Competency of Working Class Youth" is the name of a summer course at the Group School in Cambridge. According to the course description, "Self Worth" was

originally conceived with two express purposes in mind. Because of the obvious lack of information relating to the working class struggle in American history, both in elementary and high school curriculum, it was felt that an objective labor history course was necessary as a foundation for viewing working class competency and self worth. Once a basic historical foundation was laid, it was hoped that the class could begin to tackle the more personally related questions of 'how does it feel to be a kid without a history?' or 'if I as a working-class youth have never learned about my history, whose culture have I adopted?' (from the Group School summer course brochure).

The working-class schools—with their constituency of public school “drop-outs” and “push-outs”—thus directly confront the tracking function of the public schools which “prepare” these students for the lower rungs of the social and job hierarchy. In contrast, students in middle-class free schools have been slated for college and high career achievement. For them, the free high school is a way to get off, for a while at least, the beaten path to college and beyond.

Another variant of the high schools for drop-outs, more established and larger than the white working class schools, are the street academies for poor minority youth. The most famous of these is Harlem Prep, with over 400 students, but there are such places in most large cities. They are organized by adults, often with the support of community groups (e.g., the local Urban League). They seek to reawaken motivation in young people who have been completely turned off by school. While there is an atmosphere of discipline, the students do not perceive it as the same sort of discipline they experienced in the public schools. Instead, street academy discipline comes from having staff who can relate well with the students, and from the idea of black people “getting it together.”

The street academies have a sense of participation, though far from the Summerhillian image of community, participatory democracy, and almost unlimited individual choice. The pedagogy with its emphasis on skills is more conventional, and the strong commitment to getting the young people into colleges differs from the mood of the dominant free high school culture.

The *community elementary schools*, as noted above, tend to be much larger and more highly organized than the average free school. More than the middle-class groups, the people who start community schools see the struggle for community control of the public schools as a vital goal; for them the politics of control are more important than the pedagogical emphasis of middle-class reform groups. These community schools put great stress on skills and on cultural consciousness and pride. Low-income parents, wary of romantic “freedom and spontaneity” rhetoric,

often seem to support the more traditional classroom approaches, including strict discipline. Nevertheless, there is still a good deal of pedagogical innovation and libertarian atmosphere in these community schools. The implication here is that when the parents and community people feel they are in control, they are more open to "experimentation" than when it—like all the other school stuff they know—is imposed by the system which has been failing their children for years. For example, most of these schools share an aversion to fostering individual competition by means of grades; instead, they stress giving each child a sense of his or her own worth and capacities. In these schools, as in the public community controlled schools such as CCED School in Boston or Morgan Community School in Washington, D.C., one finds variations of the open classroom.

Free Schools and Social Change

The classification above describes ideal types. Many of the schools, of course, combine aspects of different types. For example, the New Community School, a high school in Oakland, has a large white middle-class group, but provides a strong Black Studies program for its large minority of poor black students. Behind the different schools stand a variety of conceptions, not only of education but also of social change and how educational reform relates to more general political and social issues.

Within the Summerhillian tradition there is a definite "apolitical" quality. The school-community deliberately looks inward, sometimes consciously disengaging itself from the larger community and its affairs; the public schools are simply ignored. This perspective makes a minimal political demand on the larger society: to be left alone by the authorities—for instance, health and fire officials who don't like "hippie schools"—so that those who share the philosophy can "do their own thing."

A more social change-oriented expression of this apolitical perspective conceives of the free schools as exemplars and models of what good schools could be like, moving others, even in the public schools, to change. Another more radical rationale conceives of the growth of these free schools as a kind of strategy to attack and weaken the public school system as more and more people withdraw from it to start their own free schools. Throughout, one underlying view of social change is that the libertarian pedagogy and the schools based upon it will develop children who are joyful, cooperative, and peaceful, neither racist nor sexist nor repressed—and the more people like this, the greater the progress toward solving social ills and building a humane, just society.

This view is more often implicit than explicit. For most middle-class elementary schools, whether staff-run or parent-cooperative, the emphasis is on a small group providing for themselves the kind of education they want for their children. They don't like the kind of education offered in the public schools—at least for their own children—but they don't see that they can or should do much to change the public schools, and they refrain from a political analysis of the role of those schools. The following excerpt from a brochure expresses a fairly common situation:

My wife and I started the school, with the help-support of a few parents dedicated to the no-pressure idea, in fear and trembling since it was beyond our ability, and is not our responsibility—we pay taxes for suitable schools. Fed up with the degrading and humiliating experience of our children in 'the system' we determined to at least have a 'school' for them—others joined us from a small newspaper ad.

Speaking of tuition, these school organizers write:

Sometimes we have felt rather crass. We charge at about the 'going rate' for the area. This rules out many who are sold on the principles of free education. Our justification goes like this: this is not our responsibility—if the system listened and acted in accord with the desires of people, there would now be available voluntary participation schools to which we would send our children.

Schools like this can afford only a limited number of scholarship students. Many of the parents—including those just quoted—would be completely satisfied if there were a voucher system or easily available "open classroom-free school" options within the existing public school system.

The more politically oriented middle-class free schools would not be so easily satisfied. There we find strong elements of counter-cultural and counter-institutional feeling, as well as a real and justifiable fear that the system will attempt to coopt educational innovations and water down their efforts. The dream of the counter-institutional "greening of America" perspective is that the dominant institutions will collapse as more and more people go off and build their own good places, self-sufficient and uncompromised by the taint of corruption in the dominant institutions. In a more immediate sense, this vision sees free school education as a way of breaking down the socialization function that most public schools serve. That is, simply being what they are, free schools accomplish a worthwhile moral and political goal by helping some children escape the "brainwashing" of the public school system.

For example, students of the Exploring Family School in San Diego wrote about the role of the public school as they see it:

coopt the growing discontent with public school education as most clearly and completely expressed by the free schools. Silberman's *Crisis in the Classroom* has been accepted, so to speak, in important areas of the educational establishment, with the result that there is increasing support for public alternative schools and programs. One obvious danger is that, as with many reforms, such reform will blunt and buy off discontent before it can bring about the larger changes which are its goals. Free-type schools supported by the system could be used to siphon off "malcontents," "troublemakers," and activists—among students and parents—and thus ease the spreading troubles in the public schools. Or public alternatives will be closely controlled by the current managers of the school system, so that experiments that are too abrasive and too "radical" can be toned down by threatening to withdraw financial support. (We have already observed this phenomenon in some of the public alternative school projects.)

A similar fear is voiced from the more pedagogical and cultural sectors of the free school movement, but since the demands there are not so extensive, many could be more easily met by a set of open classroom public alternatives or, especially, by a tuition voucher plan.

Looking Ahead

Alternatives inside the public sector supported by local, state, or federal aid, are sure to spread in the very near future. (A recent column by Albert Shanker in the weekly propaganda slot the teachers' union buys in the *New York Sunday Times* confirmed this assertion. Shanker attacks the claims of success for alternative schools—in a misleading and dishonest manner. But his tone is very defensive, as if against a growing trend he opposes.) Many parent groups are organizing to ask the school authorities for alternative public schools committed to libertarian methods. For example, the Cambridge School Committee recently approved such a proposal from the Committee for an Alternative Public School, a group of parents who organized and negotiated for almost two years to get an inside-the-system *free* school. The number of teachers, parents, and students who want such schools is growing, even though most Americans would still say that they basically approve the traditional style of the average public school. As noted, the number of free schools continues to increase rapidly. But contrary to the predictions of some free education activists, this development will not mushroom into thousands of schools and hundreds of thousands of students. As the difficulties of running free schools and scrounging even for meager resources become more widely known, enthusiasm will diminish. And as pressure for reform builds up on the public school system,

it will seem more realistic as a strategy to get an alternative public school established, even at the cost of some compromise with the system, than to establish another small and fragile free school that might easily fail after a couple of years. Even now, some schools that started outside the system are trying to figure out ways of being accepted as public schools in some form, without giving up their essential spirit or autonomy. This has happened in the case of the Children's Community Workshop School. For many free school people with a political perspective, the possibility of free schools being alternative public schools will be very attractive, despite the constant danger of being coopted and controlled. As part of public systems, reformers will be able to gain more visibility and influence for their innovations. Also, public financial support will enable schools serving poorer communities to achieve the stability needed to attract parents to what might at first seem a dubious experiment.

Some free schools will prefer to maintain their independence so as to ensure freedom from the pressures and compromises inevitably imposed by involvement in the public system. This stance includes both politically and pedagogically oriented school reformers, since it is obvious that there are free schools expressing both strands that would be too "far out" for any state system to tolerate.

Within a few years the free school movement has emerged as a significant phenomenon, if not for its actual numbers, then for its symbolic significance as representative of the spreading popularity of radical reform ideas. There have been other movements of radical progressive reform; movements that do not seem to have accomplished the serious changes of the sort they initially envisioned. We can hope that the new wave of radical school reform will find ways to avoid repeating this melancholy history.

Notes Toward a Process of Afro-American Education

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The author outlines a process of Afro-American education which would establish a cultural identity for American Blacks. Dr. Wilson discusses the underlying principles of such a process, contrasts them to the current Anglo-American educational system, and draws attention to the need for the Black community to reconsider community values and attitudes in building viable educational institutions. For her, the essence of an Afro-American process of education lies in a more clarified view of Black identity and folkways, and cannot be found in Western values, attitudes, and institutions.

As with any attempt to jolt and reorient a people's thinking, this paper must take the risk of offending those, including brothers and sisters, who adhere to one or more of three sets of assumptions regarding education and social change. I refer to those who see education as training rather than as the evolution of a probing, analytic, reflective individual and collective consciousness; those who desire the destruction of people, property, and institutions in the name of revolution, without serious concern for individual and social reconstruction after the revolution; and those reactionaries who respond to the prospect of social change with "white lashes" rather than any willingness to examine and eradicate institutionalized practices that fail to serve the well-being of all citizens. These latter patriots believe it to be inherently wrong to critically unearth inequitable

practices in the distribution of wealth, the provision of educational opportunity, and the administration of justice.

Perhaps it would be presumptuous to ask persons who operate within the staid mentalities above to consider a process of education that is uniquely Afro-American, but we do implore others to open their minds and hearts to thought processes that search for positive selfness, truth, and confident Being as foundations of education and community. Such processes oppose the notion of "proving" the total worth of one's Black selfness to other Blacks and to alien institutions within the American community.

This paper attempts to identify some of the historical and cultural elements that point toward an Afro-American process of developmental education. Our goal is to begin to specify and legitimize those educative tasks that help clarify an Afro-American communal framework which involves all the people in education. In this paper we are just beginning to delineate the underlying principles for an Afro-American educational process. We shall attempt to trace that process from a historical-cultural framework and contrast it to the current Anglo educational system, and finally we draw attention to the necessity of restructuring the community's values and attitudes toward both students and educational institutions. This approach draws from the roots of our Black existence.¹ It is this existence that we should reclaim in our homes, schools, and Afro-American communities. Throughout, we must remember that we are not proving anything to anyone but ourselves (although America might incidentally profit from this personal and Black institutional self-clarification).

Although some of us have conceived of education as a means for making a sovereign nation, and a few of us have dreamed of it as a means for achieving true freedom,² we have only begun to envision education as a process for establishing corporate communality, i.e. our institutional and socio-cultural identity.

¹ For convenience the terms "Afro-American" and "Black" are used interchangeably. However, this author prefers *Afro-American* as a more appropriate cultural and geographic designation for our people. At times, as in this paragraph, "Black Man" will refer to all persons of African descent.

² See W. E. B. DuBois, "Suppression of the African Slave Trade in America, 1838-1870." Unpublished dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1896. Also see DuBois's "Message" in which he dreams "of a world of infinite and invaluable variety." He writes, "But more especially far above and beyond this, in a realm of true freedom: in thought and dream, fantasy and imagination; in gift, aptitude, and genius—all possible manner of difference, topped with freedom of soul to do and be, and freedom of thought to give to a world and build into it, all wealth of inborn individuality . . . to stop this freedom of being is a blow at democracy. . . . There can be no perfect democracy curtailed by color, race, or poverty." In W. E. B. DuBois, *The World and Africa: An Inquiry into the Part Which Africa Has Played in World History* (New York: International Publishers, 1965), p. 261.

This position rejects the chauvinistic practices characteristic of nationalism. What we seek is a kind of sovereignty of Afro-American *being* within a social system that preserves the selfhood of all peoples.³

Historio-Cultural Bases of Afro-American Education

Let me caution against the belief that diverse cultural content as found in public schools today represents a viable base for creating Afro-American identity. At a time when Afro-Americanism is in vogue and all types of printed materials *about* Blacks are reaping commercial harvests for their authors, it might seem unduly radical for me to reject nearly all of these highly generalized and selective works. Yet many of these writings are no more than palliative white leaves, "white books with black covers." The truth is that widespread and accurate knowledge or acceptance of Afro-American culture as well as that of Indian-Americans, Mexican-Americans, Japanese-Americans, and other peoples of color has never been allowed to develop in American schools. The limited acceptance of Black works by Anglos is too often a form of "academic tokenism."⁴ Certainly, the essence of Afro-Americanism as a cultural entity with its own educational process has not been acknowledged, much less accepted in the American social system. In fact, it has been necessary to "justify" even the admission of the already distorted versions of Afro-American content that are finally beginning to appear in elementary and secondary curricula. That is to say we still find that the American educational system requires justifications much like the following, given more than a century ago:

He who writes the history of the world must not neglect to observe and describe this black stream of humanity which . . . poured into America from the Sudan. It has fertilized half a continent with its labour, and set a world on fire . . . it has influenced the progress of commerce, culture and morality in Europe and the United States and transformed a Federation into a Nationality.⁵

³ For a discussion of how one might preserve the selfhood of all peoples within a nation-state, and how wealth, land, and political power might be equitably distributed, see J. Nyerere, *Education for Self-Reliance* (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Government Printer, 1967), and Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York: Anchor Books, 1969), pp. 175-356.

⁴ It is not uncommon for Anglo-American curricular directors to include *Ebony* or perhaps *Black World* among the suggested reading materials for their school systems, but the writings of certain Blacks might be banned from their library shelves (e.g., E. Cleaver's *Soul on Ice* or H. Rap Brown's *Die Nigger Die*).

⁵ W. Winwood Reade, *The African Sketch-Book*, Vol. 2 (London: Smith, Elder, 1873), p. 511.

This need to justify Blacks implies fundamental social resistance to Afro-Americanism in American institutions. We need to clarify the valid historio-cultural bases upon which our Afro-American education rests, and these bases will have to be found outside of America's educational boundaries. Consequently, the major goal is not simply to identify culturally relevant content for Afro-American teachers and learners, but to help them use evolving thought processes to seek dynamic new values and appropriately evolving and meaningful life styles. The instruction provided by the total community should be directed toward this goal; it should allow each generation of learners to develop abilities to interpret phenomena in a self-clarified manner. The resulting confidence in self as a thinker and prime mover should enable the learner to deal with success and failure realistically; it should help the learner replace antagonistic and destructive behavior with his or her own constructive arts.

This task cannot be accomplished by attempting to clarify self through specific cultural artifacts alone, such as Afro hair styles, dashikis, lappas, bubbas, "black is beautiful" slogans, and soul food (okra, palm oil, black-eyed peas, etc.).⁶ Enduring bases and values can only emerge from less tangible factors. They must emanate from the essence of the Black man's folkways, *ways* by which the Black man can be identified historically as one who: (1) believes man should relate to man—he subscribes to interdependent sharing and caring for one another in human organizations such as the extended family⁷; (2) has behaved as a partner with nature⁸—his practices are more usufructuary than exploitative with land and property⁹; (3) uses time and space for the enhancement of intra-group relations rather than being controlled by time and space¹⁰; and (4) is conscious of unity among and between all things.

⁶ See George P. Murdock, *Africa: Its Peoples and their Cultural History* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 23 ff.

⁷ Extrafamilial kinship obligations are common in Africa. Cf. James Gibbs (ed.), *Peoples of Africa* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965) and Paul Bohannan, *Africa and Africans* (New York: The Natural History Press, 1964), Chap. 10.

⁸ See Basil Davidson, "The Balance with Nature," *The African Genius* (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1969), pp. 54-67.

⁹ Cf. Gunter Wagner's discussion of collective ownership among the Bantu of Kavirondo (Kenya) in *African Political Systems*, Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, eds. (London: Oxford University Press, 1940). See R. F. Stevenson, *Population and Political Systems in Tropical Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

¹⁰ See Daniel F. McCall, *Africa in Time-Perspective: A Discussion of Historical Reconstruction from Unwritten Sources* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 110-111. Cf. John Gay, "Classification and Thought" (of the Kpelle tribe) *Liberian Studies*, 1 (December, 1967), 20-23. Also see John Gay and Michael Cole, *The New Mathematics and an Old Culture: A Study of Learning among the Kpelle* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & World, 1967).

The first posited value, grounded in Afro-American folkways, aids in defining a basically Afro-American school, the school district as a community-family. This "community" is conceived of as that total group of persons, diverse in aspirations, motivations, and skills, who identify with and care for each other and who function as an extended-family in order to encourage the overall development of the community's children. Corporate communality is exemplified at the Nairobi Day School in East Palo Alto, for example,¹¹ by the morning assembly where parents come and sit with the children to chat and sing, to exchange commitments and to get a little happy feeling inside. This assembly is a kind of hallelujah session, a distinctive communality growing out of the Afro-American tradition. This group of persons, though unrelated by blood, constitutes an educational extended family which seeks to encourage the positive personal and socio-cultural development of all its members. This entails guiding educational experiences from conception through adulthood, and will eventually involve resocialization of adults through continuing parent-child education. It stresses the expansion of the emotional, physical, artistic, linguistic, computational, vocational, and other expressive abilities, skills, concepts, and values for all ages in the community-family.

Rather than foster exploitative tendencies among children and people, curricula based upon an Afro-American process in the Ravenswood city school district as well as in the Nairobi Day School emphasize man's partnership with nature. This second value means, for instance, teaching the young to optimally utilize and recycle goods and self, as the grandmothers and mothers of the Nairobi Day School do when they instruct boys and girls on how to make something from nothing—used clothing and junk items. More broadly, it means reordering the psycho-emotional relationships connected with daily interaction among teachers, students, parents, and the community agents. It is a means of guiding each complementary family member to realize that he or she must not use any other member of the community-family to satisfy his or her *ego-trip* needs.

The third value is the use of time and space for intra-group enhancement. Scheduling, per se, in the traditional Anglo education, fits a Western concept of time. However, in large areas of Africa, time is not so many marks on the clock; it is not the quantification of the period between sun up and sun down. Instead, it is what is done, the use to which that "time" is put. Time is a more functional concept there.

¹¹ Nairobi Day School was initiated in East Palo Alto, California in 1965 under the leadership of Mrs. Gertrude Wilks and The Mothers for Equal Education. Much of Dr. Wilson's thinking is derived from her first-hand experience as consultant to the school.

Similarly in the Nairobi Day School you do not necessarily study reading on Monday morning at 9 o'clock. If it appears that teacher and students are "out of it," they decide together what to do. Perhaps they go out and see what is happening to a tree, how it has changed from Friday until today. Time is not a constraint; it is conceived in terms of its functionality for learning and sharing with the environment.

The fourth value posited in the Afro-American process of education stresses comprehensive unity among all elements (man, natural phenomena, time and space). This fourth value speaks against divisiveness and superiority-inferiority hierarchies among members of the community. Our process would not foster a kind of unity that would be defined in terms of total similarities of interest, skills, and personalities among Blacks. Instead, it would foster diversities, all of which would be supported by different educational approaches, personnel, and places to educate.

Using the implicit socialization approaches above as our point of departure we present a challenge to Western education: an educational process that presumes to provide specific Afro-American values and practices for Afro-Americans. Our basic premise is that Western education's values and instructional behaviors and content are antithetical to authentic Afro-American socialization, culture, and education.

Historically, Afro-American existence is rooted in an African context that constantly reflected the "cultural ways" to be learned. The transmission of these folkways was shared by mothers, fathers, uncles, aunts, grandparents, community artisans, diviners, neighbors, tribal chiefs in the village-community, as well as the teachers from the tribe in the initiation schools.¹² Decisions were shared not only about *what* was to be taught, but *how* and *why*. All facets of the culture pervaded the curricular content and process, and this "curriculum" was transmitted by a prismatic range of culture bearers; all of them possessed interdependent skills, attitudes, and values that encompassed the major aspects of the people's folkways.¹³

¹² Augustus Caine, "A Study and Comparison of the West African 'Bush' School and the Southern Sotho Circumcision School." Unpublished Master's Thesis, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, 1959. Cf. Mark Hanna Watkins, "The West African 'Bush' School," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVIII (May, 1943), 1666-1675. Reprinted in George Spindler (ed.), *Education and Culture* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), pp. 426-443.

¹³ We have noted that essential and valid historio-cultural bases for our Afro-American process of education will not be found in Western education, or in the bulk of current writings on the Black man's experience. Instead, valid bases must be excavated and compiled from less contaminated sources. Truthful bases might be sought in a number of sources. In archaeology: L. S. B. Leakey, *Adam's Ancestors* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1935); regarding the oral tradition:

It is clear that the above values and practices do not fit into the American educational scheme.¹⁴ They do not condone unequal access to education. They are incompatible with heretofore accepted criteria of humane and quality education. Until now, Anglo social and economic predominance in America has effectively obscured the need to put any but mainstream content in the curriculum. The resulting neglect, ignorance, and suppression of nondominant cultures have been psychologically and culturally devastating for Afro-Americans. For centuries we extracted our "identity" from the false images available to us,¹⁵ and we knew next to nothing about the significance of Afro-American values in education. Our educational perspectives mirrored those of Anglos. We seemed satisfied to let the dominant society define us. It is time to remind ourselves that even when Anglos waxed philanthropic in the 1870's, they (and we) perceived Afro-American education as something for "special people," instituted to keep us in our places at the bottom of the social scale. Education for us involved little planning beyond the amount of hours to be spent on a limited range of subjects, usually agricultural or vocational.¹⁶ At best, it was a tool to remake Afro-Americans in the images of Anglos. Some Afro-Americans saw education as the instrument for making persons

Jan Vasina, R. Mauny and L. V. Thomas (eds.), *The Historian in Tropical Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); in glotto-chronology: Dell Hymes, "Lexicostatistics So Far," *Current Anthropology*, I (1960), pp. 3-44; in musicology: Ralph H. Metcalfe, "The West African Roots of Afro-American Music," *The Black Scholar*, I (June, 1970), pp. 16-25; in Black Theater: Floyd Gaffney, "Black Theatre: Commitment and Communication," *The Black Scholar*, I (June, 1970), pp. 10-15; Mercer and Stephen Henderson, *The Militant Black Writer* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1969); in Afro-American anthropology: Norman E. Whitten and John F. Szweid (eds.), *Afro-American Anthropology: Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: The Free Press, 1970); in discussion of African land holding practices, myths, rituals and ideologies: L. V. Thomas, "De Quelques Attitudes Africaines En Matière D'Histoire Locale," in J. Masina, R. Mauny and L. V. Thomas (eds.) *The Historian in Tropical Africa*, 1964.

¹⁴ For the values in American education, see Howard Becker, "Social Class Variations in the Teacher-Pupil Relationship," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, 25 (April, 1952), pp. 451-465. Also see Talcott Parsons, "The School Class as a Social System: Some of its Functions in American Society," *Harvard Educational Review*, 29 (Fall, 1959), pp. 297-318.

¹⁵ See Melville J. Herskovits, *The Myth of the Negro Past* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958).

¹⁶ Randal's poem epitomizes what was thought to be Black education:

"It seems to me," said Booker T.,
 "It shows a mighty lot of cheek
 To study chemistry and Greek
 When Mister Charlie needs a hand
 To hoe the cotton on his land,
 And when Miss Ann looks for a cook,
 Why stick your nose inside a book?"

Dudley Randal, "Booker T. and W. E. B." in *Black Voices: An Anthology of Afro-American Literature*, A. Chapman, ed. (New York: Mentor Books, 1968), p. 470 ff.

of color super people—better than Euro-Americans. We thought this would be accomplished through teaching the classics.¹⁷

Some current idioms challenge and blur our selfness and educational goals even further. For instance, we now know that our process of education must be stripped of any kinship with Anglo education's theme of "do your own thing." Such an individualistic approach outside the corroboration and collaboration of the community-family unit whether at home or in the community, is antithetical to the Afro-American process. In the true Afro-American process of education there can be no selfish exploitation of others; nor can there be exploitation of an environment which is viewed as complementary to the unity of man.

Our process of education stresses the continuity of existence as persons relate to persons within groups; first at home, then with peers, and later with older adults of the community. Through identification and positive interaction with the home-community-school environments, the individual can begin to experience personal and *group integrity* (socio-cultural group identity). He can begin to recognize personal worth, and differentiate success and failure as he receives the support of community-family members. Hence, our Afro-American education is concerned with *how* personal achievement is experienced as well as with what is experienced. We are proposing that a familial setting of interdependent and collaborative points of identification, goals, and behaviors, must not only foster achievement, but should enrich human caring experiences as well.¹⁸ This is not to say that our educational process would disregard personal initiative and invention, for its aim is to lead individuals towards self-direction, creativity, and individual responsibility. Nevertheless, such individualization, if it is to retain the "human touch," must be realized through caring-family interrelationships that build mutual trust, set a balance between group and individual goals, and retain collaborative behaviors that demonstrate community-family oriented feelings and concerns. In practice, Afro-American education will include the sharing of labor, laughter, and hope, the identification of a personal and group Afro-American selfness, and specification of self-initiated goals and frameworks for the realization of these goals. Individuals will

¹⁷ In America, the "re-making of Blacks" began with non-legitimate indices for humane values—exploitation of people and things, emphasis on white skins and money as important acquisitions, and association with European objects and knowledge. Cf. "Group Identity in the United States," in *Color and Race*, John H. Franklin, ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 249-263. See Edward W. Blyden, *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race* (London: W. B. Whittingham and Co., 1888).

¹⁸ The term "family members" will be discussed later with regard to educational personnel. Cf. McClelland's "achievement motive" as a view toward *personal* achievement. David McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand Publishers, 1961).

have opportunities to be joyful together, to gain patience in disappointments, to make decisions, to recognize the consequences of appropriate and inappropriate decisions, and to learn to care about oneself and others.

Personnel, Structure, and Socialization Phases


Afro-American education must begin at infancy, as the child begins to enter into the enculturative social relationships in his immediate extended family and in the community. Personnel for the Afro-American process of education consists of successive community-family educators (see Diagram 1) who will serve from infancy through adulthood. As children grow, the focus of their education shifts. For children of normal school age, the school will focus on educational activity, observation, and sensing, but the successful socialization of the children (and the resocialization of adults in the community) depends upon community members maintaining the conception that they are *always* educators. The viable transmission of our norms to the young and to psychologically confused Afro-American adults depends at least upon two aspects of awareness on the part of educational personnel: first, that each "family member" perceive that he or she *is* a family member, and second, that each member be willing to teach another Brother or Sister. Every participant in a social unit within the community must serve an educative function; as such each person is committed to teach what he or she knows to someone else in the community—in a home, park, library, public school, alternative school, or in some other community unit or agency.

It should be understood here that the term "family member" is not used in the "nuclear family" sense, for the latter is a Western-type enclosure of blood relations. In our Afro-American process of education, the term "family member" connotes caring-familial behaviors among all who identify with the community family. These identity points stretch from the home to the community on to the school units such as classrooms, multi-units within the school,¹⁹ and the total school district. These levels of *educational family memberships* hint at a bridge between a few of the more innovative educational approaches and the quality education we seek.²⁰

¹⁹ See Herbert J. Klausmeier, Richard Morrow, and James E. Walter, "Individually Guided Education in the Multiunit Elementary School: Guidelines for Implementation" (Madison, Wis.: Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, 1968).

²⁰ Some works that complement our efforts are: Klausmeier, Morrow, and Walter (*op. cit.*), J. C. Baratz, "Who Should Do What to Whom . . . and Why?" in A. C. Aarons, B. Gordon, and W. Stewart, eds., *Linguistic-Cultural Differences and American Education*, Special Anthology by the

DIAGRAM 1
Personnel for Afro-American Process of Education




"Family membership" will assume structural dimensions according to what is appropriate for a particular school family or a school district family. However, planners should make certain that the functional educative definitions, duties, and discipline of "family members" (especially as they evolve into policies, procedures,

Florida FL Reporter, Spring/Summer, 1969. Also see The Continuous Progress Concept of Seattle's Middle Schools in David Fraser, *et al.*, "Middle School Overview," Seattle Public Schools, 1969; J. S. Bruner, *Toward a Theory of Instruction* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968); H. Taba *et al.*, *Teaching Strategies and Cognitive Functioning in Elementary School Children*, Coop. Research Project #2404 (Washington, D. C.: HEW Department, 1966).

DIAGRAM 2

Learning to Think Straight: Reorganizing Levels of Distortions in Our Vision



cially fearful of maintaining a self different from that which the culturally-dominant group dictates.

It is easy to see why personal cleansing is a first step. When an individual is distracted from truth by a commitment to distorted perceptions, he is victimized by this very commitment. Even an Afro-American capable of "getting along" emerges with an impaired ability to precisely and forcefully declare, without violence, the cultural components that express the essence of our Afro-American heritage.

Of course, to recommend that Afro-Americans get to know their levels of distortion is not to ignore the concomitant need to restructure the broader American social context—the socially devastating hierarchical stratification, institutional racism, etc.—in which Afro-American communities must exist. But at present, not only does it seem reactive to use most of our energy to assault Anglo values, it is short-sighted. When we reflect upon the distance that we (Afro-Americans) must

go to clarify (to and for ourselves) our identity, and when we note that the gap between Haves and Have-Nots is widening, not narrowing, despite all the violence, we begin to realize how great our task of self-identification and implementation is. Our points of identity must still be clarified by us for our children. The education that will transmit these "points" must be engendered. If, for some, the identity question has gone underground, we must unearth it. As one African writer aptly put it:

Before the African could come into his own, he had to break out of the shell in which others had sought to contain him; he had to destroy the stereotyped idea of himself as an inferior being.²¹

There is a difference between knowing one's Black self and "playing the role" of a revolutionary—one who expends time and energy in rhetoric about destroying Anglo institutions. This becomes most clear in actual practice in education and social change. At the Ravenswood School District, for example, we asked Nairobi College students to work alongside other teachers of the district to motivate unmotivated children to learn. This required the students to put their "assumed" belief about "helping the brothers and sisters to know and appreciate themselves and their community" into practice. It did not take long for these students to discover which persons among them possessed Black selves that were clear and committed enough to design educational experiences within and beyond the classroom that motivated and guided the children. Those few junior educational leaders with clear self and sociocultural identities designed instructional approaches ranging from "cross age-grade" teaching (helping older students to set familial-group responsibilities for younger students) to regular after-noon school in the junior leaders' homes. During these home-school sessions, young students took turns teaching all that they had learned during the day from their friends, teachers, parents, the garbage man, birds, dogs, etc. Thus, the sessions emphasized the use of one's personal power to observe all that is around him.²²

²¹ Ayo Ogunsheye: "The African Personality: Ideology and Utopia," Paper presented to International Symposium on African Culture, Ibadan, Nigeria, December 1960, p. 1, mimeographed. See R. Blauner, "Black Culture: Myth or Reality?": in N. Whitten and J. F. Szew (eds.), *Afro-American Anthropology* (New York: Macmillan, 1969), and Lee Rainwater, ed., *Soul* (Chicago: Transaction Books, Aldine Press, 1970).

²² See K. Yamamoto, ed., *The Child and His Image: Self Concept in Early Years* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); G. Weinstein and M. D. Fantini, eds., *Toward Humanistic Education* (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 66-121. Also see William C. Kvaraceus, et al., *Negro Self-Concept: Implications for School and Citizenship* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965).

GUIDELINES FOR NAIROBI COLLEGE JUNIOR EDUCATIONAL LEADERS IN THE RAVENSWOOD CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT

These are performance competencies and the scale by which Junior Educational Leaders can determine if they are doing adequate justice in serving our young Brothers and Sisters within the School District.

EACH JUNIOR EDUCATIONAL LEADER (LEARNER) WILL:

1. BE ON TIME* to meet students, teacher, or other educational leaders with whom he will work. He/she should work faithfully EVEN WHEN A SUBSTITUTE TEACHER SERVES AT THE ABSENCE OF THE MAIN TEACHER AND PARAPROFESSIONALS.
2. KEEP HIS PROMISE AND COMMITMENT to the hours, persons, and programs of which he has become a part.
3. NOT REQUEST OR ACCEPT LUNCH PERMITS: these permits belong to the young Sisters and Brothers.
4. EAT WITH STUDENTS at Lunchtime and assist students on the playground.
5. SHARE HIS IDEAS AND EXPERIENCES in attempting to serve our children by producing quality education in a community-family or extended-family atmosphere.
6. Learn new ways of operating in his chosen SITUATION FOR EDUCATIONAL LEARNING (school or District office).
7. DISPLAY HONESTY, INTEGRITY, AND PROFESSIONALISM: he will not tattle, gossip, or carry information that is incorrect into the community and upset parents and others. All misunderstanding will be discussed openly with the persons concerned.
8. SHOW GOOD JUDGMENT, RELIABILITY, AND ENTHUSIASM in his school, classroom, or other task.
9. MOTIVATE OR ATTEMPT TO MOTIVATE OTHERS to better serve our children.

SCALE
EXCEPTIONAL

5

Very good

4

Average

3

Low
Motivation

2

POOR

1

*We are working toward getting personal commitments that are not bound by time alone.

Cleansing of one's levels of distortion needs to extend to institutional cleansing and reorientation after criteria are established regarding equitable behavior of institutional agents. The more honest and equitable their behavior, the better the chances of sustaining participation and commitment of the "clients." Social participation retains its dynamic character when parents, students, teachers and all community-family members set positive and satisfying goals, define specific educative tasks, foster maximum communication among members, and engender an atmosphere of just treatment for all. The "guidelines" for junior educational leaders (see p. 388) indicate what this may mean in a community college for Afro-Americans.

We are well aware of the need for individual and societal cleansing in every phase of the dominant culture in this nation, but I am appealing to us—Afro-Americans. Our traditional values and folkways offer us means to recapture ourselves; moreover, the creation of more humane, caring, constructive, and real educational experiences which the process of Afro-American education proposes would provide a model which America sorely needs. A truly Afro-American process of education will not come easily, particularly since so many Afro-Americans have become more American than African in their acquisitiveness. Nevertheless, we must pursue the goal of corporate communality, for this goal involves acceptance of and respect for diverse peoples, a willingness to teach and learn from others, and a commitment to share and communicate.

Euro-American education continues to preclude a pluralistic curricular approach. This has meant social devastation for minorities, and it is to this narrow humanism that the Afro-American "process" model offers an alternative. To the extent that we accept a "process" model of humaneness and communality we may rebuild the level of trust necessary for a pluralistic community. In any case, during this period of social examination Afro-Americans must loudly declare that *we* shall legitimize our existence, and others shall no longer determine for us the words we shall speak, the values we claim, and the beliefs we shall transmit to our children.

fully educate—that is, influence how children turn out in any important way. The most they can do successfully is provide child care and training. They could do a much better job of both than they do now, but in order to be free to do a better job they must abandon the idealistic but misguided effort to educate.

Education as a Dispensable Purpose

The assertion that schools do not have an educational effect over and above training and child care is a difficult one to substantiate, but so is the claim that they do educate. Hess and Torney (1967) and Dreeben (1968) have tried to show the school as a powerful agent for shaping social attitudes and values. Educational radicals have generally shared this opinion. The evidence rests on the correspondence between the values implicit in school curricula and procedures and the values which students espouse. School marking systems encourage competition: pupils become competitive; schools bias history patriotically: students hold jingoistic attitudes. The correspondences can be elaborated indefinitely, making a powerful case if you want to believe it. But another explanation is that in looking at school values and at student values we are merely looking at two sides of the same thing, namely, the prevailing values of society. One doesn't cause the other.

Similar arguments can be made for the school's success in developing mental abilities, another aspect of education that goes beyond training. If you look at curriculum materials or listen to classroom discussions you may observe that at higher grade levels increasingly sophisticated thinking is involved. Tests will also show that at successive grade levels pupils become progressively better at a variety of thinking skills. From this correspondence one might conclude that the schools are effective in developing the intellectual abilities of the child. Curiously, it seems that hardly anyone believes this, although the evidence for it is just as good as and logically equivalent to the evidence for the claim that schools develop social attitudes. It seems more evident in the case of intellectual abilities that the traits are ones that develop anyway and that schooling reflects rather than creates the conditions that prevail.

To say that schools educate is to say that they are responsible in some determinate way for the kinds of adults children turn out to be. To say that schools do not educate is not to deny them an important place in children's lives; rather it is to say that any other socially acceptable provisions for child care and training would have the same result. Education, I am pragmatically insisting, is education only in so far as it makes a difference.

Short of baby-in-the-barrel type experiments that can never be done, the only ways of investigating the educational impact of schooling are through looking at similar people who differ markedly in the amount or kind of schooling they received, through looking at the effects of particular courses or educational treatments, and finally through looking at major cultural shifts in thinking and behaving and seeing whether schooling anticipated or lagged behind those shifts.

For the most part people who receive different schooling are already different in other ways that make them non-comparable and that make it impossible to isolate the effect of schooling. College-educated people differ markedly from non-college-educated people in social attitudes, but the differences are already there before college, even when the comparison is made between people of similar intelligence, school achievement, or socio-economic status (Trent & Medsker, 1968). A more acceptable though still imperfect comparison involves children who receive limited schooling because of geographical isolation. It may be possible to find other children whose environments are comparable except for being closer to a school. The only completed study of this type that I know is by John Davis (1971), dealing with children in remote sections of British Columbia. Davis specifically tested a hypothesis of Dreeben's, that school experience contributed to development of the norm of universalism. His finding was that school attendance did not make a difference, that the norm was acquired early and readily by all.

The effects of particular courses or educational interventions are easier to detect, but when effects do not appear it may be because the totality of school experience masks them. In fact, effects are not observable for anything that would be called educationally significant beyond simple training and acquisition of information. As they proceed through school, pupils get better at both mathematical reasoning and mathematical knowledge, but only the latter is related to the taking of mathematics courses (Shaycoft, 1967). Similarly, social attitudes and beliefs generally show no relation to social studies courses taken (Horton, 1963; Massialas, 1969). Only in a few recent experiments has there been any demonstration of ways that educational effort can have some effect on moral development (Kohlberg, 1971, pp. 194-195).

Efforts to develop creativity tell a somewhat different but more revealing story. When the teaching of creativity has been reduced to training in a specific technique or type of production, it has been highly successful, but when it has been approached in a more general educational way not much has happened (Torrance, 1972). For whatever it is worth (and in the case of creativity, it may not be worth much), skill training seems to work. Training in attitudes and values can

work too: we call it indoctrination. What does not seem to work in school is anything beyond training, anything that would represent education in a higher sense as the effort to develop a whole person, to draw forth potentialities of the individual, and so on.

If schooling really made a difference then universal schooling should have been able to produce some massive cultural changes. I have not the information at my disposal to relate cultural changes of the past to schooling; but we have in recent memory a change in attitudes and values on the part of young people that is of such major proportions that it cannot but be a critical test case. Has schooling had anything to do with the radicalization of students, with the emergence of the counter-culture, with Consciousness III, with the sexual revolution? It is quite clear that the students changed first and only later did schools begin to reflect some of the change. If any causative role could be assigned to schooling it would have to be an indirect one, not associated with the schools' educational efforts but with the conditions of child care they provided—a permissive atmosphere that allowed dissent to thrive, or a coercive one that stirred it up, or an alienating environment that caused young people to search for more meaningful ways of living. At any rate, we can conclude that if the schools actually constituted anything like the potent educational force that both their critics and defenders make them out to be, then the profound changes in attitudes and life styles of the past decade ought never to have happened.

I do not claim that education is impossible in principle or that it never occurs in fact. One hears of the rare school or college that has a distinctive influence on its students, that leaves an intended mark. Even in ordinary schools there is the occasional great teacher who makes an important difference in the life of the occasional receptive pupil. What does not occur in actuality is mass education.

The impossibility of mass education is not at all difficult to explain. The kind of influence that would make a genuine difference in the kinds of people children turn out to be must generally come from a long and close personal relationship of the Socratic, the parent-child, or the Emile-and-his-tutor kind. It isn't reasonable to expect such influence to arise out of the conditions of mass schooling, no matter how that schooling is conducted. Even if the public were willing to support schooling to the extent of paying for one teacher for every ten children (thus nearly tripling present school budgets), it wouldn't work, because it would mean drawing in armies of less capable teachers. The teaching profession is already so large that it can never comprise anything more select than a cross-section of the college-educated population.

What we find in the elementary schools now is an idealistic commitment to the *idea* of education on the part of people who were mainly drawn into teaching because of a liking for children—whose actual motivations, in other words, are toward child care. The weight of opinion from all sources compels teachers to think of themselves as educators, for, wherever they turn, child care is spoken of condescendingly and training is usually spoken of with contempt. Yet at the same time the schools are under daily attack for doing a bad job, and it is not for failing to educate but for doing a poor job of child care and training.

School as a Place to Be

"Most schools," says John Holt (1969, pp. 15-16) "remain about what they have always been, bad places for children, or, for that matter, anyone to be in, to live in, to learn in." What goes on there, we are told by numerous observers, is nonsensical and degrading. Children are bored and humiliated. Schools are continually likened to prisons.

Holt intimates that schools have always been that way and we are just beginning to notice. Defenders point out that the great majority of children claim to like school. Both, it seems to me, overlook what is a fairly clear historical record showing that school as a place to be has changed a good deal in recent centuries and is now changing again.

Phillipe Ariés (1962) has traced the evolution of schools from the medieval colleges which were rather like open universities, to custodial institutions in which children of a certain age were kept. Harsh discipline enforced upon surly and rebellious children became the rule. In sixteenth century England, it is reported, flogging demonstrations were part of the graduation exercises for prospective Latin masters (Cole, 1931, p. 160). In 1790 Benjamin Rush observed that the spread of more humane and civilized ways of treating people had not yet reached the schools: "The rod is yet the principal instrument of governing them, and a school-master remains the only despot known in free countries." (In Knight & Hall, 1951, p. 473.) Although changes took place earlier in some other countries, it could be said that down to the middle of the 19th century a state of martial law characterized the schools of England, Canada, and the United States (Monroe, 1913; Johnson, 1952).

By no reasonable standard could such schools be considered good places for children to be. They were disorderly, stressful, and often unstable. An amazing transformation then occurred in which schools became not only tolerable but

valued and integral parts of the lives of most children. I speak now of the kinds of elementary schools attended by most adults now living.

The kind of school that emerged in the latter half of the 19th century is the kind that we now call "traditional" and which is the object of so much ridicule. It would pay us, however, to look at some of its good features, for it had more to be said for it than merely the absence of brutal treatment of children. First, the traditional school was—in contrast to earlier schools and some urban schools today—a safe and peaceful place for children to be. We tend to regard peace and safety as normal and therefore don't seek to account for them, but it would appear that in school they are not to be taken for granted and are not achieved without some effort and design. A second fact to note about life in the traditional school is that most children expressed satisfaction with it—about eighty per cent, according to various studies conducted over a span of forty years (Jackson, 1968, pp. 41-81).

There is a more significant virtue of traditional school life, however, which I do not know how to document and which I must therefore ask the reader to check against his own experience and observations. It is that in the traditional school children generally felt that what they were doing was important. If true, this is no small credit to school as a place for children to be; for in the modern world at large what children do is not important. They have no economic value except as modest consumers; they have no political force, are incapable of any impact on the course of events; with rare exceptions they do not say or do anything that is of interest to anyone except those who dote on them. Paul Goodman (1960) has criticized schools for maintaining young people in a state of uselessness, cut off from the significant work of the world. Goodman was talking about adolescents, and with respect to them the criticism has force. But with respect to children an opposite case can be made—that in a world that has little call for their services, the school provides children with an artificial environment where they are needed and where their efforts count for something.

I mention these three virtues of traditional school life—peace, enjoyment, and the child's sense that what he does is important—because they are qualities one would seek in any kind of child-care facility and because they are qualities that present-day critics find lacking in schools. Indeed, much of the concern in alternative schools, such as the First Street School described by George Dennison (1969), is to regain these elemental qualities.

How were they achieved in the traditional school? I would suggest three familiar features of the traditional school that fairly well epitomize its way of functioning. They are *working for marks*, *ritual*, and "*good student*" morality.

Working for marks. Work, though seldom arduous, occupied much of the time in a traditional school—lessons, recitations, “seat” work, homework, “projects,” and the like. The theoretical outcome of all this work was learning, but from the immediate standpoint of both teacher and child, the outcome was marks. The mutual involvement of teacher and child in working for marks is important to note. The teacher did not merely dispense the marks and other evaluations of the child’s work but also devoted herself to helping the child improve those marks. Good marks, symbolizing the doing of good work, constituted a shared goal which gave coherence and direction to what would otherwise be rather pointless efforts on the part of pupils and teachers.

Ritual. From opening exercises to procedures for donning coats and boots at the close of the day, traditional school life was highly ritualized. For virtually everything that was done in school there was a certain way to do it, and traditional school life was in part a continued painstaking struggle to do everything the way it was supposed to be done. Some things were difficult to master, like the requirements for a presentable piece of written work. Others, like the rituals of oral recitation, were so easily learned that many young children knew how to act them out before they had even entered school, having learned them by playing school with older children.

“Good student” morality. In contrast to the vagueness with which good citizenship is defined in the world at large, there was no question in the traditional school as to what good citizenship entailed. It meant, primarily, doing one’s best at all times in the collective effort to do good work and to observe the rituals. The rituals and the work assignments specified the behaviors that constituted being a good student; all that remained for the child was to supply the effort and hopefully a certain amount of aptitude for the job.

These three features of traditional school life—working for marks, ritual, and “good student” morality—are the very characteristics most thoroughly damned by modern critics, for whom they spell joyless drudgery, artificiality and meaninglessness, and destruction of individuality. On the other hand, it is these same characteristics that seem best able to account for the good qualities of traditional school life.

Ritual, clear-cut morality, and a definite job to do obviously contribute to a peaceful and orderly school life. If they are not exactly a prescription for pleasure they are at least a defense against aimless boredom. But most especially they provide the foundation for a way of life in which children feel what they do is important. Consider the child’s school work. Pointless as it might be from a detached

adult perspective, irrelevant as much of it was to any worthwhile learning, within the school context the child's work really mattered. To his teacher it mattered whether the work was done on time and done right. Her seriousness on this account, expressed through report card grades, caused the child's work to matter to his parents as well. Thus, artificial as it might be, the child had a job that was more meaningful than many a job in the real world, for it involved a striving for excellence that more routine jobs lack. Ritual also bestows importance upon the individual's actions, as shown for instance by the significance that the acts of sitting and standing have in a church service compared with their significance in an informal social gathering. Viewed from outside, ritual is absurd, but to the involved participant (and I am sure that many of today's critics were once involved participants in school rituals), rituals mean something.

The situation in a traditional school has much similarity to the situation in a peacetime army. Both the child and the peacetime soldier are being readied for future activity, but in both cases the future activity is too remote and unforeseeable to serve as adequate motivation or purpose on a day-to-day basis. There being no real accomplishments to strive for, an artificial world is generated in which work of no actual consequence becomes invested with importance by being used as a running test of merit. All aspects of life become highly ritualized and so much emotion becomes attached to the rituals that even minor deviations from them are seen as threatening to the whole structure of life. The guiding purpose in life becomes not that of achieving any external objective but that of being a good pupil or a good soldier as the case may be.

"Morale" is the military term referring to how well this artificial system functions. It appears the system never works too well in the peacetime military. Adults are simply too sophisticated to accept the necessary assumptions. Schools, dealing with a more naive membership, have enjoyed much greater success, but that seems to be changing. The declining faith of educators in the traditional school way of life can be traced back for decades—an increasing diffidence about assigning grades, a shift of concern from the quality of a child's work to a concern with his personal development, a de-emphasis of ritual in favor of naturalness and informality, a gradual softening of the line on matters of neatness, etiquette, posture, and the like. More recently one may observe among school children a sophisticated detachment that is disastrous for the traditional school way of life. The word seems to have passed down from college to high school and now to the more with-it elementary school populations that a great deal of school work is

pointless, that grades don't really tell how good you are, and that the school rituals are a subject for derision.

What seems to be happening is that the perspective of the outer world is penetrating the school. The traditional school cannot survive such an invasion, for if goings on in school come to be judged by the same standards as goings on outside they will be seen as ridiculous and the structure will collapse. You cannot have a room full of ten-year-old Paul Goodmans and Edgar Z. Friedenbergs and hope to run a traditional school, especially if the teacher holds the same viewpoint.

In discussing the traditional school I have been uncertain of what tense to use. The traditional school survives, and there are still plenty of places where teachers, children, and parents believe in it strongly enough that it still functions happily, where the children still strive to get their names on the bulletin board list of "superstars" who got all the words right on the weekly spelling test, where there is seldom any shoving in line, and where the teacher can point out only a few children who are not "working up to capacity." But the demise of the traditional school is clearly underway and seems inevitable. The process whereby things that look absurd from the outside come to be viewed as absurd from the inside seems irreversible, so that isolated little worlds that function according to their own arbitrary rules are doomed.

The other force that seems destined to destroy the traditional school is the twenty per cent or so of children who in the various surveys have *not* expressed satisfaction with school life. These are not, as Philip Jackson (1968, pp. 72-81) has shown, only the failing students but rather a fairly uniform proportion of children at all levels of achievement. The idea that dissatisfied minorities should keep quiet and put up with what is satisfactory to the majority is rapidly dying out.

A current survey might well show that 80 per cent of children still like school, and for all we know a survey taken 150 years ago might have shown the same thing. There are, however, unmistakable signs that the quality of life in school is taking a turn back toward the unfortunate state it was in at that earlier time. Complete breakdowns of classroom discipline are not uncommon, and whole schools sometimes become unmanageable. Armed attacks on teachers and policemen in the halls bespeak a failure of the traditional school to go on functioning. Even where school life is still tranquil and pleasant I find, at least among the elementary school pupils that I meet, a loss of the sense that what they are doing in school is very important. At best it is a game they enjoy playing because they are reasonably good at it. Kids still glow at a good report card, even if it no longer contains any grades. But

day to day they seem to be assured only that their teacher values them as people, not that what they do counts for anything in its own right.

Some new mode of child care is going to have to emerge. There is plenty of room for it to be better than traditional schooling ever was. The trick will be to evolve some new condition, not based on ritual and contrived "work," which enables children to feel that they are spending their days on worthwhile and meaningful things.

Informal Schooling as Child Care

The answer to the need for a new mode of child care for school age children may already be in front of us in the shape of the informal school. The informal school (which refers to roughly the same thing as the open concept and the English infant school model) is represented as a new approach to education rather than to child care. But as an approach to education it is difficult to see what there is to get excited about. Informal schooling has not demonstrated any remarkable achievements of an educational sort, the main ideas are the familiar ones of progressive education, and the kinds of learning activities that go on are, for the most part, ones that can be observed in traditional schools as well. What seems to impress people about informal schools, what brings them back oohing and ahing from England, is the style of life in the schools.

Children in the informal schools, we are told, seem so secure, they are so happy, they are so involved in what they are doing. All this sounds very familiar, but there does indeed seem to be a difference between life in a well-functioning informal school and life in a well-functioning traditional school. Mainly, I would say, it is that the children seem more natural. They move around, talk to each other, and poke into things more like the way they do in their out-of-school life. One is struck by the lack of ritualized speech and action and by the lack of striving to perform.

How does the informal school manage to function without benefit of ritual and working for grades? I hope I may be excused for not quoting explanations given by the leading thinkers associated with informal education: I find their theorizing to be unbearably maudlin. The simple fact, which does not really demand much explanation, seems to be this: *given an ample choice of activities deemed worthwhile and some help in making up their minds, children will tend to engage themselves in worthwhile activities.*

Now if that is all there is to it, one may wonder why it took school people five

hundred years, most of which were spent whacking children with sticks, before the truth dawned on them. The answer, I think, is not that people were blind or were stuck on the idea of original sin. I think people have probably always recognized the above principle as a sensible guide to child tending, but only recently has it occurred to them to call it education.

Herein we may find an explanation for the strange devotion that informal educators have to the psychology of Jean Piaget. Piaget's theory is abstract, complicated, and peculiarly difficult for the English-trained mind to get hold of. It is concerned primarily with the development of reasoning and has little or no concern with emotions, social behavior, individual differences, or creativity. Furthermore, it is devoid of practical guidance on any matter. It is, in short, about the last thing that one would expect informal educators to seize as their torch.

What Piaget's theory does do, however, is provide a license for calling virtually anything a child does education. Such, at least, has been the interpretation of leading advocates of informal schooling like Nathan Isaacs (1960):

Piaget's work as a whole has made plain all the vital education that goes on in the child quite independently of the set educational processes . . . Indeed, by far the most important portion of his intellectual growth is achieved by himself. . . . (p. 35)

In a similar vein, Charles E. Silberman (1971) says:

So far as educational practice is concerned, Piaget's most important contribution has been his demonstration that the child is the principal agent in his own education and mental development. (p. 215)

Notice that both writers use education and growth interchangeably. It is evident that to them education is something that goes on within the child. When the concept of education is thus merged with the concept of growth, it follows obviously (and without the need for Piaget's research) that the child's whole life is a process of education and that all his experiences contribute to it. From this conclusion it is then an easy step to the practical position that whatever makes for a good, experientially rich life for children is good education; and that, in its most elementary terms, is the position of the advocates of informal education.

The point at which to question the advocates of informal education is not the point at which they begin to invoke Piaget but the point at which they use the term education to refer to the process of intellectual development that Piaget describes.

What is lost when education becomes equated with development is, of course, the notion of international influence. The generations of cane-wielding and as-

signment-grading teachers of the past were not just trying to make children grow, they were trying to make them grow a certain way. No doubt they were misguided, but at least it is understandable why it did not occur to them that all they had to do was let the children follow any worthwhile activities they chose.

The merging of meanings of education and development is an error of semantics, but it is more than that. It is a social phenomenon that could be traced historically as a reflection of the declining enthusiasm of schoolmen for education in the active sense—that is, a general retreat from the effort to impose one's will on human nature and a turning instead to the idea that human nature is to be cultivated and understood rather than shaped and controlled.

Although in practice a good deal of educational effort goes on in informal schools, the underlying idea of informal schooling is non-educational. It is to provide a suitable environment for children to live and grow in. The child's life and destiny are essentially his own, with the teacher as an adjunct to nature rather than an agent of society charged with making the child turn out the way society wishes. This is a philosophy of child care, and a rather good one. Its full application is hampered, however, by the unfortunate belief that it is a philosophy of education.

A well-functioning informal school provides excellent child care: a safe, pleasant place for children to be with each other, with many more interesting things to do than are available at home, and some helpful adults around in case they are needed. The effects of adding educational effort to this child care are minor but, I think, wholly negative. In the name of education there is less freedom of choice than there would otherwise be. For some activities all the child is actually free to choose is when he will do them, not whether; and these tend to be the duller and more pointless activities such as social science projects, which, in informal schools as in traditional ones, amount to cutting pictures out of magazines and copying passages out of encyclopedias. Educational purpose dictates a certain concern about "progress," which may take the form of evaluations, conferences, progress charts, etc. It is also likely that the range of activities made available to children is narrowed somewhat by the need to give a justification, however flimsy, for each activity in terms of its educational value. Finally, educational purpose keeps teachers involved in a lot of effort to observe, understand, anticipate, and respond to everything that is going on with each child, even though the calculated effect of their effort, both in fact and according to Piagetian theory, is nil: it is all like straining to help the bus get there faster.

Perhaps there are more sinister implications to education carried out in infor-

mal schools. Lillian Weber (1971) quotes with approval a publication of England's National Froebel Foundation that claims teachers in informal schools actually have a "more active directing part to play" than teachers in traditional schools. The statement goes on to explain:

But the part to be played is of course a very different kind. It is based on not imposing anything on children, but on so closely co-operating with their native interests and drives that whatever they are led to do is felt as something that comes out of themselves. (p. 109)

Shades of Walden Two! The statement implies a kind of education against which children would have no defense, since they would not know when they were being influenced.

Any kind of child care will, of course, tend to mold children in some nonrandom way. Since children cannot be wholly the architects of their own environments, their environments will inevitably reflect some particular adults' notions as to what is suitable for them. Furthermore, as anyone who has worked with young children knows, some of them demand help in deciding what to do with their time and others become bored and troublesome if they don't get it, so that adults unavoidably bias children's choices of activities. That much we can accept as a fact of life in any institutionalized form of child care. But it is one thing for an adult to recognize his potentiality for biasing the course of child development and try to minimize this effect and another thing for him to regard such biasing as his mission. The first is responsible child care; the second is education.

Separating Training from Child Care

Not only has the traditional school failed to satisfy one out of five of its pupils, it has also failed a large number of them in its responsibility of teaching the basic skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic. Estimating what proportion of children it fails is a complex matter, for it involves not only a judgment as to what constitutes failure but also a judgment as to how many children could have succeeded under more favorable conditions; but the proportion of failures is not very important to establish anyway. The problem is not that society is burdened with an excessive number of illiterates or people who can't figure their income tax. The problem is that any children, whether they number two hundred or two million per year, who had the potentiality to acquire the basic skills but didn't learn them, have been cruelly cheated by the schools. Everett Reimer has suggested that parents of such children should be able to sue the schools for damages. Whether the

proposal is realistic or not, it at least makes us look at skill training from the proper perspective, seeing it as a matter of individual right rather than a matter of efficiency of the school system.

We are told that informal schools do as well at teaching reading as traditional schools and only a shade less well at teaching arithmetic computation (Silberman, 1971, p. 260). While these results are a comfort to those who are switching over to the informal mode, they indicate that informal schooling does not promise any advance toward a solution of what may be called the problem of the skill-deprived child. Indeed, to me these results are mainly surprising for what they suggest about the ineffectiveness of skill training in the traditional schools.

In the discussion that follows I shall deal mainly with learning to read, since it is clearly the most vital of the three R's and the one about which there has been the most study. If we take as a premise that a given child should be able to learn to read if a majority of children like him learn to read, then we may conclude that virtually all children in school are capable of learning to read. There exist now reading programs which, when properly executed, achieve one hundred per cent success in teaching beginning reading to children for whom the "normal" expectation of success is decidedly lower.¹ My purpose in mentioning this, however, is not to press for a particular method of attack on the reading problem but only to suggest that the problem is not one that has to wait for the unravelling of deep scientific mysteries before it can be solved. The unsolved problem is not how to get children to learn reading but how to get schools to teach it.

Teaching a child to read is a matter of training the child, and schools of both the traditional and informal type are, I suggest, poor settings for the conduct of training. Training may be briefly defined as the teaching of performance. Two clear-cut kinds of training that come immediately to mind in connection with schools are training in team sports and the training of a school band. In comparison to the other teaching functions of schools, these two tend to be highly successful, even in small schools where there is not much room for selection of talent.

¹ I refer to the two most systematic intensive phonic programs I know of. One grew out of the academic preschool program conducted by Siegfried Engelmann and me, where one hundred per cent success was achieved in teaching disadvantaged children to read by the end of kindergarten (Engelmann, 1970). Since developed into the DISTAR program, it has had strikingly good results in Project Follow Through (Osborn, 1971, pp. 17-24). The other is the Open Court reading program, which since 1969 has guaranteed results with its first-grade program, and, as of December, 1971, had not yet had to refund any money, even though the program has been used widely in a variety of schools and even though the users have been able to choose the tests for evaluating results (Open Court Publishing Company, 1971).

These extra-curricular kinds of training illustrate some of the characteristic features of training as it is carried out in the world at large. (1) It is not carried out for its own sake but as a means of access to a desired activity. (2) It is separated from the rest of life and has its own criteria, which are different from general criteria of self-development. Thus, motivation and success are highly specific to the skill in question. (3) The training is carried out by someone whose responsibility and concern are rather narrowly confined to the performance being learned.

Training, on these three counts, is the opposite of school learning as it is usually conceived—that is, as learning which is carried out for its own sake, closely integrated with the overall development of the child, and guided by a teacher whose responsibility and concern for the child are essentially unbounded.

The reasons why traditional schools and informal schools are inhospitable to training are somewhat different, but they have this much in common: both, in their own ways, seek to develop an internally consistent and harmonious way of school life. Thus various elements of schooling tend to lose their distinctiveness and to become like each other in sometimes absurd ways. The traditional school would off-hand seem well-suited to training, since children are continually called on to perform and their performance is continually evaluated. Indeed, the traditional school is permeated with training, to such an extent that training is sometimes applied grotesquely where it does not belong: instead of learning history children learn to perform a set of statements about history memorized by rote. But then, just as meaningful learning becomes contaminated with performance learning, so does skill training get muddled up with the effort to promote understanding, creativity, and the like. A reading lesson and a science lesson thus come to have much the same ingredients—a mish-mash of memorization, drill, procedure learning, inquiry, question-and-answer recitation, factual exposition, craft projects, and free-floating discussion. Finally, in the traditional school there is the tendency for everything to become ritualized and shaped into some kind of routine work. Thus the goal of training, which is some ultimate ability to perform, is dissolved into a concern with the day-by-day performance of lesson rituals and work assignments that have only a nominal relevance to the training goal.

In informal schools the drive for consistency creates severe problems of reconciling training with the otherwise informal and undemanding character of the school. Jonathon Kozol (1972) has recently made the strong claim that free schools fail mainly because teachers in them do not pursue seriously enough their responsibility to train children in what he calls "survival skills." He himself admits to using straight-forward, old-fashioned phonics training when it is needed. Appar-

ently many teachers in informal settings, however, find it difficult to switch over into the role of trainer, nor is it surprising that they should. Non-authoritarian parents also find it difficult to give their children formal training, because of the incongruity of the trainer and the child-care roles.

Good training and good child care have almost nothing in common. Training is authoritarian by its very nature. If you signed up for swimming lessons and the teacher told you to swim however you liked, you would want your money back. Good child care on the other hand allows maximum reasonable freedom. Training has definite goals and aims to reach them; child care flows along indefinitely like life itself. Training is highly focussed; child care takes account of the whole child. Training aims at successful performance; child care is not judgmental: the child doesn't succeed or fail at it.

With such differences it stands to reason that training and child care should be separated; different kinds of people should provide them, under different circumstances. The child should know when he is in one and when he is in the other. The result of this separation should be a purer and more wholesome kind of child care along with training that is more lively and successful.

To the advocates of informal education, such separation is anathema. One of the central ideas of progressive education embodied in informal schools is that the artificial chopping up of the curriculum into subjects and the separation of all these subjects from life should be ended. The "integrated day," according to Lillian Weber (1971, p. 91), is the ideal toward which informal educators strive. This ideal is perfectly sound in those cases where training is not necessary. The farm boy lives an integrated day and in the process learns to ride a horse; the street child in a poor nation leads an integrated day hustling a living and in the process learns arithmetic; the immigrant child leads an integrated day and in the process learns a second language. But lacking these opportunities, other children will not learn riding, arithmetic, or a second language unless they have specific training.

The need for training arises from the incompleteness of normal experience. To try to reshape the ordinary experience of children so that it includes all that is necessary for the natural acquisition of reading and numerical skills is to produce an absurdly artificial environment. (You see some of this in informal schools that go to ridiculous lengths to get children to count and measure everything that comes into view.²) The more sensible approach would be to provide train-

² Lillian Weber (1971, p. 121) tells of the visitor to an infant school being greeted with, "Miss, can I weigh your shoe?"

ing with a minimum of fuss and wasted effort, and then simply provide enough resources in the environment that the child can put the skills to use if he feels inclined.

Practical Considerations

Take an ordinary old elementary school. Announce to the teachers that they can have their choice between being child care workers and scholastic skill trainers. Put the child care workers on the ground floor and tell them that their job is not to educate children but simply to provide them with an abundance of things to do in and out of school that will make for a good life. Put the trainers upstairs or in the basement, assign them either language arts or arithmetic as their subject, and tell them to find a way to teach it successfully to any child who walks in the door, using no more than three hours of his time per week. Give the child care workers an ample equipment and field-trip budget and give the trainers some time off to be trained themselves in any teaching method of their choice.

This method of implementation, though far from ideal, would I believe be a substantial improvement over most elementary school situations now. Probably more teachers would opt for child care than for training, and that would be all right, for it would probably work out that at any given time only a fourth to a third of the children would be in a training session. The child-care types, one might predict, would be relieved at having training responsibilities taken out of their hands and would develop an appealing collection of resources and activities. The training types, I suspect, would find the chance to specialize refreshing and would acquire striking proficiency at teaching their skills. Scheduling children's time for training so that it did not get too much in the way of other activities would be a headache, but it would be resolved somehow and children would find both kinds of school experience enjoyable in their different ways. In the process of this rearrangement of school function, the function of education would have been eliminated, but if no one said anything about it, it is doubtful if it would be missed.

In order to placate a worrisome public, the school would probably have to label some of the child care activities as "science experiences," "citizenship experiences," "nature study," "our heritage," and so on. There would be no harm in this so long as nothing was done differently on account of the labeling—so long, that is, as the child-care workers continued to pursue their job of providing interesting resources and activities for children without regard to the children's getting

anything in particular out of them. Former teachers would no doubt be uneasy at first, but they would be reassured as it became evident that the children were not perceptibly more ignorant or less socialized than children who had been "educated."

The weak spot in this quick-changeover plan is the first step. Many teachers would object violently to having themselves recategorized as child-care workers or trainers. Either one sounds like a demotion, and it is. One could perhaps disguise the fact by inventing more impressive titles, but it is the case, curiously, that when you divide the teaching role into its sub-components of child care and training neither of these sub-components seems to call for the high level of professional competence that teaching does.

There are two reasons I can see that teaching has a higher status than its component roles. The first is a legitimate one that has been suggested in the previous discussion. Child care and training are both rather simple, straightforward jobs; what is difficult and anomalous and what therefore seems to require a high level of professional sophistication is to do both jobs at once. The other reason derives from the mystique of education. The perennial calls for greatness one hears in keynote addresses at teachers conventions are not calls for people who are great at child tending or at teaching children to do fractions; they are calls for greatness in developing character, intellect, and citizenship. By separating teaching into child care and training we not only divide a difficult job into two easy ones, we also eliminate a fictitious third job, that of educator, which is the one that commands the prestige.

I don't wish to imply that child care and skill training are jobs that require no talent. Clearly a good child care worker needs to be strong on human qualities, needs to relate well to children, needs tact, patience, imagination, etc. On the other hand, it is doubtful if a child care worker needs any special knowledge other than what may be acquired readily from those who already know the ropes. A good trainer does need some specialized skill in training techniques, perhaps in ways of gaining and holding attention, and so forth. But the formal part of acquiring such skills could be accomplished by any person of average intelligence in a matter of a few weeks. In his highly successful Follow-Through model, Engelmann (1970) does just this, teaching low-income parents to function as trainers in language, reading, and arithmetic. They do the same work as professional teachers and are reportedly as effective. Another example comes from CIDOC, in Cuernavaca, where Ivan Illich uses young non-professionals as language teachers. In

both cases the trainers use a highly structured program that minimizes the curricular decisions they have to make.

In the long run, a sensible staffing model for elementary schools would be one that had something like two professional child care specialists and one professional training specialist for every three hundred children. The rest of the staff could consist of non-professional adults working full-time or part-time, and adolescents working as part of a work-study program. It might be noted that summer camps manage to function successfully on a leaner model than this, with less professional guidance, but with quality child care and effective training being carried out by a staff of young counselors.

There is some logic to the staffing ratios I have proposed. The professional training specialist does not need to know the children in the school personally, but he needs to know the trainers and to work with them very closely in perfecting the training programs. Ideally, he ought also to have full authority to hire and fire them and himself be accountable for the successes and failures of training. The need for some professional supervision of child care is sufficiently obvious that it need not be spelled out. What I think is important is that the people who exercise this kind of supervision should be personally acquainted with the children involved. When *this is not the case*, as it often is not when schools make use of itinerant psychologists, psychiatrists, or child developmentalists, the situation becomes one that encourages outrageous irresponsibility and caprice on the part of the specialists.

Having the bulk of the work of running a school done by non-professionals has abundant advantages. In the first place, non-professionals, having little or no investment in preparation for the job, can be let go from it without its being a catastrophe. There is no shortage of the talents needed for child care and training, but some people don't have them. Under present conditions the removal of incompetent teachers is not only difficult for humane and contractual reasons but also because those who have the authority to fire teachers don't work with them closely enough to know which ones are incompetent. For trainers, the lack of a professional self-image would be a decided advantage. It would allow them to follow a prescriptive training program without feeling that they were lowering themselves, and this is a critical factor when it comes to implementing structured programs in schools. Finally, the use of non-professionals in child care would allow for a great deal more variety than the use of professional teachers—people with talents in different arts, and also people of different levels of maturity, from elderly ones

down to ones who were young enough that they could enter into the children's activities as participants rather than as directors or on-lookers.

The result of these proposals would be that the elementary school teacher as we now know her would cease to exist, being replaced on one hand by somewhat more highly qualified professionals and on the other hand by a variety of non-professional workers. It does seem that the role of elementary school teacher is an outdated survival from the time of the one-room schoolhouse, when the disparate functions of child care and training had to be consolidated into one for the sake of economy. But can we expect the job ever to be eliminated when elementary school teachers already exist in great and increasingly well-organized numbers, and when the proposed substitutes are mostly jobs of lower status? Not in a flash, of course. What is more in prospect is slow transformation. Parent involvement and the use of non-professionals in schools is on the increase (Hedges, 1972). At the same time public interest in spending money on schools seems to be declining (Gallup, 1971). If these trends continue, it is reasonable to expect that they will begin to combine, with professional teachers gradually becoming responsible for more children and non-professionals taking on more of the child care functions. The trend toward open-plan schools further favors this development, since it will make it easier for teachers to spread their attentions over a number of children and workers.

If the separation of training from child care occurs, however, it will be as a result of other pressures, namely pressures from those whose children are being short-changed in skill-learning. When the results of the Follow Through experiments become publicized, I predict that there will be an explosion in the ghettos violent enough to shake the experience charts off the schoolroom walls.³ Parents will simply cease to put up with illiteracy any more. The answer to this uproar is likely going to have to be to let non-professionals teach skill subjects, with supervision coming not from the classroom teacher but from a specialist in the teaching method.

I have said nothing about schooling beyond the elementary years. It is not at all certain that the high school will survive as an institution. The pressures toward its disintegration are much stronger and the reasons for its survival much weaker. For

³ I am sorry to sound so mysterious about this, but practically no results have been released yet from Project Follow Through, and what I know I know only by hearsay and peeks at a few charts. Some very general results, not isolating particular programs, are given in Soar, Ragosta, Blekking, and Soar (1972). More pointed results are alluded to briefly in some transcribed conference remarks by Jean Osborn (1971).

adolescents, institutionalized child care is unnecessary and training needs are so diverse that it makes little sense to cram all sorts of training within the same four walls. If the high school should dissolve or undergo radical transformation, then it should become much easier for the elementary schools to change in the directions I have indicated, the monolith of EDUCATION having broken down into a number of more particularized services for young people.

There is, finally, a chance that educational voucher plans will become a reality so that parents will have some individual choice as to how their schooling dollars are spent. This would greatly strengthen the case for separation of child care and training, for some parents might not want to spend vouchers on child care at all if other attractive options were available, some children would need a great deal less training than others, and there would be enough differences in the kinds of child care and the kinds of training that people wanted that it would make little sense to have the two packaged together. I suspect, furthermore, that it might take the kind of competitive market that voucher plans would create before schools would be motivated to provide as effective training as is possible.

One depressing thing about any proposal for school reform is that if it is adopted it will very likely lead to an increase in bureaucracy. Thus, the substantial savings in money that would come from use of non-professionals, savings that could well be spent on improving other cultural resources of communities, would be used up by the creation of more administrative and supervisory jobs to take care of the additional job categories and to coordinate whatever anybody thought needed coordinating.

Along with Michael Katz (1971), I do not see anything that can be done about school system bureaucracy. Even a revolution would probably result in a larger bureaucracy functioning (or more likely not functioning) under the name of participant democracy. There are two characteristics any alternate school plan should have, however, if it is at least to tend toward a decrease in bureaucracy. One is that the plan should be capable of functioning with little high-level supervision or supplementation. That is true of the plan I propose. Like the one-room school of old, the kind of school I propose could take care of its own problems and thus could survive drastic cutbacks in supervisory and supplementary services. This is not true of present-day schools, where if there is a cut-back in funds there are fewer remedial reading teachers and more kids fail to learn to read.

The other requirement of an alternate school plan is that it should carry with it a diminished rather than an inflated notion of the importance of schooling. The hordes of supervisors, consultants, and specialists who dominate our schools

thrive upon a fantastic belief in the importance of what goes on in school. Neither the free school people nor the English infant school people nor the "return to fundamentals" people are doing anything to lessen this belief. Instead, the schools keep getting renewed calls for greatness from all sides. If we want schools to be brought down to human scale, we need to conceive a role for them that is also of human scale—a modest role that ordinary people can handle by themselves. To conceive of such a modest role is to conceive of schools without education.

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*Politics, Rage and Motivation in the Free Schools**

JONATHAN KOZOL

The author discusses the unspoken ideological biases prevalent in seemingly "non-political" or "anti-political" free schools. He specifies ways in which the free schools may be able to confront these biases by offering an authentic and provocative range of choices, as well as by direct and active confrontation with real social problems. Finally, he points to one of the most serious tasks facing the Free Schools in the 1970's—the development of long-range loyalties and commitment among Free School people.

Education is always political in one fashion or another. It is political by provoking painful choices. It is political by urging ethical decisions. It is also political, though in a different sense, if it creates a mood or atmosphere in which there are no serious provocations and no ethical decisions to be made. I do not mean that education needs to be political in the sense of New Left, Old Left or Old Right—although this often is the case—but rather, that all of the school-discussion has at its foundation the question of what young people will believe, or not believe, about the way they live, about the way their nation lives, and about the way in which it serves or does not serve the cause of justice.

Most Free Schools begun in ghetto neighborhoods have had, from the first, a

* This article is adapted from the new concluding chapter to the forthcoming second edition of the author's *Free Schools*, to be published by Houghton Mifflin. Printed by permission of the publisher. Copyright © 1972 by Jonathan Kozol.

strong ingredient of direct, unfalsified political consciousness; this, in most cases, in coordination with a hard-boiled and pragmatic emphasis on skills, effectiveness and realistic willingness for certain kinds of active competition with acknowledged enemies. By and large, Free Schools begun for the children of upper class white people have been not merely non-political, but conspicuously and intentionally anti-political. In many respects, the two movements not only separate but, unfortunately, segregated; yet the fashions from one school drift easily into the other. Therefore, it is essential for the survival of the serious Free Schools of this nation to raise the issue of political participation, or, conversely, of political abdication and surrender.

The issue of "free choice" is of particular importance when we speak of schools that serve primarily children of rich people. It is simply dishonest to lead children to "experience" freedom if, in fact, they *are not free*. In an unjust nation, the children of the rich and powerful are not free in any way that genuinely matters if they are not free to know the price in pain and exploitation that their lives are built upon. To surround these children with the bright and whimsical gadgets sold by groups like Westinghouse and I.B.M. and E.D.C. while innocently pretending to ignore the fact that everybody in this high-tuition Free School is white-skinned, well-fed and middle-class, to offer anesthesia but to call it "freedom," to speak of "options" but to fail to tell the children of the unearned wealth that makes these kinds of options possible for them, and them alone, this does not seem to me to be an honest or a conscientious process.

The heart of the deception is the pretense of free choice within a carefully constructed framework of contrived and managed possibilities. The children can "choose" for Herman Hesse, for Richard Brautigan or Tolkien, for Mexican sandals, Polaroid cameras or brown rice with mushrooms; but they cannot "choose" for starving and malnourished kids in Harlem, for dying men in Venezuela, or for slaughtered babies in Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia if everything in the air and on the walls and in the meadow and over the river and, above all, in their parents' and teachers' eyes, conveys to them the secret message that such things *do not have credible existence* or, if they do, then only in a way that cannot touch them, or make claims upon them, or intrude upon their dreams, or intervene upon their slumber. To encourage these children to "experience" freedom because they are allowed to choose the water-play unit from Westinghouse above the gerbil-cages or the packaged science-game from E.D.C., if they have *no freedom* to choose to side in spirit and in fact with those who are the victims of the unjust allocation of resources which affords them privileges and pleasures such as these, to offer this

"beautiful freedom" in all things pertaining to an immediate kingdom of delight but *no freedom* in terms of access to data and openness to experience which, together, may be able to destroy or undermine the walls of anesthetic self-protection that surround the unreal world in which they live, to offer this kind of falsified freedom, in my judgment, is to purvey a very deep and desperate kind of servitude. A child in a rigorous, old-fashioned public high school would be far more fortunate in several respects. At least he would not be deceived into believing that his choices were his own and consequently would be able to react with secret rage and silent skepticism to the undisguised mendacity around him.

In visiting many of the rural Free Schools in the course of these two years, my wife and I repeatedly ask ourselves this question: Why is it, in so many of these self-conscious, open and ecstatic Free Schools for rich children, everyone boasts that he is doing "his own thing" but everyone in each of these schools, from coast to coast, is doing the same *KIND* of thing? Why is it, we ask, that "free choice" so often proves to mean the weaver's loom, tie-dye and macrame, that "organic growth" turns out in every case to mean the potter's kiln? How come it doesn't ever mean a passionate and searching look into the origins of unearned wealth that makes this segregated Free School possible? How is it that it never pertains to danger, choice, or confrontation?

It is, of course, because *all* teachers and *all* adults in these kinds of situations do in fact dictate the options and preferences of the children in a number of important and inexorable ways: by the very familiar and predictable clothes they wear and life-styles they foster, by the very familiar and predictable tools, gadgets, gimmicks, and ornamentations they provide, by the physical location they have chosen, by the pupil-tuition they establish, by the race and social class of children they enroll. I do not propose that teachers and parents in these schools ought to exercise *less* power. What I do suggest is that they ought to exercise their power with more conscious recognition of the bias they now serve and that they ought to give more honest and straightforward expression to those deep and oftentimes insuperable barriers of privilege and class which shade their preferences and tarnish and restrict their sense of love, their will to justice or their capability for passion.

Those who adhere with the highest degree of noncritical perception to the notion of impartial, nonpolitical and nondirective education attempt very often to portray themselves as those who are involved exclusively with the child "himself" and who do not desire, therefore, to bring political or social bias into pedagogic areas. In truth, however, there is immense and serious bias in their prior choice to keep things low-key, whimsical, untouched by anger. The methods with which

they decorate their pedagogic vision and demonstrate their upper-class sophistication may, from a certain point of view, appear to express a nonpolitical preference and a non-ideological choice of learning-atmosphere. In fact it is by no means non-ideological or non-political. It is a clear and obvious choice AGAINST the voice of anger. It is a clear and obvious choice AGAINST the need for ethical behavior. It is a clear and obvious choice AGAINST the need for struggle, confrontation, intervention.

"Spontaneity" is the magic word among the liberal and genteel men and women I now have in mind, but the ideological antisepsis of the kind of Free School they inevitably create guarantees well in advance that no child here will ever choose spontaneously to learn of things which lie outside the province of privilege, the kingdom of trivia, or the boundaries of self-gratification.

In certain of the more sophisticated classrooms in some of the innovative and experimental public schools, children are now provided with an opportunity to research and to explore, without apparent supervision, into a seemingly diverse array of books and films, of tapes and magazines and other types of resource-data. If we look, however, what we find in almost every case is that the seemingly diverse resources that the school purveys are not very different from the unimportant options of mass magazines, of TV networks or, at the very most, of the commercialized rebellion of the counter culture. These schools do not suppress the revolutionary instincts of our children; instead, they buy them out.

The Free School that is born of a high consciousness of struggle is in a unique position to puncture this pretense of apparent freedom and to expand and deepen the falsified mix and insubstantial options that now are purveyed as serious choices in the public schools. In one Free School that I knew first hand, teachers bring in materials from the public schools in order to give the children concrete data on the ways in which the public system of indoctrination functions and proceeds: **HOW PUBLIC EDUCATION SERVES THE FLAG IT FLIES**. In the same school—one which is operated in the Boston ghetto—there is also a semester of math-exercises built upon the exploration and examination of the drug-trade in the neighborhood in which the Free School stands. In another Free School there is a team of parents, teachers, and children who look into serious problems such as lead-paint poison in their neighborhood, research the causes, consequences, possibilities of action, call in the press, call out the neighborhood, and launch a city-wide campaign against lead-poison for *all* children.

There must be at least a hundred other ways in which some of the Free Schools I have seen endeavor to expand the sense of option and the possibilities for di-

rect provocation in the course of academic labor. Several, for example, go to great pains to be certain that the casual materials—books, magazines and pamphlets—which are present in the school, in classroom-shelves, on hallway-tables or in whatever passes for a quiet reading place, include such strong, diverse but often unfamiliar items as *Monthly Review*, the English language version of the Marxist daily paper (*Granma*) from Havana; the brilliant, angry and exciting research-bulletins that are prepared and issued by the North American Congress on Latin America ("Tupamaros," "The Rockefeller Empire," "The Great South Asian War"): the documents and data of the African Research Group in Cambridge, Massachusetts, or of the Medical Committee for Human Rights in San Francisco. I go into some detail here in regard to names and titles in order to make sure that I will not be misunderstood, and so that the point at stake here will be absolutely clear: children can only "choose" for what they see as choices. Children will never spontaneously ask to learn of things which they have never heard of. We do not awaken one morning, without prior provocation, to a spontaneous and organic sense of curiosity concerning the function of the C.I.A. in Guatemala or the progress of the sugar-crop in Cuba. Nobody walks into an airport and requests two tickets to fly to Rio de Janeiro if he does not first know it is there.

This is, for me, the crucial question in regard to choice and freedom in the Free School: ferment, provocation, liberation or the sense of option does not "happen" by spontaneous combustion. It happens only if the teachers, parents, organizers, leaders, partisans, coworkers, are willing to stand up and defend a point of view, to introduce unusual kinds of catalytic possibilities, to risk the likelihood of error, sadness, anger or upheaval by bringing into the context of the child's education visible and unexpected forms of provocation which he cannot independently discover. Children who read and who have access to a newsstand in the year of 1972 or 1973, might well be prompted on their own to pose a certain *type* of question in regard to Mao Tse-Tung or Chou En Lai, or possibly just to ordinary life in Shanghai or Peking. It is obvious, however, that they are going to ask a totally different kind of question and, as I believe, to ask that question from an infinitely less passive and less neutral point of view, if they have also had an opportunity to see a copy of *Peking Review*. It is obvious, again, that children might, by natural processes, be prompted or provoked to ask a certain sort of question in regard to Mexico, Bolivia or Brazil, merely in reaction to the latest issue of *LIFE Magazine* or *Newsweek*. They will, however, ask a far more serious and more searching kind of question if they have also had a chance to read some of the penetrating bulletins from NACLA: still more if they have been provoked to place the versions

of the truth as it is documented or narrated or reported by both publications side by side, therein to find that genuine tension and that deepdown sense of intellectual provocation, choice, decision, which never is possible within a classroom that must serve the interests of a single nation or of a single social class.

I do, of course, agree with the point made several times in recent months by certain of my colleagues, that many of these problems are less blatant and less obvious in a Free School which is situated in a neighborhood of Black or Puerto Rican people in the first place: i.e., a Free School that can locate or can ascertain the counterfoil to *TIME* or NBC or CBS merely by pulling up the blinds and looking out the window. Yet even within the most intense and conscientious Free School there are whole areas of intellectual provocation and of political consideration to which no child ever will gain access if his curiosity and his initiative are not challenged by the active and non-neutral intervention of adults.

It is one thing for an alert and serious young woman or man to recognize, on his own and without added information, the grim, archaic, racist and, at times, dysfunctional character of the public high school on the opposite corner; it is another thing to have available *the records of closed sessions of the Boston School Committee*, and to discover in this fashion the deep, deep, cynical, corrupt and conscious processes by which dishonest men defraud the poor and the least powerful of the young while serving their own allies, cronies and ward-organizers. It is one thing to recognize, from repetitive exposure, that medical services in ghetto hospitals like Boston City Hospital tend to be slow, inadequate, chaotic, and disheartening; it is another thing to understand that this is not an accidental, isolated situation, but that every major city in this nation has at least one hospital to give this kind of care to those who have no economic options: that is, that every city offers ghetto medicine to ghetto citizens and makes available its least effective, least reliable and least consistent services to those whom it has come to view as its least valuable children. It is, once again, one thing to live with a low-key, lifelong, unstated recognition that police-collusion or police-collaboration is affiliated in some stupid, gross, informal or disorganized way with the sale of drugs, the sale of sex, and the total climate of corruption, drug-addiction, and violence that now obtains on something close to plague dimensions in black communities of cities such as Boston and New York. It is another thing, however—indeed it is something of a *totally different order*—to begin to understand that wholesale drug-addiction, prostitution, violence on these dimensions COULD NOT CONCEIVABLY EXIST if it were not for the consistent, organized and even disciplined liaison between pushers, prostitutes and cops.

The difference here is something more important, I believe, than a matter of the volume of information or of the level of detective-work at stake, it is the difference, rather, between two levels of incipient perception. The first is discontent, uneasiness and involuted desperation; the second is leverage, potency, a point from which to look down and consider the full view. The first is the sense of inarticulate and as-yet-disorganized rebellion; the second is something more like "functional anger," "passion that can force its path through realistic channels." In my belief, very little of the second kind of insight, leverage or perspective ever takes place in the lives of children within a nation of manipulated will and of stage-managed choice, without the direct risk-taking intervention which is constituted by the actions and examples of adults in a state of ethical rebellion. Inevitably the areas of challenge and of catalytic action that come to my mind are those which voice a New Left bias and a Third World orientation. These are, for certain, the kinds of challenges that I would look for, advertise and foster. The point, however, is less the left-wing bias or the Third World point of view than it is the simple fact of an authentic confrontation among genuine and exciting possibilities.

I have tried to emphasize, at various points within my work, that I do not like the notion of political indoctrination; I think it is an incorrect response to the indoctrination of the state, inasmuch as it confirms the basic character and notion of the process of indoctrination, even if it transforms the subject-matter. I like even less, on the other hand, what I believe to be the ethical abdication or the disguised collaboration of the Free School which denies the struggle for justice and evades or neutralizes the experience of anger. If indoctrination is an incorrect response to pain and mandate, abdication or collaboration is an obviation of the claims of mandate altogether. The perception of pain is not the end of spontaneity; it is the starting-point of motivation. This point, so far as I can understand, must lie someplace close to the heart of any Free School that intends to take its stand in the face of history. This is the case, at least, so long as history remains, as it has been within our lives and in our generation, the chronicle of men who live upon the misery and exploitation of their brothers, yet do not know and often-times can never even dream the price that must be paid in hunger, pain and desperation in order to make their sense of private satisfaction possible. There is simply no way in which to disaffiliate entirely from the blood and stench of the times in which we live.

Postscript

This is intended as a brief, pragmatic footnote to the larger discussion of political consciousness and provocation in the Free Schools.

The urban Free School has been described by Ivan Illich as a pedagogic Free Zone in a land of intellectual stagnation.¹ The first responsibility of a revolutionary cadre—in the mountains of Bolivia or in the canyons of New York—is to solidify and to secure its borders. It is essential, therefore, both for the symbolic possibilities and for the tactical objectives of the Free School struggle in this nation that we be prepared to offer, both to those within our ranks and to those on the outside, the vision of men and women who can do things right; can start, continue, follow up and follow through; can instigate, promote, excite, inspire, and then can stick with that which we have helped inspire, promulgate, promote, long enough to bring it to at least a tentative level of completion.

The issue is posed for us, in these terms and at this time, because of the very familiar problem of low levels of *consistent* loyalty in many of the Free Schools. The deepest danger to survival, in large numbers of these schools, is by no means—as many of us like to say—the speed with which some of our allies get co-opted. It is the willingness with which we self-destruct. Hundreds of times, by now, we see and recognize the sudden and unnecessary abdication of real power and of real threshold-status in regard to the consummation and completion of a looked-for goal. Right at the edge of action, on the threshold of real generative force, there is a familiar instant of reiterated failure, fractional passage of imaginative loss and of emotional collapse which sometimes seems, remarkably, to yearn to forfeit everything. Time and again we encounter people who get high on abstract possibilities, wax rhetorical on the birth of new conceptions, become exhilarated during the opening hours of a new experience, but lose their steam the moment it appears that something they helped inspire may in fact persist and prosper and survive.

I wonder, though, what kinds of loyalties can be constructed on a groundwork of desertion. There is a black child that I know in Boston who has now gone through four generations of white teachers, organizers, drifters, VISTAS, O.E.O.-supported revolutionaries and what he calls “The Hippie People,” all in the course of six years. Peter can list the names of all the young white men and young white women he has known. They give him supper and they buy him shoes and take him out on hikes and sit down on the floor to play with the cuisenaire rods for one summer and one winter, and sometimes for one spring and for one summer once again. Then they switch gears, and they are into a New Thing. They cancel him out, or rather they do not “cancel” him—they cannot quite do that—but situate him in a slot of history or a place of pain known as “the race and conscience

¹ In a letter to the author.

bag." They make new friends and read new books, and find a whole new set of slogans and bywords, and they are off to a new dedication.

Peter, however, does not live within the "race and conscience bag." He lives on Columbus Avenue in the South End of Boston. He is a real person and, after they are gone, he is still there.

There is, for each of us, the need to learn and grow—and grow, of course, in terms of our own consciousness of what "school" is about. There is the need, therefore, to open ourselves at all times to new, vigorous and conflicting notions which will challenge those things which we presently believe or which we *think* we understand. There is, however, an even deeper need to find one solid core of concrete action and specific dedication in one neighborhood, or in one city, with just one group of children, and with one group of allies, and with one set of loyalties, and with one deep, deep dream of love and transformation. This is the struggle which large numbers of us in the Free Schools now must face during the years ahead. It is the struggle also of the whole youth movement in this nation. It is the struggle of those of us who have been taught for twenty years how to be non-stop consumers, and now must pause to teach ourselves how to be loyal to one thing that we believe in.

Book Reviews

HORACE MANN: A BIOGRAPHY.
by Jonathan Messerli.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.
672 pp. \$15.00.

From the mid-nineteenth century on, Horace Mann's admirers have placed on his shoulders the mantle of Father of the American Public School System. The standard version of his life portrays an enlightened humanitarian reformer bringing the inherent advantages of public schooling to the American people. This inspirational history has two major themes. First, that Horace Mann was a great reformer motivated by the highest humanitarian ideals. Second, that Mann helped create the publicly supported non-sectarian school system that has been essential for democratic progress, and, in fact, has been "the living embodiment of the spirit that made us a nation, the very symbol of our freedom."¹ Despite criticisms made by Merle Curti in the 1930's and Michael Katz in the 1960's, the democratic humanitarian model has

stood paramount in both academic and popular interpretations of Horace Mann's life.

The publication of *Horace Mann: A Biography*, by Jonathan Messerli is a welcome contribution to the de-mystification of Mann's life. Dr. Messerli, Dean of the Hofstra School of Education, draws upon the wealth of material left by Mann, his family, and colleagues to provide what must be considered a definitive biography. Messerli makes particular note of the connection between Mann's private and public life without upsetting the rhythm of what is essentially a narrative biography. In this account, Mann's famous twelve years as Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education recede in the view of his whole adult life's commitment to different aspects of social reform. Nevertheless, the compelling interest for most readers, before and after they read the book, will be the story of The Father of the American School System. It is with this in mind that the book will be reviewed.

A traditional reading of the Messerli narrative could identify selected facts from the wealth of material presented to support the position that Mann was a

¹ Jay Elmer Morgan, *Horace Mann: His Ideas and Ideals* (Washington, D. C.: National Home Library Foundation, 1936), p. 3.

Can such concepts do more for education than clutter our language with more dreary acronyms and divert public funds into the hands of a few educational consulting firms? Specifically, can Lessinger's scheme "transform our schools within this decade," as he asserts? (p. 3). Perhaps so, for Bobbitt's scientific management theories worked a considerable transformation in American education, although the change required a generation rather than a decade. However, if the consequences of Bobbitt's movement can be taken as instructive, it would appear that, should such a transformation take place, every kid would *not* be a winner.

Much that is mechanical and stultifying in contemporary education can be traced to its origins in that earlier attempt to make the schools more business-like. Following the logic of his analogy, Bobbitt, along with other theorists of the movement, proceeded to glean educational objectives from surveys of adult behavior. This "Neilson Rating" approach to educational objectives produced approximately the same effect in curriculum as in television programming—dullness and mediocracy. The search of the scientific management theorists for behavioral standards for well-adjusted adults led them to transform science into practical mechanics, mathematics into change counting, and English literature into newspaper reading and letter writing.⁵ The magnitude of the consequences

of these curricular alterations upon our civilization has yet to be assessed.

Consider, for example, the word list mentality that has plagued our teaching of reading and writing during the last half century. On grounds of efficiency, we have taught our language using the lowest common denominator of vocabulary and style. Although other factors are involved, the scientific management theorists must bear a portion of the blame for the decline in the richness and complexity of common English discourse during this century.⁶ Or consider the decades-long struggle of mathematics theorists to return a sound program to the schools. Much of the effort by math educators to try to restore meaning to our narrow and theoryless arithmetic teaching has been an attempt to undo what was done in the name of efficiency by the scientific management curriculum workers.

Furthermore, the movement's quest for efficiency has produced many of the evils that plague school administration. Cost accounting criteria applied to education have resulted in top heavy administrative structures, excessive and mindless supervision, and a sea of non-productive records. Even more disastrous has been the willingness of educational leaders such as Lessinger to place economic values before educational values. Our experience over this century should have taught us that the use of cost efficiency criteria for the achievement of specific, limited objectives produces enormous distortion in

College Record, 73 (February, 1972), pp. 339-345.

⁵ For two later statements from the scientific management movement that fully illustrate this curricular procedure, see Franklin Bobbitt, *How to Make a Curriculum*

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1924), and W. W. Charters, *Curriculum Construction* (New York: Macmillan, 1923).

⁶ If anyone doubts this decline, let him examine any newspaper or popular novel of the late nineteenth century.

any educational program which must, inevitably, contain many features not amenable to such a simplistic approach.

To establish these points would require much more space than is available in a brief book review. Fortunately, they have been documented by Raymond Callahan in his excellent study, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency*.⁷ Callahan offers the thesis that educational administrators take refuge in the cost effectiveness idea when they are beset by strong and destructive outside criticism. The defensive attitude of contemporary accountability advocates, Lessinger among others, lends support to this thesis. Must this mechanistic response be repeated? Can we not find a more humane model for the education of our children than the manufacture of steel rails or intercontinental ballistic missiles? Should not sixty years of educational thought produce an idea more profound than that of performance contracting?

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⁷(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962). For an excellent recent philosophical analysis of the problem, see also Robert J. Nash and Russell M. Agne, "The Ethos of Accountability—A Critique," *Teachers College Record*, 73 (February, 1972), pp. 357-370.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZERS AND SOCIAL PLANNERS: A VOLUME OF CASE AND ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIAL.

by Joan Levin Ecklein and Armand A. Lauffer.

New York: John Wiley and Sons, and the Council on Social Work Education, 1972. 378 pp. \$7.25.

Case material has been used in one form or another by all practice professions. Cases help to amplify specific methods and varying orientations to practice. They are also used as a device to relate theory and principles to field situations and issues. And equally important, cases provide a useful tool for students to get a grasp or a "feel" for the practice.

Social work has long relied on case material—from casebooks or from students' experiences in the field—to teach method content.

Graduate programs in community organization and planning, on the other hand, have not used much case material, albeit not intentionally. Few case materials have been developed over the years, partly because of the limited number of community organization programs. Until the sixties only Boston College and Ohio State University provided a concentration in community organization.

A further difficulty is the length and complexity of organizing and planning activities. Planning projects extend over months and even years. Different actors enter the process at varying and different stages. To capture the essential ingredients of the activity becomes problematical.

Boston College did try to develop community organization case material a num-

ber of years ago. Students were asked to write detailed accounts of field work projects. The material developed was uneven and only a handful of cases was found to be useful. Although the project succumbed in a few years, the need for case material did not.

In the mid-sixties the Council on Social Work Education, a national accrediting and standard-setting agency, sponsored a study of community organization curriculum in graduate social work education. One part of the study examined community organization and planning practice in the field as a means for relating practice experiences to curriculum content. Using an interview guide, practitioners were asked to describe a particular community project or program and how they went about resolving it.

This casebook, or more correctly, the bulk of it, is a result of those interviews. At the urging of colleagues, the interview material was transformed into cases. A few articles and other cases were used to fill out the book.

The casebook is also companion to a textbook on community organization and social planning, derived also from the the community organization curriculum study.¹ The reader should keep in mind that to fully understand the case material it is necessary to read the textbook. This is not meant to suggest that the casebook does not provide explanatory material on community organization and social planning—it does, and, given

the limitations, does so clearly and succinctly.

The book is divided into two parts: one related to community organization, the other to social planning. Each part is preceded by an introductory chapter containing a description of the practice itself and the roles of the organizer and planner. Each of the two parts is further divided into five sections. The rationale for the subdivisions or sections is never clear. Conceivably, the organization of the casebook was dictated by the organization of the companion text. In any event, this is a limitation.

In the introduction, the authors identify two skills necessary for the practice of community organization and social planning. One is a procedural or analytic skill. The other is an interactional skill. Analytic skills are cognitive in character. They include, for example, knowing how to plan, how to diagnose committee and group interactions, how to collect and analyze data, and how to use publicity and public relations media.

Some cases—there are fifty-seven in all—are obviously better than others. But there is a great deal of useful material. How to prepare for a strike, how to organize block clubs, the organizing principles of conflict techniques, how to write a grant proposal, how to mediate agency disputes, and techniques of surveys are just a few examples. For illustrating procedural or analytic techniques, then, this volume can be helpful.

A clear explanation of interactional skills, however, is lacking. "Interactional skills" refer to the community organizer's or social planner's ability to use himself or herself as an agent of change. The development of interactional skills requires

¹ Robert Perlman and Arnold Gurin, *Community Organization and Social Planning* (New York: John Wiley and Sons and The Council on Social Work Education, 1972).

first that the individual have an understanding of himself, of his own needs and goals; and, secondly, a capacity not to permit his own needs to be satisfied at the expense of the client group. It demands self-discipline, professional objectivity. It is not, as it is often mistakenly assumed, professional aloofness. Organizers and planners need, and must demonstrate, a sincere interest in the client with whom they are working. Although not a case, the Nicholas von Hoffman piece makes a strong argument for the necessity for knowing how to intervene in community organizing activities in an objective and disciplined manner.

It has been customary to depend upon case material, along with field experience, to demonstrate and teach interactional skills. Case material, particularly when the case is described by the organizer or planner himself, has a way of revealing both overt and underlying intentions. There are always clues to explain the behavior of the planner or organizer.

In the introductory chapters the authors stress the importance of interactional skills both for community organization (pp. 20-22) and social planning (p. 214). The volume abounds in illustrations.

For example, the case, "Black Students Take Over" (p. 81) describes the sensitive way in which a Black university official helps young Black students negotiate with university administrators. The description indicates that, although emotionally involved, he recognized the need to maintain his objectivity in order to successfully help the students achieve their demands. In the next case, an anti-poverty worker reveals how, by imposing his own judgments, he not only frustrated community efforts, but brought about his

own dismissal. Significantly, the tip-off to his behavior is his last sentence—an imperialistic comment—"Unleash *your* people and you stand to lose your job" (p. 92, reviewer's emphasis).

The failure of the casebook is in not interpreting this material to the reader. Without explanation, the reader is left to guess what is meant by interactional skills. Perhaps this is less a criticism of the casebook than a criticism of the needs of the community organization and social planning field. The authors state clearly that the intention is to provide material useful for teachers of community organization and social planning, and not for the novice or untrained worker. In most respects they have been successful. There is certainly enough case material—from a compilation of interviews with Cesar Chavez to how to PERT a planning project. I intend to use the volume.

There remains the need for case material which both describes and interprets the organizing and planning process. It is most helpful when the case author provides the interpretation—not just what he has done, but why. For clarifying the interactional aspects of organizing and planning the author's interpretations become essential. The author's diagnostic insights—his explanations of underlying reasons for specific acts as well as the description of overt behavior—are crucial.

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THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM: A RADICAL ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY.

by Richard C. Edwards, Michael Reich and Thomas E. Weisskopf, eds.

Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972. 543 pp. \$6.50.

This book grew out of a course on American capitalism that has been offered at Harvard since 1968. It contains "the most relevant material from the reading list" as well as new essays published here for the first time. Taught by economists, the course—"The Capitalist Economy: Conflict and Power"—is intended to present a critical analysis of the capitalist system and particularly of advanced capitalism as it exists in the United States today. A number of essays can be classified more easily within the realm of other social sciences, and it is likely that non-economists will also find the volume to be a useful description of the capitalist system from a radical perspective. Although most of the empirical analysis included in the volume refers to the United States, the book is by no means irrelevant to other countries with similar as well as alternative institutions.

The book is very much a product of the group of economists that constitute the Harvard chapter of the Union of Radical Political Economics, a national organization whose influence on radical economic thinking in this country has been considerable. In the preface, the editors clarify the evolution of their analytical framework: "...we recognized increasingly that social oppression is embedded in the basic economic and political institutions of capitalist society." Many of the arguments presented draw

upon "... the Marxist tradition of social concern, critical analysis, and interdisciplinary theory..." (pp. ix-x). The contributions by the Harvard group are numerous, and by writing introductions to chapters and individual essays the editors have managed to give coherence to what, at first sight at least, seems to be a collection of difficult-to-relate essays. They also succeed in passing on to the reader the message of their collective experience and work.

The collection is organized into four parts: a) the problems that capitalism generates; b) the nature of capitalist institutions; c) the functioning of capitalism in America; d) an analysis of an alternative to capitalism. Although the logic of the book calls for repetition of certain issues in the context of different chapters, some overlapping could have been avoided. The editors draw their themes from the basic characteristics and effects of advanced capitalism. First, the expansive and dynamic nature of a capitalist economy—based on the need for the capitalist firm to expand in order to maximize, and even retain, profits. Edwards' essay on this subject is, in part, a new version of Schumpeter's analysis of the "process of creative destruction" under capitalism. The subject reappears elsewhere, mainly in connection with the problem of surplus absorption and in the chapter on imperialism. This expansionist drive is also seen at the root of an irrational system that generates ever-increasing consumer wants, pollutes the environment, and allocates an unprecedented amount of resources to military expenditures. There is at least one reading on each of these subjects, with one important omission being a discussion of the American health empire.

Inequality is a central theme in the book. It is viewed as a functional consequence of basic capitalist institutions—such as the market in labor, the private ownership and control of the means of production, and the assumption that man/woman is moved by economic incentives. One of Thomas Weisskopf's essays argues that the necessity of a certain degree of inequality in a capitalist economy follows from the need for unequal capital ownership and labor earnings. The existence of inequality in the distribution of income and wealth and the effect of taxation and government spending on income distribution is well documented in several essays. Inequality, in all its aspects, is at the basis of economic and political conflict and threatens, as Robin Blackburn puts it, the "underlying harmony of interests within capitalist society" assumed by orthodox analysis (p. 38).

Schools play an important role in perpetuating inequalities. Contrary to the popular belief that the educational system is an equalizing force, the view presented here is that the supposedly meritocratic system, far from providing equality of opportunity for all, is instrumental in legitimizing and transmitting class inequalities. David Cohen and Marvin Lazerson present an historical perspective on the introduction of ability criteria in our schools as "an increasingly refined training and selection mechanism for the labor force" (p. 184). The historical consequence has been educational differentiation based upon qualification rather than birth. This educational differentiation, however, has been shown to be class-biased. The contemporary use of ability grouping as a mechanism by which inequalities are successfully transmitted within schools is

the subject of an essay by Florence Howe and Paul Lauter. The class character of the educational system is further examined by Samuel Bowles, who argues that the hierarchical social division of labor is reproduced by differences among and within schools. He shows that scholastic achievement is highly correlated with income and social class, and that class inequalities in college attendance exist even for children of the same academic ability. The argument that the educational system compensates for existing class inequalities is thus demonstrated to be fallacious.

Racial and sexual discrimination constitute another aspect of inequality—the book dedicates one chapter to each. It is important to note the similarities between the two types of discrimination. First, the concept of racial dualism in the labor market (separate employment pools for whites and Blacks), discussed by Harold Baron and Bennett Hymer, could also be applied to an analysis of sexual dualism, which unfortunately is not included. Second, the question of the relationship between capitalism and the two forms of discrimination is analyzed in three separate essays. James and Grace Boggs draw a parallel between the rise of capitalism and racism as a systematic oppression of one race by another. Margery Davies and Michael Reich examine the mutually reinforcing relationship among capitalism, the nuclear family, and sexism, concluding that capitalist development is at the same time undermining the nuclear family. Their analysis is essentially correct. What is missing is a warning that although capitalism can absorb some alternatives to the nuclear family—witness Israel's *kibbutzim*—the abolition of capitalist institutions might

facilitate, but does not guarantee, the disappearance of sexual discrimination. Third, women's "special alienation"—a theme examined directly or indirectly in several essays—is not unlike that of Blacks whose "special colonial status" is discussed in a reading from Stokley Carmichael and Charles Hamilton's *Black Power*. Finally, the question of economic exploitation of Blacks and women is documented in several readings. Reich's interesting empirical study on the economics of racism suggests very different implications from those derived from conventional analysis, and offers a number of insights for further economic analysis of sexism. That such an analysis has not been included in the present volume is symptomatic of the fact that many economic aspects of sexism remain to be explored.

Still another aspect of inequality is the existence of hierarchical social relations at all levels of society. An insightful description of the hierarchical division of labor within firms is given in a reading on alienation from Elinor Langer's "The Women in the Telephone Company." The subject is further developed in relation to the bureaucratic organization of the capitalist firm and the role of schools in perpetuating and reflecting the hierarchical stratification of production. The emphasis in this section is on the negative aspects of hierarchy. As an example, Stephen Hymer's essay differentiates between Marx's and Marshall's views of the internal division of labor within the factory. While both of them saw it as the "chief fact of modern civilization," Marx "stressed the authoritarian and unequal nature of this relationship based on coercive power of property and its anti-social characteristics" (p. 158).

At the international level, the chapter on imperialism documents the great inequalities existing between the advanced and the less developed countries. Arthur MacEwan applies the analysis of capitalism's need for expansion to the international sphere and traces the roots and the process by which the system is transmitted and defended, concluding that "what is at stake in Vietnam is not just a geographic area but a set of rules, a system" (p. 417). The chapter provides a sizeable introduction to the various aspects of United States dominance in the world, including Weisskopf's empirical survey of United States foreign private investment and his essay on the relationship between capitalism and underdevelopment. It also contains readings by Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy on the functioning of the multinational corporation, and by Harry Magdoff on the connection between militarism and imperialism.

The problem of alienation is the focus of one chapter, as well as a pervasive theme throughout the book. Readings from Marx and Engels examine the ways in which work alienation in a capitalist economy is the consequence of the gradual process of separation of labor from its means of production. The laborer thus becomes a free seller of labor power at the same time that the means of production become centralized and property more concentrated. This process is empirically documented by Reich's essay on the historical evolution of the labor force in the United States, and by a reading on business concentration by Gardiner Means. Although it is recognized that alienation can emerge from the nature of modern industrial society, it is viewed mostly as the result of capitalist institutions. Under capitalism, in Herbert Gin-

tis' words, "social criteria determining the structure and development of important social roles are essentially independent of individual needs" (p. 278). The result is a socially alienated individual lacking power to control not only the work process, but also other basic aspects of his/her life.

The belief that institutions shape human behavior and the rejection of a technological determinism that sees certain aspects of advanced industrial Society as inevitable, underlie the authors' conception of change in a capitalist society. The market, private ownership and control of means of production, the functioning of the capitalist mode of production, the schools, the nuclear family, the state, and the assumed nature of "homo economicus" are among the capitalist institutions that come under attack. The concluding Part IV dismisses alternatives to these institutions and to the human behavior that they shape. The editors make clear that the state socialism of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries has not produced a model to be emulated and that socialism must mean "more than a juridical change in the legal relations of ownership" (p. 4). Expressed in its most general terms, socialism implies "democratic, decentralized and participatory control for the individual... in the decisions that affect one's life" (p. 520). Their point of departure is a concept of man/woman akin to that of Marx—developed in a reading by Erich Fromm—and a vision of socialism as a system that "permits the actualization of man's essence" (p. 522).

Those of us who are sensitive to the criticism that the New Left in general and radical economists in particular do

not always present alternatives to the institutions they attack might be disappointed to find that Part IV is not successful enough in meeting this challenge. A question such as the role that the market should or should not play in allocating resources under socialism is not directly tackled. Neither is an attempt made to discuss alternatives to the system of economic incentives assumed to be the prime mover of "economic man," to the nuclear family, or to our own branch of educational credentialing and meritocracy.

The book does make sound positive contributions to analyzing the question of alternative institutions. Andre Gorz's essay on workers' control discusses some recent European experiences in which workers have emphasized qualitative demands aimed at gaining greater control of their work process. His analysis provides insights into the movement towards an alternative system of social relations of production. Gar Alperovitz offers an explicit discussion of the problem of building socialist institutions. Alperovitz points out the conflict between the "socialist vision and the centralist idea," that is, between the need for a degree of centralization and planning on one side and decentralization on the other. He also addresses the problem of developing a socialist alternative and what he calls a "pluralist common-wealth"—based on the principle of collective ownership and local communities that form the basis for a "larger framework of regional and national coordinating institutions" (p. 529).

The strengths and weaknesses of *The Capitalist System* reflect the development and maturation of radical economic thinking in the United States. Five years

ago this book could not have been written; today it is clear that radical economics is here to stay.

Paul Samuelson has written that "many of our graduate students had thought of the New Left as having something to do with politics, not with honest-to-goodness economics."¹ *The Capitalist System* will not

¹ Paul Samuelson in Introduction to Assar Lindbeck, *The Political Economy of the New Left: An Outsider's View* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

only reinforce the conviction that Samuelson's students (and probably their teachers) must have been badly informed; it also shows that honest-to-goodness economics often goes hand in hand with politics.

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CENTER FOR NEW SCHOOLS is a non-profit research and technical assistance group established to help communities in planning, operating, and strengthening alternative school programs. For two years, Center staff members worked together as key planners and consultants in the development of Metro High School, an alternative "high school without walls" operating within the Chicago Public School System. The Center is currently developing approaches to evaluation and technical assistance that will be used in assisting a group of five alternative schools in the Midwest on a long-term basis. The Center has also planned and is helping to establish the Illinois Quality Schools Network, a group of 45 K-12 alternative programs that will operate within local school systems in Illinois. A final major project of the Center is assistance to the Institute for Chicago Schools, a community-based coalition working for alternatives to traditional education within the Chicago Public Schools.

ALLEN GRAUBARD, currently affiliated with the Cambridge-Goddard Graduate School for Social Change, formerly taught philosophy and social theory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served as a founding director of the Santa Barbara Community School and directed the New Schools Directory Project. His book, *Free the Children*, will be released this fall.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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*Development as the Aim of Education**

LAWRENCE KOHLBERG and ROCHELLE MAYER

Harvard University

The authors offer an explanation of the psychological and philosophical positions underlying aspects of educational progressivism. They contrast tenets of progressivism, most clearly identified with the work of John Dewey, with two other educational ideologies, the romantic and the cultural transmission conceptions, which historically have competed in the minds of educators as rationales for the choice of educational goals and practices. Kohlberg and Mayer maintain that only progressivism, with its cognitive-developmental psychology, its interactionist epistemology, and its philosophically examined ethics, provides an adequate basis for our understanding of the process of education.

The most important issue confronting educators and educational theorists is the choice of ends for the educational process. Without clear and rational educational goals, it becomes impossible to decide which educational programs achieve objectives of general import and which teach incidental facts and attitudes of dubious worth. While there has been a vast amount of research comparing the effects of various educational methods and programs on various outcome measures, there has been very little empirical research designed to clarify the worth of these outcome

* The position presented in this paper was elaborated in a different form in *Proceedings of the Conference on Psychology and the Process of Schooling in the Next Decade: Alternative conceptions*. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Office of Education, 1971. This paper, itself, is an abridged version of a chapter in a forthcoming book by the authors, *Early Education, A Cognitive-Developmental View*. Chicago: Dryden Press (in preparation).

measures themselves. After a deluge of studies in the sixties examining the effects of programs on I.Q. and achievement tests, and drawing policy conclusions, researchers finally began to ask the question, "What is the justification for using I.Q. tests or achievement tests to evaluate programs in the first place?"

The present paper examines such fundamental issues and considers the strategies by which research facts can help generate and substantiate educational objectives and measures of educational outcomes. Three prevalent strategies for defining objectives and relating them to research facts are considered: the desirable trait or "bag of virtues" strategy; the prediction of success or "industrial psychology" strategy; and the "developmental-philosophic" strategy. It will be our claim in this paper that the first two strategies: 1) lack a clear theoretical rationale for defining objectives which can withstand logical and philosophic criticism; and 2) that as currently applied they rest upon assumptions which conflict with research findings. In contrast, we claim that the developmental-philosophic strategy for defining educational objectives, which emerges from the work of Dewey and Piaget, is a theoretical rationale which withstands logical criticism and is consistent with, if not "proved" by, current research findings.

This presentation begins by making explicit how a cognitive-developmental *psychological* theory can be translated into a rational and viable progressive *educational ideology*, i.e., a set of concepts defining desirable aims, content, and methods of education. We contrast the progressive ideology with the "romantic" and the "cultural transmission" schools of thought, with respect to underlying psychological, epistemological, and ethical assumptions. In doing so we focus on two related problems of value theory. The first is the issue of *value-relativity*, the problem of defining some general ends of education whose validity is not relative to the values and needs of each individual child or to the values of each subculture or society. The second is the problem of relating psychological statements about the actual characteristics of children and their development to philosophic statements about desirable characteristics, the problem of relating the natural *is* to the ethical *ought*. We claim that the cognitive-developmental or progressive approach can satisfactorily handle these issues because it combines a psychological theory of development with a rational ethical philosophy of development. In contrast, we claim that other educational ideologies do not stem from psychological theories which can be translated into educational aims free of the philosophic charge that they are arbitrary and relative to the values of the particular educator or school.

Subsequently, we look at the ways in which these ideologies form the basis for contemporary educational policy. We evaluate longitudinal evidence relevant to the "bag of virtues" definition of education objectives favored in maturationist models of education, and the academic achievement definition of objectives favored in environmental learning models. We conclude that the available research lends little support for either of these alternative educational strategies. More specifically:

1. The current prevalent definition of the aims of education, in terms of academic achievement supplemented by a concern for mental health, cannot be justified empirically or logically.
2. The overwhelming emphasis of educational psychology on methods of instruction and tests and measurements which presuppose a "value-neutral" psychology is misplaced.
3. An alternative notion that the aim of the schools should be the stimulation of human development is a scientifically, ethically, and practically viable conception which provides the framework for a new kind of educational psychology.

Three Streams of Educational Ideology

There have been three broad streams in the development of Western educational ideology. While their detailed statements vary from generation to generation, each stream exhibits a continuity based upon particular assumptions of psychological development.

Romanticism

The first stream of thought, the "romantic," commences with Rousseau and is currently represented by Freud's and Gesell's followers. A. S. Neill's Summerhill represents an example of a school based on these principles. Romantics hold that what comes from within the child is the most important aspect of development; therefore the pedagogical environment should be permissive enough to allow the inner "good" (abilities and social virtues) to unfold and the inner "bad" to come under control. Thus teaching the child the ideas and attitudes of others through rote or drill would result in meaningless learning and the suppression of inner spontaneous tendencies of positive value.

Romantics stress the biological metaphors of "health" and "growth" in

equating optimal physical development with bodily health and optimal mental development with mental health. Accordingly, early education should allow the child to work through aspects of emotional development not allowed expression at home, such as the formation of social relations with peers and adults other than his parents. It should also allow the expression of intellectual questioning and curiosity. To label this ideology "romantic" is not to accuse it of being unscientific; rather it is to recognize that the nineteenth century discovery of the natural development of the child was part of a larger romantic philosophy, an ethic and epistemology involving a discovery of the natural and the inner self.

With regard to childhood, this philosophy involved not only an awareness that the child possessed an inner self but also a valuing of childhood, to which the origins of the self could be traced. The adult, through taking the child's point of view, could experience otherwise inaccessible elements of truth, goodness, and reality.

As stated by G. H. Mead (1936):

The romantic comes back to the existence of the self as the primary fact. That is what gives the standard to values. What the Romantic period revealed was not simply a past but a past as the point of view from which to come back at the self. . . . It is this self-conscious setting-up of the past again that constitutes the origin of romanticism. (p. 61)

The work of G. Stanley Hall, the founder of American child psychology, contains the core ideas of modern romantic educational thought, including "deschooling."

The guardians of the young should strive first to keep out of nature's way and to prevent harm and should merit the proud title of the defenders of the happiness and rights of children. They should feel profoundly that childhood, as it comes from the hand of God, is not corrupt but illustrates the survival of the most consummate thing in the world; they should be convinced that there is nothing else so worthy of love, reverence and service as the body and soul of the growing child.

Before we let the pedagog loose upon childhood, we must overcome the fetishes of the alphabet, of the multiplication tables, and must reflect that but a few generations ago the ancestors of all of us were illiterate. There are many who ought not to be educated and who would be better in mind, body and morals if they knew no school. What shall it profit a child to gain the world of knowledge and lose his own health? (1901, p. 24)

Cultural Transmission

The origins of the cultural transmission ideology are rooted in the classical aca-

ademic tradition of Western education. Traditional educators believe that their primary task is the transmission to the present generation of bodies of information and of rules or values collected in the past; they believe that the educator's job is the direct instruction of such information and rules. The important emphasis, however, is not on the sanctity of the past, but on the view that educating consists of transmitting knowledge, skills, and social and moral rules of the culture. Knowledge and rules of the culture may be rapidly changing or they may be static. In either case, however, it is assumed that education is the transmission of the culturally given.

More modern or innovative variations of the cultural transmission view are represented by educational technology and behavior modification.¹ Like traditional education, these approaches assume that knowledge and values—first located in the culture—are afterwards internalized by children through the imitation of adult behavior models, or through explicit instruction and reward and punishment. Accordingly, the educational technologist evaluates the individual's success in terms of his ability to incorporate the responses he has been taught and to respond favorably to the demands of the system. Although the technologist stresses the child as an individual learner, learning at his own pace, he, like the traditionalist, assumes that what is learned and what is valued in education is a culturally given body of knowledge and rules.

There are, of course, a number of contrasts between the traditional academic and the educational technology variations of the cultural-transmission ideology. The traditional academic school has been humanistic in the sense that it has emphasized the transmission of knowledge considered central to the culture of Western man. The educational technology school, in contrast, has emphasized the transmission of skills and habits deemed necessary for adjustment to a technological society. With regard to early education, however, the two variations of the cultural transmission school find an easy rapprochement in stressing such goals as literacy and mathematical skills. The traditionalist sees literacy as the central avenue to the culture of Western man, the technologist sees it as a means to vocational adaptation to a society depending on impersonal information codes. Both approaches, however, emphasize definition of educational goals in terms of fixed knowledge or skills assessed by standards of cultural correctness. Both also stress internalization of basic moral rules of the

¹ The romantic-maturationist position also has "conservative" and "radical" wings. Emphasizing "adaptation to reality," psychoanalytic educators like A. Freud (1937) and Bettelheim (1970) stress mental health as ego-control, while radicals stress spontaneity, creativity, etc.

culture. The clearest and most thoughtful contemporary elaboration of this view in relation to preschool education is to be found in the writing of Bereiter and Engelmann (1966).

In contrast to the child-centered romantic school, the cultural transmission school is society-centered. It defines educational ends as the internalization of the values and knowledge of the culture. The cultural transmission school focuses on the child's need to learn the discipline of the social order, while the romantic stresses the child's freedom. The cultural transmission view emphasizes the common and the established, the romantic view stresses the unique, the novel, and the personal.

Progressivism

The third stream of educational ideology which is still best termed "progressive," following Dewey (1938), developed as part of the pragmatic functional-genetic philosophies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As an educational ideology, progressivism holds that education should nourish the child's natural interaction with a developing society or environment. Unlike the romantics, the progressives do not assume that development is the unfolding of an innate pattern or that the primary aim of education is to create an unconflicted environment able to foster healthy development. Instead, they define development as a progression through invariant ordered sequential stages. The educational goal is the eventual attainment of a higher level or stage of development in adulthood, not merely the healthy functioning of the child at a present level. In 1895, Dewey and McLellan suggested the following notion of education for attainment of a higher stage:

Only knowledge of the order and connection of the stages in the development of the psychical functions can insure the full maturing of the psychical powers. Education is the work of supplying the conditions which will enable the psychical functions, as they successively arise, to mature and pass into higher functions in the freest and fullest manner. (p. 207)

In the progressive view, this aim requires an educational environment that actively stimulates development through the presentation of resolvable but genuine problems or conflicts. For progressives, the organizing and developing force in the child's experience is the child's active thinking, and thinking is stimulated by the problematic, by cognitive conflict. Educative experience makes the child think—think in ways which organize both cognition and emotion. Although both the cultural transmission and the progressive views emphasize "knowledge,"

only the latter sees the acquisition of "knowledge" as *an active change in patterns of thinking* brought about by experiential problem-solving situations. Similarly, both views emphasize "morality," but the progressive sees the acquisition of morality as an active change in patterns of response to problematic social situations rather than the learning of culturally accepted rules.

The progressive educator stresses the essential links between cognitive and moral development; he assumes that moral development is not purely affective, and that cognitive development is a necessary though not sufficient condition for moral development. The development of logical and critical thought, central to cognitive education, finds its larger meaning in a broad set of moral values. The progressive also points out that moral development arises from social interaction in situations of social conflict. Morality is neither the internalization of established cultural values nor the unfolding of spontaneous impulses and emotions; it is justice, the reciprocity between the individual and others in his social environment.

Psychological Theories Underlying Educational Ideologies

We have described three schools of thought describing the general ends and means of education. Central to each of these educational ideologies is a distinctive educational psychology, a distinctive psychological theory of development (Kohlberg, 1968). Underlying the romantic ideology is a maturationist theory of development; underlying the cultural transmission ideology is an associationistic-learning or environmental-contingency theory of development; and underlying the progressive ideology is a cognitive-developmental or interactionist theory of development.

The three psychological theories described represent three basic metaphors of development (Langer, 1969). The romantic model views the development of the mind through the metaphor of organic growth, the physical growth of a plant or animal. In this metaphor, the environment affects development by providing necessary nourishment for the naturally growing organism. Maturationist psychologists elaborating the romantic metaphor conceive of cognitive development as unfolding through prepatterned stages. They have usually assumed not only that cognitive development unfolds but that individual variations in rate of cognitive development are largely inborn. Emotional development is also believed to unfold through hereditary stages, such as the Freudian psychosexual stages, but is thought to be vulnerable to fixation and frustration

by the environment. For the maturationist, although both cognitive and social-emotional development unfold, they are two different things. Since social-emotional development is an unfolding of something biologically given and is not based on knowledge of the social world, it does not depend upon cognitive growth.

The cultural transmission model views the development of the mind through the metaphor of the machine. The machine may be the wax on which the environment transcribes its markings, it may be the telephone switchboard through which environmental stimulus-energies are transmitted, or it may be the computer in which bits of information from the environment are stored, retrieved, and recombined. In any case, the environment is seen as "input," as information or energy more or less directly transmitted to, and accumulated in, the organism. The organism in turn emits "output" behavior. Underlying the mechanistic metaphor is the associationistic, stimulus-response or environmentalist psychological theory, which can be traced from John Locke to Thorndike to B. F. Skinner. This psychology views both specific concepts and general cognitive structures as reflections of structures that exist outside the child in the physical and social world. The structure of the child's concepts or of his behavior is viewed as the result of the association of discrete stimuli with one another, with the child's responses, and with his experiences of pleasure and pain. Cognitive development is the result of guided learning and teaching. Consequently, cognitive education requires a careful statement of desirable behavior patterns described in terms of specific responses. Implied here is the idea that the child's behavior can be shaped by immediate repetition and elaboration of the correct response, and by association with feedback or reward.

The cognitive-developmental metaphor is not material, it is dialectical; it is a model of the progression of ideas in discourse and conversation. The dialectical metaphor was first elaborated by Plato, given new meaning by Hegel, and finally stripped of its metaphysical claims by John Dewey and Jean Piaget, to form a psychological method. In the dialectical metaphor, a core of universal ideas are redefined and reorganized as their implications are played out in experience and as they are confronted by their opposites in argument and discourse. These reorganizations define qualitative levels of thought, levels of increased epistemic adequacy. The child is not a plant or a machine; he is a philosopher or a scientist-poet. The dialectical metaphor of progressive education is supported by a cognitive-developmental or interactional psychological theory. Discarding the dichotomy between maturation and environmentally

determined learning, Piaget and Dewey claim that mature thought emerges through a process of development that is neither direct biological maturation nor direct learning, but rather a reorganization of psychological structures resulting from organism-environment interactions. Basic mental structure is the product of the patterning of interaction between the organism and the environment, rather than a direct reflection of either innate neurological patterns or external environmental patterns.

To understand this Piaget-Dewey concept of the development of mental pattern, we must first understand its conception of cognition. Cognitions are assumed to be structures, internally organized wholes or systems of internal relations. These structures are *rules* for the processing of information or the connecting of events. Events in the child's experience are organized actively through these cognitive connecting processes, not passively through external association and repetition. Cognitive development, which is defined as change in cognitive structures, is assumed to depend on experience. But the effects of experience are not regarded as learning in the ordinary sense (training, instruction, modeling, or specific response practices). If two events which follow one another in time are cognitively connected in the child's mind, this implies that he relates them by means of a category such as causality; he perceives his operant behavior as causing the reinforcer to occur. A program of reinforcement, then, cannot directly change the child's causal structures since it is assimilated by the child in terms of his present mode of thinking. When a program of reinforcement cannot be assimilated to the child's causal structure, however, the child's structure may be reorganized to obtain a better fit between the two. Cognitive development is a dialogue between the child's cognitive structures and the structures of the environment. Further, the theory emphasizes that the core of development is not the unfolding of instincts, emotions, or sensorimotor patterns, but instead is cognitive change in distinctively human, general patterns of thinking about the self and the world. The child's relation to his social environment is cognitive; it involves thought and symbolic interaction.

Because of its emphasis on ways of perceiving and responding to experience, cognitive-developmental theory discards the traditional dichotomy of social *versus* intellectual development. Rather, cognitive and affective development are parallel aspects of the structural transformations which take place in development. At the core of this interactional or cognitive-developmental theory is the doctrine of cognitive stages. Stages have the following general characteristics:

1. Stages imply distinct or qualitative differences in children's modes of thinking or of solving the same problem.
2. These different modes of thought form an invariant sequence, order, or succession in individual development. While cultural factors may speed up, slow down, or stop development, they do not change its sequence.
3. Each of these different and sequential modes of thought forms a "structural whole." A given stage-response on a task does not just represent a specific response determined by knowledge and familiarity with that task or tasks similar to it; rather, it represents an underlying thought-organization.
4. Cognitive stages are hierarchical integrations. Stages form an order of increasingly differentiated and integrated *structures* to fulfill a common function. (Piaget, 1960, pp. 13-15)

In other words, a series of stages form an invariant developmental sequence; the sequence is invariant because each stage stems from the previous one and prepares the way for the subsequent stage. Of course, children may move through these stages at varying speeds and they may be found to be half in and half out of a particular stage. Individuals may stop at any given stage and at any age, but if they continue to progress they must move in accord with these steps.

The cognitive-developmental conception of stage has a number of features in common with maturational-theory conceptions of stage. The maturational conception of stage, however, is "embryological," while the interactional conception is "structural-hierarchical." For maturational theory, a stage represents the total state of the organism at a given period of time; for example, Gesell's embryological concept of stage equates it with the typical behavior pattern of an age period, e.g., there is a stage of "five-year-olds." While in the theories of Freud and Erikson stages are less directly equated with ages, psychoanalytic stages are still embryological in the sense that age leads to a new stage regardless of experience and regardless of reorganizations at previous stages. As a result, education and experience become valuable not for movement to a new stage but for healthy or successful integration of the concerns of the present stage. Onset of the next stage occurs regardless of experience; only healthy integration of a stage is contingent on experience.

By contrast, in cognitive-developmental theory a stage is a delimited structure of thought, fixed in a sequence of structures but theoretically independent of time and total organismic state (Kohlberg, 1969b; Loevinger *et al.*, 1970). Such stages are hierarchical reorganizations; attainment of a higher stage presupposes attainment of the prior stage and represents a reorganization or transformation

of it. Accordingly, attainment of the next stage is a valid aim of educational experience.

For the interactionist, experience is essential to stage progression, and more or richer stimulation leads to faster advance through the series of stages. On the other hand, the maturational theory assumes that extreme deprivation will retard or fixate development, but that enrichment will not necessarily accelerate it. To understand the effects of experience in stimulating stage-development, cognitive-developmental theory holds that one must analyze the relation of the structure of a child's specific experience to behavior structures. The analysis focuses upon discrepancies between the child's action system or expectancies and the events experienced. The hypothesis is that some moderate or optimal degree of conflict or discrepancy constitutes the most effective experience for structural change.

As applied to educational intervention, the theory holds that facilitating the child's movement to the next step of development involves exposure to the next higher level of thought and conflict requiring the active application of the current level of thought to problematic situations. This implies: (1) attention to the child's mode or styles of thought, i.e., stage; (2) match of stimulation to that stage, e.g., exposure to modes of reasoning one stage above the child's own; (3) arousal, among children, of genuine cognitive and social conflict and disagreement about problematic situations (in contrast to traditional education which has stressed adult "right answers" and has reinforced "behaving well"); and (4) exposure to stimuli toward which the child can be active, in which assimilatory response to the stimulus-situation is associated with "natural" feedback.

In summary, the maturationist theory assumes that basic mental structure results from an innate patterning; the environmentalist learning theory assumes that basic mental structure results from the patterning or association of events in the outside world; the cognitive-developmental theory assumes that basic mental structure results from an interaction between organismic structuring tendencies and the structure of the outside world, not reflecting either one directly. This interaction leads to cognitive stages that represent the transformations of early cognitive structures as they are applied to the external world and as they accommodate to it.

Epistemological Components of Educational Ideologies

We have considered the various psychological theories as parts of educational

ideologies. Associated with these theories are differing epistemologies or philosophies of science, specifying what is knowledge, i.e. what are observable facts and how can these facts be interpreted. Differences in epistemology, just as differences in actual theory, generate different strategies for defining objectives.

Romantic educational ideology springs not only from a maturational psychology, but from an existentialist or phenomenological epistemology, defining knowledge and reality as referring to the immediate inner experience of the self. Knowledge or truth in the romantic epistemology is self-awareness or self-insight, a form of truth with emotional as well as intellectual components. As this form of truth extends beyond the self, it is through sympathetic understanding of humans and natural beings as other "selves."

In contrast, cultural transmission ideologies of education tend to involve epistemologies which stress knowledge as that which is repetitive and "objective," that which can be pointed to in sense-experience and measurement and which can be culturally shared and tested.

The progressive ideology, in turn, derives from a functional or pragmatic epistemology which equates knowledge with neither inner experience nor outer sense-reality, but with an equilibrated or resolved relationship between an inquiring human actor and a problematic situation. For the progressive epistemology, the immediate or introspective experience of the child does not have ultimate truth or reality. The meaning and truth of the child's experience depends upon its relationship to the situations in which he is acting. At the same time, the progressive epistemology does not attempt to reduce psychological experience to observable responses in reaction to observable stimuli or situations. Rather, it attempts to functionally coordinate the external meaning of the child's experiences as *behavior* with its internal meaning as it appears to the observer.

With regard to educational objectives, these differences in epistemology generate differences with respect to three issues. The first issue concerns whether to focus objectives on internal states or external behavior. In this respect, **cultural transmission** and **romantic ideologies** represent opposite poles. The **cultural transmission** view evaluates educational change from children's performances, not from their feelings or thoughts. Social growth is defined by the conformity of behavior to particular cultural standards such as honesty and **industriousness**. These skill and trait terms are found in both common-sense evaluations of school grades and report cards, and in "objective" educational psychological measurement. Behaviorist ideologies systematize this focus by

rigorously eliminating references to internal or subjective experience as "non-scientific." Skinner (1971) says:

We can follow the path taken by physics and biology by turning directly to the relation between behavior and the environment and neglecting . . . states of mind. . . . We do not need to try to discover what personalities, states of mind, feelings, . . . intentions—or other prerequisites of autonomous man really are in order to get on with a scientific analysis of behavior. (p. 15)

In contrast, the romantic view emphasizes inner feelings and states. Supported by the field of psychotherapy, romantics maintain that skills, achievements, and performances are not satisfying in themselves, but are only a means to inner awareness, happiness, or mental health. They hold that an educator or therapist who ignores the child's inner states in the name of science does so at his peril, since it is these which are most real to the child.

The progressive or cognitive-developmental view attempts to integrate both behavior and internal states in a functional epistemology of mind. It takes inner experience seriously by attempting to observe thought process rather than language behavior and by observing valuing processes rather than reinforced behavior. In doing so, however, it combines interviews, behavioral tests, and naturalistic observation methods in mental assessment. The cognitive-developmental approach stresses the need to examine mental competence or mental structure as opposed to examining only performance, but it employs a functional rather than an introspective approach to the observation of mental structure. An example is Piaget's systematic and reproducible observations of the preverbal infant's thought-structure of space, time, and causality. In short, the cognitive-developmental approach does not select a focus on inner experience or on outer behavior objectives by epistemological fiat, but uses a functional methodology to coordinate the two through empirical study.

A second issue in the definition of educational objectives involves whether to emphasize immediate experience and behavior or long-term consequences in the child's development. The progressive ideology centers on education as it relates to the child's experience, but attempts to observe or assess experience in functional terms rather than by immediate self-projection into the child's place. As a result the progressive distinguishes between *humanitarian* criteria of the quality of the child's experience and *educative* criteria of quality of experience, in terms of long-term developmental consequences. According to Dewey (1938):

Some experiences are miseducative. Any experience is miseducative that has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience. . . . An experience may be immediately enjoyable and yet promote the formation of a slack and careless attitude . . . (which) operates to modify the quality of subsequent experiences so as to prevent a person from getting out of them what they have to give. . . . Just as no man lives or dies to himself, so no experience lives or dies to itself. Wholly independent of desire or intent, every experience lives on in further experiences. Hence the central problem of an education based on experience is to select the kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experience. (pp. 25-28)

Dewey maintains that an educational experience which stimulates development is one which arouses interest, enjoyment, and challenge in the immediate experience of the student. The reverse is not necessarily the case; immediate interest and enjoyment does not always indicate that an educational experience stimulates long-range development. Interest and involvement is a necessary but not sufficient condition for education as development. For romantics, especially of the "humanistic psychology" variety, having a novel, intense, and complex experience is *self-development* or self-actualization. For progressives, a more objective test of the effects of the experience on later behavior is required before deciding that the experience is developmental. The progressive views the child's enjoyment and interest as a basic and legitimate criterion of education, but views it as a humanitarian rather than an educational criterion. The progressive holds that education must meet humanitarian criteria, but argues that a concern for the enjoyment and liberty of the child is not in itself equivalent to a concern for his development.

Psychologically, the distinction between humanitarian and developmental criteria is the distinction between the short-term value of the child's immediate experience and the long-term value of that experience as it relates to development. According to the progressive view, this question of the relation of the immediate to the long-term is an empirical rather than a philosophic question. As an example, a characteristic behaviorist strategy is to demonstrate the reversibility of learning by performing an experiment in which a preschooler is reinforced for interacting with other children rather than withdrawing in a corner. This is followed by a reversal of the experiment, demonstrating that when the reinforcement is removed the child again becomes withdrawn. From the progressive or cognitive-developmental perspective, if behavior changes are of this reversible character they cannot define genuine educational objectives. The progressive approach maintains that the worth of an educational effect is

decided by its effects upon later behavior and development. Thus, in the progressive view, the basic problems of choosing and validating educational ends can **only** be solved by longitudinal studies of the effects of educational experience.

The third basic issue is whether the aims of education should be universal as opposed to unique or individual. This issue has an epistemological aspect because romantics have often defined educational goals in terms of the expression or development of a unique self or identity; "objectivist" epistemologies deny that such concepts are accessible to clear observation and definition. In contrast, cultural transmission approaches characteristically focus on measures of individual differences in general dimensions of achievement, or social behavior dimensions on which any individual can be ranked. The progressive, like the romantic, questions the significance of defining behavior relative to some population norm external to the individual. Searching for the "objective" in human experience, the progressive seeks universal qualitative states or sequences in development. Movement from one stage to the next is significant because it is a sequence in the individual's own development, not just a population average or norm. At the same time, insofar as the sequence is a universally observed development it is not unique to the individual in question.

In summary, the cognitive-developmental approach derives from a functional or pragmatic epistemology which attempts to integrate the dichotomies of the inner versus the outer, the immediate versus the remote in time, the unique versus the general. The cognitive-developmental approach focuses on an empirical search for continuities between inner states and outer behavior and between immediate reaction and remote outcome. While focusing on the child's experience, the progressive ideology defines such experience in terms of universal and empirically observable sequences of development.

Ethical Value Positions Underlying Educational Ideologies

When psychologists like Dewey, Skinner, Neill and Montessori actually engage in innovative education, they develop a theory which is not a mere statement of psychological principle, it is an ideology. This is not because of the dogmatic, non-scientific attitude they have as psychologists, but because prescription of educational practice cannot be derived from psychological theory or science alone. In addition to theoretical assumptions about how children learn or develop (the psychological theory component), educational ideologies include value assumptions about what is educationally good or worthwhile. To call a

pattern of educational thought an ideology is to indicate it is a fairly systematic combination of a theory about psychological and social fact with a set of value principles.

The Fallacy of Value Neutrality

A "value-neutral" position, based only on facts about child development or about methods of education, cannot in itself directly contribute to educational practice. Factual statements about what the processes of learning and development *are* cannot be directly translated into statements about what children's learning and development *ought to be* without introduction of some value-principles.

In "value-neutral" research, learning does not necessarily imply movement to a stage of greater cognitive or ethical adequacy. As an example, acquisition of a cognitively arbitrary or erroneous concept (e.g., it is best to put a marble in the hole) is considered learning in the same general sense as is acquisition of a capacity for logical inference. Such studies do not relate learning to some justifiable notion of knowledge, truth, or cognitive adequacy. Values are defined relative to a particular culture. Thus, morality is equivalent to conformity to, or internalization of, the particular standards of the child's group or culture. As an example, Berkowitz (1964) writes: "Moral values are evaluations of actions generally believed by the members of a given society to be either 'right' or 'wrong' " (p. 44).

Such "value-free" research cannot be translated into prescriptions for practice without importing a set of value-assumptions having no relation to psychology itself. The effort to remain "value-free" or "non-ideological" and yet prescribe educational goals usually has followed the basic model of counselling or consulting. In the *value-free consulting model*, the client (whether student or school) defines educational ends and the psychologist can then advise about means of education without losing his value-neutrality or imposing his values. Outside education, the value-free consulting model not only provides the basic model for counselling and psychotherapy, where the client is an individual, but also for industrial psychology, where the client is a social system. In both therapy and industrial psychology the consultant is paid by the client and the financial contract defines whose values are to be chosen. The educator or educational psychologist, however, has more than one client. What the child wants, what parents want, and what the larger community wants are often at odds with one another.

An even more fundamental problem for the "value-free" consulting model

is the logical impossibility of making a dichotomy between value-free means and value-loaded ends. Skinner (1971, p. 17) claims that "a behavior technology is ethically neutral. Both the villain and the saint can use it. There is nothing in a methodology that determines the values governing its use." But consider the use of torture on the rack as a behavior technology for learning which could be used by saint and villain alike. On technological grounds Skinner advises against punishment, but this does not solve the ethical issue.

Dewey's logical analysis and our present historical awareness of the value consequences of adopting new technologies have made us realize that choices of means, in the last analysis, also imply choices of ends. Advice about means and methods involves value considerations and cannot be made purely on a basis of "facts." Concrete, positive reinforcement is not an ethically neutral means. To advise the use of concrete reinforcement is to advise that a certain kind of character, motivated by concrete reinforcement, is the end of education. Not only can advice about means not be separated from choice of ends, but there is no way for an educational consultant to avoid harboring his own criteria for choosing ends. The "value-neutral" consulting model equates value-neutrality with acceptance of value-relativity, i.e., acceptance of whatever the values of the client are. But the educator or educational psychologist cannot be neutral in this sense either.

Values and the Cultural Transmission Ideology

In an effort to cope with the dilemmas inherent in value-neutral prescription, many psychologists tend to move to a cultural transmission ideology, based on the value premise of *social relativity*. Social relativity assumes some consistent set of values characteristic of the culture, nation, or system as a whole. While these values may be arbitrary and may vary from one social system to another, there is at least some consensus about them. This approach says, "Since values are relative and arbitrary, we might as well take the given values of the society as our starting point and advocate 'adjustment' to the culture or achievement in it as the educational end." The social relativist basis of the Bereiter-Engelmann system, for example, is stated as follows:

In order to use the term cultural deprivation, it is necessary to assume some point of reference. . . . The standards of the American public schools represent one such point of reference. . . . There are standards of knowledge and ability which are consistently held to be valuable in the schools, and any child in the schools who falls short of these

standards by reason of his particular cultural background may be said to be culturally deprived. (1966, p. 24)

The Bereiter-Engelmann preschool model takes as its standard of value "the standard of the American public schools." It recognizes that this standard is arbitrary and that the kinds of learning prized by the American public schools may not be the most worthy; but it accepts this arbitrariness because it assumes that "all values are relative," that there is no ultimate standard of worth for learning and development.

Unlike Bereiter and Engelmann, many social relativist educators do not simply accept the standards of the school and culture and attempt to maximize conformity to them. Rather, they are likely to elaborate or create standards for a school or society based on value premises derived from what we shall call "the psychologist's fallacy." According to many philosophical analysts, the effort to derive statements of *ought* (or value) directly from statements of *is* (or fact) is a logical fallacy termed the "naturalistic fallacy" (Kohlberg, 1971). The psychologist's fallacy is a form of the naturalistic fallacy. As practiced by psychologists, the naturalistic fallacy is the direct derivation of statements about what human nature, human values, and human desires ought to be from psychological statements about what they are. Typically, this derivation slides over the distinction between what is desired and what is desirable.

The following statement from B. F. Skinner (1971) offers a good example of the psychologist's fallacy:

Good things are positive reinforcers. Physics and biology study things without reference to their values, but the reinforcing effects of things are the province of behavioral science, which, to the extent that it concerns itself with operant reinforcement, is a science of values. Things are good (positively reinforcing) presumably because of the contingencies of survival under which the species evolved. It is part of the genetic endowment called 'human nature' to be reinforced in particular ways by particular things. . . . The effective reinforcers are matters of observation and no one can dispute them. (p. 104)

In this statement, Skinner equates or derives a value word (good) from a fact word (positive reinforcement). This equation is questionable; we wonder whether obtaining positive reinforcement really is good. The psychologist's fallacy or the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy because we can always ask the further question, "Why is that good?" or "By what standard is that good?" Skinner does not attempt to deal with this further question, called the "open question" by philosophers. He also defines good as "cultural survival." The

postulation of cultural survival as an ultimate value raises the open question too. We may ask, "Why should the Nazi culture (or the American culture) survive?" The reason Skinner is not concerned with answering the open question about survival is because he is a cultural relativist, believing that any non-factual reasoning about what is good or about the validity of moral principles is meaningless. He says:

What a given group of people calls good is a fact, it is what members of the group find reinforcing as a result of their genetic endowment and the natural and social contingencies to which they have been exposed. Each culture has its own set of goods, and what is good in one culture may not be good in another. (p. 128)

The Fallacy of Value-Relativism

Behind Skinner's value-relativism, then, lie the related notions that: 1) all valid inferences or principles are factual or scientific; 2) valid statements about values must be statements about facts of valuing; and 3) what people actually value differs. The fact that people do value different things only becomes an argument for the notion that values are relative if one accepts the first two assumptions listed. Both assumptions are believed by many philosophers to be mistaken because they represent forms of the fact-value confusion already described as the naturalistic fallacy. Confusing discourse about fact with discourse about values, the relativist believes that when ethical judgment is not empirical science, it is not rational. This equation of science with rationality arises because the relativist does not correctly understand philosophical modes of inquiry. In modern conceptions, philosophy is the clarification of concepts for the purpose of critical evaluation of beliefs and standards. The kinds of beliefs which primarily concern philosophy are normative beliefs or standards, beliefs about what ought to be rather than about what is. These include standards of the right or good (ethics), of the true (epistemology), and of the beautiful (esthetics). In science, the critical evaluation of factual beliefs is limited to criteria of causal explanation and prediction; a "scientific" critical evaluation of normative beliefs is limited to treating them as a class of facts. Philosophy, by contrast, seeks rational justification and criticism of normative beliefs, based on considerations additional to their predictive or causal explanatory power. There is fairly widespread agreement among philosophers that criteria for the validity of ethical judgments can be established independent of "scientific" or predictive criteria. Since patterns for the rational statement and justification of normative beliefs, or "oughts," are not identical with patterns of scientific statement and justification, philosophers

can reject both Skinner's notion of a strictly "scientific" ethics and Skinner's notion that whatever is not "scientific" is relative. The open question, "Why is reinforcement or cultural survival good?," is meaningful because there are patterns of ethical justification which are ignored by Skinner's relativistic science.

Distinguishing criteria of moral judgment from criteria of scientific judgment, most philosophers accept the "methodological non-relativism" of moral judgment just as they accept the methodological non-relativism of scientific judgment (Brandt, 1956). This ethical non-relativism is based on appeal to principles for making moral judgments, just as scientific non-relativism is based on appeal to principles of scientific method or of scientific judgment.

In summary, cultural transmission ideologies rest on the value premise of social relativism—the doctrine that values are relative to, and based upon, the standards of the particular culture and cannot be questioned or further justified. Cultural transmission ideologies of the "scientific" variety, like Skinner's, do not recognize moral principles since they equate what is desirable with what is observable by science, or with what is desired. Philosophers are not in agreement on the exact formulation of valid moral principles though they agree that such formulations center around notions like "the greatest welfare" or "justice as equity." They also do not agree on choice of priorities between principles such as "justice" and "the greatest welfare." Most philosophers do agree, however, that moral evaluations must be rooted in, or justified by, reference to such a realm of principles. Most also maintain that certain values or principles ought to be universal and that these principles are distinct from the rules of any given culture. A principle is a universalizeable, impartial mode of deciding or judging, not a concrete cultural rule. "Thou shalt not commit adultery" is a rule for specific behavior in specific situations in a monogamous society. By contrast, Kant's Categorical Imperative—act only as you would be willing that everyone should act in the same situation—is a principle. It is a guide for choosing among behaviors, not a prescription for behavior. As such it is free from culturally-defined content; it both transcends and subsumes particular social laws. Hence it has universal applicability.

In regard to values, Skinner's cultural transmission ideology is little different from other, older ideologies based on social relativism and on subjective forms of hedonism, e.g., social Darwinism and Benthamite utilitarianism. As an educational ideology, however, Skinner's relativistic behavior technology has one

feature which distinguishes it from older forms of social utilitarianism. This is its denial that rational concern for social utility is itself a matter of moral character or moral principle to be transmitted to the young. In Skinner's view, moral character concepts which go beyond responsiveness to social reinforcement and control rely on "prescientific" concepts of free will. Stated in different terms, the concept of moral education is irrelevant to Skinner; he is not concerned with teaching to the children of his society the value-principles which he himself adopts. The culture designer is a *psychologist-king*, a value relativist, who somehow makes a free, rational decision to devote himself to controlling individual behavior more effectively in the service of cultural survival. In Skinner's scheme there is no plan to make the controlled controllers, or to educate psychologist-kings.

Values and the Romantic Ideology

At first sight the value premises of the romantic ideology appear to be the polar opposites of Skinner's cultural transmission ideology. Opposed to *social control* and survival is individual freedom, *freedom for the child to be himself*. For example, A. S. Neill (1960) says:

How can happiness be bestowed? My own answer is: Abolish authority. Let the child be himself. Don't push him around. Don't teach him. Don't lecture him. Don't elevate him. Don't force him to do anything. (p. 297)

As we have pointed out, the romantic ideology rests on a psychology which conceives of the child as having a spontaneously growing mind. In addition, however, it rests on the ethical postulate that "the guardians of the young should merit the proud title of the defenders of the happiness and rights of children" (G. S. Hall, 1901, p. 24). The current popularity of the romantic ideology in "free school," "de-school," and "open school" movements is related to increased adult respect for the rights of children. Bereiter (1972) carries this orientation to an extreme conclusion:

Teachers are looking for a way to get out of playing God. . . . The same humanistic ethos that tells them what qualities the next generation should have also tells them that they have no right to manipulate other people or impose their goals upon them. The fact is that there are no morally safe goals for teachers any more. Only processes are safe. When it comes to goals, everything is in doubt. . . . A common expression, often thrown at me, when I have argued for what I believed children should be taught, is 'Who are we to say what this child should learn.' The basic moral problem . . . is inherent in education itself. If you are engaged in education, you are engaged in an effort to influence the

course of the child's development . . . it is to determine what kinds of people they turn out to be. It is to create human beings, it is, therefore, to play God. (pp. 26-27)

This line of thought leads Bereiter to conclude:

The Godlike role of teachers in setting goals for the development of children is no longer morally tenable. A shift to informal modes of education does not remove the difficulty. This paper, then, questions the assumption that education, itself, is a good undertaking and considers the possibilities of a world in which values other than educational ones, come to the fore. (p. 25)

According to Bereiter, then, a humanistic ethical concern for the child's rights must go beyond romantic free schools, beyond de-schooling, to the abandonment of an explicit concern for education. Bereiter contrasts the modern "humanistic ethic," and its concern for the child's rights, with the earlier "liberal" concern for human rights which held education and the common school as the foundation of a free society. This earlier concern Bereiter sees expressed most cogently in Dewey's progressivism.

The historical shift in the conception of children's rights and human rights leading Bereiter to reject Dewey's position is essentially a shift from the liberal grounding of children's rights in ethical principles to the modern humanistic grounding of children's rights in the doctrine of ethical relativity.

Bereiter is led to question the moral legitimacy of education because he equates a regard for the child's liberty with a belief in ethical relativity, rather than recognizing that liberty and justice are universal ethical principles. "The teacher may try to play it safe by sticking to the middle of the road and only aiming to teach what is generally approved, but there are not enough universally endorsed values (if, indeed, there are any) to form the basis of an education" (Bereiter, 1972, p. 27). Here, he confuses an ethical position of tolerance or respect for the child's freedom with a belief in ethical relativity, not recognizing that respect for the child's liberty derives from a principle of justice rather than from a belief that all moral values are arbitrary. Respect for the child's liberty means awarding him the maximum liberty compatible with the liberty of others (and of himself when older), not refusal to deal with his values and behavior. The assumption of individual relativity of values underlying modern romantic statements of the child's liberty is also reflected in the following quote from Neill (1960):

Well, we set out to make a school in which we should allow children freedom to be themselves. In order to do this, we had to renounce all discipline, all direction, all sug-

gestion, all moral training, all religious instruction. We have been called brave, but it did not require courage. All it required was what we had—a complete belief in the child as a good, not an evil, being. For almost forty years, this belief in the goodness of the child has never wavered; it rather has become a final faith. (p. 4)

For Neill, as for many free school advocates, value relativity does not involve what it did for Bereiter—a questioning of all conceptions of what is good in children and good for them. Neill's statement that the child is "good" is a completely non-relativist conception. It does not, however, refer to an ethical or moral principle or standard used to direct the child's education. Instead, just as in Skinner's cultural transmission ideology, the conception of the good is derived from what we have termed the psychologist's fallacy. Neill's faith in the "goodness of the child" is the belief that what children *do* want, when left to themselves, can be equated with what they *should* want from an ethical standpoint. In one way this faith is a belief that children are wired so as to act and develop compatibly with ethical norms. In another sense, however, it is an ethical postulation that decisions about what is right for children should be derived from what children do desire—that whatever children do is right.

This position begs the open question, "Why is freedom to be oneself good; by what standard is it a good thing?"

The question is raised by Dewey as follows (1938):

The objection made [to identifying the educative process with growing or developing] is that growth might take many different directions: a man, for example, who starts out on a career of burglary may grow in that direction . . . into a highly expert burglar. Hence it is argued that 'growth' is not enough; we must also specify the direction in which growth takes place, the end toward which it tends. (p. 75)

In Neill's view it is not clear whether there is a standard of development, i.e., some standard of goodness which children who grow up freely all meet, or whether children who grow up freely are good only by their own standards, even if they are thieves or villains by some other ethical standards. To the extent that there is a non-relativist criterion employed by Neill, it does not derive from, nor is it justified by, the ethical principles of philosophy. Rather, it is derived from matters of psychological fact about "mental health" and "happiness."

The merits of Summerhill are the merits of healthy free children whose lives are unspoiled by fear and hate. (Neill, 1960, p. 4)

The aim of education, in fact, the aim of life is to work joyfully and to find happiness. (Neill, 1960, p. 297).

Freedom, then, is not justified as an ethical principle but as a matter of psychological fact, leading to "mental health and happiness." These are ultimate terms, as are the terms "maximizing reinforcement" and "cultural survival" for Skinner. For other romantic educators the ultimate value terms are also psychological, e.g., "self-realization," "self-actualization," and "spontaneity." These are defined as "basic human tendencies" and are taken as good in themselves rather than being subject to the scrutiny of moral philosophy.

We have attempted to show that romantic libertarian ideologies are grounded on value-relativism and reliance on the psychologist's fallacy, just as are cultural-transmission ideologies, which see education as behavior control in the service of cultural survival. As a result of these shared premises, both romantic and cultural-transmission ideologies tend to generate a kind of elitism. In the case of Skinner, this elitism is reflected in the vision of the psychologist as a culture-designer, who "educates others" to conform to culture and maintain it but not to develop the values and knowledge which would be required for culture-designing. In the case of the romantic, the elitism is reflected in a refusal to impose intellectual and ethical values of libertarianism, equal justice, intellectual inquiry, and social reconstructionism on the child, even though these values are held to be the most important ones:

... Summerhill is a place in which people who have the innate ability and wish to be scholars will be scholars; while those who are only fit to sweep the streets will sweep the streets. But we have not produced a street cleaner so far. Nor do I write this snobbishly, for I would rather see a school produce a happy street cleaner than a neurotic scholar. (Neill, 1960, pp. 4-5)

In summary, in spite of their libertarian and non-indoctrinative emphases, romantic ideologies also have a tendency to be elitist or patronizing. Recalling the role of Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor, they see education as a process which only intends the child to be happy and adjusted rather than one which confronts the child with the ethical and intellectual problems and principles which the educator himself confronts. Skinner and Neill agree it is better for the child to be a happy pig than an unhappy Socrates. We may question, however, whether they have the right to withhold that choice.

Value Postulates of Progressivism

Progressive ideology, in turn, rests on the value postulates of ethical liberalism.²

² There are two main schools of ethical liberalism. The more naturalistic or utilitarian one is represented in the works of J. S. Mill, Sidgwick, Dewey, and Tufts. The other is represented

This position rejects traditional standards and value-relativism in favor of ethical universals. Further, it recognizes that value universals are ethical principles formulated and justified by the method of philosophy, not simply by the method of psychology. The ethical liberal position favors the active stimulation of the development of these principles in children. These principles are presented through a process of critical questioning which creates an awareness of the ground and limits of rational assent; they also are seen as relevant to universal trends in the child's own social and moral development. The liberal recognition of principles as *principles* clears them from confusion with psychological facts. To be concerned about children's happiness is an ethical imperative for the educator without regard to "mental health," "positive reinforcement," or other psychological terms used by educators who commit the "psychologist's fallacy." Rational ethical principles, not the values of parents or culture, are the final value-arbiters in defining educational aims. Such principles may call for consultation with parents, community, and children in formulating aims, but they do not warrant making them final judges of aims.

The liberal school recognizes that ethical principles determine the ends as well as the means of education. There is great concern not only to make schools more just, i.e., to provide equality of educational opportunity and to allow freedom of belief but also to educate so that free and just people emerge from the schools. Accordingly, liberals also conscientiously engage in moral education. It is here that the progressive and romantic diverge, in spite of a common concern for the liberty and rights of the child. For the romantic, liberty means non-interference. For the liberal, the principle of respect for liberty is itself defined as a moral aim of education. Not only are the rights of the child to be respected by the teacher, but the child's development is to be stimulated so that he may come to respect and defend his own rights and the rights of others.

Recognition of concern for liberty as a principle leads to an explicit, libertarian conception of moral education. According to Dewey and McLellan (1895),

Summing up, we may say that every teacher requires a sound knowledge of ethical and psychological principles . . . Only psychology and ethics can take education out of the rule-of-thumb stage and elevate the school to a vital, effective institution in the *greatest of all constructions—the building of a free and powerful character.* (p. 207)

In the liberal view, educational concern for the development of a "free

in the works of Locke, Kant, and Rawls. A modern statement of the liberal ethical tradition in relation to education is provided by R. S. Peters (1968).

character" is rooted in the principle of liberty. For the romantic or relativist libertarian this means that "everyone has their own bag," which may or may not include liberty; and to actively stimulate the development of regard for liberty or a free character in the child is as much an imposition on the child as any other educational intervention. The progressive libertarians differ on this point. They advocate a strong rather than a weak application of liberal principles to education. Consistent application of ethical principles to education means that education *should* stimulate the development of ethical principles in students.

In regard to ethical values, the progressive ideology adds the postulates of *development* and *democracy* to the postulates of liberalism. The notion of educational democracy is one in which justice between teacher and child means joining in a community in which value decisions are made on a shared and equitable basis, rather than non-interference with the child's value-decisions. Because ethical principles function as principles, the progressive ideology is "democratic" in a sense that romantic and cultural transmission ideologies are not.

In discussing Skinner we pointed to a fundamental problem in the relation between the ideology of the relativist educator and that of the student. Traditional education did not find it a problem to reconcile the role of teacher and the role of student. Both were members of a common culture and the task of the teacher was to transmit that culture and its values to the student. In contrast, modern psychologists advocating cultural transmission ideologies do not hold this position. As social relativists they do not really believe in a common culture; instead they are in the position of transmitting values which are different both from those they believe in and those believed in by the student. At the extreme, as we mentioned earlier, Skinner proposes an ideology for ethically relative psychologist-kings or culture designers who control others. Clearly there is a contradiction between the ideology for the psychologist-king and the ideology for the child.

Romantic or radical ideologies are also unable to solve this problem. The romantic adopts what he assumes are the child's values, or takes as his value premise what is "natural" in the child rather than endorsing the culture's values. But while the adult believes in the child's freedom and creativity and wants a free, more natural society, the child neither fully comprehends nor necessarily adheres to the adult's beliefs. In addition, the romantic must strive to give the child freedom to grow even though such freedom may lead the

child to become a reactionary. Like the behavior modifier, then, the romantic has an ideology, but it is different from the one which the student is supposed to develop.

The progressive is non-elitist because he attempts to get all children to develop in the direction of recognizing the principles he holds. But is this not indoctrinative? Here we need to clarify the postulates of development and democracy as they guide education.

For the progressive, the problem of offering a non-indoctrinative education which is based on ethical and epistemological principles is partially resolved by a conception that these principles represent developmentally advanced or mature stages of reasoning, judgment, and action. Because there are culturally universal stages or sequences of moral development (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1971), stimulation of the child's development to the next step in a natural direction is equivalent to a long range goal of teaching ethical principles.

Because the development of these principles is natural they are not imposed on the child—he chooses them himself. A similar developmental approach is taken toward intellectual values. Intellectual education in the progressive view is not merely a transmission of information and intellectual skills, it is the communication of patterns and methods of "scientific" reflection and inquiry. These patterns correspond to higher stages of logical reasoning. Piaget's formal operations. According to the progressive, there is an important analogy between scientific and ethical patterns of judgment or *problem-solving*, and there are overlapping rationales for intellectual and ethical education. In *explaining* the child to opportunities for reflective scientific inquiry, the teacher is guided by the principles of scientific method which the teacher himself accepts as the basis of rational reflection. Reference to such principles is non-indoctrinative if these principles are not presented as formulae to be *learned* ready-made or as rote patterns grounded in authority. Rather, they are part of a process of reflection by the student and teacher. A similar approach guides the process of reflection on ethical or value problems.

The problem of indoctrination is also resolved for the progressive by the concept of democracy. A concern for the child's freedom from indoctrination is part of a concern for the child's freedom to make decisions and act meaningfully. Freedom, in this context, means democracy, i.e., power and participation in a social system which recognizes basic equal rights. It is impossible for teachers not to engage in value-judgments and decisions. A concern for the liberty of the child does not create a school in which the teacher is value-

neutral and any pretense of it creates "the hidden curriculum" (Kohlberg, 1969b). But it can create a school in which the teacher's value-judgments and decisions involve the students democratically.

We turn, now, to the nature and justification of these universal and intrinsically worthy aims and principles. In the next sections we attempt to indicate the way in which the concept of development, rooted in psychological study, can aid in prescribing aims of education without commission of the psychologist's fallacy. We call this the developmental-philosophic strategy for defining educational aims.

Strategies for Defining Educational Objectives and Evaluating Educational Experience

We have considered the core psychological and philosophical assumptions of the three major streams of educational ideology. Now we shall consider these assumptions as they have been used to define objectives in early education.

There appear to be three fundamental strategies for defining educational objectives, which we call "the bag of virtues" or "desirable trait" strategy, the "industrial psychology" or "prediction of success" strategy and the "developmental-philosophic" strategy. These strategies tend to be linked, respectively, with the romantic, the cultural transmission, and the progressive educational ideologies.

The romantic tends to define educational objectives in terms of a "bag of virtues"—a set of traits characterizing an ideal healthy or fully-functioning personality. Such definitions of objectives are justified by a psychiatric theory of a spontaneous, creative, or self-confident personality. This standard of value springs from the romantic form of the psychologist's fallacy. Statements of value (desirability of a character-trait) are derived from psychological propositions of fact, e.g., that a given trait is believed to represent psychological "illness" or "health."

The cultural transmission ideology defines immediate objectives in terms of standards of knowledge and behavior learned in school. It defines the long-range objective as eventual power and status in the social system (e.g., income, success). In Skinner's terms, the objective is to maximize the reinforcement each individual receives from the system, while maintaining the system. In defining objectives, this focus on prediction of later success is common to those

whose interest lies in maintaining the system in its present form and those whose interest lies in equalizing opportunity for success in the system.

Within the cultural transmission school there is a second strategy for elaborating objectives which we have called the "industrial psychology" approach (Kohlberg, 1972). Psychologically, this strategy is more explicitly atheoretical than the "bag of virtues" approach; with regard to values it is more socially relativistic. Adopting the stance of the value-free consultant, it evaluates a behavior in terms of its usefulness as a means to the student's or the system's ends, and focuses on the empirical prediction of later successes. In practice, this approach has focused heavily on tests and measurements of achievement as they predict or relate to later success in the educational or social system.

The third strategy, the developmental-philosophic, is linked to the progressive ideology. The progressive believes that a liberal conception of education pursuing intrinsically worthy aims or states is the best one for everyone. Such a conception of objectives must have a psychological component. The progressive defines the psychologically valuable in developmental terms. Implied in the term "development" is the notion that a more developed psychological state is more valuable or adequate than a less developed state.

The developmental-philosophic strategy attempts to clarify, specify, and justify the concept of adequacy implicit in the concept of development. It does so through: a) elaborating a formal psychological theory of development—the cognitive-developmental theory; b) elaborating a formal ethical and epistemological theory of truth and worth linked to the psychological theory; c) relating both of these to the facts of development in a specific area; and d) describing empirical sequences of development worth cultivating.

Now we need to critically examine the three strategies. Our task is both logical and empirical. Logically, the chief question is, "Does the strategy define objectives which are intrinsically valuable or universally desirable? Can it deal with the charge that its value is relative or arbitrary?" Empirically, the major question is, "Does the strategy define objectives predicting to something of long-term value in later life?"

The Bag of Virtues Strategy

The "bag of virtues" strategy for choosing objectives is the approach which comes most naturally to educators. An example is the formulation of a Headstart list of objectives—as cited in Dr. Edith Grotberg's review (1969) offered by a panel of

authorities on child development. One goal is "helping the emotional and social development of the child by encouraging self-confidence, spontaneity, curiosity and self-discipline." We may note that development is defined here in terms of trait words. From the point of view of the philosophic-developmentalists, the qualification of the term "social development" by such trait words is superfluous and misleading. The developmentalist would chart universals in preschool social development empirically and theoretically with implications for later development and would indicate the conditions which stimulate such development. Such a charting of development would make trait words like "spontaneity" and "self-confidence" unnecessary.

The justification for using trait words to qualify development as an educational end has usually been that development is too vague a term. We consider this question later. Here we need only note the arbitrariness and vagueness which underlies all efforts to use the positive connotations of ordinary trait terms of personality or character to define educational standards and values. This arbitrariness and vagueness exists in lists of mental health traits such as the Headstart list and also in lists of moral virtues composing moral character, such as the Hartshorne and May (1928-1932) objectives of "honesty, service, and self-control." Arbitrariness exists first in composing the list or "bag" of virtues itself. One member of the committee likes "self-discipline," another "spontaneity"; the committee includes both. While both words sound nice, one wonders whether cultivating "self-discipline" and cultivating "spontaneity" are consistent with one another. Second, we may note that the observable meaning of a virtue-word is relative to a conventional cultural standard which is both psychologically vague and ethically relative. The behavior that one person labels "self-discipline" another calls "lack of spontaneity." Because the observable meaning of a virtue-word is relative to a conventional cultural standard, its meaning is psychologically vague, a fact which was first demonstrated by Hartshorne and May for the virtue-word "honesty." Hartshorne and May were dismayed to discover that they could locate no such stable personality trait as honesty in school children. A child who cheated on one occasion might or might not cheat on another: cheating was for the most part situationally determined. In a factor analysis, there was no clearly identifiable factor or correlation pattern which could be called "honesty." Furthermore, "honesty" measurements did not predict to later behavior. This contradicts the commonsense notion underlying the bag of virtues approach. It turns out that dictionary terms for personality do not describe

situationally general personality dispositions which are stable or predictive over development.

Related to the problem of psychological definition and measurement is the problem of the relativity of the standard of value defining "honesty" or any other virtue. Labeling a set of behaviors displayed by a child with positive or negative trait terms does not signify that they are of adaptive or ethical importance. It represents an appeal to particular community conventions, since one person's "integrity" is another person's "stubbornness," one person's "honesty in expressing your true feelings" is another person's "insensitivity to the feelings of others."

We have criticized the "bag of virtues" approach on the grounds of *logical* questions raised by a procedure of sorting through the dictionary for trait terms with positive meaning. We need next to question two "scientific" or *psychological* assumptions, the concept of the personality trait and the concept of mental health, as they relate to the development of children. With regard to the trait assumption, longitudinal research findings lead us to question whether there are positive or adaptive childhood personality traits which are stable or predictive over time and development, even if such traits are defined by psychological rather than lexical methods. The relatively general and longitudinally stable personality traits which have been identified in earlier childhood are traits of temperament—introversion-extroversion, passivity-activity—which have been shown to be in large part hereditary temperamental traits without adaptive significance (research reviewed in Ausubel & Sullivan, 1970; Kohlberg, 1969b; Kohlberg, La Crosse & Ricks, 1971). The longitudinal research indicates that the notions of "mental health" or "mental illness" are even more questionable as concepts defining the meaning and value of personality traits. Unlike development, the term "mental health" has no clear psychological meaning when applied to children and their education. When the clinician examines a child with reference to mental health, he records the child's lags (and advances) in cognitive, social, and psychomotor development. Occasionally such lags are indicative of "illness," e.g., of an organic brain condition. But, in general, if "illness" means anything beyond retarded development it means a prognosis of continued failure to develop. Considering the child's development as an aim of education, the metaphors of health and illness add little to detailed and adequate conceptions of cognitive and social development. This also is indicated by empirical longitudinal findings (Kohlberg, LaCrosse & Ricks, 1971).

We are led to ask whether early childhood traits with apparent negative mental health implications like dependency, aggression, or anxiety, have predictive value as indicators of adult difficulties in "life adjustment" or "mental health." The answer at present is no: the mental health traits listed among the Headstart objectives, as well as those commonly included among the goals of other early education programs, have failed to show their predictive value for positive or negative adult life adjustment. Even if the behavior changes sought in such programs were achieved, the child would be no more likely than before to become a well-adjusted adult.

Secondly, from the philosophic point of view, those who espouse the mental health bag of virtues commit the psychologist's fallacy and a related fallacy, that a panel of psychiatrists or child psychiatrists such as the one defining Headstart objectives are "experts" on ethical principles or values.

In educational practice, a concern for mental health has at least meant an ethical concern for the happiness of the child; this was neglected by cultural transmission school. But ethical principles based on a concern for the child's liberty and happiness can stand on their own without a mental health bag of virtues to rationalize them.

The Industrial Psychology Rationale

Translating educational objectives into a "bag of virtues" (skills) in the intellectual domain does not run into all the difficulties which it has encountered in the social-emotional domain. This is because reasonable precision has been attained in defining and measuring intellectual skills and achievements, because there is some degree of predictability over time in these skills, and because the questions of value-relativity raised by concepts of "moral character" and "mental health" as educational objectives are not as obvious when school aims are defined in terms of intellectual skills. But concepts of intellectual skills have only appeared satisfactory because of the high empirical overlap or correlation of these skills with cognitive development (in the developmental-philosophic sense) and because of the overlap with the non-educational or "biological" constant of general intelligence. Once cognitive skills are defined and measured by educational *achievement* measures, they have little clear use in defining educational objectives.

The "achievement skills" conception is a joint product of the "bag of virtues" and "industrial psychology" approach to educational aims. We have noted that the industrial psychology approach rests on identifying and measuring relative individual success in meeting the task demands of a current job or work-position,

and on identifying characteristics predicting to later success or mobility in the job-system. Its major application in education has been the development of achievement tests. While not originally developed to define operational educational goals, achievement tests have frequently been used for this purpose. The massive Coleman Report (1966) rested its entire analysis of the quality and effects of schooling on variations in achievement test scores. A number of academic early education programs, including the Bereiter and Engelmann program (1966) previously quoted, essentially define their objective as the improvement of later achievement scores.

From the ethical or philosophic point of view, the use of achievement tests to measure educational objectives rests on a compounding of one type of relativism on another. The items composing an achievement test do not derive from any epistemological principles of adequate patterns of thought and knowledge, but rather represent samples of items taught in the schools. The information taught in the schools is relative and arbitrary: Latin and Greek for one hour, computer programming for another. There is no internal logical or epistemological analysis of these items to justify their worth. Another relativistic aspect of achievement tests is "marking on the curve." This leads to what Zigler has called "defining compensatory education objectives as raising the entire country above the 50th percentile in achievement tests" (unpublished comment).

Finally, and most basically, the relativism underlying achievement tests involves predicting to success in a system without asking whether the system awards success in an ethically justifiable manner, or whether success itself is an ethically justifiable goal. The original ethical impulse in constructing the achievement test was to equalize educational opportunity by a more impartial selection system than teachers' grades, recommendations, and the quality of schools the child has previously attended. This was done with relativistic acceptance that the content and demands of the school serve as social status gating mechanisms. It is hardly surprising that the whole desire to equalize opportunity, or increase educational and occupational justice through raising educational achievement scores, has failed in every possible sense of the word "failure" (Jencks, *et al.*, 1972).

On the psychological and factual side, there have been two basic and related flaws in the assumption that achievement tests represent something of educational value. The first is the notion that correlation or prediction can be substituted for causation. The second, related notion is that success within an

arbitrary system, the schools, implies success in other aspects of life. With regard to the first assumption, advocates of the industrial psychology strategy and achievement tests based on it feel that the relation between causation and prediction is unimportant. We can efficiently select those who will do well in college, become successful salesmen, or become juvenile delinquents without facing the causation issue. But if we shift from using a test or a measure of behavior as a selector to using it as the criterion for an educational objective, the problem is quite different. Unless a predictor of later achievement or adjustment is also a causal determinant of it, it cannot be used to define educational objectives.

As an example of the confusion between correlation and causation, we know that grades and achievement scores in elementary school predict to comparable scores in high school which in turn predict to comparable scores in college. The assumption is then made that the *cause* of particular achievement scores is the earlier achievement. It is assumed that a child who does not attain a second grade level of performance on reading achievement will not attain an adequate level of reading later because he is low in reading achievement at second grade.

In fact, the prediction of early to later achievement is mainly due to factors extraneous to achievement itself. Longitudinal studies show that the stability or predictive power of school achievement tests is largely due, first, to a factor of general intelligence and, second, to social class. Achievement scores correlate with I.Q. scores and both measures predict to later school achievement; early elementary achievement does not predict to later achievement any better than does I.Q. alone. In other words, bright children learn what they're taught in school faster, but learning what they're taught in school does not make them brighter nor does it necessarily mean that they will learn later material faster.

Achievement tests also fail to predict to success in later life; in fact, longitudinal studies indicate that school achievement predicts to nothing of value other than itself.

For example, in terms of future job success, high school dropouts do as well as graduates who do not attend college; high school graduates with poor achievement scores and grades do as well as those with good scores; and, college graduates with poor grades do as well as those with good grades (see Kohlberg, LaCrosse & Ricks, 1971; Jencks, *et al*, 1972).

In summary, academic achievement tests have no theoretical rationale. Their

practical rationale is primarily an industrial psychology "prediction for selection." But even by industrial psychology standards the tests do not do well since they fail to predict to later life achievement.

These criticisms do not imply that schools should be unconcerned with academic learning. They do suggest: (1) a heavy element of arbitrariness in current school objectives in academic learning; (2) the inability of educational testing methods endorsed by the industrial psychology school to make these objectives less arbitrary; and (3) the invalidity of assuming that if academic achievement is good, early achievement is best. Schools should teach reading, writing, and arithmetic, but their goals and success in teaching these subjects should not be judged by skill or achievement tests.

The Developmental-Philosophic Strategy

The developmental-philosophic strategy, as opposed to the other two, can deal with the ethical question of having a standard of non-relative or universal value and with factual questions of prediction. The concept of development, as elaborated by cognitive-developmental theory, implies a standard of adequacy *internal* to, and governing, the developmental process itself. It is obvious that the notion of development must do more than merely define what comes later in time. It is not clear that what comes later must be better. As an example, if anal interests mature later in time than oral interests, this in itself is no reason for claiming that the anal interests are better than the oral interests.

Cognitive-developmental theory, however, postulates a formal internal standard of adequacy which is not merely an order of events in time. In doing so it elaborates the ordinary-language meaning of the term "development." Webster's Dictionary tells us that to develop means "to make active, to move from the original position to one providing more opportunity for effective use, to cause to grow and differentiate along lines natural of its kind; to go through a process of natural growth, differentiation, or evolution by successive changes." This suggests an internal standard of adequacy governing development; it implies that development is not just any behavior change, but a change toward greater differentiation, integration, and adaptation. Cognitive-developmental psychological theory postulates that movement through a sequential progression represents movement from a less adequate psychological state to a more adequate psychological state. The existence of this "internal standard of adequacy" is suggested by studies which show that the child prefers thinking at the next

higher moral or logical stage to thinking at his own stage (or at lower stages) (Rest, 1973), and that he moves in that direction under normal conditions of stimulation.

The concept of development also implies that such an internal standard of adequacy is different than notions of adaptation based on culturally relative success or survival. As a case, we may take stages of morality. Being at the highest moral stage led Socrates and Martin Luther King to be put to death by members of their culture. Obviously, then, moral development cannot be justified as adaptive by standards of survival or of conformity to cultural standards. In terms of developmental psychological theory, however, King's morality was more adequate than the morality of most people who survive longer. Formally, King's morality was a more differentiated and integrated moral system than that of most people. It was more adequate because if all people adopted King's morality, it would resolve for everyone moral problems and conflicts unresolved by lower-stage moralities.

As the example of King suggests, the formal standard of cognitive-developmental psychological theory is not itself ultimate, but must be elaborated as a set of ethical and epistemological principles and justified by the method of philosophy and of ethics. The distinctive feature of the developmental-philosophic approach is that a philosophic conception of adequate principles is coordinated with a psychological theory of development and with the fact of development.

In contrast to "value-free" approaches, the approach suggested by Dewey and Piaget considers questions of value or adequacy at the very start. Piaget begins by establishing epistemological and logical criteria for deciding which thought structures are most adaptive and adequate for coping with complexity. Similarly, our work on ethical stages has taken a philosophic notion of adequate principles of justice (represented especially in the work of Kant and Rawls) to guide us in defining the direction of development. Epistemological and ethical principles guide psychological inquiry from the start. Thus, the strategy attempts to avoid the naturalistic fallacy of directly deriving judgments of value from judgments about the facts of development, although it assumes that the two may be systematically related. It takes as an hypothesis for empirical confirmation or refutation that development is a movement toward greater epistemological or ethical adequacy as defined by philosophic principles of adequacy.

The progressives' philosophical method differs from the approaches of philosophers of other persuasions in that the progressive or developmental method is partly empirical rather than purely analytic. It combines a prior

conception of development with a prior notion of an ethical standard of adequacy; but these notions can be revised in light of the facts, including the facts of development. If the facts of development do not indicate that individuals move toward philosophically desired principles of justice, then the initial philosophic definition of the direction of development is in error, and must be revised. The analytic and normative "ought" of the developmental philosopher must take into account the facts of development, but is not simply a translation of these facts.

This method of "empirical" or "experimental" philosophy is especially central for an educational philosophy prescribing educational aims. Philosophical principles cannot be stated as ends of education until they can be stated psychologically. This means translating them into statements about a more adequate stage of development. Otherwise the rationally accepted principles of the philosopher will only be arbitrary concepts and doctrines for the child. Accordingly, to make a genuine statement of an educational end, the educational philosopher must coordinate notions of principles with understanding of the facts of development.

Development as the Aim of Education

We have attempted to clarify and justify the basic claim that developmental criteria are the best ones for defining educationally important behavior changes. We need now to clarify how the psychological study of development can concretely define educational goals. A common criticism is that the concept of development is too vague to genuinely clarify the choice of the curricular content and aims of education. A second, related criticism is that the concept of development, with its connotation of the "natural," is unsuited to determine actual educational policy.

With regard to the issue of vagueness, if the concept of development is to aid in selecting educational aims and content, this assumes that only some behavior changes out of many can be labeled developmental. We need to justify this assumption and to clarify the conditions for developmental change.

Our position has been challenged by Bereiter (1970), who claims that determining whether or not a behavior change is development is a matter of theory, not an empirical issue. For example, Piagetian research shows that fundamental arithmetical reasoning (awareness of one-to-one correspondence, of inclusion of a larger class in a sub-class, of addition and subtraction as in-

verse operations), usually develops naturally, without formal instruction or schooling, i.e., it constitutes development. Such reasoning can also be explicitly taught, however, following various non-developmental learning theories. Accordingly, says Bereiter, to call fundamental arithmetical reasoning developmental does not define it as a developmental educational objective distinct from non-developmental objectives like rote knowledge of the multiplication tables.

In answer, the cognitive-developmental position claims that developmental behavior change is irreversible, general over a field of responses, sequential, and hierarchical (Kohlberg, 1970). When a set of behavior changes meets all these criteria, changes are termed stages or structural reorganizations. A specific area of behavioral change like fundamental arithmetical reasoning may or may not meet these criteria. Engelmann claims to have artificially taught children the "naturally developing" operation of conservation, but Kamii (1971) found that the children so taught met Engelmann's criteria of conservation without meeting the criteria of development, e.g., the response could be later forgotten or unlearned, it was not generalized, and so forth.

When a set of responses taught artificially do not meet the criteria of natural development this is not because educational intervention is generally incompatible with developmental change. It is because the particular intervention is found to mimic development rather than to stimulate it. The issue of whether an educational change warrants the honorific label "development" is a question for empirical examination, not simply a matter of theory.

We have claimed that development can occur either naturally or as the result of a planned educational program. As was discussed earlier, development depends on experience. It is true, however, that the way in which experience stimulates development (through discrepancy and match between experienced events and information-processing structures) is not the way experience is programmed in many forms of instruction and educational intervention. It is also true that the kinds of experience leading to development must be viewed in terms of a stimulation which is general rather than highly specific in its content or meaning.

Because the experiences necessary for structural development are believed to be *universal*, it is possible for the child to develop the behavior naturally, without planned instruction. But the fact that only about half of the adult American population fully reaches Piaget's stage of formal operational reasoning and only 5% reach the highest moral stage demonstrates that natural or

universal forms of development are not inevitable but depend on experience (Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg & Haan, 1971).

If this argument is accepted, it not only answers the charge that development is a vague concept but helps answer the charge that there are kinds of development (such as growth in skill at burglary) which are not valuable.

Such questionable types of "development" do not constitute development in the sense of a universal sequence or in the sense of growth of some general aspect of personality. As stated by Dewey (1938): "That a man may grow in efficiency as a burglar . . . cannot be doubted. But from the standpoint of growth as education and education as growth the question is whether such growth promotes or retards growth in general" (p. 75).

While a coherent argument has been made for why universal developmental sequences define something of educational value, we need to consider why such sequences comprise the ultimate criteria of educational value. We also need to consider how they relate to competing educational values. How does universal structural development as an educational aim relate to ordinary definitions of information and skills central to the educational curriculum? It seems obvious that many changes or forms of learning are of value which are not universals in development. As an example, while many unschooled persons have learned to read, the capacity and motivation to read does not define a developmental universal; nonetheless, it seems to us a basic educational objective. We cannot dispose of "growth in reading" as an educational objective, as we could "growth in burglary," simply because it is not a universal in development. But we argue that the ultimate importance of learning to read can only be understood in the context of more universal forms of development. Increased capacity to read is not itself a development, although it is an attainment reflecting various aspects of development. The value or importance of reading lies in its potential contribution to further cognitive, social, and aesthetic development. As stated by Dewey (1898):

No one can estimate the benumbing and hardening effect of continued drill in reading as mere form. It should be obvious that what I have in mind is not a Philistine attack upon books and reading. The question is not how to get rid of them, but how to get their value—how to use them to their capacity as servants of the intellectual and moral life. To answer this question, we must consider what is the effect of growth in a special direction upon the attitudes and habits which alone open up avenues for development in other lines. (p. 29)

A developmental definition of educational objectives must not only cope with competing objectives usually defined non-developmentally, but with the fact that the universal aspects of development are multiple. Here, as in the case of evaluating non-developmental objectives, the progressive educator must consider the relation of a particular development to development in general. As an example, Kamii (1971) has defined a program of preschool intervention related to each of the chapter headings of Piaget's books: space, time, causality, number, classification, and so on. Kamii's intent in making use of all the areas of cognitive development discussed by Piaget is not to imply that each constitutes a separate, intrinsic educational objective. Rather, her interest is to make use of all aspects of the child's experience relevant to *general* Piagetian cognitive development. Such a concept of generalized cognitive-stage development is meaningful because Kohlberg and DeVries (1971) and others have shown that there is a general Piagetian cognitive-level factor distinct from psychometric general intelligence.

In contrast to the psychometric concept of intelligence, the developmental level concept of intelligence does provide a standard or a set of aims for preschool education. It does not assume a concept of fixed capacity or "intelligence quotient" constant over development. In this sense, developmental level is more like "achievement" than like "capacity," but developmental level tests differ from achievement tests in several ways. While the developmental level concept does not distinguish between achievement and capacity, it distinguishes between cognitive achievement (performance) and cognitive process (or competence). Developmental tests measure level of thought process, not the difficulty or correctness of thought product. They measure not cognitive performance but cognitive competence, the basic possession of a core concept, not the speed and agility with which the concept is expressed or used under rigid test conditions.

Psychometric and developmental level concepts of intelligence are quite different. In practice, however, the two kinds of measures are highly correlated with one another, explaining why clear theoretical and operational distinctions between the two concepts of intelligence have not been made until recently. Factor-analytic findings now can provide an empirical basis for this distinction (Kohlberg & DeVries, 1971). While psychometric measures of general intelligence and of "primary mental abilities" at mental age six correlate with Piagetian measures of cognitive level, there is also a common factor to all developmental level tests. This factor is independent of general intelligence or of any special psychometric ability. In other words, it is possible to distinguish

between psychometric capacity and developmental level concepts or measures of intelligence. Given the empirical distinction, cognitive stage measures provide a rational standard for educational intervention where psychometric intelligence tests do not. This is true for the following reasons:

1. The core structure defined by stage tests is in theory and experiment more amenable to educational intervention—Piagetian theory is a theory of stage movement occurring through *experience* of structural disequilibrium.
2. Piagetian performance predicts later development independent of a fixed biological rate or capacity factor, as demonstrated by evidence for longitudinal stability or prediction independent of I.Q. Because Piaget items define invariant sequences, development to one stage facilitates development to the next.
3. Piagetian test content has cognitive value in its own right. If a child is able to think causally instead of magically about phenomena, for instance, his ability has a cognitive value apart from arbitrary cultural demands—it is not a mere indicator of brightness, like knowing the word “envelope” or “amanuensis.” This is reflected in the fact that Piaget test scores are qualitative; they are not arbitrary points on a curve. The capacity to engage in concrete logical reasoning is a definite attainment, being at mental age six is not. We can ask that all children reason in terms of logical operations; we cannot ask that all children have high I.Q.’s.
4. This cognitive value is culturally universal, the sequence of development occurs in every culture and subculture.

The existence of a general level factor in cognitive development allows us to put particular universal sequences of cognitive development into perspective as educational aims. The worth of a development in any particular cognitive sequence is determined by its contribution to the whole of cognitive development.

We must now consider the relation of developmental aims of education to the notion of developmental acceleration as an educational objective. We indicated that a concept of stages as “natural” does not mean that they are inevitable; many individuals fail to attain the higher stages of logical and moral reasoning. Accordingly, the aim of the developmental educator is not the acceleration of development but the eventual adult attainment of the highest stage. In this sense, the developmentalist is not interested in *stage-acceleration*, but in avoiding *stage-retardation*. Moral development research reviewed else-

where suggests that there is what approaches an optimal period for movement from one stage to the next (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1973). When a child has just attained a given stage, he is unlikely to respond to stimulation toward movement to the next stage. In addition, after a long period of use of a given stage of thought, a child tends to "stabilize" at that stage and develops screening mechanisms for contradictory stimulation. Accordingly, it has been found that both very young and very old children at a given stage (compared to the age-norm for that stage) are less responsive or less able to assimilate stimulation at the next higher stage than children at the age-norm for that stage. The notion of an "open period" is not age-specific, it is individual. A child late in reaching Stage 2 may be "open" to Stage 3 at an age beyond that of another child who reached Stage 2 earlier. Nevertheless, gross age-periods may be defined which are "open periods" for movement from one stage to the next. Avoidance of retardation as an educational aim means presenting stimulation in these periods where the possibility for development is still open.

We need to consider a related distinction between *acceleration* and *decalage* as an aim of education. Piaget distinguishes between the appearance of a stage and its "horizontal *decalage*," its spread or generalization across the range of basic physical and social actions, concepts, and objects to which the stage potentially applies. As a simple example, concrete logic or conservation is first noted in the concept of mass and only later in weight and volume. Accordingly, acceleration of the stage of concrete operations is one educational enterprise and the encouragement of *decalage* of concrete reasoning to a new concept or phenomenon is another. It is the latter which is most relevant to education. Education is concerned not so much with age of onset of a child's capacity for concrete logical thought, but with the possession of a logical mind—the degree to which he has organized his experience or his world in a logical fashion.

It is likely that the occurrence of such horizontal *decalage*, rather than age of first appearance of concrete operations, predicts to later formal operational thought. Formal reasoning develops because concrete reasoning represents a poor, though partially successful, strategy for solving many problems. The child who has never explored the limits of concrete logical reasoning and lives in a world determined by arbitrary unexplained events and forces, will see the limits of the partial solutions of concrete logic as set by intangible forces, rather than looking for a more adequate logic to deal with unexplained problems.

We have so far discussed development only as general cognitive develop-

ment. According to cognitive-developmental theory there is always a cognitive component to development, even in social, moral, and aesthetic areas. Development, however, is broader than cognitive-logical development. One central area is moral development, as defined by invariant stages of moral reasoning (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1971, 1973). On the one hand, these stages have a cognitive component; attainment of a given Piaget cognitive stage is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the parallel moral stage. On the other hand, moral reasoning stages relate to action, principled moral reasoning has been found to be a precondition for principled moral action (Kohlberg and Turiel, 1973). For reasons elaborated throughout this paper, the stimulation of moral development through the stages represents a rational and ethical focus of education related to, but broadening, an educational focus upon cognitive development as such (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1971). Programs effective in stimulating moral development have been successfully demonstrated (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1973).

While developmental moral education widens the focus of cognitive-developmental education beyond the purely cognitive, there is a still broader unity, called ego-development, of which both cognitive and moral development are part (Loevinger, Wessler & Redmore, 1970). Particularly in the earlier childhood years, it is difficult to distinguish moral development from ego-development. Cognitive development, in the Piagetian sense, is also related to ego development, since both concern the child's core beliefs about the physical and social world. Much recent research demonstrates that the development of the ego, as attitudes and beliefs about the self, involves step-by-step parallel development of attitudes and beliefs about the physical and social world. Further, it indicates definite stages of ego-development, defined by Loevinger *et al.* (1970), van den Daele (1970) and others, which imply step-by-step parallels to Piaget's cognitive stages, although they include more social emotional content. In general, attainment of a Piagetian cognitive stage is a necessary but not sufficient condition for attainment of the parallel ego stage. All children at a given ego stage must have attained the parallel cognitive stage, but not all children at a cognitive stage will have organized their self-concept and social experience at the corresponding ego stage. Thus, a general concept of ego-development as a universal sequential phenomenon is becoming an empirically meaningful guide to defining broad educational objectives. Furthermore, experimental educational programs to stimulate ego-development have been piloted with some definite success at both the preschool and the high school levels (van den Daele, 1970; Sprinthall & Mosher, 1970).

Thus, education for general cognitive development, and perhaps even education for moral development, must be judged by its contribution to a more general concept of ego-development. In saying this, we must remember that "ego-development" is the psychologist's term for a sequence which also must have a philosophic rationale. One pole of ego-development is self-awareness; the parallel pole is awareness of the world. Increasing awareness is not only "cognitive," it is moral, aesthetic, and metaphysical; it is the awareness of new meanings in life.

Finally, we need to note that in the realm of ego-development, a focus upon "horizontal *decalage*" rather than acceleration is especially salient. The distinction reflects in a more precise and viable fashion the concern of maturational or romantic stage-theorists for an educational focus upon "healthy" passage through stages, rather than their acceleration. In maturational theories of personality stages, age leads to a new stage regardless of experience and organizations at previous stages. As a result, education and experience become valuable not for movement to a new stage, but for healthy or *successful integration* of the concerns of a stage. Onset of the next stage occurs regardless of experience; it is only healthy integration of the stages which is contingent on experience and which should be the focus for education. Without accepting this contention, cognitive-developmental theory would agree that premature development to a higher ego stage without a corresponding *decalage* throughout the child's world and life presents problems. In psychoanalytic maturational terms, the dangers of uneven or premature ego development are expressed as defects in ego-strength with consequent vulnerability to regression. In cognitive-developmental terms, inadequate "horizontal *decalage*" represents a somewhat similar phenomenon. While the relation of "ego-strength" to logical and moral *decalage* is not well understood, there are many reasons to believe they are related. A child who continues to think in magical or egocentric terms in some areas of cognition and morality is likely to be vulnerable to something like "regression" under stress later in life.

In conclusion, if a broad concept of development, conceived in stage-sequential terms, is still vague as a definer of educational ends, it is not due to the inherent narrowness or vagueness of the concept. Rather, it is due to the fact that researchers have only recently begun the kind of longitudinal and educational research needed to make the concept precise and useable. When Dewey advocated education as development at the turn of the century, most American educational psychologists turned instead to industrial psychology or to

the mental health bag of virtues. If the results of the cognitive-developmental research of the last decades are still limited, they indicate real promise for finally translating Dewey's vision into a precise reality.

Summary and Conclusions

The present paper essentially recapitulates the progressive position first formulated by John Dewey. This position has been clarified psychologically by the work of Piaget and his followers; its philosophic premises have been advanced by the work of modern analytic philosophers like Hare, Rawls, and Peters. The progressive view of education makes the following claims:

1. That the aims of education may be identified with development, both intellectual and moral.
2. That education so conceived supplies the conditions for passing through an order of connected stages.
3. That such a developmental definition of educational aims and processes requires both the method of philosophy or ethics and the method of psychology or science. The justification of education as development requires a philosophic statement explaining why a higher stage is a better or a more adequate stage. In addition, before one can define a set of educational goals based on a philosophical statement of ethical, scientific, or logical principles one must be able to translate it into a statement about psychological stages of development.
4. This, in turn, implies that the understanding of logical and ethical principles is a central aim of education. This understanding is the philosophic counterpart of the psychological statement that the aim of education is the development of the individual through cognitive and moral stages. It is characteristic of higher cognitive and moral stages that the child himself constructs logical and ethical principles; these, in turn, are elaborated by science and philosophy.
5. A notion of education as attainment of higher stages of development, involving an understanding of principles, was central to "aristocratic" Platonic doctrines of liberal education. This conception is also central to Dewey's notion of a democratic education. The democratic educational end for all humans must be "the development of a free and powerful character." Nothing less than democratic education will prepare free people for factual

and moral choices which they will inevitably confront in society. The democratic educator must be guided by a set of psychological and ethical principles which he openly presents to his students, inviting criticism as well as understanding. The alternative is the "educator-king," such as the behavior-modifier with an ideology of controlling behavior, or the teacher-psychiatrist with an ideology of "improving" students' mental health. Neither exposes his ideology to the students, allowing them to evaluate its merit for themselves.

6. A notion of education for development and education for principles is liberal, democratic, and non-indoctrinative. It relies on open methods of stimulation through a sequence of stages, in a direction of movement which is universal for all children. In this sense, it is natural.

The progressive position appears idealistic rather than pragmatic, industrial-vocational, or adjustment-orientated, as is often charged by critics of progressivism who view it as ignoring "excellence." But Dewey's idealism is supported by Piagetian psychological findings which indicate that all children, not only well-born college students, are "philosophers" intent on organizing their lives into universal patterns of meaning. It is supported by findings that most students seem to move forward in developmentally oriented educational programs. Furthermore, the idealism of the developmental position is compatible with the notion that the child is involved in a process of both academic and vocational education. Dewey denied that educational experience stimulating intellectual and moral development could be equated with academic schooling. He claimed that practical or vocational education as well as academic education could contribute to cognitive and moral development; it should be for all children, not only for the poor or the "slow." Our educational system currently faces a choice between two forms of injustice, the first an imposition of an arbitrary academic education on all, the second a division into a superior academic track and an inferior vocational track. The developmental conception remains the only rationale for solving these injustices, and for providing the basis for a truly democratic educational process.

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Highlander Folk School: Getting Information, Going Back and Teaching It

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If our judgments about educational change were based only on conventional histories, our vision of alternative futures would be constrained. We would probably come to the conclusion that a small number of school professionals and prominent social reformers have alone been responsible for initiating and maintaining worthwhile reforms.

Yet there are other histories. There is a history of modest or regional successes which do not meet the historians' standards of significance. There is a history of leaders and groups who are ahead of their time, who resist prevailing trends, but who appear in the official accounts as misinformed or malintentioned obstacles to the main direction of historical development. There is a history of "commonfolk" struggling to become, and becoming, their own leaders. There is a history of alternative educational perspectives, from utopian visions to practical classroom applications—developments too often known only to the few directly involved.

The neglect of these histories makes it difficult for those who today seek more humane alternatives to find reasonable connections with the past. Since they have little sense of the partial but significant successes of this tradition, reformers again and again see themselves in the despairing position of being the "first" to take on the collective legacy of centuries of Western education. The effort to record and

understand this history does not mean that all "good guys" are now "bad guys," or that all people hidden from the official pages of history are saints, but that our links with the past and our hopes for the future are forged by the infrequently powerful and the powerless as well as by the characters of official history.

The story of the Highlander Folk School lends support to an alternative interpretation of our educational tradition. For forty years, the school has been an adult education center working with Southerners and dedicated to developing its students' capacities for both individual and group self-determination. This article, adapted from the author's unpublished manuscript, "Unearthing Seeds of Fire: The Idea of Highlander," reconstructs the history of the school from records kept on file at Highlander and from interviews with key participants. It describes the education and inspiration of Myles Horton, the school's founding and guiding spirit. It tells how Highlander pursued its aims in the labor struggles of the 30's, the civil rights movement, and, most recently, the awakening of Appalachian community. Finally, it presents some educational lessons deriving from the Highlander Folk experience.

THE EDITORS

The idea of starting a school to serve oppressed people first struck Myles Horton when he was 22, and then it held his imagination and dedication for life. In 1927, the summer before his senior year at Cumberland University, the Presbyterian Church sent Horton to Ozone, Tennessee, to organize daily vacation Bible schools. While much of the country was enjoying prosperity, Ozone's people were already deep in their own Great Depression. Greed's harvest had exploited and exhausted the natural supplies of timber and coal, and the people who did not leave the region faced extreme poverty and seemingly unending misery. Horton ran the Bible schools, but soon came to feel that memory verses, hymns, and games didn't have much real use in relation to the daily problems faced by the children or their hard-pressed parents.

Nor could Horton learn of any school program that was directly related to mountain people and their common problems. Horton decided to do something about the situation. He wasn't certain what to do, so he asked parents of children attending Bible classes to come to church at night to talk about their problems.

To his amazement, they came. Some would walk in the dusk several miles down the hollows knowing they would have to go home in the dark. The things they talked about were basic. How could jobs be found? How does a person test a well for typhoid? Could the stripped hillsides ever grow trees again? Horton's inability

to answer most of their questions didn't bother them. Soon, however, they started asking him to find someone who did have the answers. The county agent was helpful. So was a man who knew how to test wells. Once neighbor started talking with neighbor they learned that answers to many of their questions were available right there in Ozone. By the summer's end the people were urging Horton to stay on, and not return to college. Cumberland University became at once unimportant and important. He'd learned that the people knew the answers to their own problems. He'd learned that the teacher's job is to get them talking about those problems, to raise and sharpen questions, and to trust people to come up with the answers. Yet, having been in traditional schools all his life he could not trust this way of learning. He promised to come back when he had something to offer. That fall, he was back in college.

During Horton's senior year, one of Tennessee's leading businessmen, a woolen manufacturer named John Emmett Edgerton, came to Cumberland and spoke against unions. Essentially he said the workers were wrong to think they could decide things for themselves. It was he, Edgerton, and other industrialists, who should determine what was good for the working man. Horton's understanding of the union movement was slight, but Edgerton's speech shocked him. Soon after, Horton went to Edgerton's Lebanon mill to talk with his workers, arguing that they were human beings who should exercise their inalienable rights. His appeal was spirited, but naive; it fell on uninterested, perhaps even fearful, ears. Horton himself was deeply confused and disappointed that the workers didn't rise in rebellion at hearing his arguments. He returned to the campus downcast, only to be greeted by university authorities with orders to stay away from Edgerton's mill. Undaunted, Horton went back, but again to no avail. This time, university authorities threatened him with expulsion.

After a year as student YMCA secretary for the state of Tennessee, Horton was introduced to Dr. Harry F. Ward's *Our Economic Morality* by Reverend Abram Nightingale of Cumberland County who subsequently urged him to study with Ward at Union Theological Seminary in New York. On being accepted, Horton went to New York, arriving just before the stock market crash, the creation of bread and soup lines throughout the city, and the eruption of much labor strife and violence in the South.

Academic life and Union profoundly affected Horton, too. Horton recalls that Abbott Kaplan, an urbane northerner, years later told a Highlander fund-raising gathering in New York City: "This little hillbilly fellow wandered up to New York to Union Theological Seminary to get the Word of the Lord. Instead, he

ran into Reinhold Niebuhr, who was speaking with almost as much authority as the Lord, and apparently had a greater social conscience."

Niebuhr was just beginning his distinguished career when Horton arrived. He was teaching and writing with biting clarity against any over-simplification of the social gospel. In his course, as later in his books, Niebuhr attacked the uncritical idealism of social gospel advocates and liberal theologians. In response, those he criticized considered Niebuhr a pessimist, noting that even his moral man proved not to be very moral. Such pessimism notwithstanding, Niebuhr's arguments curbed the notion of inevitable progress then rampant in theological circles.

Horton was first drawn to Niebuhr because of his vigorous defense of the working people whose efforts to organize in 1929 were being thwarted across the nation. Niebuhr encouraged Horton in what then seemed just a dream: the idea of a school in the mountains for mountain people. While Niebuhr thought that his student could best accomplish this aim by becoming a minister, he did not withdraw his support in face of Horton's obstinate refusal to accept his advice. In fact, he agreed to help in whatever ways he could if Horton actually got the project underway. As Horton wrote to him as late as 1966: ". . . It was your inspiration and encouragement which provided the reservoir of strength and commitment that still keeps me going."

Horton was also much influenced during this period by the works of John Dewey, Vernon Parrington, George C. Counts, Edward C. Lindeman, and Joseph K. Hart. Lindeman and Hart had both written specifically on adult education, and were among the first to argue that adult education be recognized as a potent agent for social change. Hart, in fact, despaired over the possibility of producing significant change through traditional children's educational programs. He argued that adults must first learn how to live the new social order before trying to teach it. Lindeman's writing, which compared experiences in several countries, prompted Horton to look beyond his own Southern origins. He was only familiar with institutions in Tennessee, but now he began to look around New York and other major cities for models for what he called the Ozone Project. Horton left Union for the year 1930-31 to study at the University of Chicago with sociologist Robert Park and to learn first-hand from the experiences of Jane Addams' Hull House.

His struggle to "get some background" was given still another major push by a Danish-born Lutheran living in Chicago, the Reverend Aage Moller, who encouraged Horton to visit the "Danish folk schools." Horton previously had read about these schools. When the idea first emerged, the Danes were being attacked by Germany. Many Danes were forsaking their customs and even language in

order to learn German, and German ways. This was especially true among the Danish upper classes. The first folk school started near the German border in 1844, and had as its major purpose the preservation of the Danish language. Four years later, another school started. It championed the cause of the people in their struggles against the landlords and nobility. A third, started in 1864 soon after Germany had taken southern Jutland, sought to spur the revival of Christianity among the peasants.

In the next thirteen years, some twenty-six folk schools were started; still others came later. The schools were free of government control. They were unencumbered with grades, ranking, examinations, and certifying students. Teaching was primarily limited to the "spoken word," lectures on mythology, Danish history, religion and language. Each folk school had an "emotionally charged" cause and unequivocally took sides on contemporary issues. Anyone eighteen or older could attend. Those who came supported the schools in whatever way possible—work at the school, food from their farms, money, if they had it. They stayed as long as they were able. Music and poetry were used by teachers to engage the students. The lectures were often repeated in the evening for older people who came into the lecture halls from the countryside.

By the end of the summer of 1931 Horton had earned enough money to make the passage. He went to Denmark, learned the language, and studied the trade union movement, the farmers' cooperatives, and the folk schools—many of which were disappointing because they had lost their initial vitality and sense of purpose. But by interviewing many of the older folk school directors he managed to discern four key characteristics that had initially produced the kind of school he had in mind.

First, many of the directors were unconventional educators. They were people on fire with awareness of injustice and the determination to correct it, to awaken the peasants to the misery restricting their lives. Second, the schools, each with its own purpose, sought to evoke among their students, as one director put it, "a picture of reality not as we have met it in our surroundings, but as we ourselves would have formed it if we could—a picture of reality as it *ought* to be." Toward that end, the schools made wide use of poetry and song: a revolutionary spark seemed inherent in these ways of communicating. Third, Horton found, the early schools sought to develop feelings and will more than memory and logic.

Joseph K. Hart best described the fourth characteristic which emerged from Horton's conversations with the older directors: "A folk school in America, as in Denmark, would probably center about a personality of some real teacher; a man

who is capable of learning, and who can teach, not so much by his teaching, as by his capacity to learn. America's great lack, at present, is the lack of men of this sort. We have plenty of men and women who can teach what they know; we have very few who can teach their own capacity to learn."¹

Horton now knew what he had to do: get behind the common judgments of the poor, help them to learn to act and speak for themselves, help them gain control over the decisions affecting their daily lives. He left Denmark and returned to New York City, where, with Niebuhr, he began laying plans to fulfill his dream. Niebuhr wrote the first fund-raising letter for the project, which was tentatively called the Southern Mountain School.

Horton's next tasks were to find a staff and a place. He turned to former Union Theological classmates John Thompson, a Tennessean, and James Dombrowski of Tampa, Florida. Both agreed to join Horton before the school's first year concluded, and to help him find other staff people in the meantime. Horton then headed south to the mountains of East Tennessee to find a place. Chance led him to meet Don West, a Georgia native, who also had been to Denmark and was interested in starting a folk school. West had a contract to teach a traditional school in Kentucky that year, but Horton's determination to start a folk school proved persuasive; West broke the contract. They visited Horton's early sponsor, Mr. Nightingale, who knew of a possible place. The house was on Monteagle Mountain, west and north of Chattanooga, and belonged to Dr. Lillian Johnson, the daughter of a wealthy Memphis banking and merchant family. Dr. Johnson, after studying the cooperative movement in Italy, had returned to the South, bought land in Grundy County, built the house, and started a school. Since 1930, however, she'd been talking of retirement and of giving her home to someone who would carry on her ideas of "community betterment."

When Horton and West arrived, Dr. Johnson was shocked as they laid out their plans for a school. Her approach to education and social service was structured and well-planned. The idea of an adult residential school without courses, without a planned curriculum, violated all Dr. Johnson's training and instincts, yet she relented before the insistence of the young men that education ought to be directly useful to the life of the community. She gave them a year's probationary lease, which was later extended indefinitely.

Horton and West moved into the house. They decided on a name which derived from the people, the place, and the school's purpose. In the 1930's, Highland was

¹ Joseph K. Hort, *Light From the North*. New York: H. Holt, 1927.

the popular name for Appalachia. A Highlander was an Appalachian, and, for Horton, folk was a term that had both a positive anthropological and a political meaning. The Highlander Folk School was created.

Grundy County: A Place in Need

The folk school was started in a place where the right to work and the right to live had been a constant struggle. Grundy County's problem could be traced, in part, to the Compromise of 1876 which resulted in the election of Rutherford B. Hayes as President of the United States. Until that year the South was essentially agrarian and characterized by a rigid caste system. While condoning exploitation of Blacks within the region, white Southerners generally were not exploited by industry. However, the Compromise of 1876, engineered by old Southern conservatives and determined Southern industrialists in league with Northern bankers, brought the railroads and industry into the region to take advantage of widespread unemployment and abundant cotton, coal, and timber.

Working people were routinely abused. On August 14, 1892, unemployed Grundy miners, organized by the secretive Knights of Labor, rebelled against the state's practice of leasing convicts to private coal companies. The rebellious miners marched on the huge prison stockade at Tracy City, captured it, and freed 390 convicts under contract to Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, the parent of today's giant U.S. Steel, and then burned the stockade to the ground. The convicts were put on a train and sent to Nashville, as much as a warning to the politicians as to get them out of Grundy. These hapless convicts had been used by mine operators throughout the Appalachian coal fields both as a cheap source of labor and a means to prevent or break strikes.

The next day war broke out between the armed miners and the state militia after 1,500 more convicts were set free at Inman, Oliver Springs, and Coal Creek, all mines owned by Tennessee Coal and Iron. Throughout the early months public opinion remained firmly on the miners' side. By 1893, however, the combined forces of the state and the coal companies had gradually retaken the mines, still using convict labor. But the revolt that started in Tracy City had sounded the death knell of convict leasing in Tennessee. In 1899, the legislature outlawed the practice. (Grundy men still speak with pride of the rebellion of 1892.)

The natural companion of injustice was long-term poverty. In 1938, nearly eighty per cent of Grundy's population of 2,250 families were on relief, placing it among the eleven poorest counties in the nation. Most men on the dole were miners and timber workers; on the average, their families survived on monthly

benefit checks of \$10.26 per person. Men with WPA jobs earned \$19.20 a month, less than a nickel a meal for each member of a family of six—provided every cent went for food.

The Wilder Strike: Learning to Learn

Circumstances at Wilder, a bleak valley town over 100 miles to the north of Grundy County, provided a catalyst for Highlander. Horton heard of a mining company that had locked out striking miners at Wilder. He went to see the situation for himself.

Wilder was a company town; coal was its profitable reason for being. The town's few unpainted shacks were company owned. Miners were paid in scrip, good only at the company store, which charged higher prices than independent stores in the region. The company made weekly deductions for rent on the shacks, for a bath house, which didn't exist, and for a doctor, who was infrequently available. No matter how hard or long the men worked in the mines, they couldn't break even, much less get ahead. As their debts piled up, and food at home dwindled, their indignation and desperation mounted. Finally, they struck, without the support of a larger union.

Almost immediately, the company shut off the electricity and took the doors off the houses; it was winter and bitter cold. Horton was told that the company blew up a rotting, unused trestle as a pretext by which they could call on the governor to send in National Guard troops to protect private property. Horton figured that it cost the state more to guard the mines for three months than the company had paid in taxes for twenty years.

The Red Cross, supposedly responding to the emergency created by hunger growing daily in the community, handed out food and flour to the strikebreakers, but not to the strikers who, with their families, were literally starving. The county chairman of the Red Cross was the wife of the mine superintendent.

Having learned as much as he could about conditions in Wilder, and having arranged for students and teachers from Highlander to join in support of the strikers, Horton commenced writing letters to newspapers across the state appealing for food and clothing for the strikers. John Thompson, who had recently joined Highlander, later wrote, "I will never forget the long line of gaunt, haggard, brave people who lined up to receive the scant rations we handed out to last them a week. Each family got a pound of dried beans, a half-pound of coffee, two tins of canned milk (if they had a baby), half a pound of sugar. Those rations saved many lives, but meanwhile many babies had died of starvation."

The strike was led by Barney Graham, a tough mountain man. Nothing the company did seemed to break the strikers' morale. Constant harassment and insults from the National Guard seemed only to deepen the men's resolve to win. The company let it be known that if Horton and Thompson didn't stop bringing food into Wilder, they wouldn't get out alive. There was an attempt to bomb Highlander, the first of many subsequent attempts, and the students and teachers stood armed guard night and day for two weeks.

Horton persuaded Norman Thomas to come to Wilder and speak at a mass meeting for the strikers. His words were stirring, but the *Wilder Blues* written by Ed Davis, one of the strikers, was the hit of the day.

The strike and the violence went on. Barney Graham was shot in the back as he went to fetch a doctor for his ailing wife; once he fell in front of the company store, his head was bashed in by his killers, who then stood guard over his body, refusing to let anyone take it away until the sun set. Other union men's homes were shot into; some were dynamited. One scab was shot and killed; another wounded; six union men were arrested and jailed five months without bail.

Horton was arrested in Wilder, and charged by a National Guard officer with "coming here and getting information and going back and teaching it." It was his first arrest. He was marched off at bayonet point to the officers' quarters, where he was held eight hours before being released.

When the company couldn't break the strike, they started evicting strikers from their rented homes. This action, coupled with the loss of Graham's defiant leadership, broke the strike.

The Wilder strike had a powerful impact on the Highlander staff. The miners' words, songs, and deeds had dramatically illustrated the intense class consciousness of Southern workers. The Highlander staff, most of whom were strongly committed to ideologies, had hoped to kindle the workers' latent revolutionary spirit, but quickly realized that to accomplish this goal, the workers themselves would have to state—one way or another—their own beliefs. Highlander had to learn not to convert, but to bring forth; education not only had to serve the people, but, more importantly, had to be of the people.

Workers' Education: The Highlander Program

Horton's Christmas greetings for 1932 give a good picture of the school in those first days:

Our four regular boarding students from neighboring states have become an accepted part of the local community, and each is in charge of some phase of community activity.

Four regular classes are held each week, with an average attendance of twenty to twenty-five. These classes are: psychology, cultural geography, revolutionary literature, and a course in the study of our present social and economic problems. In addition to those classes, there is a seminar on how social change is brought about. Much of our class discussion is based on information gained by investigation of actual labor situations in the Southern industrial area. Such first-hand information is obtained by both students and teachers. The people of our own surrounding communities are eagerly reading all the books we have and are asking for more. We are fortunate in having the support of our community, many of whom help cut wood and divide their meager food supply with us.

By 1936, Highlander had developed a three-phase educational program: six-week residence courses, extension work, and community activities. Workers who showed promise of becoming organizers or local leaders in the labor movement were selected as resident students, usually by vote of their locals. While the majority came from mills, mines, and farms, a few were college graduates interested in workers' education.

Workers' education in the 1930's usually meant schooling that taught workers reading skills, or some work skill. Highlander, like the Danish folk schools before it, did not disavow teaching basic knowledge, but students at Highlander were not taught to adjust to exploitation. Nor were they expected to become merely good union members. Highlander was teaching that the unions were organized to be controlled by and to serve the members, not the other way around.

The extension program operated in cooperation with the unions and the few farmers' organizations. Highlander students assisted strikers during organization drives. More systematic education work was done through study groups set up by the extension workers (students), often at the picket lines, where songs and group singing techniques were taught, both to spark determination and to build solidarity. Not only did the extension program recruit new students, it also permitted the school to keep in contact with both the labor movement and those former students who were moving up the organizational ranks. In the community activities program, old and young took part in dramatic classes, music lessons, and group dancing. The wide diversity of experiences and geographical backgrounds meant there was much information to be shared among the students participating in the residential programs.

Early Efforts at Desegregation

During the 1930's the staff at Highlander became much more aware of the plight

of Blacks in the south and of the shared interests of poor Blacks and poor whites. Too often Blacks had been used as exploited scab labor to prevent the development of better general working conditions.

Even before Highlander opened, Horton had hoped to bring Black and white students together. But, in 1932, the climate was hardly favorable from the point of view of either Blacks or whites. The Scottsboro case, its defendants mostly from nearby Chattanooga, still inflamed racist sentiment. This was aggravated by the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in *Powell v. Alabama* that denial of counsel in a capital case violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff, Powell, was a Black.

Thus, Horton was disappointed, but not surprised, when, in answer to his request for help in recruiting Black students, Dr. J. Herman Daves, then teaching at segregated Knoxville College, replied, "At this time we know of no student or graduate of our school who would be a good candidate or who would be desirous of enrolling with you." He added, however, "A number of us are extremely interested in your work."

Try as they might, the Highlander staff failed to attract Black students on any significant scale until 1944. But they persisted, as is evidenced by the fact that about a year after refusing to help find students, Dr. Daves himself, accompanied by his wife, came to teach a course at Highlander. Resident students, including some few from Grundy County, had been studying labor problems and wanted to talk about Blacks in the labor movement. The staff prepared the way by first talking with as many neighbors as possible, and by posting in their irregular community newsletter: "A few students, who have families to support and live in towns where Negroes are unorganized, wanted first-hand information as to how Negro workers could be organized. Following a discussion, several people from the community said that the students should get the Negroes' side."

Dr. Daves and his wife, in 1933, became the first Black people to stay overnight and eat at Highlander. In doing so they violated the State of Tennessee's Jim Crow school law prohibiting Blacks and whites eating together or staying overnight under the same roof. It was a law to be repeatedly flaunted at Highlander.

Throughout the 30's, Highlander worked to open the labor movement to all working people, regardless of race or sex, and, to this end, they were able to drive an occasional wedge in a closed society's door. The union education program comprised the major part of Highlander's educational effort at the time, and they continually stressed the practical daily damage of discrimination. If the bosses could pit whites against Blacks to keep wages low, then whites had to join Blacks

for both their sakes. Eventually these discussions were more and more led by Black labor leaders in the South or college professors.

In 1940, Highlander informed all the unions that it served in the South that the school would no longer hold workers' education programs for unions which discriminated against Blacks. This first paid off four years later when Paul Christopher, regional CIO director and a member of Highlander's board, organized a workshop for the United Auto Workers. It was attended by forty union members, Black and white, from every corner of the South. The workers attended classroom sessions on collective bargaining, the economics of the auto and aircraft industry, and the UAW's postwar plans; while there, they also organized a cooperative food store. After this, Highlander began urging other unions to join the pioneering UAW. Support was soon developed from the Tennessee Industrial Union Council and the Southern Farmers' Union. Others followed.

Highlander found that the common problems which brought union people to Highlander in the first place, plus the informal setting away from home, provided sufficient ground upon which newly-integrated groups could work out their own ways of interacting and relating. One crucially important way Highlander nourished the working out of new interpersonal relationships was through music, usually organized by Horton's wife, Zilphia Horton.

As in Ozone years earlier, Horton found that song and dance sparked people with determination and self-assurance in ways that no other communication could. Moreover, his wife was uniquely gifted in bringing people together through music, and in helping people to express themselves by writing their own music. Perhaps the most striking example is the song brought by two union members from South Carolina that she, with folk singers Pete Seeger and Frank Hamilton, modified. The song was "We Shall Overcome."

Highlanders' Frustration: Fear at the Top

Toward the end of World War II the unions, pledged to no-strike policies for the duration of the conflict, began plans to rapidly expand membership. Those decisions had a local and regional impact. The unions were once again on the move. Highlander reflected this: Horton temporarily took on the job of organizing and developing educational programs for small farmers in Tennessee for the National Farmer's Union; the Tennessee Citizens Political Action Committee was formed at the school in 1944 when sixty delegates, representing twenty-four national

unions, gathered; three labor conferences attracted over 280 Southern union delegates to Highlander that year; over 100 students, all sent by their locals, came for month-long resident sessions on labor problems.

These residential students helped run Highlander through a council of workers which was reconstituted each term. In this way, they gained practical knowledge of parliamentary procedures, public speaking, community relations, the making of posters and leaflets, and the writing of news releases and shop papers. In short, how to build a strong local.

Many of the goals shared by Highlander and the unions were attained: union membership increased throughout the South and across the nation; the procedures of the War Labor Board and the "maintenance of membership" clauses added stability to that membership; wages rose, sometimes jumped, and integration of the unions was on the rise. But where, asked Highlander staffers, was the political consciousness of the workers?

Highlanders' early hope that the union movement, especially the CIO, would become a powerful force for social and economic change had dimmed with experience. Any struggle on behalf of the working class had been submerged beneath a bureaucratic struggle for power. By 1949, an organization which had thrived on militancy was fearful of militancy, afraid the bottom might upset the top.

Highlander had joined the union movement when, as John L. Lewis wrote in an introduction to one of Zilphia's union songbooks, "it was a singing army." To many on Highlander's staff and board, though certainly not all, labor's anti-democratic impulse reached its zenith in 1949 when the CIO convened in Cleveland, Ohio, its main order of business to expel "... members of the Communist Party, any fascist organization or other totalitarian movement ... or any person or organization who consistently aided other organizations to accomplish their own purposes rather than the objectives and policies set forth in the constitution of the CIO. . . ." The convention expelled two unions, the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, and the Farm Equipment Workers, for "communism." Also, it withdrew from the allegedly communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions.

Believing that the bureaucrats who controlled the unions were using red-baiting simply to preserve the status quo, Horton predicted that ten years would pass before a single top CIO leader left office. He was wrong. It was eleven.

Highlander itself felt the weight of the approaching red purge weeks before the Cleveland convention. The school was notified in July that the union would not

hold its usual workers' term at Highlander that year because, "rightly or wrongly, some leaders were of the opinion that at Highlander there exists some left-wing 'communist' influence."

Despite CIO displeasure, Highlander continued its support of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, then one of the last militant unions in the South. The CIO sent out a directive telling locals to stop using Highlander, but Highlander's association with the unions did not end quite yet. There were few enforcement powers in the CIO's constitution, thus their threat of non-support was difficult to carry out. In fact, two years after the bitter exchange between the national union hierarchy and Highlander, Horton was asked by the United Packinghouse Workers, an affiliated union, to become their director of education.

Civil Rights: A New Highlander Priority

Horton's work with the UPW was Highlander's final fling with the union movement, however. Developments in the South were as much a reason for the change as disappointment at Highlander with the union movement. By 1950, Grundy County had joined much of the rest of the South in emerging from the worst of its economic ills. Not every Southern worker had a full stomach or a decent paying job, not all their children attended decent schools, but more did than didn't. Since there was little indication that the unions would go beyond these limited attainments, it was time for a shift in Highlander's priorities—away from the union movement and toward interracial progress.

In 1953, Dr. George Mitchell, who headed the Southern Regional Council in Atlanta and who was chairman of Highlander's board, told the school's annual policy-making meeting: "The next great problem is not the problem of conquering poverty, but conquering meanness, prejudice, and tradition." Highlander could become "a place in which this is studied, a place where one could learn the art and practice and methods of brotherhood." Dr. Mitchell specifically urged them to explore the problems which might occur should the U. S. Supreme Court, before whom the famous *Brown vs. Board of Education* was then pending, rule to end segregation in the public schools and/or enforce the separate but equal facilities decision. Consequently, Highlander sponsored two summer workshops for "men and women in positions to provide community leadership for an orderly transition from a segregated to an unsegregated public school system in the South."

To Make the Tongue Work

Two quite separate events in the early 1950's accidentally resulted in what Horton considers Highlander's single most important contribution to the civil rights movement and, broadly, to the field of liberal adult education.

First, in 1953, Highlander received a three-year grant from the Schwartzhaupt Foundation "to increase participation in local and national affairs, in stimulating interest in community problems, and in changing attitudes which limit democracy." In essence, the grant allowed freedom to experiment in adult education.

After two experimental efforts failed, other opportunities arose. In 1955, one of Highlander's students, Mrs. Septima Poinsette Clark, was "let go" by the Charleston School Board. Mrs. Clark had been actively encouraging Blacks to vote. Her second unpardonable transgression was accepting social invitations to the home of Judge and Mrs. Waring, patricians made pariahs by the judge's decision that South Carolina Blacks had a right to vote. After she was fired Mrs. Clark came to Highlander as director of education. It was in this capacity that she introduced the school to Esau Jenkins of Johns Island, South Carolina.

Set off from Charleston by the brackish Stono and Kaiwah rivers, the island was segregated by race in the 1950's, as it had been for some time. It was further divided by tongue—the whites spoke Charlestonese, a Southern dialect peculiar even to other native-born Southerners, while the Blacks spoke mostly Gullah, a dialect that bore traces of an African Gold Coast language spoken before the days of slavery. Mrs. Clark first went to Johns Island to teach in the 30's. The island's 3,000 Blacks fished and gardened when they could, but most of the time they worked hard in bountiful fields that weren't theirs. Sickness, illiteracy, disease, and superstition were common. Education was scarce, at least for Blacks. Mrs. Clark was eighteen when she was assigned to a two-room schoolhouse which was badly in need of repair, if not space. Over 130 students, ranging in age from six to sixteen, filled the schoolhouse wall to wall. For her duties, Mrs. Clark was paid \$35 a month. Her white counterpart taught three students in a well-furnished, well-kept schoolhouse and was paid \$85 a month.

On Mrs. Clark's second visit to Highlander in 1954, she brought along several people from the Charleston area, among them Esau Jenkins. For Jenkins, the immediate problem was literacy education. He told them that "so many people here (on Johns Island) can't read and write and I know this condition because I would have been almost in the same condition if I didn't go back to school."

He asked Horton if Highlander would set up night schools for adults "to help them become better citizens."

Over the years, Jenkins himself had tried to do the same, but one man wasn't a school. He operated a bus from Johns Island to Charleston carrying people to their jobs and decided to get a group in the bus in the mornings and teach them how to read the part of the state constitution they would have to read to become registered voters. In this way, in twos and threes, Jenkins had added a handful of Blacks to the voting rolls. But this just scratched the surface.

With the Schwarzhaupt Foundation's money, Horton spent six months visiting Johns Island, listening to the farmers, fishermen, maids, and field hands, in an effort to learn the ways of island life.

Gradually, he learned that the islanders were ill at ease in the state's adult literacy program for some very simple, but not so obvious reasons. For one thing, the adults didn't fit into the classroom chairs. They'd been designed for children. Not only were the adults who attended uncomfortable, but they were called "Daddy Long-legs," and there was just enough deprecation in the nickname to cause embarrassment, just enough embarrassment to cause a prideful man or woman to quit. In just the same way, they were being taught as children: step-by-step; a-b-c-d; "the ball is red"; "New York is a big city." They were being asked to delay reading sentences useful to them until they could read sentences of dubious value to children. It seemed very far from the Constitution. The few who had enrolled just stopped going to classes.

Horton concluded that if Highlander were to respond to the request to "start a night school for adults," then that school would have to be outside the traditional school room and would have to be in a setting, or settings, more familiar to adults. Moreover, the work of learning to read had to be adult work. At the end of three months and thirty-six classes in all, the first fourteen students took the voting test. Eight of them were registered. And before the first Citizenship School ended, its size had more than doubled from fourteen to thirty-seven, just the opposite of the "regular" reading school.

Jenkins later told Guy Carawan of Highlander what happened next:

And then the people on Wadmalaw and Edisto Islands found out later the reason for Johns Island was so successful in registering Negroes. They ask me if it's possible to help them to get an adult school. So the next year when I went to Highlander, when it comes time for immediate problem again, I brought in Wadmalaw and Edisto, and they again say they will help if I can find a place and the teachers. I found the place, and today Wadmalaw registered more Negroes than ever registered in the history of Wadmalaw.

The same thing is happening on Edisto and all over the county. In 1954, in the county, there were 'round five or six thousand Negroes registered. In 1964, almost fourteen thousand. So everybody is jubilant for the Highlander Folk School, who have helped them see the light.

In 1963, seven years after the first Citizenship School began, figures totaled by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, which by then was running the program, indicated that since they had taken the program over in 1960, nearly 26,000 Blacks in twelve Southern states had learned to read enough to register. SCLC also reported that volunteer teachers were at that time running over 400 Citizenship Schools across the South for over 6,500 adults. In all, Mrs. Clark estimates that nearly 100,000 learned to read and write as a result of the program.

Highlander's role on Johns Island, South Carolina, was that of a catalyst: providing the educational experience, what money was necessary, and recruiting and training teachers. Horton never entered a Citizenship School classroom as a teacher, and, as the idea spread, he discouraged other well-meaning whites from doing so, too. He felt the presence of any white stranger in the classroom altered, even stopped, the naturalness of learning. Citizenship Schools were run by Blacks from the start.

Success Invites Repression: Tennessee vs. Highlander Folk

The inevitable happened. Highlander drew fire from Southern white racists. On the celebration of its twenty-fifth anniversary, Labor Day weekend of 1957, about 180 Southerners gathered to renew their friendship, talk about the South, and share their thinking about how Highlander could strengthen its role. Among those that visited were Aubrey Williams and the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. Also amongst the crowd was Abner Berry, a writer from the *Daily Worker*, and Ed Friend, an undercover agent for Governor Griffin of Georgia. Berry's unwanted and apparently contrived appearance in many of Friend's photographs—including one of Horton, Aubrey Williams, Dr. King, and Rosa Parks—gave much grist to the anti-Highlander propaganda mill. Undercover agent Friend's report and this photograph, 250,000 copies in all, were subsequently sent throughout the South and the nation by Governor Griffin's Georgia Commission on Education, a tax-funded body he'd set up to root out any deviation from segregation. In an "editorial comment" accompanying the broadside, the governor stated, "It has been our purpose, as rapidly as possible, to identify the leaders and participants of this Communist training school and disseminate this information to the general pub-

lic. It behooves each of us to learn more of Communist infiltration and the direction of Communist movements. Only through information and knowledge can we combat this alien menace to Constitutional government."

By the first week in October, the slick broadside, which included the photo of Horton, Dr. King, Rosa Parks, Williams, and Berry had been distributed throughout the nation. Shortly, billboards using the photo started appearing across the South, claiming in huge lettering that "King attended a Communist Training Center." Postcards using it still circulate through the mails. Years later, when Horton rejoined the Council of Southern Mountains, a board member, disgusted about Horton's re-election, sent in his resignation on one of them.

Though Governor Griffin subsequently retired, Ed Friend and his undercover work came back to haunt Highlander. He was called to testify against Highlander several years later, and brought along a twelve-minute film he'd made at the twenty-fifth anniversary.

To a degree, Governor Griffin's calumny backfired. The anniversary proved to be Highlander's highwater mark for publicity. *Time* magazine noted the event. The *Christian Century* described Griffin's attack as work "shadowed through . . . distorting prisms . . . sad and sordid enough if it stayed south near whatever paranoid minds nurture such deceit." And on December 22, the *New York Times* carried a statement released by Highlander and signed by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, Monsignor John O'Grady, then head of the National Conference of Catholic Charities, and Lloyd K. Garrison, former dean of the University of Wisconsin Law School:

The attempt of the Georgia governor's commission to draw from the serious and fruitful deliberations of this gathering sustenance for the efforts of Southern racists to equate desegregation with communism evokes our strong condemnation. This kind of irresponsible demagoguery is obviously designed to intensify the difficulties confronting decent Southerners who might otherwise give leadership in the adjustment necessary for the desegregation which is inevitable. We deem it morally indefensible for any men or group to inflict upon such institutions as Highlander and upon such individuals as the respected leaders, both white and Negro, who attended the Labor Day Seminar, the damage to reputation and position which may result from the wide distribution of this slanderous material.

Highlander's hide proved tougher than the governor expected. And so the Commission on Education turned to other "problem" areas.

Highlander played a significant role in the civil rights protests of the next few years. However, to be consistent with its past and realistic about its present, Highlander had to work behind the Black movement. With perhaps as much gut in-

stinct as analytical insight, Horton realized Highlander could help lay the groundwork for the struggle, but they couldn't much take part in it. They were white and the struggle was Black. Even more important, the leadership was now Black. The people were leading themselves.

Highlander had to figure out ways to respond to those requests for help which moved the social forces in collective directions, while ignoring those which would foster continued individualism.

Specifically to aid the Black movement, Highlander turned the Citizenship School program over to SCLC. As educators, Highlander's staff felt that to continue administering an already established program would hamper their ability to experiment with new approaches. And they believed that a strong educational program linked to a forceful organization would help to build the organization's leadership potential.

There was still another major reason for giving the program over to SCLC in 1960. The year before Highlander had been seriously threatened with revocation of its charter by an investigation conducted by a committee established by the Tennessee state legislature. At the time of the decision, Highlander had been charged with being a place where people engaged in "immoral, lewd and unchaste practices," the scene of "loud, boisterous gatherings," engaging in the sale and consumption of "intoxicating liquor," breaking a 1901 state law forbidding Blacks and whites from going to school together, and, finally, that Horton "operated the school for personal gain." A trial was scheduled.

Shortly after turning the Citizenship Schools over to SCLC, Horton was free to fulfill the roles he thought proper: responding to requests for educational work only when Blacks requested it and fighting for Highlander's survival. Not long after, the State of Tennessee seized the school's property and revoked its charter. The idea and institution were reorganized and rechartered under the present name, Highlander Research and Education Center, Inc., and relocated in Knoxville.

The reorganized institution continued the policy of training community people to become leaders with a major emphasis on helping those interested in the voter registration movement, especially supporting the activities of SNCC in Mississippi. Literally dozens of workshops were run at the Center and in various parts of the South during the next few violent and crucial years of the civil rights drive.

A Glimpse of the Future

By 1964, Horton was trying to get Highlander out of the civil rights movement and back into Appalachia, and to encourage the civil rights movement to become

a means by which all suppressed people in America could challenge their oppressors. It was slow work.

Horton foresaw the day when Blacks would tell whites to get out of the movement, to let them run their own show. Yet Horton continued to push the civil rights movement's leadership to go beyond their own concerns and link up with all of the nation's oppressed. The last conversation he had with Dr. King in March, 1968, only days before King was slain, is recorded in a letter he wrote the Reverend Andrew Young upon returning to Knoxville:

I believe we caught a glimpse of the future at the March 14 meeting called by SCLC. We had there in Atlanta authentic spokesmen for poor Mexican-Americans, American Indians, blacks, and whites, the making of a bottom-up coalition . . .

Highlander continued its involvement by holding annually a five-day workshop where Mexican-Americans, Blacks, Puerto Ricans, American Indians, and whites from Appalachia could get together to talk about common problems. But since 1964, Highlander has been involved primarily in Appalachia, experimenting and evaluating ways to put education to use for perhaps another social movement.

Starting Where the People Are: The Development of Highlander's Educational Style

While Highlander has attempted to mesh the social and physical setting to make the school a way of life, it was no Utopia in the early years. The staff was young, constantly changing and usually in desperate want of money: thus the pressures and tensions were severe. Petty annoyances often became major sources of friction. Outspoken staff assertions of ideology, coupled with an inability to let the students speak their own minds, sometimes led to difficulties. On the whole, however, the staff tried to live in a way which would demonstrate for the students the sort of new social order they envisioned: one built on brotherhood, democracy, and co-operation. As Horton wrote Jim Dombrowski, before he arrived at Highlander in 1933:

If I understood our purpose correctly, we will all be working at the same job but will be using different approaches. Our task is to make class-conscious workers who envision their roles in society, and to furnish motivation as well as technicians for the achievement of this goal.

In other words, we must try to give the students an understanding of the world in which we live (a class-divided society) and an idea of the kind of world we would like to have. We

have found that a very effective way to help students to understand the present social order is to throw them into conflict situations where the real nature of our society is projected in all its ugliness. To be effective, such exposure must be preceded, accompanied by, and followed by efforts to help the observer appreciate and digest what he has seen. This keeps education from getting unrealistic. While this process is going on, students need to be given an inkling of the new society. Perhaps this can be done best by having a type of life that approaches as nearly as possible the desired state. This is where our communal living at the school comes into the picture as an important educational factor. The tie-in with the conflict situations and participation in community life keeps our school from being a detached colony or utopian venture. But our efforts to live out our ideals makes possible the development of a bit of proletarian culture as an essential part of our program of workers' education.

The Highlander staff had begun as rank romantics and idealists. Theirs was a vision of the new workers' world, one where production was for use and need, not profit; where government was of and for the people; where children were well-fed. But the dreams of the Highlander staff did not make room for the people themselves. The people living around Highlander and attending from various parts of the South didn't care about education; they didn't want to build a new society. They wanted food and jobs. To Highlander's young staff, food was just an excuse for communal participation and jobs seemed almost incidental to union-building and cooperative organization. They were at first disillusioned when they proposed a cooperative to grow potatoes, ordered seed potatoes for the planned-for garden, and found that the people ate the seed as soon as it arrived. Slowly, from this and a host of similar experiences—which each staff member had to assimilate himself or herself—they came to realize that if the school was going to teach poor people, the staff would have to start the learning process at that point in their lives where the students were confronted with an immediate problem; moreover, the problem had to be one which they, the individuals or community, not the school, perceived.

In this respect, as far as institutions can, Highlander had to open itself to learning. All the staff had to learn a new tempo of interpersonal relationships, much different than their own middle-class experience. For one thing, the people were reticent and quiet. Only as they understood the people and their way of life could the staff find enough security within themselves to move away from traditional academic methods. Once they stopped trying to teach the way they'd been taught, mutual learning could begin.

Having come to question their own traditions, there was a temptation for the Highlander staff to go all the way, to reject all tradition, even their individuality.

"To share their poverty, live in their cabins, assuming that to pick at bed ticks and lice while going hungry is to somehow 'be as one' with the poor is false logic," Horton argued. You could walk a mile in another man's shoes, but you couldn't wear them for life. Horton and others rejected this approach.

There were other "practical" matters to learn before Highlander's effectiveness was fully felt. At one point, soon after the Wilder strike, they were asked to organize an employment agency. At first blush, the notion had appeal. The idea came from the local community, and, if it worked, would be of use to them. However, the staff refused. They said that their goal was to help workers unite with other workers for common strength, not to help a few individuals rise above the rest. An employment agency, as such, would have added little to the community's collective strength, no matter how many individuals advanced because of it. By refusing, they taught something about mutual aid among people, and tried to attack the dilemmas of individualism.

This was one instance among many of the tension at Highlander between individualism and collective action. While the individualistic impulse could come from the students, it was just as likely to arise in the staff. Horton, despite his intellectual commitment to socialism and collective solutions, held to an abiding belief in individualism. Passages he copied as a student from John Stuart Mills' essay *On Liberty* remain in his files today.

He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decisions, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold his deliberate decision.

If a person possess any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, *his own mode of laying out his existence* is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is *his own mode*. (Italics are Horton's.)

Of course, part of the impact of this strain of Horton's thought was positive, for he insisted that students at Highlander establish *their own modes* of existence and share them with the collectivity. This insistence often found fruit first through collective approaches to education. "Peer teaching" was one such method. A worker coming into his own could also help his fellow workers. Horton learned this from Dolf Vaughn, a "blacklisted" miner, who related information to students which they would use, almost immediately, in spite of previous efforts by other staff members to share the same information. Vaughn was a bridge between staff and workers. Formally educated staff members, it turned out, were never as effec-

tive in teaching as the people themselves, once they saw themselves as teachers.

At times, when the workers were facing failure and feeling inadequate to make their own decisions, there were poignant displays of the conflict between professionals advising people directly and encouraging them to decide their own fates. The problem was put most clearly to Horton during an extended and bitter strike during 1937 at a cotton mill in North Lumberton, North Carolina. After the strike had begun, Horton moved to North Lumberton to support it.

In spite of the fact that Horton and the local leadership carefully set up committees charged with the responsibility for making decisions about welfare, recreation, or the strike itself, the people weren't experienced in the business of decision-making. Horton kept telling them their union would only be as strong as their decisions made it. He rarely took part in committee work. He would make suggestions, point out alternatives, or furnish additional information. He never pushed a committee to a decision. Nonetheless, his suggestions, alternatives, and information carried added weight, especially during the strike's early days.

He was making some progress on this problem during his last weeks in Lumberton. The strike committee was meeting at a moment when it appeared as if the company was going to win. The committee had been unable to reach a conclusion on what steps to take next. There was collective anger when Horton refused to offer a suggestion. "My answer might be better than yours," he said. "Or it might be worse. But it would just be one man's answer. If I make this decision, what will you do when I'm not here and you are faced with tough decisions?"

One man started crying. Another, in desperation, pulled a pistol on Horton.

"You son of a bitch," he yelled, "you are going to tell us what to do." Horton was too startled to respond instantly. Other committee members got the weapon from their fellow member and sat him down. Eventually, as tempers cooled, the committee reached a decision on their own, learning, in the process, that they could decide on issues, and had to. In the end the tactics that were developed were successful and the union members won the right to an election and a contract.

Conclusion: The Highlander Idea

Through Highlander's programs, many people have been encouraged to find beauty and pride in their own ways, to speak their own language without humiliation, and to learn of their own power to accomplish self-defined goals through social movements built from the bottom up.

People learn of unity by acting in unity. They learn of democracy by acting democratically. And each time they do these things as a result of experiences at

Highlander they both renew their capacity to act in these ways again and demonstrate the process of education in action. Talk about this process distorts, and is one step removed from the essential element—the people themselves doing. Writing words about the process is two steps removed. Education at Highlander is a synthesis of person, group, time, place, purpose, and problem. Words and sentences, spoken or written, tend to order this synthesis and give it logic by making it a sequence, when, in fact, it cannot be and is not sequential or logical. There are, of course, methods within this context, and it is these methods which Highlander has been refining with each new experience.

Baffled by education without assignment or examination, without the learned doing the talking and the unlearned the listening, some critics have described Highlander's residential workshops as anti-intellectual gatherings where the exchange of anecdote passes for education. They overlook the fact that Highlander is dedicated to helping develop the fulfillment of democracy, not to the preservation of academic discipline. They ignore that what is learned at Highlander is usually tested in real life, under the eye of unrelenting opponents, not in the classroom under the eye of a tutor.

Highlander changed its focus from workers' education and union organizing in the thirties to involvement in civil rights in the fifties and sixties and to community organizing in Appalachia in the seventies. In each stage of its history Highlander has had to combat what can only be termed repression—calumny, accusations, and arbitrary use of the legal system by local and state authorities. This has included harassment by local American Legionnaires in 1935, threats from the "Grundy County Crusaders" in 1940 and investigation by the House Un-American Activities Committee, and prosecution by the state of Tennessee in 1959 which led to the revocation of Highlander's charter and the confiscation of its property.

Highlander has survived, despite arson, arrests, and eviction. And it adjusted, in a changing political climate, to new sets of students and problems. It would be hard to lift out of the historical account of the Wilder strike and Highlander's early days, or out of its later history, a precise set of principles we could call the "Highlander idea." Yet we can make some reasonable judgments. At the least, Highlander can be described as an adult residential center in the South for the development of community leaders among school, church, civic, labor and farm groups, and for liberal education. And we can say with assurance that Highlander is committed to democracy, brotherhood, mutuality, and united social action. But it is deliberately vague about those governing concepts, letting the people it serves and the times they live in define precisely what they mean. These ideals change as people change and Highlander changes with them.

Community Colleges and Social Stratification *

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The expansion of the community colleges in recent years repeats an American pattern that couples class-based tracking with "educational inflation." Shaped by a changing economy and by the American ideology of equal opportunity, community colleges are moving toward vocational rather than transfer curricula and are channeling first generation college students into these programs. The author examines the social forces behind the community college movement and the social processes within the community colleges that have produced a submerged class conflict in higher education.

In recent years a remarkable transformation has occurred in American higher education, a change as far-ranging in its consequences as the earlier transformation of the American high school from an elite to a mass institution. At the forefront of this development has been the burgeoning two-year community college movement. Enrolling 153,970 students in 1948, two-year public colleges increased their enrollment by one million over the next twenty years to 1,169,635 in 1968 (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1970, p. 75). This growth in enrollment has been accompanied by an increase in the number of institutions; during the 1960's, the number of community colleges increased from 656 to 1,100. Nationally, one-third of all students who enter higher education today start in a community col-

* I would like to thank Christopher Jencks, David Riesman, Russell Thackrey, and Michael Useem for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The author takes full responsibility for the views expressed in this article.

lege. In California, the state with the most intricate network of community colleges, students who begin in a community college represent 80 per cent of all entering students (Medsker & Tillery, 1971, 16-17). In the future, the role of community colleges in the system of higher education promises to become even larger.

A complex set of forces underlies this extraordinary change in the structure of American higher education. One critical factor in the expansion and differentiation of the system of colleges and universities has been a change in the structure of the economy. Between 1950 and 1970, the proportion of technical and professional workers in the labor force rose from 7.1 per cent to 14.5 per cent (Bureau of the Census, 1971a, p. 225). Some of this increase took place among traditional professions, such as law and medicine, but much of it occurred among growth fields such as data processing and the health semi-professions which frequently require more than a high school education but less than a bachelor's degree. Community colleges have been important in providing the manpower for this growing middle-level stratum and, if current projections of occupational trends are correct, they are likely to become indispensable in filling labor force needs during the next few years. Openings for library technicians and dental hygienists, for example, jobs for which community colleges provide much of the training, will number 9,000 and 2,400 respectively per year for the next decade. Overall, the largest growth area until 1980 will be the technical and professional category with a projected increase of 50 per cent (Bushnell and Zagaris, 1972, p. 135). Without these major changes in the American economy, it is extremely unlikely that the community college movement would have attained its present dimensions.

Although a change in the nature of the labor force laid the groundwork for a system of two-year public colleges, the magnitude and shape of the community college movement owe much to American ideology about equal opportunity through education. Observers, both foreign and domestic, have long noted that Americans take pride in their country's openness—in its apparent capacity to let each person advance as far as his abilities can take him, regardless of social origins. This perceived freedom from caste and class is often contrasted to the aristocratic character of many European societies.¹ America, according to the ideology, is the land of opportunity, and the capstone of its open opportunity structure is its system of public education.

¹ Contrary to popular perceptions, American and European rates of social mobility, at least as measured by mobility from manual to non-manual occupations, are very similar. For data on this point see Lipset and Bendix (1959).

TABLE 1

Percentage of U. S. Younger Employed Males in Professional and Managerial Occupations, by Level of Educational Attainment, Latter 1960's

<i>Level of Educational Attainment</i>	<i>Percentage, Professional and Managerial</i>
High school graduation only	7
One or two terms of college	13
Three or four terms of college	28
Five to seven terms of college	32
Eight or more terms of college	82

Source: Unpublished tabulations of the October 1967, 1968, and 1969 Current Population Surveys of the Bureau of the Census, in which the occupations of younger persons, and the imputed earnings for the various occupations were related to levels of educational attainment. (Jaffe and Adams, 1972, p. 249)

Americans have not only believed in the possibility of upward mobility through education, but have also become convinced that, in a society which places considerable emphasis on credentials, the lack of the proper degrees may well be fatal to the realization of their aspirations. In recent years higher education has obtained a virtual monopoly on entrance to middle and upper level positions in the class structure. Table 1 shows that the probability of holding a high status job, in this case defined as a professional or managerial position, increases sharply with the possession of a bachelor's degree. This stress on diplomas has led to a clamor for access to higher education, regardless of social background or past achievements. The American educational system keeps the mobility "contest"² open for as long as possible and has been willing and able to accommodate the demands of the populace for universal access to college.

Response to the pressure for entrance led to greater hierarchical differentiation within higher education.³ Existing four-year colleges did not, for the most part, open up to the masses of students demanding higher education (indeed, selectivity at many of these institutions has increased in recent years); instead, separate two-year institutions stressing their open and democratic character were created for these new students. Herein lies the genius of the community college movement: it seemingly fulfills the traditional American quest for *equality of opportunity* without sacrificing the principle of *achievement*. On the one hand, the openness of

² See Ralph Turner's "Modes of Social Ascent through Education" (1966) for a discussion of how differing norms in the United States and England lead to patterns of "contest" and "sponsored" mobility.

the community college⁴ gives testimony to the American commitment to equality of opportunity through education; an empirical study by Medsker and Trent (1965) shows that, among students of high ability and low social status, the rate of college attendance varies from 22 per cent in a community with no colleges to 53 per cent in a community with a junior college. On the other hand, the community colleges leave the principle of achievement intact by enabling the state colleges and universities to deny access to those citizens who do not meet their qualifications. The latent ideology of the community college movement thus suggests that everyone should have an opportunity to attain elite status, but that once they have had a chance to prove themselves, an unequal distribution of rewards is acceptable. By their ideology, by their position in the implicit tracking system of higher education—indeed, by their very relationship to the larger class structure—the community colleges lend affirmation to the merit principle which, while facilitating individual upward mobility, diverts attention from underlying questions of distributive justice.

The community college movement is part of a larger historical process of educational expansion. In the early twentieth century, the key point of expansion was at the secondary level as the high school underwent a transition from an elite to a mass institution. Then, as now, access to education was markedly influenced by socioeconomic status.⁵

As the high school became a mass institution, it underwent an internal transformation (Trow, 1966). Formerly providing uniform training to a small group of relatively homogeneous students in order to enable them to fill new white-collar

⁴ For an empirical study of hierarchical differentiation within higher education, see "Social Class, Academic Ability and College Quality" by Jerome Karabel and Alexander W. Astin (American Council on Education, Washington, D. C., forthcoming).

⁵ The term "community college" is used in this study to refer to all *public two-year colleges*. Excluded from this definition are private two-year colleges and all four-year colleges and universities. In the text, the terms "junior college" and "two-year college" are used interchangeably with community college though they are not, strictly speaking, synonyms. The name community college has become the more frequently used because of the increasing emphasis of two-year public institutions on fulfilling local needs. Further, as the community college struggled to obtain a distinct identity and as greater stress was placed on two-year programs, the junior college label, which seemingly describes a lesser version of the four-year college geared almost exclusively to transfer, became increasingly inappropriate.

⁶ Two of the most comprehensive recent studies of the influence of social class and ability on access to higher education are Sewell and Shah (1967) and Folger *et al.* (1970). George Counts (1922:149), in a classical empirical study of the American high school of a half century ago, concluded that "in very large measure participation in the privilege of a secondary education is contingent on social and economic status." Similarly, Michael Katz (1968), in a study of public education reform in nineteenth century Massachusetts, found that the early high school was overwhelmingly a middle class institution.

jobs, the high school responded to the massive influx of students by developing a differentiated curriculum. The main thrust of this new curriculum was to provide terminal rather than college preparatory education.

Martin Trow places this "first transformation of American secondary education" between 1910 and 1940. During this period, the proportion of the 14 to 17 age group attending rose from about 15 per cent to over 70 per cent. Since World War II, a similar transformation has been taking place in American higher education: in 1945, 16.3 per cent of the 18 to 21 age group was enrolled in college; by 1968, the proportion had grown to 40.8 per cent (Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1970, p. 67). This growth has been accompanied by increasing differentiation in higher education, with the community colleges playing a pivotal role in this new division of labor. In short, educational expansion seems to lead to some form of tracking which, in turn, distributes people in a manner which is roughly commensurate with both their class origins and their occupational destination.

The process by which the educational system expands without narrowing relative differences between groups or changing the underlying opportunity structure may be referred to as "educational inflation" (cf. Milner, 1972). Like economic inflation, educational inflation means that what used to be quite valuable (e.g., a high school diploma) is worth less than it once was. As lower socioeconomic groups attain access to a specific level of education, educational escalation is pushed one step higher. When the high school was democratized, sorting continued to take place through the mechanism of tracking, with higher status children taking college preparatory programs and lower status children enrolling in terminal vocational courses; similarly as access to college was universalized, the allocative function continued to occur through the provision of separate schools, two-year community colleges, which would provide an education for most students that would not only be different from a bachelor's degree program, but also shorter. The net effect of educational inflation is thus to vitiate the social impact of extending educational opportunity to a higher level.

If the theory of educational inflation is correct, we would expect that the tremendous expansion of the educational system in the twentieth century has been accompanied by minimal changes in the system of social stratification. Indeed, various studies indicate that the rate of social mobility has remained fairly constant in the last half-century (Lipset and Bendix, 1959; Blau and Duncan, 1967) as has the distribution of wealth and income (Kolko, 1962; Miller, 1971; Jencks, 1972). Apparently, the extension of educational opportunity, however much it

may have contributed to other spheres such as economic productivity and the general cultural level of the society, has resulted in little or no change in the overall extent of social mobility and economic inequality.

To observe that educational expansion has not resulted in fundamental changes in the American class structure is in no way to deny that it *has* been critical in providing upward mobility for many individuals. Nor is the assertion that patterns of mobility and inequality have been fairly stable over time meant to reflect upon the intentions of those who were instrumental in changing the shape of the educational system; at work have been underlying social processes, particularly economic and ideological ones, which have helped give shape to the community college.

The thesis of this paper is that the community college, generally viewed as the leading edge of an open and egalitarian system of higher education, is in reality a prime contemporary expression of the dual historical patterns of class-based tracking and of educational inflation. The paper will examine data on the social composition of the community college student body, the flow of community college students through the system of higher education, and the distributive effects of public higher education. Throughout, the emphasis will be on social class and tracking. An analysis of existing evidence will show that the community college is itself the bottom track of the system of higher education both in class origins and occupational destinations of its students. Further, tracking takes place *within* the community college in the form of vocational education. The existence of submerging class conflicts, inherent in a class-based tracking system, will receive considerable attention, with special emphasis on the processes which contribute to these conflicts remaining latent. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the implications of its findings on class and the community college.

The Composition of the Community College Student Body

If community colleges occupy the bottom of a tracking system within higher education that is closely linked to the external class structure, the social composition of the two-year public college should be proportionately lower in status than that of more prestigious four-year institutions. Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, in *The Academic Revolution* (1968, p. 485), however, citing 1966 American Council on Education data, suggest that the "parents of students who enroll at community colleges are slightly *richer* than the parents of students at four-year institutions." This conclusion is derived from the small income superiority students at

two-year public colleges had over students at four-year public colleges in 1966; it ignores public universities and all private institutions. Several other studies, most of them more recent, show that community college students *do* come from lower class backgrounds, as measured by income, occupation, and education, than do their counterparts at four-year colleges and universities (Medsker and Trent, 1965; Schoenfeldt, 1968; American Council on Education, 1971; Medsker and Tillery, 1971; Bureau of the Census, 1972).

Table 2 presents data showing the distribution of fathers' occupations at various types of colleges. Community colleges are lowest in terms of social class; they have the fewest children of professionals and managers (16 per cent) and the most of blue-collar workers (55 per cent). Private universities, the most prestigious of the categories and the one linked most closely to graduate and professional schools, have the highest social composition: 49 per cent professional and managerial and only 20 per cent blue-collar. Interestingly, the proportion of middle-level occupations shows little variation among the various types of colleges.

Having demonstrated the lower-middle and working-class character of community colleges, it would seem to follow that college type is also related to family income. Table 3, based on nationally representative American Council on Education data for 1971, reveals systematic income differences among the student bodies at various types of colleges. Over one-quarter of all community college students are from relatively low income families (under \$8000) compared with about 11 per cent at private universities. Affluent students (over \$20,000) comprise 12 per cent of the student body at community colleges but over 40 per cent at private institutions. The four-year public colleges show income distributions between community colleges and private universities.

TABLE 2
Father's Occupational Classification by Type of College Entered (percentages)

Type of College	Father's Occupational Classification			Total
	Skilled, Semi-skilled Unskilled	Semi-professional, Small Business, Sales and Clerical	Professional and Managerial	
Public two-year	55	29	16	100
Public four-year	49	32	19	100
Private four-year	38	30	32	100
Public university	32	33	35	100
Private university	20	31	49	100

Source: Medsker and Trent (1965)

TABLE 3

Family Income by Type of College Entered (percentages)

Type of College	Family Income				Total
	Under \$8,000	\$8,000–12,499	\$12,500–20,000	Over \$20,000	
Public two-year	27.2	34.8	26.4	11.5	100
Public four-year	25.4	31.7	28.3	14.7	100
Public university	15.1	29.7	32.8	22.3	100
Private university	10.6	20.4	27.3	41.8	100

Source: American Council on Education (1971, p. 39)

Prestige differences among colleges also correspond to differences in fathers' educational attainment. In Table 4, American Council on Education data for 1966 show that the proportion of students whose fathers graduated from college ranges from 15 per cent at community colleges to 72.6 per cent at elite institutions (colleges with average Scholastic Aptitude Tests over 650). Over one third of public two-year college students have fathers who did not graduate from high school compared with less than 5 per cent at elite colleges.

The data on occupation, income, and education all run in the same direction and testify to an increase in social class position as one ascends the prestige hierarchy of colleges and universities. Community colleges, at the bottom of the tracking system in higher education, are also lowest in student body class composition. That college prestige is a rough indicator of factors leading to adult occupational attainment and of adult socioeconomic status itself is borne out by a number of

TABLE 4

Father's Education by Type of College Entered (percentages)

Type of College	Father's Education						Total
	Grammar School or Less	Some High School	High School Graduate	Some College	College Graduate	Post-graduate Degree	
Public two-year	12.7	21.3	31.7	19.1	11.5	3.8	100
Public four-year	12.1	19.4	34.7	17.9	11.1	4.8	100
Public university	8.0	13.9	29.0	20.3	19.0	9.8	100
Private university	4.6	9.6	21.9	18.9	24.4	20.5	100
Elite ^a	1.2	3.5	10.6	13.1	31.3	40.5	100

Source: American Council on Education (1967, p. 22)

^aElite colleges are defined as institutions having average freshman SAT's over 650. For more data on elite colleges see Karabel and Astin (forthcoming).

studies (Havemann and West, 1952; Reed and Miller, 1970; Wolffe, 1971; Pierson, 1969; Collins, 1971; Spaeth, 1968; Sharp, 1970; Folger *et al.*, 1970). Thus, the current tracking system in higher education may help transmit inequality inter-generationally. Lower class students disproportionately attend community colleges which, in turn, channel them into relatively low status jobs.

However related attendance at a community college may be to social origins, students are not explicitly sorted into the hierarchically differentiated system of higher education on the basis of social class. More important than class background in predicting where one goes to college is measured academic ability (Folger *et al.*, 1970, pp. 166-167; Karabel and Astin, forthcoming). Schoenfeldt (1968), using Project TALENT data, reports that junior college students are more like non-college students in terms of academic ability and more like four-year college students in terms of socioeconomic status. A review of research on the ability of junior college students by Cross (1968) concludes that they show substantially less measured academic ability than their four-year counterparts although there is a great diversity in academic ability among junior college students. In a sample of 1966 high school graduates in four states who entered community colleges, 19 per cent were in the highest quartile of academic ability (Medsker & Tillery, 1971, p. 38). As is common with aggregate data, generalizations obscure important variations among individuals. In California, where admission to the state colleges and university are limited to the top 33 1/3 and 12 1/2 per cent in ability respectively, approximately 26 and 6 per cent of students who choose a junior college would have been eligible for a state college or university (Coordinating Council, 1969, p. 79).

There is evidence that many high ability students who attend community colleges are of modest social origins. In California, for example, the proportion of eligible students who choose to attend the state colleges or university varies from 22.5 per cent among students from families with incomes of under \$4,000 to over 50 per cent in the \$20,000-25,000 category (Hansen and Weisbrod, 1969, p. 74). It is assumed that many of these low-income students attend a nearby two-year college. Table 5 estimates the probability of a male student entering a junior college (public and private). The likeliest entrant at a two-year college is the person of high academic ability and low social status followed by the high status student of less than average ability. These data, however, cannot be construed as providing the relative proportion of intelligent, poor students as opposed to mediocre, rich students in the community college; instead, they merely show the probability of attending a two-year college if someone falls into a particular category. Table 5 also illustrates that there is a diversity of both social class and academic ability in the

TABLE 5
Probability of a Male Entering a Two-Year College

Socioeconomic Quarter		Ability Quarter			
		Low 1	2	3	High 4
Low	1				
	2	.04	.07	.06	.16
	3	.03	.07	.10	.08
High	4	.07	.11	.10	.08
		.11	.12	.11	.05

Source: Schoenfeldt (1968, p. 357)

community college. Internal diversity notwithstanding, the community college does indeed stand at the bottom of the tracking system in higher education not only from the perspective of social class, but also from that of academic ability.

The Flow of Community College Students Through the Educational System

A substantial body of research links the presence of a community college to increased utilization of higher education (Medsker & Trent, 1965; Cross, 1968; Willingham, 1970). The Medsker-Trent study, for example, shows that the existence of a community college increases the percentage of people who enter the system of higher education, especially among low status youth of high ability. This extension of the opportunity to attend college to persons of modest social origins or past achievements is unique to this nation and ranks as one of the community college movement's greatest accomplishments. Widely hailed as the "democratization of higher education" (Cross, 1968, p. 21; Fields, 1962, p. 55), the expansion of educational opportunity provided by two-year public colleges seemingly marks a giant stride toward the realization of the American ideal of upward mobility through education.

Increased access, however, does not automatically lead to a genuine expansion of educational opportunity. The critical question is not who gains access to higher education, but rather what happens to people once they get there. The distinction parallels the distinction between equal access (which is what many people mean by equal opportunity) and equal outcomes or results. For community college students, this interest in both access and outcomes leads naturally into an examination of patterns of aspirations, attrition, and transfer to four-year colleges.

Patterns of Attendance

Despite the fact that community colleges offer no degrees or certificates higher than an associate of arts degree (A.A.), over 70 per cent of their students aspire to a bachelor's degree with more than 20 per cent aspiring to a degree beyond the B.A. Occupational aspirations are also high among these students with 64 per cent hoping to enter managerial and professional occupations (Cross, 1968, pp. 41-46). Students at two-year colleges, though generally of low to moderate economic and educational backgrounds, desire upward mobility in both education and career.⁶ Indeed, high aspirations among community college students, at least upon entrance, is one of the most consistent findings in research on the topic.

In view of the community college's position within the tracking system of higher education, one would expect that unrealized aspirations through attrition would be quite high. Bruce Eckland (1964), in a seminal study of the college dropout, proposed a "diversity hypothesis" which suggested a link between social class and college graduation. The hypothesis is that "the rate of dropout at a college or university varies inversely with the class composition of its student population." Community colleges, with the lowest class composition among American institutions of higher education, are expected to show the highest dropout rate. Indeed, attrition among community college students is commonplace. In California, where the junior college movement is most advanced, the ratio of sophomores to freshmen among full-time students at community colleges is .36 (Jaffe & Adams, 1972, p. 229). While some of these students may transfer to a four-year college and others may later return to higher education, it remains true that there are almost three freshmen for every sophomore in California community colleges. Nationally, 38.4 per cent of two-year college students had received an A.A. degree in four years with only an additional 2 per cent still enrolled.⁷ Among four-year college students, 46.7 per cent received a B.A. degree after four years with 11.8 per cent still

⁶ We need to be cautious in interpreting this data; the aspirations of community college students may not be as deeply embedded as their counterparts at four-year colleges. There is a tendency in social research to reify data derived from questionnaires, even though the same response to an item may obscure differences in the intensity of the reply (e.g., two students may both check yes when asked if they aspire to a B.A., but one may merely like the idea while the other is committed to it). Further, there is a distinction between *aspirations*, which are frequently high, and *expectations*, which are often more realistic.

⁷ Since these data include private two-year college students, they probably *underestimate* attrition at community colleges. Students at private junior colleges are somewhat higher than public two-year college students in both class background and academic ability (American Council on Education, 1971). A few of the studies reported in this paper aggregate public and private junior college data, but this poses little problem in that the inclusion of private institutions tends to provide a conservative estimate of differences between community colleges and four-year institutions. Fur-

enrolled. Noting that nearly 90 per cent of all junior college students expected to obtain at least an A.A. upon entrance to college, Astin (1972, p. 13) concludes that "it may certainly be said that unfilled expectations are the rule rather than the exception among two-year college students." For many community college students the "open door" turns out to be nothing more than a "revolving door."

With less than half of community college students receiving any kind of a degree at all, it is not surprising that few of them transfer to a four-year college and that even fewer obtain a bachelor's degree. The proportion of community college students who actually transfer to a four-year institution is difficult to determine, but estimates seem to range from 25 to 35 per cent. Clark (1960, p. 65) in a study of San José City College, found that one student in four transferred. Trent and Medsker (1968, p. 79), in a four-year follow-up of students who entered community colleges, found that 11 per cent had obtained a B.A., 22 per cent were still enrolled, and 67 per cent were no longer in college. Whatever the precise figures, we can surely say that no more than half of the over 70 per cent of community college students who aspire to a bachelor's degree upon entrance transfer to a four-year institution.

The number of community college entrants who obtain a B.A. is, of course, smaller than the number of transfers. Folger *et al.* (1970, p. 174) report that 22 per cent of junior college entrants obtain a B.A. within five years. Trent and Medsker (1968) find that slightly more than one junior college entrant in ten has a bachelor's degree four years after high school graduation. In comparison, 49 per cent of students who entered private colleges and universities have a B.A., with an additional 21 per cent still enrolled. Knoell and Medsker (1964), in the best study of students who do transfer from community colleges to four-year institutions, show that 62 per cent of these transfer students get a B.A. after three years and 9 per cent remain enrolled. For those community college entrants who succeed in transferring to a four-year college there is apparently a good chance that, despite a somewhat lower grade point average than native students, they will obtain a diploma.

Some indirect evidence suggests that the community college students who go on to a bachelor's degree are from higher socioeconomic backgrounds than students who never graduate. One indication of this is the finding that students enrolled in the transfer curriculum are from more affluent backgrounds than those in non-transfer programs (Cross, 1970, p. 191; Cohen, 1971, p. 72; Bushnell & Zagaris,

ther, since public colleges comprise well over 85 percent of total two-year college enrollment (HEW, 1970, p. 33), it is highly unlikely that the inclusion of private junior colleges seriously affects the results of these studies.

1972, p. 28). Unpublished ACE data from a 1969 follow-up of the entering class of 1966 show that the estimated probability of transferring from a junior college (public or private) to a four-year institution increases in linear fashion as father's educational attainment rises from less than high school (45 per cent transfer to a four-year college) to college graduate or higher (58 per cent). While the data relating social class at the community college to the attainment of a bachelor's degree are inadequate, they do suggest that the community college serves the middle class at least as well as it serves the working class. Christopher Jencks, in a personal communication, however, has suggested an alternative interpretation: "one of the primary functions of the two-year colleges is not to 'cool out' (see pp. 536-540) the upwardly mobile working class, but to cool out the downwardly mobile middle class who are not so smart." This is a central question for students of higher education and stratification. It is one that is susceptible to empirical investigation, but existing research simply cannot settle the matter.

One of the most interesting findings to emerge from the research on community college attrition is that the sheer fact of attending a community college, *controlling for other variables*, seems to increase the likelihood of dropping out. Astin's recent longitudinal study, which controlled a myriad of variables (including aspirations, SES, and ability) applied the regression formula developed to predict returning for a second year at four-year college to two-year colleges and found that the expected rate of persistence exceeded the actual rate at 14 of 23 institutions. When he applied the formula for two-year colleges at four-year institutions, the actual persistence rates exceeded the expected ones in 151 out of 189 cases. Persistence, as measured by returning for a second year, seems negatively affected by attending a community college.⁸

The finding that community colleges have a negative impact on persistence, taking differential student characteristics at entrance into account, fits in with the repeated finding of a general positive relationship between institutional selectivity and the probability of staying in school. In a four-year national longitudinal study, Astin and Panos (1969) found that college selectivity is positively related to student persistence even when student inputs, including ability and

⁸ The fact that community colleges are almost all commuter rather than residential institutions may contribute to their apparently negative impact on student persistence. Astin, in a personal communication, reports that much of the difference between two- and four-year colleges in attrition disappears when commuting is controlled. There may be a strain for the commuter student between the more academic world of college and the less intellectual world of family, neighborhood, and peers. One way to resolve this conflict is to move into a residential setting, but a more common resolution of the problem seems to be to drop out of college altogether.

SES, are controlled. Wegner and Sewell (1970), using Wisconsin data, have shown that type of college attended accounts for 3.1 per cent of the variance in graduation *beyond* the effects of academic ability, occupational aspiration, and SES. It is thus not surprising that community colleges, which are among the least selective institutions of higher education, have a negative impact on student persistence.

Since college selectivity negatively affects grades (Astin, 1971), the finding that attendance at a selective institution, even when controlling for student characteristics at entrance, increases the likelihood of remaining in college is somewhat surprising. Perhaps the greater the selectivity of the college the more likely the institution is to expect its students to graduate. Conversely, less selective colleges may exaggerate the differences between those who are "college material" and those who are not—flunking out students who might otherwise have skimmed by. The community colleges were designed, in part, to provide a limited number of transfer students to four-year colleges. Aware that its reputation as a transfer institution depends on the success of its students who attend four-year colleges and universities, the community college may "cool out" (see the next section) students who might have survived elsewhere. In short, low selectivity coupled with a built-in awareness of a sorting function may contribute to high rates of attrition.

The data presented in Table 6 show dramatically the negative impact of attending a community college, controlling separately for academic ability and socioeconomic status, on the probability of obtaining a bachelor's degree in five years. These data, though lacking a simultaneous control for SES and ability, provide evidence for massive differentials between junior and senior college entrants in rates of college completion within the same categories of class and intelligence. Among high aptitude men, for example, more than two-thirds of senior college entrants obtain a B.A. in five years compared with less than one-third among two-year college entrants. One could argue that these differentials will decrease over time as community college students have a chance to complete their degrees, but Eckland's (1964) study suggests that this may be dubious. Offering a "persistence hypothesis" which proposes that class differentials in rates of college completion increase over time, Eckland verifies this theory with empirical evidence. Since community colleges have a disproportionately large share of lower-class students, the persistence hypothesis suggests that the gap between two- and four-year college entrants in obtaining a four-year diploma may well increase over the years.

Another notable finding which emerges from studies of the progress of community college students through the educational system is the failure of massive systems of public two-year colleges to increase the number of people obtaining

TABLE 6

Proportion of Students Receiving Bachelor's Degrees Among Senior and Junior College Entrants with Similar Academic Aptitude, by Sex

<i>Academic Aptitude and SES by Type of College</i>	<i>Percent Graduating from College</i>	<i>Percent Graduating from College</i>
	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
<i>Academic aptitude</i>		
<i>High</i>		
Senior College	70	74
Junior College	31	40
<i>High-Medium</i>		
Senior College	55	60
Junior College	19	20
<i>Socioeconomic Status</i>		
<i>High</i>		
Senior College	67	70
Junior College	21	26
<i>High-Medium</i>		
Senior College	57	63
Junior College	23	21

Source: Folger, et. al. (1970, p. 176)

bachelor's degrees. This finding is contrary to what we might expect; community colleges were supposed to increase the number of four-year degrees by increasing the number of low SES and high ability students who received bachelor's degrees. Jaffe and Adams (1972, pp. 230-231), using Census Bureau data from the late 1960's, find that the Pacific division (California accounts for 75 per cent of the young population) shows the second lowest proportion of the *age cohort* completing four years of college among the nine census divisions. California, with the largest system of community colleges in the nation, apparently provides four or more years of college to an unusually small proportion of its population (Knoell and Medsker, 1964, p. 3; Coordinating Council, 1969, p. 28; Jencks and Riesman, 1968, p. 489). The Rocky Mountain region, which also has a highly developed system of two-year colleges (but without the cultural milieu of the Pacific Coast states which, one could argue, might lead to high attrition) is the *lowest* of the nine regions in the proportion of the age group receiving bachelor's degrees.

The implications of the failure of the community college movement to expand opportunity for the attainment of the B.A., the credential which is critical for admission into the professional and managerial upper-middle class, are far-ranging.

The Folger Commission, reflecting on their findings regarding socioeconomic status and educational progress, expresses concern:

Paradoxically, the community colleges appear to have increased college opportunity for low-status youth, and at the same time to have increased socio-economic differentials in college completion. They have been successful in getting low-income youth into college, but have not increased their chances of getting a degree nearly as much. (Folger *et al.*, 1970, p. 319)

The complexity of the relationships among social class, attrition, and the community college should not be allowed to obscure their importance for an understanding of the stratification function of two-year public colleges. Eckland's "diversity hypothesis," stated at the beginning of this section, led us to expect high attrition among community colleges from the relatively low status composition of their student body. Notwithstanding high aspirations, attrition was shown to be prevalent among community college students. The fact of attending a two-year college, even controlling for ability, social class, and other variables, has a negative impact on persistence. Hence, the high attrition rate at the community college is not merely an outgrowth of the low status social composition of its student body. Tracking in higher education leads to disproportionately high attendance of low status students at community colleges which, in turn, decreases the likelihood that they will stay in school. Further, once a student is in a community college, both Eckland's persistence hypothesis and fragmentary evidence from transfer programs suggest that the high status student is more likely to remain in school, to transfer, and to obtain a bachelor's degree. This process does not contribute to equal educational opportunity, though it may contribute something to explaining the failure of community colleges to increase the proportion of college graduates. Writing in 1964, Eckland warned that "social-class differences will increasingly determine who graduates among the college entrants of the next few decades, since it is apparently among the less qualified students that class origins have the greatest impact" (p. 50). If current trends continue, his analysis will have been prophetic.

Cooling Out: Process and Functions

The preceding section on patterns of attendance among community college students showed large discrepancies between aspirations and their realization. Unrealized educational aspirations, almost always linked to a desire for upward mobility, reach genuinely massive proportions among community college students. Clearly, the social process which enables those who entered the junior college with

high hopes never to be realized to adjust to their situation bears close investigation.

The key to this process is what Burton Clark (1960), in a classic case study of San José City College (a two-year institution), referred to as "cooling out." The community college, according to Clark, has three types of students; pure terminal (usually occupational), pure transfer, and latent terminal. The latent terminal student, the one who would like to transfer but who is not likely to meet the qualifications, poses a serious problem for the junior college. The crux of the dilemma is how to gently convince the latent terminal student that a transfer program is inappropriate for him without seeming to deny him the equal educational opportunity that Americans value so highly. Clark does not specify the class origins of these students, but since the modal community college student is of relatively low social status (Cross, 1971) and since SES is itself related to both academic ability and to the probability of dropping out of college, it seems fair to assume that many of them are working class or lower middle class. A great deal is thus at stake here: failure to give these students a "fair shake" would undermine American confidence in the democratic character of the educational system and, very possibly, of the larger society.

"Cooling out," the process described by Clark (pp. 71-76) of handling latent terminal students, begins even before the student arrives as a freshman. A battery of pre-entrance tests are given, and low scores lead to remedial classes which not only cast doubt on the student's promise, but which also slow his movement toward courses for credit. The second step is a meeting with a counselor to arrange the student's class schedule. In view of test scores, high school record, and the student's objectives, the counselor tries to assist the student in choosing a realistic program.⁹

The next step of the process Clark describes in his case study of San José is a specially devised course called "Psychology 5, Orientation to College." A one-unit mandatory course, it is designed to assist the student in selecting a program and places special emphasis on the problem of "unrealistic aspirations." Counselors

⁹In discussing the role of guidance in the junior college, it is interesting to observe the connection between the growth of the school counseling profession and educational tracking. As long as the curriculum at a particular level of schooling remains unified, there is relatively little need for guidance. However, when a number of curricula leading to occupations of varying prestige come into being, counseling becomes a virtual necessity. It is worth noting in this connection the long-standing enthusiasm of the business community for guidance programs. George S. Counts, in a study entitled *School and Society in Chicago* (1928), noted the fervor with which the Chicago Association of Commerce, the city's dominant business association, supported the establishment of a program of vocational guidance in the public schools in the early twentieth century.

report that the course provides an ideal opportunity "to talk tough" in an impersonal way to latent terminal students.

The cooling out process has, until this point, been gentle, and the latent-terminal student can refuse to heed the subtle and not-so-subtle hints he has been given. The fourth step of the process, however—dissemination of "need for improvement notices," given to students in courses where they are getting low grades—is impossible to ignore. If the student does not seek guidance, the counselor, with the authority of the disciplinary apparatus behind him, requests to see the student. All of this goes into the student's permanent record.

The fifth and possibly most decisive step of the process is the placing of a student on probation. This is to pressure him into a realistic program. "The real meaning of probation," says Clark, "lies in its killing off the hope of some of the latent terminal students" (p. 75).

The purpose of the drawn-out counseling procedure is not to bludgeon the student into dropping out, but rather to have the student himself decide to switch out of the transfer program. If the student can be persuaded to take himself out of the competition without being forced out of it (through being flunked out), he is much more likely to retain a benign view of the sorting process.

The opaqueness of the cooling out function is indispensable to its successful performance. In a revealing passage, Clark describes the nature of the problem:

A dilemma of this role, however, is that it needs to remain reasonably latent, not clearly perceived and understood by prospective clientele. Should the function become obvious, the ability of the junior college to perform it would be impaired. The realization that the junior college is a place where students reach undesired destinations would turn the pressure for college admission back on the "protected" colleges. The widespread identification of the junior college as principally a transfer station, aided by the ambiguity of the "community college" label, helps keep this role reasonably opaque to public scrutiny. (p. 165)

The implication of this passage, of course, is that the community college would be unable to perform its task of allowing high aspirations to gently subside if its social function were understood by those most directly affected by it. Clark considers "the student who filters out of education while in the junior college . . . to be very much what such a college is about" (p. 84), and refers to the "transforming of transfer students into terminal students" as the community college's "operational specialty" (p. 146).

One problem with Clark's analysis of the community college is that he perceives the "situation of structured failure" to emerge out of a conflict between the rigour-

ous academic standards of higher education and the non-selective open door. What Clark has failed to do here is to take his analysis a step further to analyze the social function of standards. Rothbart (1970) notes that "objective" academic standards also serve to exclude the poor and minorities from the university. The even-handed application of these standards to all groups gives each individual the feeling that he "had his chance." Academic standards, far from being the quintessential expression of an objective ivory tower concept, justify the university as a means of distributing privilege and of legitimating inequality. This is not to deny that academic standards have important intellectual substance, but it is to say that standards do have a class function. Indeed, what appears to Clark to be a conflict between professors committed to standards and students who do not "measure up" is, in a wider sense, a conflict between low-status students demanding upward mobility and a system unable to fully respond to their aspirations because it is too narrow at the top. Academic standards are located in the midst of this conflict and serve as a "covert mechanism" which, according to Rothbart, enables the university to "do the dirty work for the rest of the society" (p. 174). The cooling out process, the opaqueness of which Clark himself stresses, is thus the expression not only of an academic conflict, but also of a submerged class conflict.

Community colleges, which are located at the very point in the structure of educational and social stratification where cultural aspirations clash head on with the realities of the class system, developed cooling out as a means not only of allocating people to slots in the occupational structure, but also of legitimating the process by which people are sorted. One of its main features is that it causes people to blame themselves rather than the system for their "failure." This process was an organic rather than a conscious one; cooling out was not designed by anyone but rather grew out of the conflict between cultural aspirations and economic reality. Commitment to standards, sincerely held by many academics, may have played a small part in this process, but professorial devotion to academic rigor could disappear and the underlying cultural and structural conflict would remain. Cooling out, or something very much like it, was and is inevitable given this conflict.

The cooling out process not only allows the junior college to perform its sorting and legitimation functions; given the class composition of the community college and the data on attrition, it also enables the two-year college to contribute to the intergenerational transmission of privilege (Bowles, 1971a and 1971b). At the bottom of an increasingly formalized tracking system in higher education, community colleges channel working-class students away from four-year colleges and into middle-level technical occupations. Having gained access to higher education,

the low status student is often cooled out and made to internalize his structurally induced failure. The tremendous disjunction between aspirations and their realization, a potentially troublesome political problem, is thus mitigated and the ideology of equal opportunity is sustained. That community colleges have a *negative* impact on persistence, that they do *not* increase the number of bachelor's degrees, that they seem to provide the greatest opportunity for transfer (and hence mobility) to *middle* class students—these are all facts which are unknown to their clientele. The community college movement, seemingly a promising extension of equal educational opportunity, in reality marks the extension of a class-based tracking system into higher education and the continuation of a long historical process of educational escalation without real change.

Tracking Within the Community College—Vocational Education

The subordinate position of the community college within the tracking system of higher education has often been noted. What has been less frequently noted is that tracking also takes place *within* the community college. Two-year public colleges are almost always open door institutions, but admission to programs within them is often on a selective basis. What this generally means in practice is that students who are not "transfer material" are either tracked into vocational programs or cooled out altogether.

Class-based tracking, whether between schools, within schools, or both, is not new in American education. This pattern extends back into the early twentieth century, the period during which the American high school became a mass institution.¹⁰ If the theory of class-based hierarchical differentiation in education is applied to the question of tracking within the community college, it would lead us to expect a relatively low class composition among students in vocational programs.

Data presented in Table 7 show a pronounced class bias in the composition of community college students enrolled in vocational programs. Compared with

¹⁰ When George L. Counts examined class differences in secondary schools in the early twenties, he wrote:

These differences in the extent of educational opportunity are further accentuated through the choice of curricula. As a rule, those groups which are poorly represented in the high school patronize the more narrow and practical curricula, the curricula which stand as terminal points in the educational system and which prepare for wage-earning. And the poorer their representation in high school, the greater is the probability that they will enter these curricula. The one- and two-year vocational courses, wherever offered, draw their registration particularly, from the ranks of labor (Counts, 1922, p. 143). See also Trow, 1966; Cohen and Lazerson, 1972; Greer, 1972.

TABLE 7

Selected Characteristics of Students Enrolled in Three Curriculums in 63 Comprehensive Community Colleges (percentages)

<i>Characteristics</i>	<i>College Parallel</i>	<i>Technical</i>	<i>Vocational</i>
<i>Father's occupation</i>			
Unskilled or semiskilled	18	26	35
White collar	46	35	25
<i>Parental income</i>			
Less than \$6,000	14	14	24
More than \$10,000	36	28	21
<i>Father's formal education</i>			
Less than high school graduation	27	34	50
Some college or more	31	20	14
<i>Race</i>			
Caucasian	91	79	70
Negro	5	7	14
Oriental	1	7	7
Other	1	4	6

Source: Comparative Guidance and Placement Program, 1969. (Cross, 1970, p. 191)

students in transfer programs, vocational students are markedly lower in family income, father's education, and father's occupation. While almost half of community college students in the transfer curriculum are from white-collar families, only one-fourth of the students in vocational programs are from such backgrounds. Students enrolled in technical programs fall in between vocational and transfer students along various measures of socioeconomic status. Black students show themselves to be considerably more likely than white students to enroll in community college vocational programs.¹¹

The relatively low social origins of vocational and technical students are likely to be reflected in their adult occupations. Community college occupational programs are broadly designed to prepare people for entrance into the growing technical and semi-professional stratum. Estimates as to the size of this expanding class suggest that it may comprise one-third of the labor force by 1975 (Harris, 1971, p. 254). This stratum occupies the lower-middle levels of the system of social strat-

¹¹ Minority students are also disproportionately enrolled in two of the lower rungs of the higher education tracking system—community colleges and unselective black colleges. Patterns of enrollment, of course, vary from region to region with community colleges dominant in the West and black institutions more prominent in the South. For data showing that the proportion of minority students decreases as one progresses up the three-track California system see Coordinating Council (1969: 23) and Jaffe and Adams (1972: 232).

TABLE 8

Yearly Income of U. S. Younger Employed Males, by Level of Educational Attainment, Late 1960s (Base: High school graduation income = 100)

<i>Level of Educational Attainment</i>	<i>Income</i>	<i>Percentage of All College Dropouts</i>
High school graduation	100	—
One or two terms of college	110	40
Three or four terms of college	119	37
Five to seven terms of college	121	23
Eight or more terms of college	150	—

Source: Unpublished tabulations of the October 1967, 1968, and 1969 Current Population Surveys of the Bureau of the Census, in which the occupations of younger persons, and the imputed earnings for the various occupations were related to levels of educational attainment. (Jaffe and Adams, 1972, p. 249)

ification, but it creates a sensation of upward mobility among its members because it is representative of the change from a blue-collar (or secondary) to a white-collar (or tertiary) economy. Since many members of this "new working class" originate from blue-collar backgrounds, their movement into this stratum does in fact represent mobility. Yet it may be conjectured that this perception of mobility is only temporary; as more and more people move into these jobs, the prestige of a white-collar position may undergo a corresponding decline in status.¹²

Evidence on the economic returns of these vocational programs is, at best, indirect, and empirical studies on this topic would be extremely useful. Yet it is apparent that, in general, having two years of college is not half as good as having four years (Bowles, 1971b, Jaffe & Adams, 1972). Table 8, based on recent Census Bureau data, indicates that the recipient of five to seven terms of college is closer in income to a high school graduate than to a college graduate. Possibly, there is some sort of "sheepskin effect" associated with the attainment of a bachelor's degree. But whatever the reasons, having part of a college education seems to be

¹² At the same time, however, it is easy to forget that *absolute* changes in occupation, income, and educational attainment can have important consequences in everyday life and may raise general levels of satisfaction. Having more people attend college, while not narrowing the gap in relative terms, may lead to a more enlightened populace. Keniston and Gerzon (1972) attack the narrowly economic view of higher education and argue that important non-pecuniary benefits accrue from college attendance. Similarly, a change from a blue-collar to a white-collar economy may eliminate many menial tasks and hence lead to greater job satisfaction. Finally, an absolute increase in the standard of living, while not necessarily abolishing poverty (which, as Jencks argues, is primarily a relative phenomenon), may result in a higher quality of life than was possible under conditions of greater scarcity.

of limited economic value. Whether this is also true for community college students in programs specially designed to prepare them for an occupation remains to be seen.¹³

The Sponsors of the Vocational Movement

Unlike the movement for open admissions to college, which received much of its impetus from mass pressure, there has been little popular clamor for community college vocational programs. Indeed, most junior college entrants see the two-year college as a way-station to a four-year college and shun occupational programs (see the next section). Despite this, there has been an enormous push to increase enrollment in community college occupational programs. This push from the top for more career education marks one of the major developments in the evolution of the community college movement.

The interest of the business community in encouraging occupational training at public expense is manifest. With a changing labor force which requires ever-increasing amounts of skill to perform its tasks and with manpower shortages in certain critical areas, private industry is anxious to use the community college as a training ground for its employees. An associate of the Space Division of the North American Rockwell Corporation makes the corporate viewpoint clear: "industry . . . must recognize that junior colleges are indispensable to the fulfillment of its needs for technical manpower" (Ryan, 1971, p. 71). In the Los Angeles area, Space Division personnel and junior college faculty work together to set up curricular requirements, frame course content, determine student competence, and formulate "on-the-job performance objectives."

The influence of the business community on the junior college is exerted in part through membership of local industrial notables on community college boards

¹³ Grubb and Lazerson (1972) report that economic returns to vocational education are almost uniformly low, but their review does not include studies of programs at community colleges. Some skepticism as to the allegedly high incomes of graduates of occupational programs for blue-collar jobs may, however, be expressed. Contrary to popular mythology about the affluent worker, the proportion of male blue-collar workers earning more than \$15,000 in 1970 was a miniscule 4 per cent (Bureau of the Census, 1971: 30). Only 3 out of 10 blue-collar workers earned more than \$10,000 in 1970.

We do not know what economic rewards accrue to graduates of community college vocational programs, nor do we know much about the occupational and economic status of the community college drop-out. This is fertile ground for empirical inquiry. A longitudinal study of three groups of high school graduates—students who do not enter college, community college drop-outs, and community college entrants who obtain a degree (A.A. or B.A.)—matching students with similar personal characteristics, would do much to illuminate the effects of attending a community college.

of trustees. Hartnett (1969, p. 28) reports that 33 per cent of public junior college trustees are business executives and that over half of all community college trustees agree that "running a college is basically like running a business." Overt business interference in the affairs of the community college is, however, probably rare; the ideological influence of the business community, with its emphasis on pragmatism and economic efficiency, is so pervasive in the two-year college that conflicts between the industrial and educational communities would not normally arise. One imagines that Arthur M. Cohen (1971b, p. 6), Director of the ERIC Clearinghouse for Junior Colleges, is hardly exaggerating when he says that when "corporate managers . . . announce a need for skilled workers, . . . college administrators trip over each other in their haste to organize a new technical curriculum."

Foundations have also shown an intense interest in junior college vocational programs, an interest which is somewhat more difficult to explain than that of business and industry. The Kellogg Foundation, which over a period of years, has made grants to the community college movement totaling several million dollars (Gleazer, 1968, p. 38), has a long-standing interest in career training. In 1959, the general director of the Kellogg Foundation noted approvingly that the "community college movement can do much to supply the sub-professionals, the technicians so necessary to the professions and industry in the years ahead" (Powell, 1965, p. 17). Kellogg followed up on this interest in career education with grants to Chicago City Junior College in 1963 and 1964 for associate degree programs in nursing and business which came to \$312,440 and \$112,493 respectively (Sunko, 1965, p. 42). In addition, in the late 1950's, Kellogg made a several hundred thousand dollar commitment to support the American Association of Junior Colleges, the national organization of the two-year college movement which has itself been a long-time advocate of vocational programs (Brick, 1964).

The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, financially sponsored by, but independent of, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, has also been active in sponsoring career education. In its widely read pamphlet, *The Open-Door colleges*, the Carnegie Commission (1970), made explicit policy proposals for community colleges. Members of the Commission came out strongly for occupational programs, and stated that they "should be given the fullest support and status within community colleges" and should be "flexibly geared to the changing requirements of society" (1970, p. 1). Later in the report (pp. 15-16) the Commission recommended that community colleges remain two-year institutions lest they "place less emphasis on occupational programs." Community colleges, the Com-

mission said, "should follow an open-enrollment policy, whereas access to four-year institutions should generally be more selective." The net impact of these recommendations is to leave the tracking system of higher education intact. Considering the class composition of the community college, to maintain the status quo in higher education tracking is, in essence, to perpetuate privilege (see Wolfe, 1971).

The influence of foundations in fostering vocational education in community colleges is difficult to measure precisely, but it is clear that they have been among its leading sponsors.¹⁴ State master plans (see Hurlburt, 1969; Cross, 1970) have also done much to formalize the subordinate status of the community college within higher education and to encourage the growth of their vocational curricula. The federal government, too, has promoted vocational training in the two-year institutions. Federal involvement dates back at least to 1963. At that time, Congress authorized the spending of several hundred million dollars to encourage post-secondary technical education. More recently, the Higher Education Act of 1972 (pp. 77-78) authorized \$850,000,000 over the next three years for post-secondary occupational education. In comparison, the entire sum authorized for the establishment of new community colleges and the expansion of old ones is less than one-third as much—\$275,000,000.

The language of the Higher Education Act of 1972 makes clear just what is meant by vocational education:

The term 'postsecondary occupational education' means education, training, or retraining . . . conducted by an institution . . . which is designed to prepare individuals for gainful employment as semi-skilled or skilled workers or technicians or sub-professionals in recognized occupations (including new and emerging occupations) . . . but excluding any program to prepare individuals for employment in occupations . . . to be generally considered professional or which require a baccalaureate or advanced degree. (p. 87)

The import of this definition of occupational education is to exclude four-year programs leading to a B.A. from funding. The intent of this legislation, which provides enormous sums of money for community college career education, is obvious: it is designed to fill current manpower shortage in the middle and lower-middle levels of the occupational structure.

The idea of career education which the U.S. Office of Education is "working to

¹⁴ Karier (1972) has written a provocative essay on the role of foundations in sponsoring educational testing. The role of far-sighted foundations in fostering educational reform, possibly as a means of rationalizing the social order, is a topic worthy of careful investigation.

spread throughout elementary, secondary and at least community college circles" (Marland, 1972, p. 217) is that the student, regardless of when he leaves the educational system, should have sufficient skills to enable him to be gainfully employed. The idea is a worthy one, but it implicitly accepts the existing system of social stratification. The philosophy of career education is that the proper function of the educational system is to respond to current manpower needs and to allocate people to positions characterized by large disparities in rewards. Commissioner of Education, Sidney Marland, observes that no more than 20 per cent of all jobs in the 1970's will require a bachelor's degree; apparently, this is supposed to provide a rough index as to how many people should attend college for four years. Further, it is worth noting that career education does not seem to extend above the community college level. An idea whose "time has come," it somehow does not seem applicable to the sons and daughters of the middle and upper classes who attend four-year colleges and universities.

Federal sponsorship of vocational programs in the community college may have contributed to the development of a rigid track system (Cohen, 1971a, p. 152). By prohibiting the allocation of funds to non-vocational programs, federal laws have deepened the division between transfer and occupational programs. This division fosters separate facilities, separate brochures, and separate administrations. The result is a magnification of the differences between transfer and vocational programs leading to a decline in the desirability of occupational training.

Also at the forefront of the movement to expand vocational programs in community colleges have been various national higher education organizations. The American Association of Junior Colleges (AAJC), almost since its founding in 1920, has exerted its influence to encourage the growth of vocational education. Faced with the initial problem of establishing an identity for two-year colleges, the AAJC set out to describe the unique functions of the junior college. Prominent among these was the provision of two-year occupational training at the post-secondary level. In 1940 and 1941 the AAJC sponsored a Commission on Junior College Terminal Education. According to Ralph Fields (1962), a long-time observer of the junior college, this commission was instrumental in lending legitimacy to vocational training in the community college.

In recent years, the AAJC has continued its active encouragement of occupational programs in the community college. Numerous pamphlets, training programs, and conferences on vocational training in the two-year college have been sponsored by AAJC. In that the AAJC, the leading national association of junior colleges, has probably done more than any other single organization to give defini-

tion to the community college movement, its enthusiasm for vocational training takes on particular importance.

The American Council on Education, the umbrella organization for the various associations of higher education, is considered by many to be the leading spokesman for American higher education. It, too, has given major support to post-secondary technical education. In 1963, the Council sponsored a study of the place of technical and vocational training in higher education. One of the conclusions of the report was that "two-year colleges, if they are to assume their proper and effective role in the educational system of the nation, should make vocational and technical education programs a major part of their mission and a fundamental institutional objective" (Venn, 1964, p. 165). Edmund Gleazer, Jr. (1968, p. 139), Executive Director of AAJC, points to this report as critical in gaining acceptance for vocational training within the higher education community.

Finally, many American universities have looked with favor on the development of the community college into a "comprehensive" institution with occupational programs in addition to its more traditional transfer programs. From the origins of the junior college in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as an institution designed to extend secondary education for two years in order to keep the university pure, there has been a recognition among many university academics that it is in their interest to have a diversity of institutions in higher education (Thornton, 1960, pp. 46-50). A number of observers have noted that the community colleges serve as a safety valve, diverting students clamoring for access to college away from more selective institutions (Clark, 1960; Jencks and Riesman, 1968; Cohen, 1971b). Elite colleges neither want nor need these students; if separate institutions, or, for that matter, vocational programs within these institutions help keep the masses out of their colleges, then they are to be given full support.¹⁵ Paradoxically, the elite sector of the academic community, much of it liberal to radical, finds itself in a peculiar alliance with industry, foundations, government, and established higher education associations to vocationalize the community college.¹⁶

¹⁵ Amitai Etzioni (1970), chairman of the Department of Sociology at Columbia University, expresses this point of view well: "If we can no longer keep the floodgates closed at the admissions office, it at least seems wise to channel the general flow away from four-year colleges and toward two-year extensions of high school in the junior and community colleges." Vice President Agnew (1970), in a speech attacking open admissions, approvingly cited this quotation.

¹⁶ See Riessman's "The Vocationalization of Higher Education: Duping the Poor" for an analysis of the movement to turn the community college into a technical institution. For a brilliant article on the elitism of leftist academics toward working-class students see McDermott (1969).

The Response to Vocational Education: Submerged Class Conflict

Despite the massive effort by leading national educational policy-makers to encourage the development of occupational education in the community college, student response to vocational programs has been limited. Estimates vary as to how many community college students are enrolled in career education programs, but the figures seem to range from 25 to 33 per cent (Cross, 1970; Ogilvie, 1971; Medsker and Tillery, 1971). Over two-thirds of two-year college entrants aspire to a bachelor's degree, and a similar proportion enroll, at least initially, in college-parallel or transfer programs. Many of these students, of course, are subsequently cooled out, but few of them seem to prefer a vocational program to leaving the community college altogether.

Leaders of the occupational education movement have constantly bemoaned the lack of student enthusiasm for vocational education (Venn, 1964; Gleazer, 1968; Carnegie, 1970; Medsker and Tillery, 1971; Cross, 1971). The problem, they believe, is the low status of career training in a society that worships the bachelor's degree. Medsker and Tillery (p. 140), for example, argue that "negative attitudes toward vocational education . . . are by-products of the academic syndrome in American higher education." Marland (1972, p. 218) refers to the difficulty as "degree fixation." The problem, then, since it is one of an irrational preoccupation with obtaining a traditional four-year education, leads to an obvious solution: raising the status of vocational education. This proposed solution has been suggested by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, the Office of Education, the American Association of Junior Colleges, the American Council on Education, leaders of industry, and scholars in the field of community colleges.

Despite the apparent logic and simplicity of raising the status of vocational education, the task presents enormous difficulties. Minority students, though more likely to be enrolled in occupational programs than white students, seem especially sensitive to being channeled into vocational tracks. Overall, students are voting with their feet against community college vocational programs.

This is not an irrational obsession with four-year diplomas on the part of the students. It is not just snobbish prejudice; there are sound structural reasons for the low status of career education in the community college. At the base of an educational institution's prestige is its relationship to the occupational and class structure of the society in which it operates (Clark, 1962, pp. 80-83). The community college lies at the base of the stratification structure of higher education both in the class origins of its students and in their occupational destinations. Within the

community college, the vocational curriculum is at the bottom of the prestige hierarchy—again, both in terms of social composition and likely adult status.

It is unrealistic, then, to expect that community college vocational programs, the bottom track of higher education's bottom track, will have much status. It is worth noting that the British, generally more hardheaded about matters of social class than Americans, faced the matter of educational status directly some years ago. In the 1950's in Great Britain, there was a great deal of talk about "parity of esteem" in English secondary education. The problem was to give equal status to grammar schools (college preparatory), technical schools (middle level managerial and technical), and secondary modern schools (terminal). After considerable debate, the British realized that "parity of esteem" was an impossible ideal given the encompassing class structure (Banks, 1955; Marshall, 1965).

The educational establishment's concern with the low status of occupational programs in the community colleges reveals much more about its own ideology than it does about the allegedly irrational behavior of students resistant to vocational education. A great deal of emphasis is placed on improving the public image of vocational education, but little attention is paid to the substantive matter of class differences in income, occupational prestige, power, and opportunities for autonomy and expression at the workplace. The Carnegie Commission, whose ideology is probably representative of the higher education establishment, blurs the distinction between *equality* and *equality of opportunity* (Karabel, 1972a, p. 42). Discussing its vision of the day when minority persons will be proportionately represented in higher occupational levels, the Commission hails this as an "important signal that society was meeting its commitment to equality." The conception of equality conveyed in this passage is really one of equality of opportunity; the Commission seems less interested in reducing gross differences in rewards than in giving everyone a chance to get ahead of everyone else. The Carnegie Commission, reflecting the values not only of the national educational leadership but also of the wider society, shows concern about opportunities for mobility, but little concern about a reduction in inequality.

The submerged class conflict that exists between the sponsors of vocational education in the junior college, who represent the interests and outlook of the more privileged sectors of society, and community college students, many of them working class, occasionally becomes overt. At Seattle Community College in 1968-1969, the Black Student Union vigorously opposed a recommendation to concentrate trade and technical programs in the central (Black) campus while the "higher"

semiprofessional programs were allocated to the northern and southern (white) campuses (Cohen, 1971a: 142). Rutgers (Newark) was the scene in 1969 of extensive demonstrations to gain open admissions to a branch of the state university. The import of the case of Rutgers (Newark) was that the protests took place in a city where students already had access to an open-door community college (Essex) and a mildly selective state college (Newark State). What the students were resisting here was not being tracked within the community college, but rather being channeled into the community college itself.¹⁷ The well-known struggle for open admissions at CUNY in the spring of 1969 was not primarily for access per se, but for access to the more prestigious four-year institutions: City, Brooklyn, Queens, and Hunter.

The pattern in these isolated cases of manifest resistance to tracking within or between colleges is one of minority student leadership. In the United States, where race is a much more visible social cleavage than class, it is not surprising that Black students have shown the most sensitivity to tracking in higher education. Channeling of Black students to community colleges and to vocational programs within them is, after all, fairly visible; in contrast, the *class* character of the tracking system is much less perceptible. Were it not for the militancy of some minority students, it is likely that the conflict over vocational education would have long continued to manifest itself in enrollment patterns without becoming overt.

The class nature of the conflict over tracking has, however, not always been invisible. In Illinois in 1913, there was a battle over a bill in the state legislature to establish a separate system of vocational schools above the sixth grade. Business strongly backed the bill, sponsored by Chicago School Superintendent Edwin G. Cooley. The Chicago Federation of Labor, lobbying against the bill, expressed fear that it reflected

an effort on the part of large employers to turn the public schools into an agency for supplying them with an adequate supply of docile, well-trained, and capable workers [which] . . . aimed to bring Illinois a caste system of education which would shunt the children of the laboring classes at an early age first into vocational courses and then into the factories (Counts, 1928, p. 167).

After a bitter fight, the bill was defeated in the legislature.

The tracking which takes place in the community college is, however, much more invisible than that proposed in the Cooley Bill. For one thing, the commu-

¹⁷ I am indebted to Russell Thackrey for pointing out the implications of the interesting case of Rutgers (Newark).

nity college, by the very use of the word "college" in its title, locates itself squarely within the system of higher education and gives it at least the minimal status which comes from being a college rather than a technical school. For another, the apparent emphasis of the junior college on the transfer function leads to a perception of it as a way station on the road to a four-year college. This view of the community college as a place of transfer rather than a track is strengthened by the subtlety and smoothness of the cooling out process. The community college is a "comprehensive" institution; like the high school before it, it provides preparatory and terminal education in the same building and offers sufficient opportunities for movement between programs to obscure the larger pattern of tracking. Finally, the very age at which students enter the community college makes tracking a less serious issue; there is a difference between channeling an eleven-year-old child and channeling a young adult of eighteen.

Whatever the differences between high school and college tracking, there is a marked similarity in the rationales given in each case for curricular differentiation. The argument is that a common curriculum denies equality of opportunity by restricting educational achievement to a single mode which will inevitably lead to some form of hierarchy. In 1908, the Boston school superintendent argued:

Until very recently [the schools] have offered equal opportunity to receive *one kind* of education, but what will make them democratic is to provide opportunity for all to receive such an education as will fit them *equally well* for their particular life work. (Cohen and Lazerson, 1972: 69)

Similarly, K. Patricia Cross (1971: 162), a leading researcher on the junior college, argues more than 60 years later:

Surely quality education consists not in offering the same thing to all people in a token gesture toward equality but in maximizing the match between the talents of the individual and the teaching resources of the institution. Educational quality is not uni-dimensional. Colleges can be *different* and excellent too.

In principle, colleges can be different and excellent, too. But in a stratified society, what this diversity of educational experiences is likely to mean is that people will, at best, have an equal opportunity to obtain an education that will fit them into their appropriate position in the class structure. More often than not, those of lower class origins will, under the new definition of equality of educational opportunity, find themselves in schools or curricula which train them for positions roughly commensurate with their social origins.

The current movement to vocationalize the community college is a logical outgrowth of the dual historical patterns of class-based hierarchical differentiation in education and of educational inflation. The system of higher education, forced to respond to pressure for access arising from mobility aspirations endemic in an affluent society which stresses individual success and the democratic character of its opportunity structure, has let people in and has then proceeded to track them into community colleges and, more particularly, into occupational programs within these two-year colleges. This push toward vocational training in the community college has been sponsored by a national educational planning elite whose social composition, outlook, and policy proposals are reflective of the interests of the more privileged strata of our society. Notably absent among those pressuring for more occupational training in the junior college have been the students themselves.

The Distributive Effects of Public Higher Education

One of the benefits supposed to result from the democratization of access to higher education accompanying the growth of community colleges is a more just distribution of resources in the public sector of higher education. Before the advent of open-door junior colleges, the argument goes, access to a college education was closely related to family income. However, now that everyone has a chance to go to college, class differences in attendance patterns should diminish, and we might expect differences in subsidies received from the public system of higher education to be minimized.

Hansen and Weisbrod (1969), in a study of the California system of public higher education, find that the three-track system of state university, state college, and community college results in poor people's paying for the education of the affluent. Position within the California tracking system is related to the amount of money spent on one's education; the cost of the first two years of education in the tripartite system is \$2970, \$2700, and \$1440 at the university, state college, and community college levels respectively. Thus the higher ranking the institution, the more public money spent on the student.

Eligibility to attend the high-cost state university or the middle-cost state college system shows a generally linear relationship with family income. Table 9 shows that students from families with incomes of over \$25,000 are about four times as likely to be eligible for the university and twice as likely to be eligible for the state colleges as are students from families with incomes under \$4000. Further, the prob-

TABLE 9

Distribution of High School Graduates by Eligibility for Public Higher Education in California, by Type of Education and Family Income, 1966

Family Income	Percentage Distribution of High School Graduates by Eligibility for	
	University of California	University of California and State Colleges
\$ 0-3,999	10.7	28.0
4,000-5,999	11.5	26.3
6,000-7,999	11.9	30.5
8,000-9,999	16.2	33.2
10,000-12,499	19.4	37.1
12,500-14,999	22.5	39.8
15,000-17,499	27.9	45.4
17,500-19,999	29.5	45.1
20,000-24,999	33.3	46.1
25,000 and Over	40.1	54.3
Not Reported	13.3	28.0
All	19.6	36.3

Source: Hansen and Weisbrod (1969, p. 72)

ability that a student will take advantage of his eligibility to enter the upper two tracks is also substantially related to his family income (Hansen & Weisbrod, 1969: 74). Family income is thus related to which track a student attends and, indeed, to whether a student attends college at all. Among California high school graduates, 41 per cent of all high school graduates do not enter the system of public higher education.

Students in the higher tracks are more likely to persist in college and hence to get larger subsidies. Figures for the total higher education subsidy given to students in the three tracks are \$4870, \$3810, and \$1050 from top to bottom. Since taxes in California are approximately proportional to income and since the probability of attending an expensive school is positively related to income, the net effect of the California system is to redistribute income from poor to rich.¹⁸ Table 10 shows the net distributive effects of possibly the most celebrated state system of American

¹⁸ A minor reversal of this pattern takes place in occupational programs within the community college. Morsch (1971: 33) presents data showing that occupational programs in two-year colleges cost \$756 annually compared with \$557 for transfer programs. Since low status students are disproportionately enrolled in vocational programs, there may be some minor redistribution of resources from rich to poor occurring.

TABLE 10

Average Family Incomes, Average Higher Education Subsidies Received, and Average State and Local Taxes Paid by Families, by Type of Institution Children Attend, California, 1964

	All Families	Families Without Children in California Public Higher Education	Families With Children in California Public Higher Education			
			Total	Junior College	State College	University of California
1. Average Family Income	\$8,000	\$7,900	\$9,560	\$8,800	\$10,000	\$12,000
2. Average Higher Education Subsidy Per Year	—	0	880	720	1,400	1,700
3. Average Total State and Local Taxes Paid	620	650	740	680	770	910
4. Net Transfer (Line 2—Line 3)	—	-650	+140	+40	+630	+790

Source: Hansen and Weisbrod (1969, p. 76)

public higher education. The real losers in this system are the families (average income \$7900) without children in the Californian system of public higher education who receive a negative subsidy of \$650. Junior college families, with average incomes of \$8800 do slightly better than break even while families with children at the university, with incomes of \$12,000, get an annual subsidy of \$790.¹⁹

Again, the pattern revealed by examining the distributive effects of public higher education is part of a recurring historical process.²⁰ Katz (1968: 53), analyzing the

¹⁹ For a critique of Hansen and Weisbrod which uses family income rather than college type as the independent variable see Pechman (1970). Using Hansen and Weisbrod's own figures, Pechman argues that the California system of public higher education does *not* result in a redistribution of resources from poor to rich. Windham (1970), however, applies Pechman's method of using family income rather than college type as the unit of analysis in a study of the Florida system and finds the state of Florida does indeed redistribute resources in a regressive fashion. Whatever the net gains and losses by income class which occur when state tax systems are taken into account, it seems clear that the affluent *do* receive more benefits from state-supported systems of higher education than do the poor. Insofar as California and Florida have unusually large systems of free-access community colleges, the effects may be even more pronounced in states with more limited access to higher education.

²⁰ The case of public higher education, in which the middle class gains the greatest benefits, may be typical of the distributive effects of many social services in the modern Welfare State. See Titmuss (1964), Marshall (1965), and Blackburn (1969) for evidence showing that the prime beneficiaries of the British Welfare State are members of the middle class.

founding of the American high school in mid-nineteenth century Massachusetts, observes how the middle class was "spreading throughout the whole community the burden of educating a small minority of its children." The study by George S. Counts in the early twenties (1922: 152) strikingly illustrates the historical parallel:

At the present time the public high school is attended quite largely by the children of the more well-to-do classes. This affords us the spectacle of a privilege being extended at public expense to those very classes that already occupy the privileged positions in modern society. The poor are contributing to provide secondary education for the children of the rich, but are either too poor or too ignorant to avail themselves of the opportunities which they help to provide.

Thus the stratified system of public higher education, like the class based system of secondary education before it, results in a redistribution of resources from poor to rich.

Discussion

The recent Newman Report on Higher Education (1971: 57) noted that "the public, and especially the four-year colleges and universities, are shifting more and more responsibility onto the community colleges for undertaking the toughest tasks of higher education." One of the most difficult of these tasks has been to educate hundreds of thousands of students, many of them of modest social origins, in whom more selective colleges and universities showed no interest. Community colleges have given these students access to higher education and have provided some of them a chance to advance their class position.

Despite the idealism and vigor of the community college movement, there has been a sharp contradiction between official rhetoric and social reality. Hailed as the "democratizers of higher education," community colleges are, in reality, a vital component of the class-based tracking system. The modal junior college student, though aspiring to a four-year diploma upon entrance, receives neither an associate nor a bachelor's degree. The likelihood of his persisting in higher education is *negatively* influenced by attending a community college. Since a disproportionate number of two-year college students are of working-class origins, low status students are most likely to attend those institutions which increase the likelihood that they will drop out of college. Having increased access to higher education, community colleges are notably unsuccessful in retaining their students and in reducing class differentials in educational opportunity.

If current trends continue, the tracking system of higher education may well become more rigid. The community college, as the bottom track, is likely to absorb the vast majority of students who are the first generation in their families to enter higher education. Since most of these students are from relatively low status backgrounds, an increase in the already significant correlation between social class and position in the tracking system of higher education is likely to occur. As more and more people enter postsecondary education, the community college will probably become more distinct from the rest of higher education both in class composition and in curriculum. With the push of the policy-planning elite for more career education, vocational training may well become more pervasive, and the community college will become even more a terminal rather than a transfer institution. These trends, often referred to as expressions of higher education's "diversity" and of the community college's "special and unique role" are the very processes which place the community college at the bottom of the class-based tracking system. The system of higher education's much-touted "diversity" is, for the most part, hierarchy rather than genuine variety (see Karabel, 1972a and 1972b), a form of hierarchy which has more to do with social class than educational philosophy.

The high rate of attrition at community colleges may well be functional for the existing social system. The cooling out function of the junior college, as Clark puts it, is what "such a college is about." Community colleges exist in part to reconcile students' culturally induced hopes for mobility with their eventual destinations, transforming structurally induced failure into individual failure. This serves to legitimize the myth of an equal opportunity structure; it shifts attention to questions of individual mobility rather than distributive justice. Cooling out, then, can be seen as conflict between working class students and standards that legitimize the position of the privileged—a veiled class conflict. Similarly, there is class conflict implicit in the differences over vocational education between the aspirations of students and the objectives of policy-makers. This has occasionally become overt, but the community colleges seem to serve their legitimizing function best when the conflict remains submerged.

Can the inability of the community college movement to modify the American class structure be overcome? An assessment of some specific reforms that have been proposed may yield some insight. One obvious reform would be to reverse the pattern that Hansen and Weisbrod (1969) document—simply to invest more money in the community colleges than in the four-year public institutions. The idea of this reform would be both to provide the highest quality education to those who

have socioeconomic and cognitive disadvantages to overcome and to put an end to the pattern of poor people subsidizing relatively affluent people through public systems of higher education. This proposal, which may be justified on grounds of equity, is unlikely to make much difference either in terms of education or social class. A repeated finding in social science research, confirmed by both the Coleman Report (1966) and the recent Jencks (1972) study, is that educational expenditures seem to be virtually unrelated to cognitive development at the elementary and secondary levels, and there is no reason to believe that money is any more effective in colleges. However desirable a shift in resources from four-year colleges to community colleges might be on other grounds, it is unlikely to seriously affect the larger pattern of class-based tracking in higher education.

Another possibility would be to transform the community college into a four-year institution—the very proposal that the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education strongly opposes. The purpose of this reform would be to upgrade the status of the community college and to diminish the rigidity of the tracking system. Yet it is highly questionable whether making the junior college into a senior college would have any such effect; there are marked status distinctions among four-year colleges and, in all likelihood, the new four-year institutions would be at the bottom of the prestige hierarchy. Further, the creation of more four-year colleges would probably accelerate the process of educational inflation.

The proposal to vocationalize the community college exemplifies the dilemma faced by those who would reform the public two-year college. Noting that many community college students neither transfer nor get an associate degree, proponents of vocational education argue that the students should stop engaging in a uni-dimensional academic competition which they cannot win and should instead obtain a marketable skill before leaving the educational system. If one accepts the existing system of social stratification, there is an almost irresistible logic to the vocational training argument; there are, after all, manpower shortages to be filled and it is true that not everyone can be a member of the elite.

In a sense, the community colleges are “damned if they do and damned if they don’t.” The vocational educational reform provides a striking example of their dilemma, for the question of whether community colleges should become predominantly vocational institutions may well be the most critical policy issue facing the two-year institutions in the years ahead. If they move toward more career education, they will tend to accentuate class-based tracking. If they continue as “comprehensive institutions” they will continue to be plagued by the enormous attrition

in their transfer curricula. Either way, the primary role of the colleges derives from their relation to the class structure and feasible reforms will, at best, result in minor changes in their channeling function.

That the community colleges cannot do what many of their proponents claim they are supposed to do does not mean that they can do nothing at all. They do make a difference for many students—providing them opportunities for better lives than their parents had. They are able to introduce some students, particularly those who are residential rather than commuter students, to ideas, influences, and ways of life that broaden their view of the world. And surely it is not beyond reason to think that better staff, counseling, and facilities could somewhat reduce the rate of attrition in the transfer curricula. It is not beyond hope to think that reform of the vocational tracks could encourage students not to fit like cogs into rigid occupational roles but to have some faith in themselves, their right to decent working conditions, and to some control over their own work so that they could shape the roles they are supposed to fit into. It may be that students and teachers intent on changing society could raise the consciousness of community college students about where they fit in the social system and why they fit where they do. All this is possible, important, and underway in many community colleges.

But as for educational reform making this a more egalitarian society, we cannot be sanguine. Jencks (1972) has shown that the effects of schooling on ultimate income and occupation are relatively small. Even if the community colleges were to undergo a major transformation, little change in the system of social stratification would be likely to take place. If we are genuinely concerned about creating a more egalitarian society, it will be necessary to change our economic institutions. The problems of inequality and inequality of opportunity are, in short, best dealt with not through educational reform but rather by the wider changes in economic and political life that would help build a socialist society.

Writing in favor of secondary education for everybody many years ago, R. H. Tawney, the British social historian, remarked that the "intrusion into educational organization of the vulgarities of the class system is an irrelevance as mischievous in effect as it is odious in conception." That matters of social class have intruded into the community college is beyond dispute; whether the influence of class can be diminished not only in the community college but also in the larger society remains to be seen.

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Book Reviews

THE NATIONAL EDUCATION FINANCE PROJECT, GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA.

Roe L. Johns, Director;

Kern Alexander, Associate Director.

The following NEFP publications are distributed free.

Vol. 1, Dimensions of Educational Need, Roe L. Johns, Kern Alexander, and Richard Rossmiller, eds. 1969. 242 pp.

Vol. 2, Economic Factors Affecting the Finance of Education, Roe L. Johns, Irving J. Goffman, Kern Alexander, and Dewey H. Stollar, eds. 1970. 372 pp.

Vol. 3, Planning to Finance Education, Roe L. Johns, Kern Alexander, and K. Forbis Jordan, eds. 1971. 463 pp.

Vol. 4, Status and Impact of Educational Finance Programs, Roe L. Johns, Kern Alexander, and Dewey H. Stollar, eds. 1971. 336 pp.

Vol. 5, Alternative Programs for Financing Education, Roe L. Johns and Kern Alexander. 1971. 363 pp.

Summary Volume, Future Directions for School Financing: A Response to Demands for Fiscal Equity in American Education. 1971. 61 pp.

Data Volume, Personal Income by School Districts in the United States. 1971. 447 pp.

FINANCING EDUCATION:

FISCAL AND LEGAL ALTERNATIVES.

edited by Roe L. Johns,

Kern Alexander, and Forbis Jordan.

Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill 1972. 508 pp. \$8.95.

The National Educational Finance Project (NEFP) was initiated in mid-1968 as the first comprehensive national study of public school finance since 1933. Unlike the 1933 study, which was cut short by a stingy Congress,¹ the NEFP was a four-year project fully funded in the amount of \$2,000,000. Its goals were as large as its funding: they were to

- (1) identify the dimensions of educational need in the nation;
- (2) identify target populations with special educational needs;
- (3) measure cost differentials among different educational programs;
- (4) relate the variations in educational needs and costs to the ability of school districts, states, and the federal government to support education;
- (5) analyze economic factors affecting the financing of education;
- (6) evaluate present state and federal programs for

¹ Paul Mort and staff, *State Support for Public Education* (Washington, D. C.: American Council for Education, 1933).

the financing of education; and (7) construct alternative school finance models, both state and federal, and analyze the consequence of each. (Vol. 5, p. vii)

The results were to be a body of data and methodology to evaluate and improve existing methods of financing public education.

The ideals motivating the NEFP were admirable enough, if rather pallid and uncontroversial. It was reaffirmed that finance mechanisms should further equality of educational opportunity, that expenditures should be more equal and tax burdens more equally distributed, and that educational accountability and efficiency in school organization should be sought. All other things being equal, these would seem to be acceptable goals to the majority of Americans; they reflect the ideology, if not the practice, which has dominated education and educational finance throughout this century. The real wonder is that these goals, sixty-six years after Ellwood Cubberly² first enunciated them, have remained so elusive.

But elusive they still seem to be. Although the seven goals cited above were all fulfilled to some extent, the voluminous material published by the NEFP largely repeats what others have already found, or provides the framework for future analysis without providing the analysis itself. The strengths of the NEFP are in its listing and categorizing of problems, and its cataloguing of alternatives with their advantages, disadvantages, and arguments pro and con. But while the NEFP may be useful for gathering such material in one place—it

will certainly prove valuable as an historical document reflecting present concerns and priorities—it has failed to generate much new information about the mechanisms of school finance or any new proposals which might eliminate present inequities and inefficiencies. At the end of this review I will attempt to outline some reasons for the weaknesses of school finance research in general and the NEFP in particular. But because the NEFP reflects some standard practices and presents new methods of dubious value, it is important to understand its weaknesses.

The work of the NEFP can be conveniently divided into four parts. The most extensive section is intended to identify "target populations" to be served by special programs, to indicate the nature of educational programs appropriate to needs of these target populations, and to measure cost differentials between these special programs and a "regular" education. Eleven satellite projects investigating the various levels of education from pre-school to junior college are summarized in Volume 3.³ Volume 1, which is largely superfluous given Volume 3, contains discussions of "dimensions of need" underlying various aspects of education, along with an introduction to the NEFP and a chapter which reviews the literature on modifying the conventional school year. All of the analyses are based on samples of schools or school districts, either randomly selected

³ The eleven projects covered early childhood and basic elementary and secondary education, programs for exceptional children, programs for the culturally deprived, vocational education, adult and continuing education, community junior colleges, capital expenditures, school food services, pupil transportation, fiscal capacity, and school district reorganization.

² *School Funds and their Apportionment* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1905).

or selected as "exemplary." The samples are used to develop cost ratios (cost per pupil as a percentage of the cost per pupil of a normal education) for the various types of schooling. Straight-line extrapolation and population projections are then used to estimate the size of the nation-wide "target population" for 1980. The computation of cost differentials enables estimation of future costs. This presumably facilitates the development of state and federal aid formulas for educational programs.

The second major part of the NEFP, contained in Volume 4, attempts to describe federal and state programs of school support, in order to determine how effectively they equalize expenditures and how they might be improved. This effort culminated in simulations of federal and state aid programs to illustrate the relative equalizing power of alternative proposals (Volume 5, Chapters 8 and 10).

Volume 2 contains eleven essays summarizing research on topics in education which have been of special concern to economists. The topics include the role of education in stimulating growth and reducing poverty, human capital theory, fiscal federalism and taxation, externalities generated by education, and educational production functions. Aside from a querulous article by James Buchanan, the volume is useful as an introduction to the economics of education and is particularly suitable for teaching purposes. But it is hardly an original contribution; most of the content can be found elsewhere in the literature.

An additional, unnumbered volume contains data for 1967-68 on personal income by income class for all the school districts in the country. This is the most readily useable data gathered by the NEFP. Although much of it will be superseded by

information from the 1970 census, such data is extremely difficult to collect for states where school districts are not contiguous with town or county boundaries. The NEFP itself produced a small summary volume, entitled *Future Directions for School Financing: A Response to Demands for Fiscal Equity in American Education*. In addition, three of the head staff members of the NEFP edited a compilation of articles from the five volumes published independently of the NEFP, titled *Financing Education: Fiscal and Legal Alternatives*.⁴ It includes several of the better papers from Volumes 2 and 4, along with two historical articles and several summary articles from Volumes 1 and 5.

Several shortcomings are common to the analyses of educational programs in Volume 3. First, given the stated purpose of improving school financing through better educational planning, it is not clear how the quantification of needs and forecasts to 1980 on the *national* level are helpful. Unless public education is to be sponsored largely by the federal government, planning on the state and local level is necessary. Such planning requires knowledge of state birth rates, growth rates, migration patterns, and the future structure of occupational demands, none of which are considered by the authors of the studies in Volume 3.

Still, the calculation of cost differentials might have some value were it not for two additional flaws in the procedures set up by the NEFP. One is a failure to distinguish carefully between descriptive and normative analysis. The use of "exem-

⁴ This volume appears to have been photo-reproduced directly from the NEFP publications; but authors' names were unconscionably deleted before reproduction.

plary" schools or of a random sample of schools to forecast future needs implies that current practices are in some sense optimal, that they reflect the concept of "need" accurately. "Exemplary" schools were chosen simply by asking specialists, without testing whether the schools they selected were significantly different from those judged not exemplary. Cost variations among schools so chosen may be due to underlying technological relationships (the factor which the NEFP intended to measure), price differentials, aspiration levels of the various programs, or backgrounds of the children involved. Several studies noted the extreme difficulty of isolating cost ratios, given the wide variety of existing programs and the fact that some special programs are produced jointly with regular education (see Volume 3, Chapters 3 and 5). All of the studies found tremendous variation in costs; hence the resulting cost ratios merely reflect the range of costs of the programs sampled. Their application to school systems generally—as in state aid formulas or in educational planning—is inappropriate.

The second flaw stems from the way in which samples were selected and used to describe larger populations. In most cases the authors have selected ten to fifteen districts in each of five to ten states. The use of such small samples, typical of both the analyses of needs and cost ratios in Volume 3 and the description of state and federal aid in Volume 4, increases the uncertainty of the results. It also limits conclusions to relatively crude, qualitative statements rather than quantitative ones. For example, the data in Volume 3, Chapter 4, indicate vocational education costs more than regular education, but not precisely how much

more; likewise, the results in Volume 4 indicate that state and federal aid tends to equalize revenues among school districts, but not how much equalization is achieved. Furthermore, the collection of small samples precludes certain kinds of analysis, particularly multivariate analysis and investigation of heterogeneous behavior within a sample of districts. Finally, because the samples are small and the data restricted in purpose, the data collected by the NEFP cannot be profitably used by many other researchers. Unlike other large research projects—the Survey of Equal Educational Opportunity (the Coleman Report) and Project TALENT are two examples—which stimulated considerable amounts of further research through the data which they made available, the NEFP data cannot easily be used in related research efforts.

The studies in Volume 4 are more informative than those in Volume 3. They address themselves to a topic of considerable current interest—the extent of inequality in school finance and the impact of state and federal programs on revenue inequities. The various authors conclude that most state aid and some federal aid—ESEA Titles I, V, and VI-A, NDEA Title III, and Vocational Education Act basic grants—tend to equalize the distribution of revenues. While the conclusions and emphases of this volume are largely correct, two statistical practices standard in the literature have been used which weaken the results.

First, the findings on the equalization effects of state and local aid programs are based on correlation coefficients. It is assumed that a negative correlation between a measure of fiscal ability (usually property valuation per pupil) and the amount of

aid per pupil indicates an equalizing effect. While this is a sufficient condition for equalization, it is not a necessary condition. Correlation coefficients measure the strength of association between two variables in absolute amounts, while equalization is generally held to be a relative concept measured by statistics such as Gini coefficients or ratios from a Lorenz curve. Hence it is perfectly possible for equalization to take place in the absence of any correlation between state and federal aid and local revenue.⁵ In fact, various authors in the NEFP have recognized that increased state funding will tend to equalize revenues despite the method used to allocate it (see Volume 4, Chapters 2 and 4, Volume 5, Chapter 10). While the results in Volume 4 can be shown to be correct using Gini coefficients, correlation coefficients make the results less clear.

Second, the NEFP has not investigated behavioral models of school finance, models which attempt to *explain* (rather than simply describe) distributions of revenue in terms of easily-identifiable characteristics of school districts such as wealth, income, occupational structure, etc. Such models are the basis for an extensive literature on the determinants of educational and non-educational expenditure.⁶ The

⁵ If L_1 and L_2 are local per pupil revenues in two districts and each district receives a flat grant of S per pupil, the correlation coefficient between local revenue and state revenue is zero. But $(L_1 + S)/(L_2 + S)$ approaches one (perfect equality) as S increases relative to L_1 and L_2 . It is even possible for state and local aid to be positively correlated and still result in somewhat greater equality; the only necessary condition is $S_1/S_2 > L_1/L_2$ (where $L_1 > L_2$).

⁶ Some of this literature is reviewed in Chapter I of Richard Rossmiller, James Hale,

purpose of such models is to predict reactions to programs of state and federal aid, and to investigate the interactions between the educational and non-educational sectors (e.g., the problem of municipal overburden). With behavioral models, it is possible to specify the effect of varying state and federal programs of school aid; without them, it is necessary to simulate the results of different programs using arbitrary assumptions of unknown validity (as in Chapters 8 and 10 of Volume 5). The development of behavioral models is an area of potentially powerful results, neglected entirely by the NEFP.

In addition to methodological problems in individual sections of the NEFP, the Project as a whole was far too broadly conceived. It tried to cover every aspect of the financing of public education, using the resources of no fewer than 45 researchers. Despite efforts by the directors to create some uniformity of goals and procedures, the final report suffers from a lack of coordination and unification. Duplication of effort is evident in data collection⁷ and

and Lloyd Frohreich, *Fiscal Capacity and Educational Finance* (NEFP Special Study No. 10, 1970), the study summarized as Chapter 10 of Volume 3. The models developed so far tend to be poorly specified and subject to least-squares bias; in addition, they have generally been estimated using very small data samples. Both theoretical considerations and some preliminary work with Massachusetts data indicate that simultaneous systems of equations are necessary to implement such models, and that school districts within a state tend to behave in different ways depending on their wealth, size, etc. See W. Norton Grubb and Stephan Michelson, *Public School Finance in Contractual Societies* (Cambridge, Mass., unpublished, 1972).

⁷ See, for example, Tables 5-1 and 6-4, Volume 4.

also in entire sections of the published report.⁸ There are even several contradictory findings. One author concludes, based on property valuation per pupil, that a "fair degree of fiscal equity has been attained" (Volume 3, Chapter 10, p. 395).⁹ By contrast, the chapters on equalization in Volume 4 reveal considerable inequality among districts, and proceed on the assumption that the inequality is severe enough to require major changes in present mechanisms of resource allocation. While the ideal of the directors of the NEFP was to permit each research group complete freedom, on the basis that "considerable information of value is suppressed when a consensus is required on any policy recommended or advocated," (Volume 2, Foreword), the amounts of wasted effort resulting from this policy are astonishing.

Finally, the directors of the Project made little attempt to unify the conclusions of the various studies into a set of clear policy prescriptions. Most of Volume 5 simply summarizes the previous four volumes. Chapters 8 and 10 of this volume presumably are the culmination of the NEFP, a series of simulations of federal and state finance plans. They clarify the equalization effects of the various plans, although they amount simply to numerical examples illustrating the underlying formulas because of the lack of any behavioral model. The final conclusions of the NEFP are unbelievably weak. They are expressed in the

form of ten contingent statements, the first of which is:

If one believes that educational opportunities should be substantially equalized financially among the districts of a state, but that districts should be left with some local tax leeway for enrichment of the foundation program, an equalization model is the best model. However, the higher the priority one gives to equalization, the more he will prefer the equalization model that provides the most equalization. (Volume 5, p. 348).

For \$2,000,000, one expects something more than tautologies.

* * * * *

What was the real function of the NEFP, the real motivation for an undertaking of such magnitude? It is simply not obvious that a comprehensive review of school finance was necessary. The answer which the directors of the Project give is as follows:

The National Educational Finance Project is being undertaken at a time when conventional approaches to financing education are under sharp attack. . . .

Indicative of current dissatisfaction with existing programs for financing ed-

suburbs, and small towns. The conclusion is obtained because of substantial variation in fiscal capacity (as well as school revenues) *within* the various groups, and relatively insignificant amounts of variation among them. Several other reports aggregate district data in similar ways (Volume 4, Chapters 5, 6, and 10), producing notably vacuous results. It isn't clear in terms of equity why we should care about the nature of a town except as it is described by the wealth, income, and socioeconomic status of its children.

⁸ e.g., Chapter 10 of Volume 4 describes the equalizing effects of Title I, duplicating some of the results of Chapter 8, Volume 4.

⁹ This dubious conclusion results from examining data on school districts aggregated into major and minor core cities, independent cities, small cities, established and developing

ucation are suits which have been filed in Michigan, Illinois, California, Virginia, and Texas claiming that state support programs in each of these states is unconstitutional in that it denies to pupils in various types of school districts equal protection under the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Also noteworthy are the proposals advanced recently by such noted educators as Conant and Allen that the state abandon local taxes for education and assume complete responsibility for financing its public schools. It is against this background and within this context that the National Educational Finance Project has been launched. (Volume 1, pp. 4-6).

But the history of school finance and the omissions of the NEFP furnish clues for a more purposeful interpretation. The writings of school finance experts, from that of Cubberly in 1906 to the National Survey of School Finance in 1933 to the National Educational Finance Project, are marked by an extraordinary uniformity of style. The emphasis in this writing has always been on the minutiae of finance, on choosing variables to be used in aid formulas, on quantifying need and precisely determining ability to pay. The result has been an emphasis on the mechanisms by which school resources are allocated, rather than on the allocations themselves. There has also been an insistence that the process of redistributing resources be fair, rather than that the distributions themselves be fair.¹⁰

¹⁰ The underlying assumption has been that substantial efficiencies could be obtained by improving the mechanism of school financing, a reflection of the increased intrusion of economic considerations into education. This is clearly manifest in the essays in Volume 2, as well as in the declaration that the NEFP

While these emphases have not themselves caused the failure to allocate school resources equitably, they have served to obfuscate the persistence of gross inequalities, and to focus attention on a model of financing which leaves the fundamental role to local districts—in the name of local control and individual sovereignty—offering merely an ameliorative role to the state and federal governments.

Whatever their faults, the various proposals of the late 1960's—community control, voucher plans, performance contracting, the Fourteenth Amendment challenges to present financing mechanisms, district power equalizing and family power equalizing—provide models of educational finance radically different from the traditional one. Such proposals are largely ignored by the NEFP.¹¹ Rather than stimulate thinking about real innovation, the NEFP reasserts the importance of traditional models of school finance, reminds us of the range of options available in state and federal aid programs, and further binds us to current practice in educational financing.¹² Furthermore, while community control proposals and the various voucher plans deny that educational experts should make all decisions, the Na-

would use a "broadly based PPBS approach" (Volume 1, p. 6). For an account of efficiency considerations in an earlier era, one which bears some resemblance to our own, see Raymond Callahan, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

¹¹ They are reviewed in an excellent article by Charles Benson in Volume 2, but rarely mentioned in the other volumes.

¹² The last function can be clearly seen in the use of random samples and samples of "exemplary" schools to project needs to 1980, in Volume 3.

tional Educational Finance Project is based on the premise that "concentrating research talent and knowledge of experts on educational needs and the problems of financing education can produce methods of financing education more responsive to the needs of children and society than they are now" (Volume 1, p. 207). By the frequency of references to "experts" and "specialists," the NEFP seems to reaffirm the competence of professional educators, and their right to make financial decisions in the face of attack from all sides.

The conservative function of the NEFP should be placed in historical context. Briefly stated, two trends stand out in the development of public education in the United States—the increased integration of schools into the economy resulting in the dominance of broader economic considerations over the schools, and the increased use of educational institutions to perpetuate and legitimize class divisions in our society. School finance mechanisms have played a role in the second trend. The rhetoric of local control and individual sovereignty has been invoked to maintain differences in resource availability among school districts and among schools.¹³ Educational finance specialists from Cubberly to the NEFP have called for the alleviation of such inequities. But their efforts have been constrained by the larger forces shaping public education and have been largely unfulfilled.

The NEFP was a large undertaking—even larger in terms of expenditures than the Coleman Report, which cost some

\$1,500,000. In contrast to the NEFP, the Coleman Report provoked considerable controversy, prompted response from all sectors of the academic and government community, provided (with the reanalyses) some preliminary answers to crucial questions, and generated a vast amount of data which other researchers could use. When the two projects are compared, it is easy to see the relative strengths of the Coleman Report. It began with a clearly-defined problem deemed critical by the nation as a whole; it was centrally directed toward one goal, rather than being fragmented into independent studies; it collected a considerable amount of new data, and made this available to others so that its errors could be corrected, its conclusions checked, and other problems investigated. As almost every NEFP author noted, the data on school finance is extremely difficult to collect; very little is known about the behavior of school districts and *differences* in behavioral patterns within states; the political forces influencing the provision of education on the state and local levels are almost undocumented; the history of school finance and the interaction between financing and the development of education has not yet been written, except for the South. It would be easy to spend \$2,000,000 on these four areas alone. The results of such research would be useful in themselves and useful as a source of data and impetus to further research.

Thus the most difficult problem raised by the NEFP is that of how research funds (and hence research efforts) should be allocated. Certainly a frequent problem is our inability to predict what the results of research will be. But this need not be the case; in many instances consideration of what answers might possibly come from a

¹³ For the development of this argument, see Grubb and Michelson, Ch. 2. An abbreviated version has been published in *The Forensic Quarterly* (August 1972).

given piece of research would be enough to disqualify it as inconclusive, banal, or otherwise unworthy of attention. As an illustration, the attempt of the NEFP to definitively identify and quantify "target populations" for various educational programs would appear to be doomed from the start; it takes no great skill to make general statements about which children need compensatory education. But since family income, one of the determinants of need is continuous, there can be no non-arbitrary division of children into educationally deprived and educationally advantaged; and our standards of deprivation change constantly, so that a forecast to 1980 is surely a meaningless exercise.

Of course, not all of the NEFP could have been judged pointless by such an *ex ante* evaluation.¹⁴ A more common method of evaluation is to infer from past work what a researcher is likely to produce.¹⁵

¹⁴ Katzman and Rosen have offered an example of *ex ante* evaluation in their criticism of the National Educational Assessment Program (NEAP). They argue at length that the process by which the NEAP was developed eliminated all elements which might be controversial or embarrassing to professional educators. The result was a project design which conformed to the norms of the education profession and prevented innovative approaches. Furthermore, despite the putative commitment of the educational community to research and evaluation, the project would duplicate previous efforts, provide almost no information on current policy issues, and be of little value to local schools and schoolmen. They conclude that the resources committed to the NEAP would be better spent for some other research project. Martin Katzman and Ronald Rosen, "The Science and Politics of National Educational Assessment," *Teachers College Record*, May 1970.

¹⁵ This is, of course, one of the fundamental assumptions of present mechanisms of re-

Thus, the directors of the NEFP are all men with long lists of publications in school finance. It would be unreasonable, given that individuals will be motivated to repeat the kind of research that has gained them prior success and promotion, to expect their research designs to deviate markedly from previous work. In my opinion, the writings of the NEFP directors and research staff would not have justified much optimism about the Project's contribution to redirecting policy.

But the fundamental problem still remains; what mechanisms should direct the distribution of research funds, and who should control those mechanisms? As part of the problem of control, it should be noted that there is now no mechanism for determining general research strategies. No one receives recognition for summarizing knowledge, establishing the possibilities for meaningful research, and outlining sets of priorities. That is, there is rarely evaluation of whether, *on the average*, resources are fruitfully spent. The consequence is that large sums of money are often misspent, generating research which is either redundant or inconsequential. If this is to end, the question of how to allocate research funds should remain open.

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source allocation—the process of research, publishing, and obtaining grants from government agencies and foundations based on the amount and notoriety of one's past research. While this procedure does have a conservative bias in the sense of perpetuating the kind of research which has gone on before, it can yield good or bad results depending on who conducts the procedure.

* The author acknowledges helpful comments from Stephan Michelson and Jerome Murphy on an early draft of this review.

Drugs and Youth

DRUG ABUSE IN TODAY'S SOCIETY.

Edited by Arthur Tye, William M. Dickson, and Robert A. Buerki.

Columbus: Ohio State University, 1970. 213 pp. \$4.50.

SOCIETY AND DRUGS.

by Richard H. Blum and Associates.

San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1970. 400 pp.

STUDENTS AND DRUGS.

by Richard H. Blum and Associates.

San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1970. 400 pp. \$25.00 (set).

DRUG EDUCATION: CONTENT AND METHODS.

by Daniel A. Girdano and Dorothy Dusek Girdano.

Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1972. 280 pp. \$5.95.

SPEED IS OF THE ESSENCE.

by Gail Sheehy.

New York: Pocket Books, 1971. 166 pp. \$.95.

During the last decade, drug abuse has found its way to a position among the top ten American social issues. As an inevitable result of its newly earned status, it has become shrouded by a bevy of impinging considerations, ranging from relevant to extraneous. The heart of the issue, referred to variously as "controversy" or "crisis," depending upon one's circumstance or persuasion, rests in four basic facts. First, the use of self-administered psychoactive and hallucinogenic drugs has

increased in prevalence to the point where virtually all segments of the population have the potential for exposure to the practice. Second, in most instances, use of these drugs is of no demonstrable medicinal value, and the effects of use, if any, are in the direction of reducing the user's productivity. Third, such use without benefit of medical sanction and supervision is, in most instances, in violation of the law. Lastly, this increased usage coupled with its illegality has resulted in a situation where demand is satisfied through illegal means which offer neither cost nor quality control. These factors combine to divert increased resources, both human and financial, into illegal channels.

Since drug abuse became most noticeable among the young, the issue became a predictable source of concern for parents and educators. As young drug users grew into adult users, administrators and general citizenry joined in the concern. This concern, verging at times on panic, has spawned the apparently endless flow of books and publications on drugs and drug abuse. It seemed for a time that anyone who ever computed a chi-square in the name of social relevance had a study, a theory, or an observation to contribute. Parents, educators, and the ubiquitous American public looked to these "experts" for answers. We can now look back and ask how well their needs were met. The five books listed above are an appropriate place to begin, being representative of neither the best nor the worst our publishers have to offer.

Drug Abuse in Today's Society is a paperback published by the Ohio State University College of Pharmacy, consisting mostly of a verbatim transcript of the Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Ohio

Pharmaceutical Seminar held during March, 1970. The seminar was a meeting of representatives from pharmacy, law, psychology, and education. The book is inexpensively bound, printed on slick paper, and liberally illustrated with photographs of the participants—thus producing the effect of a high school yearbook. A seminar is rarely organized without the promise that the proceedings will be published, and the organizers of this seminar fulfilled their promise admirably.

All of the contributors are knowledgeable in their respective fields, and, although few are of national eminence, their concern and dedication is unquestionable. The book, however, offers few surprises and no substantial additions to the literature; nor, in all honesty, was this its intent. The purpose was rather to "... prepare an in-depth coverage of a broad range of issues surrounding drug abuse (with) appeal to a wide range of professionals involved in the problem."¹ Herein are both its virtue and undoing.

The contributions range from pharmacological models with diagrams of molecules that only a chemist could love, to clinical anecdotes and treatment philosophy. Consequently both the style and content is uneven, and terminology is used inconsistently. The editing, or lack of it, offers a good feel for what it must have been like to participate, but subjects the reader to much that is redundant or irrelevant. In short, the book is a fine memento of a four day visit to Ohio, but its survival as a publication owes more to the timeliness of its topic than to the depth and originality of its content.

¹From a press release distributed by the College of Pharmacy, Ohio State University.

Society and Drugs and its companion, *Students and Drugs*, were prepared under the aegis of Stanford's Institute for the Study of Human Problems and reflect the scholarly humanitarianism characteristic of its director, Nevitt Sanford. The volumes, two in a succession of fine Jossey-Bass publications, provide an overview of drug history of truly Wagnerian proportions.

Of the thirty-six chapters which constitute the two volumes, Richard H. Blum is author of twenty-six and co-author of an additional four. Volume I, *Society and Drugs*, is primarily an account of the history and use patterns of major drugs, including alcohol and tobacco. One consistent message is that drugs and their abuse have been with us for a long time, perhaps since 6400 B.C.; this may be of solace to those who prefer company in their misery. The chapters themselves are carefully prepared, if ponderously written, and supported by eighteen pages of references. A cross-cultural study, based on Human Relations Area Files data, constitutes one-eighth of the book, and those with a strong enough interest in social and epidemiological psychopharmacology to sustain them through four hundred pages will find

this section alone worth the price of the book.

Students and Drugs reports original research conducted by Richard Blum's Psychopharmacology Project, and while it is actually the fifth major research publication by the Project, it is the first to focus specifically on the nature and correlates of student drug use. The data-base for the volume is extensive, consisting of a research population of some twenty thousand students representing a reasonable cross-section of secondary schools and colleges.

While the methodology is not particularly original and the statistical procedures are less than innovative, the approach is logical, systematic, and thorough. Major limitations are less a result of methodology than of the simple passage of time; most of the data was collected during the mid-sixties and may already be out of date.

While Blum and his associates have provided us with a wealth of painstakingly assembled and admirably presented data, their conclusions are disappointingly one-dimensional. In 1967, Blum authored *Task Force Report: Narcotics and Drug Abuse* for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. Perhaps it is coincidental, but the style of this volume reads very much like a Commission Report; dry, factual, and systematic, with few controversial interpretations. In fact, it is not until the final chapter that the reader is rewarded with interpretations of any consequence. These culminate in a single diagram which presents "vectors contributing to illicit-drug use by students" (p. 369).

The vectors do follow logically enough from the preceding chapters, concluding that permissive, affluent home environments, combined with a liberal school milieu and mass media sensationalization of drug use are associated with a drug supply and what is perceived to be a safe setting for use. This setting, combined with peer group drug use and cultural optimism about the effects of drugs, leads to student experimentation with illicit drugs. What this may imply for those who must respond to issues raised by drug abuse is left largely to the reader.

Drugs and Education is a paperback workbook designed on the premise that education is an effective deterrent to drug

abuse. The text itself is a combination resource book, workbook, and teacher's guide. Methods advocated include active student participation ("inviting an ex-addict to lead a class discussion") and visual presentation (seventy-six pages of the book are tear-out mini-posters). The text deals with most forms of drug abuse, including alcohol, and contains a section on the physiological basis of drug action on the central nervous system. The entire book is thorough, accurate, and well documented. While the authors state that they have developed the text for drug education courses at the college level, it is probably a more appropriate resource for teachers and parents concerned with young people at the junior high school level.

Speed is of the Essence is a small paperback of the type found in airline terminals and bus stations; the cover is cute and seductive, and, on the back, in small apologetic print, you find that it is classified as "Sociology." Gail Sheehy is a contributing editor of *New York Magazine*, and the title piece is but one essay in this collection on changing life-styles.

Speed is written in a style ("Morning sun creams the rough walls and greens the plants") destined to delight the editors of *More Picturesque Speech*. By the author's admission, the episode described is based on the author's personal experience with young neighbors experimenting with the "magic vitamin"—speed—a class of drug more insidious than the opiates. Possibly the most pleasant surprise is the discovery that this is a well-balanced and superbly written account. For those who have never experienced the charm, vitality, and ironic despair of the speed freak, this book is a bargain. For thousands of parents who have followed their children with vacillat-

ing optimism, amusement, and tragic frustration, it is a bad dream revived. Ms. Sheehy takes no sides, offers no solutions, and advances no pretense at wisdom. Perhaps this is her book's greatest virtue.

Many of the drug-related publications produced during the past decade have been designed to serve specific, specialized functions, or were directed to limited audiences. Most, however, regardless of their original intent, have succumbed to the temptation to imply that they respond to the public's concern with current drug use practices. As such, their effectiveness is open to serious question.

Public concern generates two primary needs: for information and for direction. Most publications have attempted to provide information, and have met with varying degrees of success. As a rule, however, the more technical and authoritative the sources, the less immediately applicable the information. The more one becomes involved in the subtlety and complexity of drug research, the greater the realization that much remains unknown. Complicating this is the reality that very little agreement exists, even in such basic areas as terminology. Some classification systems are based on the origin of a drug; others, on its method of action. Some divisions are made on the basis of potency; others, on the legal conventions such as the Marihuana Tax Act and Harrison Narcotics Act. Each of these conventions is supported by a legitimate rationale, and each is a source of legitimate debate. For the concerned layman seeking simple answers to not-so-simple questions, those conventions can easily appear to obscure the truth behind a cloud of pedantic trivia.

It is safe to say that there is much to be learned about the nature of psychoactive

drugs and their use. It is also equally apparent that adequate knowledge exists to satisfy the immediate needs of parents and policy-makers without resorting to extremes of informational overkill. In many instances, thoroughly researched and accurately presented information is available at little or no cost through family physicians, local and federal government agencies, and even in Sunday supplements. For those with particular or specialized concerns, or for those who prefer to measure their commitment to social issues by the width of their bookshelves, reputable publishers have provided us with a wealth of alternatives.²

Regardless of the state of our knowledge, it is clear that any drugs with sufficient potency to justify their consumption are equally capable of being abused.³ Although there are complex motives for taking drugs, a major motive is the assumption that the drug will have the maximum effect, positive or negative. This effect may be on the user or on parents or

² The serious reader would be well advised to start with Lester Grinspoon's *Marihuana Reconsidered* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) and Theodore X. Barber's *LSD, Marihuana, Yoga and Hypnosis* (Chicago: Aldine, 1970).

³ The degree to which the drug actually initiates the effect varies, of course, with the nature of the drug, its dosage, the tolerance of the user, and other contributing factors and circumstances. Changes in perception and behavior are also noted in and reported by users of relatively mild drugs and placebos. Generally, the best predictor of response to these latter substances rests in the user's own expectations, which in turn are best predicted by the personality of the user. See, for example, Diane Bennett's *Marijuana Use among College Students and Street People* (unpublished senior honors thesis, Harvard University, 1971).

others significant to the user. If the potential effect is to make the user feel good, the drug (or its absence) has an equal potential for making the user feel bad.

Potent drugs do have one property which separates them from most other forms of calculated risk. While it is usually possible to evaluate the degree, course, and probable outcome of most voluntary risks, the effects of potent drugs, by definition, impair these judgments. While this is most characteristic of central nervous system (CNS) stimulants and hallucinogens, it is a property of all drugs of consequence. This, combined with the increased tolerance the body develops for most drugs, creates a situation with truly serious medical and judicial implications. It is here that the public turns to the literature for its second potential contribution; that of offering advice, interpretation, and direction to those who must confront the realities of those implications and translate them into appropriate and effective avenues of action.

There are four primary rationales used to support the contention that no intervention is necessary or appropriate in the area of psychoactive drugs and their potential abuse:

Denial of the problem argues that drug use and experimentation is not an issue of consequence to the general public. It makes a distinction between the most commonly used "mild" drugs such as marijuana, and "hard" drugs which the enlightened user will avoid. It maintains that adolescent use of mild drugs is a phase that will soon go out of fashion, with little or no effect on its participants. It further maintains that the decision to use drugs is a matter of individual conscience, and

what one person chooses to put into his or her body should not be subject to public debate or control.

Denial of responsibility points to a multiplicity of environmental factors as contributing to the incidence of drug abuse, from the War and social unrest, the pressures of day-to-day existence, and the deterioration of the American family, to the rapid change, the loss of old values, and social and economic injustice. It blames the mass media and commercial advertising for popularizing and advocating drugs and escape and points to the "pusher" and peer group pressure as seducing unwilling victims to a fate they could neither anticipate nor control.

Denial of the accuser offers variations of the above and points accusingly at those who condemn drug use yet tolerate alcohol abuse and the medicine cabinets filled with "prescriptions" for mood drugs, diet pills, pep pills, and chemical escapes. It says, "You don't object to drugs; you object to *our* drugs and *our* life-styles." It cites the War, hypocrisy, and injustice as additional reasons why the "establishment" is not qualified to question the morality of an emerging generation.

Appeal to higher loyalty transcends all of the above. It maintains that the existing social order is so thoroughly corrupt and destined to collapse that it must no longer be taken seriously. It equates the drug experience with religious phenomena and elects the "priests" of the new order. It transforms law and morality, turns inward, and shuts the door to outside intrusion.

Each of these rationales offers a logic of its own, and the credentials of a given observer are poor predictors of the degree

to which he may find them persuasive.⁴ Those who have experienced drug use and subsequently devoted their lives to the treatment of drug users remain unimpressed. They are aware of the dynamics and potential tragedy inherent in the drug experience. They recognize the distinction between an *explanation* and a *justification* and realize that the first step in treatment is the confrontation of rationalizations as rationalizations.

Where does this leave the parents and administrators who are faced, on the one hand, with an overwhelming task and convincing rationales for inaction, and, on the other hand, with the belief that their concerns and responsibilities transcend the seductiveness of those rationales? They are left with a monumental dilemma. We are a nation that believes, above all else, in the sanctity and integrity of the individual. We recognize and encourage the pursuit of calculated risk in the name of progress, and abhor the restriction of personal liberty in the name of safety. At the same time, we face a risk that threatens to shake the foundations of those fundamental beliefs.

We have learned long ago that the legislation of morality can be a futile pursuit.⁵ We have also learned, through long

and hard experience, that to ignore an act is to become an accomplice to its consequences. In designing our judicial system, we have usually recognized the ineffectiveness of creating laws to prohibit specific acts, but have, instead, designed an effective and enduring system for prescribing *accountability* for the *consequences* of these acts.

It is doubtful that the medical profession will ever be relieved of its responsibility for the administration and supervision of drugs of demonstrable medicinal value. To exercise this responsibility effectively, it will require legal sanctions and support. For the substantial residual category of psychoactive drugs not directly under medical control, other controls based solely on possession or use without regard to the consequences of that possession or use are both ineffective and exceedingly difficult to enforce. Avenues for judicial controls based on assignment of responsibility for consequences are both available and potentially effective. These avenues simply require that any individual voluntarily using psychoactive drugs be held fully accountable for his or her actions and for the consequences of those actions. In exchange for the freedom of choice provided to the individual, he or she relieves society of all responsibilities for his or her health, safety, and personal maintenance, and will remain open to redress for injuries inflicted on the health, safety, and property of others.

This solution seems simple enough and is certainly consistent with our national traditions and ideology. Nevertheless, it has never been seriously implemented because it runs in direct contradiction to another closely cherished ideal. In an old

⁴ It is interesting to look back at Timothy Leary's "How to Change Behavior," first delivered as an address to the International Congress of Applied Psychology in 1961. The address was subsequently reprinted in such prestigious publications as W. G. Bennis, E. H. Schein, D. E. Berlew and F. I. Steele's *Interpersonal Dynamics: Essays and Readings on Human Interaction* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1964).

⁵ One resurrection of the realization is presented in John Kaplan's *Marijuana: The New Prohibition* (New York: World, 1970).

and distant time, before public concern swelled to the point of panic, those left to grapple with the dilemmas of drug abuse found a convenient solution to their problem. Universities were among the prime offenders in deciding that drug abuse was not a matter for disciplinary action since it was an irrational act and, hence, a problem for the psychiatrists. There is, no doubt, a kernel of truth to this assumption, but its implementation as policy leaves us with a second major dilemma.

How do we shift from a model that emphasizes treatment to one that emphasizes accountability? At the same time, how do we retain the tools of psychiatry for those cases which truly have a psychiatric basis? The problem is a real one but no more formidable than those created by any other major policy shift. First, it is necessary to formulate a national policy that is both realistic and capable of implementation. Secondly, commitments made or implied prior to the formulation of a new policy must be honored, as would be necessary without a policy redefinition. Thirdly, the public must be informed of the new policy and its implications.

At an individual level, it is necessary to determine whether a given individual is aware of the implications of drug use and, if so, whether he or she is willing and able to accept the responsibilities it implies. If the individual is unaware of the nature of psychoactive drugs and their effects, it becomes society's responsibility to provide that information honestly and objectively (drug education is most effective before the individual is exposed to drug use; efforts to educate users are usually too little, too late). If informed awareness is accompanied by the capacity to accept the consequences of drug use, no further immediate

action is necessary. If informed awareness is not accompanied by the capacity to accept the consequences of drug use, then intervention at an administrative or psychiatric level is indicated.

The charges inherent in the rationalizations for drug use are not without merit. We face our problems on a variety of fronts, and the time when we could afford the luxury of concentrating on a single Great Cause has passed. It is probably true that our responsibilities to youth have never been greater nor more difficult to fulfill. Nevertheless, if we accept any justification for failing to honor those responsibilities in the most reasonable and judicious manner, it will be we who must answer for the consequences.

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Something for Everybody Is Not Enough: An Educator's Search for his Education.

by William M. Birenbaum.

New York: Random House.

293 pp. \$7.95.

Not every community college president publishes his autobiography at age forty-eight. Then again, William Birenbaum is not the typical community college president. His background includes an apprenticeship at Robert Hutchins' University of Chicago, a moment as cause célèbre being sacked as Long Island University's provost, and a period with Robert Kennedy planning an urban affairs college at Bedford-Stuyvesant in Brooklyn.

Birenbaum has written a fascinating autobiography. It is interesting for what is said about growing up in Waterloo, Iowa, and about the mobile career patterns of administrators, but the volume is hardly required reading on that account. Rather, what is important are Birenbaum's strong-minded educational stands, which grow out of the experiences he describes. It is to these indictments and prescriptions that educators need to repair, to help make sense of the solutions proffered them by foundations, legislatures, and community groups.

Although currently head of Staten Island Community College in New York, Birenbaum's perspective does not fit the smug rhetoric of those who see the two-year college as the salvation of the higher learning. He vigorously dissents from prevailing educational trends and advocates a reconstructed "college in the city." Birenbaum's position flows from a critique of society and education which was first described in *Overlive: Power, Poverty, and the University*¹ and developed in this volume. "Overlive" is a "surplus living power" which represents the disparity between the promises of American life and the actual uses of the country's enormous powers. On the one hand a substantial number of citizens are denied a share in the material riches of American life; on the other hand, groups that have achieved success have found it barren of meaning. Higher education sits at the gatepost of "the overlive predicament," embodying and intensifying economic inequality and skewed national priorities.

¹ William M. Birenbaum, *Overlive: Power, Poverty, and the University* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1969).

The university admits to college and career only those who fit a given profile. Research grants determine the social problems worthy of study and the solutions deemed feasible. Community relations programs help determine the lives of residents who live near the university. Higher education's credentialing powers establish a student in a vocation and limit the supply of professionals available. These "overlive" characteristics which operate in the most prestigious institutions become the model for every college, in an unfortunate example of the snake-like academic procession.²

The two-year community college is the linchpin of the emerging educational system in Birenbaum's view. These institutions are "successful"; they are growing rapidly in number, with many statewide systems developing. Their intent is to provide two, often conflicting, functions, vocational training and liberal arts education, for those masses of students who presumably lack intellectual or economic resources to attend four-year colleges. The community colleges are also charged with a responsibility to respond to diverse needs of their localities. Yet Birenbaum views these colleges as failing to promote either economic justice or the quality of life. Instead, they serve overlive functions complementary to the senior colleges, and, in so doing, they split rich from poor, Black from white, thought from action, community from college.

Birenbaum notes that with courses of study limited in time and scope, the community college has little opportunity to

² See David Riesman, *Constraint and Variety in American Education* (Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1956).

exercise education's liberalizing powers. Without sufficient respite from short-term vocational exigencies, its students lack the freedom of choice which characterizes effective education. In urban poverty areas, Birenbaum's particular concern, the community college must also attempt to compensate for the debilitating effects of poor public schooling. Burdened with defects of structure and of extremely limited resources, the two-year college too often confirms the low expectations society has of its students and of their inevitable roles in the new working class.³

Like the arcadian senior colleges which they slavishly—if poorly—imitate, two-year colleges often isolate themselves from the communities about them by ignoring pressing social problems. Even in the densest urban areas, the community colleges, both architecturally and programmatically, are institutions set apart. In particular, Birenbaum indicts the colleges for taking no direct role in improving the public schools, preferring as they do to deal ineffectively with those who somehow have struggled to the next hurdle.

Birenbaum would replace this overlive constellation of values and institutions with new ones, which would combine the intellectual rigor of a Hutchins-style liberal education with the concern for enlarged life-experience urged by Dewey and other progressives. He thus proposes a college in the city in which everyone would be eligible to be a student. The

college would operate all day, year-round, with at least a four-year degree program. The total community would be the campus, so rather than isolating educational functions on special turfs, activities would take place everywhere. Indeed, the physical renewal of the city, especially the core, would be tied to implementation of the college plan. A coherent curriculum of liberal studies, skills studios, and internship experiences would be organized around business, education, health care, the arts. In this way the college in the city could respect the pluralistic life-styles of community residents, while at the same time offering a comprehensive program for environmental renewal. Drawing from his experience in Chicago, Detroit, and elsewhere, Birenbaum presented such a college plan while head of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Educational Affiliate.⁴

In his current position at Staten Island, Birenbaum proposes to create a Learning Town based on many of the principles articulated at Bed-Stuy. With its own pedestrian streets and town hall, the college is to be organized into smaller learning blocks, each a smaller community of two hundred students and twenty faculty. This community of scholars appropriately placed in the urban context will provide, Birenbaum hopes, a new model for higher education.

In writing this personal testament Birenbaum sharply joins the issue: the battle for the soul of higher education. To one side stand political and university leaders who demand academies uncontaminated by wider social needs. They

³ See Burton Clark, "The Cooling-out Function in Higher Education," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 65 (May 1960), pp. 569-576. In this *HER* issue, Jerome Karabel also analyzes the role of the two-year colleges in sorting people.

⁴ See the Educational Affiliate's *A College in the City: An Alternative* (New York: Educational Facilities Laboratory, 1969).

want separate (but not equal) two-year colleges, with campuses set apart from their communities as if they were oases in a desert. In fact, the current fiscal crisis has provided them the opportunity to eliminate what they see as "low priority" college programs. Open admissions programs in New York have been dangerously undermined by lack of resources, and alleged bankruptcy has served as excuse for the governor of the nation's wealthiest state to veto legislation to establish innovative colleges. In actions such as these an unholy alliance is forged between those who want an educational status quo and those who want a social status quo.

To another side stand Birenbaum and confreres. With some optimism they point to a growing number of honorable educational alternatives: external degrees; universities without walls; urban, Black, and other minority studies. They look to the current generation of senior state colleges (e.g., Ramapo, N.J., Minnesota Metropolitan), which incorporate individualized study, civic internships, and curricula promoting new professional roles. These seek to develop educational programs more appropriate to the needs of contemporary urban life through reformulating the traditional liberal arts models followed so scrupulously during the fifties by such new institutions as Oakland University (Michigan).⁵ The headway made by alternative urban secondary school programs (e.g., Parkway in Philadelphia, open campus in Massachusetts) is an additional indicator foreshadowing change at the higher education level.

⁵ David Riesman, Joseph Gusfield and Zelda Gamson, *Academic Values and Mass Education: The Early Years of Oakland and Montclair* (New York: Doubleday, 1970).

In this contest for direction of the American university system, however, Birenbaum provides unsteady guidance. He seems to believe in an Establishment made up of the movers and shakers of the existing order—of which he reminds us he is a part—which can somehow reform itself and honor the American promise. The job of the educational reformer seems to be as midwife to new ideas and as salesman to convince others of their worth. Birenbaum's autobiography, chronicling his frequent moves from one position to another, provides evidence of the frustrations inherent in this role.

Although Birenbaum says that his work as college president is difficult and complex, he does not indicate sufficiently how decisions get made and things get done. How, for example, does Birenbaum resolve the apparent disparity between his constituency—the community—and those to whom he looks for reform—the academic and political leadership? Overlapping groups of faculty, students, taxpayers, and governmental leaders are not easily harmonized, thus requiring the harsh choice of which groups Birenbaum must take most seriously. Is the college in the city to be operated by the centralized city authorities or only by the particular neighborhood in which it is based? Recent political controversies in New York City about schooling and housing indicate that the notion of community control is difficult to reconcile with that of a larger public interest.

Birenbaum is aware of the "red, white, and blue" expectations of Americans, particularly of the impoverished. But he is not clear about the means by which college planners—like professionals in the fields of new town planning, public broad-

casting, and group health practices—can resolve the apparent differences between what is said to be good for people and what they say they want. Some citizens, for example, have been told that a college is a country place with ivy, playing fields, and parking lots. How can educators organize something different while still respecting expectations for a traditional college plan?

In addition to these omissions, the book is marred by an air of self-justification; it appears that at least part of the book's purpose is to set the public record straight about various projects in which Birenbaum has been a principal. Stylistic improprieties—jarring colloquialisms and too-sudden shifts from past to present—are also distracting elements.

Birenbaum has, however, accomplished a great deal in the present volume. At a time when too much of higher education literature is at an abstracted, theoretical level unconnected with practice or is overly concerned with instrumentalist, input-output analyses, he has written a decent and humane document relating theory to practice, vision to personal experience. We await a progress report about Birenbaum's work at Staten Island, hoping he may address himself there to more specific issues concerning the professional educator's roles and responsibilities in the improvement of higher education.

NEIL KAUFFMAN
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TEACHER EDUCATION AND TRAINING,
A REPORT BY A COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY
APPOINTED BY THE SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR EDUCATION AND SCIENCE,
UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF
LORD JAMES OF RUSHOLME.

*London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1972. 128 pp. £ 0-85.*

*Distributed in U.S. by Pendragon
Press, Redwood City, Calif. \$3.60.*

Every few years there issues from Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Britain's Government Printing Office, a prestigious report commissioned by the government of the day and known forever by the name of the distinguished educationist—British for *educator*—or layman who chaired the committee that wrote it. Thus, in the last fifteen years there have been Crowther's *15 to 18* (with Lord James among the signatories), Robbins's *Higher Education*, Newsom's *Half our Future* (a report on the less achieving children in the schools), and, of course, Plowden's *Children and their Primary Schools*. We now can add to this list *Teacher Education and Training*.

Americans lusting for a fresh British bandwagon to replace a mythical Leicestershire that no Englishman would recognize in his native land will be disappointed, since much of this comparatively short report deals with local administrative arrangements. Even Scotsmen would find little here to tickle their fancies.

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Secretary of State for Education and Science in Mr. Heath's Conservative government, asked the James Committee:

to enquire into the present arrangements for the education, training and

probation of teachers in England and Wales and in particular to examine:

- (i) what should be the content and organization of courses to be provided;
- (ii) whether a larger proportion of intending teachers should be educated with students who have not chosen their careers or chosen other careers;
- (iii) what, in the context of (i) and (ii) above, should be the role of the . . . colleges . . . and the universities and to make recommendations. (p. iii)

The rather narrow terms of reference have been strictly adhered to, partly, no doubt, because of the indecent haste upon which Mrs. Thatcher insisted, and partly because of the mound of paper accumulated by the previous Labour government. The James Committee, all of them busy people in key positions, were told to report within twelve months, and some members worked four or five days a week to meet the deadline. Under Secretary of State Edward Short, Mrs. Thatcher's predecessor, various groups, official and unofficial, had been assembling evidence and arriving at positions under the glare of considerable publicity, and the government was expected to produce something exciting out of the hat. Then came the election, and his enemies accused Mr. Heath of wanting to close off discussion and head off the steam—which may explain the narrow terms of reference and the timetable.

Notably absent from the Committee's report is a stated quasi-philosophical position, of the sort so often turgidly overdone in comparable American documents. This reviewer misses such a statement, although

philosophical justification would admittedly be less needed in a more unitary society than the United States, such as Great Britain, where policy makers have more shared experiences and therefore more unspoken agreements and hence a common feeling of the way things ought to be. As two contributors to a booklet issued last year and entitled *Dear Lord James* point out, "There is an inevitable tendency for anyone working in an organization . . . to assume that its purpose is self-evident" and "You have not been asked to examine the future role of teachers."¹

But brevity also has its drawbacks and disappointments, especially for this reviewer who taught in the school of which Eric James was the distinguished head, and who is still running on some of the steam the "Chief," as we used to call him, generated in the early sixties and before. Where in this Report is the educationist—how he hates the word!—whose writing can be as precise and far ranging as that of Matthew Arnold, Inspector of Schools? Where is the arch meritocrat² who, having been against most forms of teacher training, established a Department of Education as soon as he became Vice-Chancellor (president) of the University of York and selected as its head Harry Rée, a sanely maverick school man? Where is the skillful administrator whom American college presidents invite to Aspen to chair their meetings? Where is the compassionate headmaster who, the day

¹ Tyrell Burgess, ed., *Dear Lord James, A Critique of Teacher Education* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1971), pp. 61 and 14.

² Eric James is said by some to have inspired Michael Young, *The Rise of the Meritocracy, 1870-2033, An Essay in Education and Equality* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1958).

he became the first British headmaster awarded a peerage, spent two hours helping a young teacher with a personal problem? Where is the elitist radical who wrote, "The existence of heretics is a necessity for a moral society. The heretic may ultimately be the best citizen."³

One just isn't able to confound those critics-before-the-fact who wrote, "Without disrespect to you and your colleagues, we feel bound to question the relevance of your expertise."⁴ Lord James's expertise, in the widest sense, is supremely relevant, but it doesn't come through in the document; nor is the unquestioned expertise of his distinguished colleagues allowed to become apparent. One can only hope that his influence has been felt behind the scenes.

The James Report cost about \$100,000 to put together; Plowden cost \$300,000. James had seven members; Plowden had over twenty-five. The James Committee didn't travel; Lady Plowden and her group visited five countries. The James Report does not even mention Scotland, where a far greater proportion of teachers has graduated from fully fledged universities than in neighboring England. James neither commissioned nor refers to research; Plowden did both. There is no bibliography, no indication of the range of the Committee members' reading. No summary is provided of the written reports and submissions received from three hundred and eight organizations, and two hundred and thirty-two individuals and groups of individuals, nor of the almost fifty dollops of oral testimony formally received. And

not a mention of SPERTTTT, the Society for the Promotion of Educational Reform Through Teacher Training that organized numerous meetings throughout Britain and put together *Dear Lord James*, receiving considerable publicity in the process.

One saving grace is the summary of the one hundred and thirty-three recommendations the James Committee makes to Mrs. Thatcher. Especially interesting is the naive plea that "there should be no implication that one route is more difficult or more prestigious than another" (p. 41), a reference to the chasm between the twenty per cent of teachers who are what Americans would call liberal arts college graduates and the rest who have attended glorified—yet sometimes very good—normal schools for three years. The B. Ed. degree that the majority can now work for will never have the same standing as a B.A. from Oxford or York, even if the education and training provided are more appropriate. One hopes that James's response to Mrs. Thatcher's second question, whether more teachers should receive some of their higher education with persons who will probably not become teachers or who have not made up their minds—one hopes that this response is acted upon and not shelved, despite the realities of the academic procession.⁵ The Committee, in brief, proposes that a Diploma in Higher Education be awarded after two years of college. This would allow the present Colleges of Education to become Liberal Arts colleges; it would allow the average student to make a career commitment two

³ Sir Eric James, *Education and the Moral Basis of Citizenship* (London: Heinemann, 1955), p. 15.

⁴ *Dear Lord James*, p. 12.

⁵ See David Riesman, *Constraint and Variety in American Education* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958), Ch. 1.

years later than he/she does now; and it would allow programs to develop whereby one institution could house under its roof persons who are headed for a variety of service and other professions.

James's committee stresses the "great weight" that should be given to teachers' "personal qualities, motivation, and experience, as well as to their formal qualifications," and we on this side of the Atlantic should heed the warning not to become locked in by certification laws (p. 28). The Report further emphasizes the need for continued personal and professional education, suggesting several ways in which this can be institutionally encouraged without teachers scrambling for credits—an educational unit of measurement still almost unknown in Britain—or salary increments or whatever.

"Every school," says James, "should regard the continued training of its teachers as an essential part of its task, for which all members of staff share responsibility," and the Committee goes on to propose that "every school should have on its staff a 'professional tutor' " whose job would be to coordinate and encourage in-service training (pp. 11, 13). But it won't happen

until the powers that be and the National Union of Teachers buy into the concept of staff development and until headmasters see themselves, as did Eric James, as teachers of teachers.

If you want to read a civilized, unexciting document concerning the arrangement of teacher training in England and Wales, this is it. If you want to get a feeling for British education at its best, then read Eric James⁶ or Sir Alec Clegg⁷ or the novelist Edward Blishen⁸ or the Plowden Report. Unfortunately—and Mrs. Thatcher's haste must take the major share of the blame—this Report doesn't get an A.

JONATHAN M. DAUBE
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⁶ *An Essay on the Content of Education* (London: Harrap, 1949) and *Education and Leadership* (London: Harrap, 1951).

⁷ *Revolution in the British Primary Schools* (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Elementary School Principals, 1971).

⁸ *Roaring Boys* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1955) and *This Right Soft Lot* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1969).

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
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
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